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This thesis is focused on the main challenges which faced the progress of the GCC
when it was established in May 1981. The core topic is the security challenges and
the bilateral boundary disputes, internal and external, as well as the steps which
resulted in the establishment of the GCC. The importance of the GCC is that the six
Arab Gulf States contain 60% of the world's total oil reserves. This study focuses on
the political and historical development of the reasons behind the establishment of
the GCC, and the main internal and external challenges, which prevented these
countries from achieving a trustful co-operation on the objectives for which the
Council was established. External security in the Arab Gulf States was and still is the
main responsibility of the West, Britain and the United States in particular. The
boundary disputes, along with the other secondary challenges, are the main obstacles
in the way of the GCC's achievements.
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Two of the core chapters
concentrate on security (internal and external), and three on boundary disputes
(internal and external and maritime). The first chapter provides a historical and
political survey of the six states of the GCC. The second concentrates on the political
developments which led to the establishment of the GCC. The third and fourth
chapters address security in the Gulf, both external and internal; the fifth, sixth and
seventh concentrate on the boundary challenges between the GCC states on one hand
and the GCC states and their neighbours (Iraq, Iran and Yemen) on the other. The
introduction of the thesis is a review of the relevant literature.
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After the Second World War, regional co-operative, economic, social, political and
military gatherings were convened across the globe and especially in the South as a
result of the common wish and characteristics of various countries and because of
their fear that an external threat might again menace their political existence.
Examples include the Arab League, the European Community , the Organisation of
African Unity and the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation.
The Gulf Co-operation Council, which incorporates six countries similar in
their political, economic and social systems, is a more recent example of such
regional organisations. Despite the factors that led to the creation of the GCC, it has
experienced many problems, especially in the security field. Nevertheless it
represents an important experiment in regional cooperation and may still lead to the
realisation of integration between the member states in the future.
The Gulf States comprise eight independent states bordered by the Arabian
(Persian) Gulf. 1 This study concentrates on the reasons behind the formation and the
challenges facing the GCC, which consists of six conservative (traditional) Arab
Gulf States (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman). The political developments of the late 1960s
and early 1970s constitute the main threats and influences on the Arab (Persian) Gulf
region. This study deals with the period between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, in
addition to giving the historical background for most of the political events and
challenges faced by these countries. This study also includes the most important
internal and external political developments.
The British withdrawal from the Gulf region resulted in the emergence of
several mini-Sheykhdoms which were not strong enough to protect their
independence. The Gulf area witnessed the emergence of two strong regional
powers, Iran (dominated by the ambitions of the Shah of Iran) and Iraq (dominated
by the ambitions of the Ba'th Party in Iraq). Among the important events which had
an impact on the Gulf during this period were the Iranian Islamic revolution, the
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the disunity and
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breakup of the Arab countries as a result of the Egyptian accord with Israel (Camp
David Agreement) and the continuation of the power struggle between the Soviets
and Americans, who were both interested and involved in the Gulf region.
Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early 1970s, the
Arab Gulf States (Sheykhdoms) have become an area of increasing importance for
security, political, and economic reasons. The existing conservative Arab states were
unable to face these challenges individually. Thus, with considerable support from
Britain and the United States, the GCC was established to deal with these challenges
and to minimise the tension in the area. The decision to establish the GCC resulted
from both external and internal factors. Following the British withdrawal, the Shah
of Iran committed his nation to protect the existing regimes in the Gulf area and
western interests there. This stability and security was short-lived, however; the Shah
was overthrown in 1978. Now there are perceived threats from Iran and Iraq. Against
this background and because of the importance of oil the Gulf region has been a
focus for policy analysts and researchers especially since 1973.
Discussion of Sources
Secondary Sources
There are numerous books and articles about the Gulf region and the GCC countries.
However, these are limited in time and subject matter, as shown by this selection of
some of the best. Derek Hopwood's volume Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics
provides useful information on the history and politics of the Gulf region, while
Husain M. Al-Baharna's The Arabian GulfStates Their Legal and Political Status
and their International Problems covers political and legal developments (especially
on boundaries) in the area. However, both were published in the early 1970s. John A.
Sandwick edited one of earliest books in English on the GCC, The GulfCooperation
Council Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World. However, it ends in
the early 1980s, and does not deal with boundaries. F. Gregory Gause Ill's recent
book published in 1994 Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the
Arab GulfStates was very useful in this study. It is of great value on political life in
1. The writer uses the term "Arabian (Persian) Gulf'
the Gulf monarchies. However, it does not explore boundary disputes. Two further
books were of particular but limited value. The first by Hassan Al-Alkim, The GCC
States in an Unstable World Foreign-Policy Dilemmas ofSmall States, is useful for
Gulf states foreign policy but it does not deal with the GCC, boundaries, or security.
The second, edited by Richard Schofield, Territorial Foundation of the GulfStates
is the most important text on boundaries, but it does not provide much information
on the history and politics of the GCC. There are also a number of secondary sources
in Arabic. These too are constrained chronologically and in subject matter. The
books by Nayif 'AIT Ubaved Majlis al-Ta'awun Li-Duwal al-Khali} al-Arabiyyah
Min al-Ta'awun ila al-Takamul and by Abdullah Bisharah Tajrubat Majlis al-
Ta 'awun al-KhalTiI Khatwah Aw- 'Aqabah Fi-Tariq al-Wahdah al- Arabivvah are of
value regarding the establishment of the GCC, but they contain very little on
boundary disputes. Two further books, the first edited by Mustafa Kamil al-Sayyid,
Hatta La-Tanshub Harb 'Arabivvah-'Arabivvah Ukhra (Min Durus Harb al-
Khalij), and the second edited by 'Abd al-Mun'Tm al-Mashshat Amn al-Khalil al-
Arabl: Dirasah fi al-Idrak Wa-al-Siyasat are confined to security issues especially
after the second GulfWar of the early 1990s. None of the books mentioned here or in
the bibliography gives the full picture on the historical and political evolution of the
GCC and its member states, and also cover security and borders disputes since the
formation of the GCC in May 1981. This thesis aims to fill this gap.
Methodology of the Study
This thesis has focused on primary sources in Arabic and English including
documents, dissertations and memoirs. It has also made use of interviews, despite
hesitation on the part of officials in the region to discuss security and other sensitive
issues with researchers from the area. I am, therefore, particularly grateful to 'Abd
al-'AzIz Al-Rawas, the Omani Minister of Information and one of the most informed
people in the region, for giving me his time. The thesis also involved an exhaustive
survey of the secondary source material in Arabic and English. In the course of my
work I made several research trips to Oman, the UAE, Cairo and Amman. Within the
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UK I consulted material in Libraries in London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Durham and
Exeter.
The aim of this Study
This thesis explores the origins and evolution of the GCC and its member states, and
evaluates its performance up to the mid-1990s by providing the historical and
political background to the formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council and by
examining the main challenges it has faced between member states and with regional
neighbours during this period.
Organisation of the Study
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first describes the geographical setting
and provides the historical political background of the six states of the Arab Gulf.
The second focuses on the importance of the process through which the GCC was
founded, as well as the main internal and external factors which underlay the
establishment of the GCC in 1981. The third and the fourth chapters analyse the
security history external and internal of the Gulf region from the early 1970s until
mid-1995 and tackle the main challenges still facing the security of the Arab Gulf
States. The remaining core chapters of this thesis concentrate on boundary disputes.
These are chapters five, six and seven, which discuss the historical and political
disputes over boundaries (onshore and offshore) between the GCC states on the one
hand and between the GCC countries and their neighbours on the other.
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Chapter One
Brief Background of the GCC States
Saudi Arabia
General Geographical Description
Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the Arabian Peninsula and is the only Arab
Gulf State which extends from the Arabian (Persian) Gulf in the east to the Red Sea
in the west, and from the Syrian Desert and the Euphrates in the north, to 'Aslr,
Najran, the Hadramaut Valley and Oman in the south and southeast. Saudi Arabia
has land boundaries with all the GCC States. In the west, the Kingdom is bordered by
the Red Sea and Jordan (452 miles; 728 km), and in the North by Iraq (502 miles;
808 km) and Kuwait (101 miles; 162 km). It also has borders with the lower Arab
Gulf states: the state of Qatar (25 miles; 40 km), the United Arab Emirates (364
miles; 586 km) and the Sultanate of Oman (420 miles, 676 km) in the East and the
Republic of Yemen (906 miles, 1,458 km) in the South. Saudi Arabia is close to a
number of African countries across the Red Sea, namely Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea. It is also close to Israel and the Gulf of 'Aqaba in the
north-west and, finally, Iran on the other shore of the Gulf. 1
The total area of Saudi Arabia is approximately 2,149,700 square kilometres
(nearly 80% of the Arabian Peninsula)2 (see map no.l). This map is, in fact, issued
by the Saudi government and the border-line with the Republic of Yemen (especially
with the ex-South Yemen) is still un-demarcated as it is in dispute. The Saudi line
resulted from the 1943 Saudi claims (for more details of this line see map p. 241)
1. Peterson, Erik. The GulfCo-operation Council, Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. Boulder,
Colorado. Westview Press, London, 1988. pp. 15-16 and The Encyclopedia of International
Boundaries, (ed.) Biger, Gideon. The Jerusalem Publishing House, Israel, 1995. Facts on File,
New York, 1995. p. 460.
2. Al-Amri, A.B.M. The Gulf Co-operation Council, Integration or Co-operation. M.Phil. Thesis.
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Chapter One
Population
The Saudi government census of 1992 estimated the Kingdom's population at 16.9
million including 12,304,835 Saudi citizens and 4,624,459 non-Saudis. However
many Western writers do not agree with the Saudi government census and estimate
the Saudi population at between five and seven million. It is hard to find two
references which agree on the precise level of the Saudi population.3
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is divided into four major areas:
a) The West, the area of the Hijaz, which contains the two holy cities of Islam,
Mecca and al-Madinah al-Munawwarah. The population of these cities is mixed and
indeed multi-racial.
b) The South West which includes Najran and 'Aslr. This is the most densely
populated part of Saudi Arabia.4
c) The Eastern province (Al-Hasa, Al-Qatif, Dhahran, Dammam) which is the most
important oil-producing area. Nearly all the Saudi Shi'a population is found in this
area. There is no exact figure for the number of the Saudi Shi'a population, but it is
estimated at 500,000.
d) The Centre which is inhabited by the Najdi tribes and is the birthplace of the
WahhabI (or Muwahhidun) reform movement founded in the 18th century by
Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab. This movement contains the main supporters of the
royal family of Al-Sa'ud and they continue to swell the ranks of both the regular
Sa'udi Army and the National Guard. The area of Najd contains the Sa'udi capital
Riyadh, which is also the home of the GCC Secretariats
3. Secretariat of G C.C. Economic Bulletin. Vol. 8. Department of Information of the GCC, Riyadh,
1993. p. 189. Also See Al-Havat Newspaper. 13 May 1993. London, p. 1.
4. Shata, Hashim A. A Study of the Security Relations Between the States of the Gulf Co-operation
Council. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Keele, 1990. p. 59.
5. Meri Report. Saudi Arabia Middle East Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. Croom




Since 1992 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been divided into a new system of
districts which divides the country into 13 provinces (imarat, singular-zmara/z) which
are, in turn, subdivided into districts and sub-districts. Each province (imarah) is
administered by a governor-general (Amir) from the Al-Sa'ud family; each district is
ruled by a governor and each sub-district is governed by a headman. The new
administrative divisions of 1992 have allowed the people to form provincial local
councils whose members are elected by the local Saudis and which are dominated by
tribal chiefs and merchants.6
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is considered to be the largest oil-exporting
country in the world and has the largest proven oil reserves. The first oil concession
was granted in 1933 and Saudi oil began to flow in large quantities in the early
1950s. By the early 1970s the Saudi oil output had reached eight million barrels a
day, with the capacity to rise to twenty million, compared to Iraq's two million and
Kuwait's three million.7
Historical Background
The modern Saudi state has never been subjected to any foreign rule or direct
control. The only time, in recent history, when central Arabia was under foreign
domination was in 1818, when Turkish-Egyptian troops under Ibrahim Pasha, the
son of Muhammad 'All of Egypt, occupied the heart of Arabia. They destroyed the
Sa'udi (Wahhabi) state and captured the capital at Dir'Iyyah in Najd.8 The history of
Saudi Arabia dates back to the 18th century and can be divided into three phases.
6. Katzman, Kenneth "The Gulf Monarchies Open Up How Stable Are Saudi Arabia and Kuwait?
Middle East Quarterly. Vol.l:No.3, September 1994. Washington, p. 22.
7. The Economist Intelligence Unit. " Saudi Arabia, Country Profile 1991-92" London, p. 5.
8. Meri Report, op.cit. pp. 4-5.
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-————— Chapter One
The First Saudi State
The first phase began in the year 1744, with the alliance between Muhammad b.
'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), the founder of the Muwahhiddun reform movement
(which is known to western writers as Wahhabism, and Muhammad b. Sa'ud, the
son of the founder of the Sa'udi Dynasty and the ruler of a small district which
surrounds the town of al-Dir'iyyah in Najd in central Arabia. The movement of
Shaykh Muhammad b.'Abd al-Wahhab was the main means by which Muhammad
b. Sa'ud was able to extend his authority over the tribes of Najd. This movement,
which is known in Arabia as al-Da'wah ila al-Tawhld (the call to the doctrine of the
oneness of God), called for a return to the original principles of Islam and the
repudiation of all innovations contrary to the practice of the Prophet Muhammad and
the early generation of pious Muslims. As a result of popular appeal and military
force, the resulting movement gradually spread.
Between 1801 and 1806 the followers of the movement launched attacks and
raids in many areas of Iraq (especially against the Shi'a Shrines in Karbala), and
against the Turks in Mecca and al-Madinah.9 The first Saudi State was destroyed by
Egyptian-Turkish troops during the era of 'Abdullah b. Sa'ud, the fourth ruler of the
first Saudi state. The forces of Muhammad 'All Pasha of Egypt brought the Sa'udi
state to an end and remained in the area of Najd until 1840 when his empire
collapsed and he could not defend Arabia against the western imperialist countries
such as Britain and France. 10
The Second Saudi State
The second Sa'udi state was founded in 1834 when Turk! b.'Abdullah b. Muhammad
b. Sa'ud nominally recognised the suzerainty of the Ottoman empire. Turkl's
accession marked a change in the ruling branch of the royal family. The previous
9. Rentz, George. " Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia" in: Hopwood, Derek (ed.) The Arabian Peninsula
Society and Politics. George Allen and Unwin ltd, London, 1972, p.p. 54-55. And also see
Winder, Bayly R. Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. Macmillan, London. 1965. p. 6.
10. Rentz, George, op.cit. p. 61.
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Imams had all been descendants of 'Abd al-Aziz b. Muhammad b. Sa'ud, whereas
TurkI and the succeeding rulers, including the present ruler King Fahd, who is
Turkl's great-great grandson, all descend from a different line. Faisal b. TurkI
succeeded to power after his father's assassination in 1834. During his long reign
(1834-1838, 1843-1865), Faisal faced many challenges and threats from the Egyptian
military in the Hijaz after he returned from Cairo (where he had been held captive by
Muhammad 'All Pasha since 1838) and was also challenged by the other emirates in
Najd which were supported by Turkish troops. 11 In two decades the stability and the
tribal cohesion which had been built up during Faisal's reign was destroyed by civil
wars between two of Faisal's sons, 'Abdullah (1865-71 and 1875-89) and 'Abd al-
Rahman. In 1871 Saud, another son of Faisal, came to power, although this brought
anarchy in the whole ofArabia.
The Ottoman Turks, who had repossessed the area of Hijaz after the death of
Muhammad 'All in 1844, captured al-Hasa and imprisoned 'Abdullah. At the time of
Sa'ud's death in 1875 'Abd al-Rahman (1875 and 1889-91), the younger brother of
Sa'ud and 'Abdullah, announced his accession. 'Abdullah regained power after one
year and ruled until his death in 1889, when 'Abd al-Rahman once again assumed
leadership. 'Abd al-Rahman, after ruling briefly from 1889-1891, was defeated when
the ruler of the Shammar tribes (who had based his capital at Ha'il) drove him from
Riyadh and destroyed the second Saudi state. 12
The Third Saudi State
The third phase of the House of Sa'ud's history began in 1902, when 'Abd al-'Aziz
b. 'Abd al-Rahman, better known as Ibn Sa'ud, returned from exile in Kuwait and
recaptured Riyadh. He then created the Ikhwan (brothers) and adopted a more
11. Troller, Gary. The Birth ofSaudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House ofSaud. Frank Cass,
London, 1976. p. 15.
12. Carter, Laraine Newhouse. "Historical Setting" in: Nyrop, Richard, (ed.) Saudi Arabia A




ambitious programme. He encouraged the Bedouin to found hundreds of hujayrat
(new towns). These were a combination of military cantonments, agricultural
colonies and missionary centres for the propagation of the WahhabI movement. The
settlers called themselves Ikhwan. 13
By 1912 Ibn Saud had gathered more than 11,000 members of the Najdi tribes
into the forces of the Ikhwan. Tribalism and Islam were to play a central part in the
building of the third Saudi state and they were exploited by Ibn Sa'ud during his long
reign which extended from 1902 until 1953. From late 1917 until 1930 the Ikhwan
movement played a significant role in spreading and extending the authority of Ibn
Sa'ud in the Arabian Peninsula.
In 1913 Ibn Sa'ud captured al-Hasa (the Eastern province) from the Turks and
with the strong support of the Ikhwan, he extended his authority in 1921 to the north¬
west when he seized the capital of the Al-Rashid family, the old enemies of Al-
Sa'ud. However, by the end of the 1920s, the power of the Ikhwan movement in
Arabia was beginning to pose a strong challenge to Ibn Sa'ud's ambitions. The
leaders of the movement became a source of embarrassment rather than of support.
The crushing of the Ikhwan was the first essential step in asserting the primacy of the
Al-Sa'ud family over the religious institutions in Saudi political life. 14
Between 1924 and 1925, the forces of Ibn Sa'ud were able to reach many areas
in the south-west and occupied the southern parts of Arabia. Princes Saud and Faisal,
the two sons of Ibn Sa'ud, were able to capture many areas such as Tihama, 'Aslr
and Najran and penetrated right to the heart of the Yemeni area of Hudeida. Britain,
during the First World War, recognised the authority of Ibn Sa'ud in order to gain his
support in their war against the Turks and paid him £5,000 to induce him not to
attack westwards. However Ibn Sa'ud, after the end of the Great War, came into
conflict with Sherif Hussein of Mecca. This arose inter alia when Sherif Hussein
declared himself to be the King of the Arabs and when he assumed for himself in
13. Rentz, George, op.cit. p. 64.
14. Gregory Gause III, F. Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab GulfStates.
Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1995. p. 13.
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1924, the title of Khalfah of the Islamic people, three days after Atatiirk had
abolished the Khilafah in Turkey. 15 The struggle between Ibn Sa'ud and the Sherif
of Mecca over the control of the Arabian Peninsula came to an end when the Saudis
succeeded, in 1926, in driving the Hashimites out of the Hijaz. Ibn Sa'ud, later in the
same year, declared himself King of the Hijaz and Sultan ofNajd and, six years later,
in 1932, he announced himself to be King of the whole country, which would
henceforth be known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In May 1933 Sa'ud, the oldest
son of 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, was appointed Heir Apparent.
The 1964 Coup of Faisal
The reign of King Sa'ud, which lasted from 1953 to 1964, is considered the most
critical era of conflict in the history of Al-Sa'ud. The Egyptian revolution of 1952
played a significant role in the political developments in Arabia. The first part of
King Sa'ud's policy saw him form an alliance with Egypt and Syria in a joint
command opposing the Baghdad Pact of 1955. He also supported Egypt during the
Suez crisis of 1956. During the early 1960s a serious dispute arose between King
Saud and his brother, the Heir Apparent Prince Faisal, and many Princes were exiled
to Cairo. The Free Princes movement of Talal, Badr, Fawwaz and his other cousins
posed a real threat to the Saudi royal family, as they had strong support from 'Abd
al-Nasser. The aim of the Princes Movement was to bring about the creation of a
constitutional democracy within a monarchical framework in Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, at the same time, several Saudi officers escaped to Egypt with their
aircraft. Moreover, in June and September of 1969, two unsuccessful coups were
attempted in Saudi Arabia. 16 During the early 1960s the dispute between King Sa'ud
and Faisal over Saudi internal and external policy intensified, especially after the
15. Kelidar, A.R. "The Arabian Peninsula in Arab and power Politics" in: Hopwood, Derek, (ed.)
The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1972, pp.
146-147.
16. Henderson, Simon. After King Fahd Succession In Saudi Arabia. The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, Washington, D.C. Second Edition, 1995. pp. 10-11. See also. Cordesman,
Anthony. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in
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outbreak of the North Yemen revolution of 1962. Egyptian troops became involved
by giving strong support to the republicans against the monarchists who were
supported by Saudi Arabia. In March 1964 Prince Faisal, with the support of the
Saudi royal family, the 'Ulama'and the Judges, who had issued a fatwa, attempted to
transfer the power to himself. King Sa'ud rejected the fatwa, and made many
attempts with his Royal Guard to regain power, but he was in no position to protect
himself. King Sa'ud later described the 1964 Coup as follows:
"When I tried to cancel the military agreement of 1951 between Saudi
Arabia and the United States, the Americans made arrangements for removing
me from Saudi Arabia. 1 was relying in the first place on the loyalty of the Royal
Guard and the loyalty ofthe tribes. The Commander of the Royal Guard came to
me and said: Sir, American planes are flying over our barracks; ifwe ever try to
resist we will be in an impossible situation because the planes will wipe out the
barracks and all therein. 17
In 1964 King Faisal assumed power in Saudi Arabia, after his brother had been
compelled to abdicate. Sa'ud went to Egypt to join his brothers there, hoping that the
Egyptian President 'Abd al-Nasser would support him. King Faisal's rule was an
important period. Internally the country witnessed more modernisation with the
boom in the oil industry. The first act he undertook was to finally abolish slavery in
Saudi Arabia. Externally his containment of Arab Nationalism and Communism
played a significant role in American policy in the Middle East. The main challenge
facing King Faisal during his reign was the civil war in North Yemen, in which the
Republican side was supported by Egyptian troops and the Royalists were backed by
Saudi Arabia and the United States. Saudi Arabia and Egypt did not really begin to
improve their relations until after the death of 'Abd al-Nasser in 1970. The other
important challenge which faced King Faisal was the conflict over al-Buraimi (for
more details see chapter 5). In the later years of his reign King Faisal took many
decisions to support Arab and Islamic causes, especially during the war of 1973
between the Arabs and Israel, when he threatened to suspend oil exports to some of
the Gulf and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado
and Mansell Publishing, London, p. 110.
17. Al-Jabha al-Sha'biyyah Li-TahrJr al-Bahrayn. Al-sira' 'ala al-Khallj al-'Arabl Dirasah
Iqtisadiyyah Siyasiyyah Li-Mashru'al-Amn al-Khaliji. Dar al-Tali'ah, Beirut, 1978. p. 96.
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the Western countries for a short time. The reign of King Faisal came to an abrupt
end in March 1975, when he was assassinated by his nephew Faisal b. Musa'id.18
The Reigns of King Khalid and Fahd
Crown Prince Khalid, following the assassination, immediately succeeded to the
throne and received the bay 'ah (formal pledges of support) from the Royal family,
the 'Ulama and the tribal leaders within the traditional three days. Fahd, the Interior
Minister, was named the Crown Prince. King Khalid's style of leadership was very
different from that of Faisal and he adopted a more liberal policy in terms of
informing the press of the rationale behind foreign policy decisions. The most
important events during the reign of King Khalid were his early state visits to all the
Arab Gulf States, which laid the foundation for the establishment of the Gulf Co¬
operation Council. During the reign of King Khalid, which lasted from 1975 to 1982,
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faced many internal and external threats, such as the
Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979 and the Shi'a riots in al-
Hasa in the Eastern Province. The main external threat was the outbreak of the
Iranian Islamic Revolution and the fall of the Shah of Iran, the main ally of the Saudi
regime according to the United States doctrine of the Twin Pillars. 19
In spite of his seven years control of Saudi Arabia, King Khalid was not
interested in politics and his health was not good. Flowever, he was supported by his
brother Crown Prince Fahd who took a major role in day-to-day decision-making.
Fahd b. 'Abd al-'AzIz (the present King), succeeded to power after the death of King
Khalid in 1982.20 The beginning of Fahd's reign coincided with the strengthening
and expansion of Saudi Arabia's strategic alliance with the United States. This
Sa'udi alliance came as a result of many events and direct threats to the Kingdom's
security, which were caused by the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq
18. Al-Ajmi, Hamza Jassim. The International History of the Gulf. 1958-1979. Ph.D. Thesis,
University of Glasgow, 1988. p. 192.
19. Carter, Laraine Newhouse. "Historical Setting" op.cit. pp. 44-45.
20. Al-Ajmi, Hamza Jassim. op.cit. p. 14.
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war (which lasted eight years), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. The most important internal progress came in 1992 when King
Fahd issued many decrees for the establishment of the Shura Council, the Basic
System ofRule and the new system of administrative divisions and districts.21
Saudi political leadership is dominated by the royal family of the House of 'Al-
Sa'ud. No reference work knows exactly how large it is, but it is estimated at 5,000
persons. The King is the head of the family as well as the chief of state and head of
the government. The family of Al-Sa'ud have continued to dominate the political,
economic and military sectors. During recent years a number of the second
generation of Princes (grandsons of 'Abd al-'AzTz) have begun to enter public life,
like Saud al-Faisal, the Foreign Minister, his brother Turk! al-Faisal, the Intelligence
Chief, and Bandar b.Sultan the Saudi ambassador to the United States.22 Politically,
the sons of 'Abd al-'AzIz were the prominent group in the government, but the new
system, instituted by King Fahd in 1992, changed the previous system of government
and provided for the establishment of a new procedure for the royal succession
among the grandsons ofKing 'Abd al-'Aziz.23 (see chapter no. 4)
The military sector in Saudi Arabia has not played a significant role in politics.
The Saudi military is not able to protect the Kingdom against any strong external
threat, such as that posed by Iraq before 1990, or Israel and Iran. This is in part due
to the fact that the royal family has kept both forces, the military forces and the
National Guard, small, since it is well known that many third-world regimes are
overthrown by their own armed forces.24 The active armed forces were estimated, in
1990, at 65,700 and the National Guard, which reports to Crown Prince 'Abdullah,
was estimated at 35,000.25
21. Al-Rayyis, Riyad Najib. Riyah al-Sumum, al-Sa'udiyyah wa-Duwal al-Jazirah Ba'd Harb al-
Khaljj. 1991-1994. Riyad Al-Rayyis Books, London, 1994. p. 157.
22. Meri Report, op.cit. p. 14.
23. Butt, Gerald. "Saudi Arabia: A tentative step forward" . Middle East International. 6 March 1992.
London, p. 13.
24. Meri Report, op.cit. pp. 6-7.
25. The Economist Intelligence Unit, op.cit. p. 6.
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Democracy and Constitutional Movements
Constitutional Developments
The history of the House of Al-Sa'ud is not renowned for democratic or
constitutional processes. In 1926 King 'Abd al-'Aziz, the founder of the current
Saudi state, established a small, un-elected Consultative Council {Majlis al-Shura) in
the Hijaz area which ran for three years. After the establishment of the Saudi state in
1932, King 'Abd al-'Aziz established a kind of consultative assembly to reconcile
the leaders and chiefs of some of the opposing tribes, who had refused to join him.
This legislative body lasted for a short time and was then dissolved, when King 'Abd
al-'Aziz spread his authority over the Arabian Peninsula.26
Both King Sa'ud and King Faisal refused to set up any kind of consultative
body. During the 1960s many Saudi princes, especially prince Talal, called for a
constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia, but King Faisal rejected the idea, being
afraid of any public participation in his government.
King Fahd's Reforms
After the conclusion of the Mecca incident of 1979 (for more details see Chapter 2)
and the riots of the Shi'a in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, Crown prince Fahd
(the present King) promised the Saudi people that a parliament would be established
within the year. After a long period of waiting and many promises and, in the wake
of several crises facing the Kingdom, King Fahd issued a decree in March 1992
granting the Kingdom a Constitution (Basic Law), Al- Shura Council and a system
of districts.27 A few months later, in August 1993, the King appointed a cabinet and
26. See. Katzman, Kenneth "The Gulf Monarchies Open Up, How Stable Are Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait?" pp. 21-22. See also. Middle East Quarterly, op.cit. pp. 21-22.
27. The Saudi Basic Law is divided into five main chapters: Systems of Government (monarchy);
Features of the Saudi family, Economic Principles, Rights and Duties; The Authorities of the
State; and Financial Affairs. The Saudi Basic Law came as a result of the direct demands and
petitions from the Saudi 'Ulama' and educated people and under pressure from Western
governments, especially the US. See The Economist Intelligence Unit " Saudi Arabia Country
Profile 1996-97". p. 5.
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named the members of the Shura Council. The powers of the Shura Council turned
out to be limited to expressing its opinion in respect to the general policies of the
state referred to it by the Prime Minister (i.e. the King). However, it had no right to
discuss whatever was not referred to it by the Prime Minister, general development,
economic, and social plans and to study and interpret the regulations rules,
international treaties and agreements as well as concessions. The Shura Council also
had the right to summon any government minister to stand before it during its
discussions on matters that fall within its jurisdiction. Meetings of committees are
held in private. The Council has no power to legislate without referring to the
Cabinet and no member of the Shura Council may speak about any subject for longer
than ten minutes during discussions. According to the new Cabinet regulations, the
Cabinet's term of office lasts for four years, but the term of office of any minister
may be extended by a royal decree. In his organisational decrees, King Fahd has
emphasised that the Cabinet, which he chairs, has the exclusive right to lay down
foreign, internal, defence, financial, economic, and educational policies and all
public affairs of state as well as being able to supervise their implementation. It is to
the Cabinet that the Shura Council's decisions are referred for consideration. If the
views of the two bodies coincide then the King issues his approval. If they differ then
the King is entitled to endorse whichever he sees fit.28
At the present time the government and leadership in Saudi Arabia are an elite
consisting of four groups: Firstly, there are the members of the royal family,
secondly, the Sheykhs of large tribal federations and the descendants of princely
families, thirdly, the religious leaders and finally, the bureaucratic elite.29
Political Opposition
There are no political parties in Saudi Arabia and no criticism of the royal family of
Al-Sa'ud is tolerated. The history of political opposition in Saudi Arabia dates from
28. Al-Reyyis, Riyad N. op.cit. pp. 157-158. See also. The Economist Intelligence Unit" Saudi
Arabia Country Profile 1996-97" op.cit. p. 6. See also The French News Agency 6 July 1997, and
The Omani News Asencv. 6 July 1997.
29. Shararah, Wadah. The Family and the Loot, Political Principles in Saudi Arabia. Al-Inma
Publication. Beirut, 1981, p. 39.
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the movement of the Ikhwan at the end of the twenties, but King 'Abd al-'Aziz, with
the support of Britain, crushed the movement by arresting its leaders. There were
also two small opposition movements which appeared during the 1960s. One of these
was led by a group from the royal family and called for a constitutional monarchy
and was supported by the Egyptian leader Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser. The other
opposition group was led by many Nationalists during the 1960s and 1970s and
advocated radical change and a regionally-based government, rejecting the term
Saudi as being the name of just one tribe or family. These groups included the Hijaz
Union of the People of the Peninsula, the Revolutionary Najd Party and the Union of
the People's Front for Liberation of Arabian Peninsula. Most of these groups were
supported by Egypt during the period ofNasser.
During the early 1970s many Saudi students in the United States set up an
opposition movement called the Voice of the Vanguard.30 After the second Gulf
War, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia witnessed the emergence of real internal
opposition groups. The most important and the strongest group, the appearance of
which challenged the Saudi royal family, came from many lUlama'from the Sunni
(WahhabT) sect. During 1991 over 400 members of the ' Ulama along with Islamic
activists sent a petition to the King in an attempt to counter the other Saudi
opposition group of intellectuals and the Western-educated elite who sought to
persuade King Fahd to introduce democratic changes in Saudi Arabia.31 The Islamic
group's "Memorandum of advice" to King Fahd consisted of many demands for
Islamic rights concerning the basic practice of the Saudi government. The occasion
of the Gulf crisis led some of the elements in the Islamic movement in Saudi Arabia
to speak against the government in the universities and mosques and to criticise its
un-Islamic policies, the presence of American troops, and Saudi relations with the
30. Meri Report, op.cit. p. 19.
31. During late 1990, forty-three Saudis identified as "liberal" or "secularists" sent a petition to King
Fahd explicitly calling for the maintenance of the existing regime and the "noble ruling family"
praised the King's openness and devotion to the people, and strongly supported his decision to
establish a Consultative Assembly. Middle East Journal, op.cit. p. 11.
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United States.32 In the early 1990s, the voice of the Saudi opposition was heard more
openly from many Western capitals, especially from London.
The Shi'a activities constituted the main outspoken media criticism of the
Saudi royal family and they launched a campaign of publications against Saudi
discrimination. This was with strong support from Iran. During 1993, the Saudi
government quietly moved for a conciliation with the leaders of the Shi'a and invited
the opposition Shi'a group to return to Saudi Arabia, promising an end to some of the
areas of economic discrimination as well as the release of all Shi'a political
prisoners. Since the late 1970s, the activities of the Shi'a people in Saudi Arabia
have become more intensive against the Saudi authorities, especially in their home
area of the Eastern Province, where numerous oil and gas deposits are located.33
The other voice of opposition, which has become internationally famous, rose
from the activity of many Saudis in London, especially the Committee for the
Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR),34 which still operates in exile, and has been
headed by Muhammad al-Mas'arl since 1994. He won his appeal to remain in
Britain, after the decision of the British government, who had been under Saudi
pressure to exile him from Britain. 35
32. Gregory Gause III, F. op.cit. p. 34.
33. Whitley, Andrew. "Minorities and the Stateless in Persian Gulf Politics" Survival. Vol. 35, No.4,
Winter 1993. p. 42.
34. The CDLR organisation was founded in 1993 by a group of Saudi notables to act as an
independent human rights commission and enforce what the founders saw as declining Islamic
standards in the wake of the second Gulf War. See. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and
Political Stability in the Gulf'. Arab Studies Quarterly. Vol. 17. No. 4. 1995. The Association of
Arab-American University Graduates and Institute of Arab Studies, p. 65.
35. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Saudi Arabia Country Report" 2nd quarter 1995". p. 9.
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The State Of Kuwait
General Geographical Description
The State of Kuwait occupies the north-western corner of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.
It borders with the Republic of Iraq in the north with a total land boundary of 149
miles (240 km) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the south with a total land
boundary of 138 miles ( 222 km). In the east it is bordered by the waters of the Gulf
(121 miles (195 km) (see map No.2). It has a total area of 17,818 square kilometres,
a little smaller than the state ofNew Jersey. The state of Kuwait is divided into five
administrative areas {Muhafazat), al-Ahmadl, al-Jahrah, al-Kuwait (capital), Hawaii
and al-Farwaniyah.
Population
The estimated population of Kuwait according to the Gulf Co-operation Council's
Economic Bulletin in 1993, was 500,083 (citizens).36 Oil lifted Kuwaiti society out
of its traditional economic environment of hunting, pearl-diving and limited trade.
The entire way of life of Kuwaitis changed in a very brief period of time. While in
1946 Kuwait's income from oil did not exceed $760,000, by 1971 it had risen to
$963 million, and by 1977 to $8.9 billion. It is within this context of rapid economic
development that new social forces emerged in Kuwait. Under the new welfare state,
the number of Kuwaiti citizens tripled between 1957 and 1975, from 113,622 to
470,123. By 1994, the total number of Kuwaiti citizens had reached 669,000, while
the number of non-Kuwaiti residents was 1.1 million including the biduns (stateless
persons) estimated at 150,000. During the period of the oil boom (1975-1981) the
Kuwaiti population had one of the highest growth rates in the world, with a Gross
National Product of $17,000 per capita.37
36. Crystall, Jill. "Kuwait" in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Persian GulfStates Country Studies. U.S.
government Printing Office. Washington. D.C. Third Edition. 1994. pp. 47-48. See also. The
Secretariat of the G.C.C. Economic Bulletin. Vol. 8. Department of Information of the GCC,
Riyadh, 1993. p. 189 and the Encyclopedia ofInternational Boundaries, op.cit. p. 344.
37. Amin, S.H. Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf. Royston Limited.





Kuwaiti political history goes back to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, when many tribes of the Ban! 'Utub of the 'Aniza federation migrated from
central Arabia and settled near the point of Ras 'Ajuza on the southern shore of the
Kuwait Bay. The name of Kuwait is a diminutive of 'kut' meaning a small fortress.
The area was also known by many European travelers as "Qurayn", which is in turn
a diminutive of the Arabic 'Qarn' meaning a small hill. The heads of the three
principal tribes of Al-Jalahimah, Al-Khalifah (the family which now rule Bahrain)
and Al-Sabah agreed to appoint the head of Al-Sabah as the dominant person in
political affairs and, subject to consultation, the head of Al-Khallfah to be dominant
in commercial affairs and the Jalahimah in maritime affairs. A dispute over
leadership resulted in the deportation of Al-Khallfah to their original home in central
Arabia near the Qatar Peninsula in 1677.
Sheykh Sabah b. Jaber, the founder of the Al-Sabah dynasty in Kuwait, ruled
the Kuwaiti tribal federation from 1750 until his death in 1762.38 'Abdullah
succeeded to the leadership after his father's death. After the long rule of Sheykh
'Abdullah, which lasted 53 years from 1762 to 1815, the small Sheykhdom of
Kuwait faced certain difficulties of a political and economic nature from Britain, as
well as attacks of the Saudis (Wahhabis), the Ottomans and the Persians on the
eastern shore of the Gulf. Relations between the Sheykhdom of Kuwait and Britain,
which have been recorded since 1755, played a significant role in protecting the
authority of the Al-Sabah family against any external attacks, especially Ikhwan
the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change", Middle East Journal. Vol. 51. No.3. Summer, 1997,
pp. 359-360.
38. Crystall, Jill. Oil and Politics in the Gulf Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1990. p. 22. Also see Abu- Hakima, Ahmed M. "The development
of the Gulf States" in: Hopwood, Derek (ed.) The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics.
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1972. p. 32.
17
_ Chapter One
attacks from the Arabian Peninsula.39 British government interests became more
important since Kuwait had the best natural harbour in the Gulf and her location
allowed her to benefit from the caravan trade to Aleppo and Baghdad from the Shatt
el-Arab and the smuggling trade into Ottoman territories. The Ottoman influence
over Kuwait became stronger during the reign of 'Abdullah Al-Sabah II, who ruled
from 1866 to 1892.
However, the critical era in Kuwait's modern history, when Kuwait came more
closely under the British sphere of influence, came at the end of the nineteenth
century, when Sheykh Mubarak (the Great) (1896-1915) sought British support
against the Ottoman authorities in Basrah and al-Hasa after he murdered his two
brothers (Muhammad and Jarrah) who were pro-Ottoman. He concluded and signed
a secret agreement of protection with the British government in 1899. The agreement
provided that the British government would protect the Sheykhdom of Kuwait
against any internal or external threats on condition that the Sheykh of Kuwait would
not have any direct relations with any other foreign power, and would not sell, lease
or cede land to any such power. This agreement remained the main element in the
relationship between Britain and Kuwait until the announcement of the independence
ofKuwait in 1961.
After Mubarak's death, Kuwait was ruled by two of his sons, Jabir (1915-17)
and Salim (1917-21) and, up until the present time, the Amir has traditionally been
chosen from the descendants of these two branches which are known as Al-Jabir and
Al-Salim. After Salim's death, the Sheikhdom of Kuwait was ruled by Ahmad Al-
Jabir for nearly three decades (1921-50); during this period oil was discovered (in
1938) and its large-scale exploitation began soon after 1945, transforming Kuwait
City from a small fishing port into a thriving commercial centre.40 In 1950 Ahmad
Al-Jabir was succeeded by his cousin 'Abdullah Al-Salim.
The reign of 'Abdullah (1950 to 1965) saw a number of crises in the history of
Kuwait. The most important event was when Kuwait's independence was announced
39. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. op.cit. pp. 33-34.
40. Crystall, Jill. "Kuwait" op.cit. pp. 74-75. Also see Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. op.cit. 36.
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in June 1961. The Iraqi leader, 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, declared his rejection of
Kuwaiti independence and claimed that Kuwait was part of the old Ottoman Sanjaq
of Basra. During early 1963, Iraqi troops moved near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border in an
attempt to occupy some Kuwaiti territory, but British troops, which had landed in
Kuwaiti territory with the support of Arab League forces, maintained the
Sheikhdom's independence and prevented the Iraqi troops from invading.41 The
independent Kuwaiti state was not accepted as a full member of the United Nations
during 1961, because of the Iraqi claim which received support from the Soviet
Union who then vetoed the independence of Kuwait. Moscow's veto was not
withdrawn until the new government in Iraq recognised the Sheykhdom's
independence (for more details see Chapter 6).42
From 1965 onwards the state of Kuwait was ruled by Sheykh Sabah al-Salim,
who was succeeded by his brother. This choice was unusual, since it broke the
alternation between the two branches ofAl-Jabir and Al-Salim, the sons ofMubarak.
The reign of Sabah continued until his death from a heart attack in 1977. The reign
of Sabah saw many changes in every aspect of education, health ,and transport.
Various Iraqi regimes were considered the major external and internal threat due to
the presence of thousands of Iraqi workers in Kuwait. Sheykh Jabir, the present ruler
(Amir) succeeded his cousin Sabah in 1977.
The influence of external and internal events dominated the political scene and
posed a real direct threat to the stability of Kuwait. The most serious external threats
were the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted eight years, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990 which, for the first time in Kuwait's history, placed the state under
direct foreign rule until its liberation in February 1991. The other internal threat was
the conflict between the royal family and some members (Nationalist and Islamic) of
the Kuwaiti National Assembly, which resulted in the assembly being suspended
twice in 1976 and 1986. The tensions in Kuwaiti society, between Sunni and Shi'a,
41. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Kuwait Country Profile 1992-93" London, 1991-92. p. 3.
42. Al-Baharna, Hussein M. The Arabian GulfStates Their Legal and Political Status and Their




resulted in the bombing of the United States Embassy, the Air France office and the
attempted assassination of Sheykh Jabir in 1985 (for more details see Chapter 4).43
Political System
The Constitutional Background
The political system of the state of Kuwait is a hereditary constitutional monarchy.
Kuwait has had the most extensive past experience of open political life in any of the
Arab Gulf states. The historical record of the consultative political process in Kuwait
dates back to 1921 when Sheykh Ahmad Al-Jabir established a consultative council
of twelve representatives of the most powerful families in Kuwait and the main
merchants.44 Flowever, the council's disputes with the Al-Sabah family led to its
being reduced to six members, which included two from Al-Sabah. In 1930, as a
result of the dissolving of the 1921 consultative council, the Sheykh of Kuwait
established a Municipal Council consisting of twelve elected members. Two years
later the ruler created another council for education when he dissolved the former
council.45
During 1938 there arose serious opposition to the rule of Sheykh Ahmed Al-
Jabir, who exercised power under the name of the royal family of Al-Sabah. The
Movement of 1938, which consisted of the main merchant families in Kuwait,
created a real challenge and the tension escalated into a crisis. The complex
relationship between the ruling family and the old established merchant families
resulted in the movement's leaders demanding British protection. Some of them also
43. Crystall, Jill " Kuwait" op.cit. pp. 77-78.
44. Before the discovery of oil in Kuwait the relationship between the ruling family and the old
merchant families was that of equals in the Kuwaiti oligarchy. After the development of oil, there
was an unwritten social compact whereby the Al-Sabah were allowed to remain politically pre¬
eminent as long as the oil wealth was distributed among the merchant families. See. The
Economist Intelligence Unit. "Kuwait Country Profile 1996-97" London, p. 6.
45. Peterson, J.E. The Arab Gulf States Steps Toward Political Participation. The Washington
Papers. Praeger, New York, 1988. pp. 28-29.
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fled to Iraq and established a National Bloc against the political system in Kuwait.46
Under British pressure the ruler of Kuwait responded to petitions from the leaders of
the movement and agreed to the formation of a council. A committee formed a list of
eligible voters from 150 Kuwaiti families, who elected a 14 -person council {Majlis
al-Ummah al-Tashri'i)chaired by the heir-apparent 'Abdullah Al-Salim.47 When the
state of Kuwait became independent in June 1961, the agreement of 1899 and the
British protection of the Sheykhdom came to an end. The members of the royal
family of Al-Sabah as a result of Iraqi threats, entered into serious negotiations with
the leading Kuwaiti merchants and tribes in order to create an elected constituent
assembly.
Majlis Al-Ummah
The first elections to the National Assembly were held in January 1963, with 205
candidates returning five members from each of ten districts.48 Subsequent elections
were held in 1967, 1971 and 1975 and, in 1976, the National Assembly was
suspended due to a conflict between the royal family and the opposition groups on
the one hand and the opposition members of the assembly on the other. The Prime
Minister Jabir Al-Ahmad (the present ruler) resigned on August 29 1976 and
dissolved the National Assembly and placed restrictions on the press on the same
day.
The second suspension of the Kuwaiti National Assembly took place in July
1986. This suspension came about as real internal and external threats faced the
stability of Kuwait. Examples of this are terrorist activities and bombings in Kuwait,
the conflict between the government and the opposition groups and the effects of the
Iran-Iraq war, which had become a direct threat to Kuwaiti security and stability,
especially as Iran had begun to make progress in the war. The third suspension of the
46. Crystall, Jill. "Kuwait" op.cit. p. 75. See also Ghabra, Shafeeq "Kuwait and the Dynamics of
Socio-Economic Change" Middle East Journal. Vol.51. No.3. op.cit. pp. 361-362.
47. Peterson, J. E. op.cit. p. 30.
48. Meri Report, op.cit. p. 7. See also. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability" Arab
Studies Quarterly. Vol. 17. No.4. 1995. The Association of Arab-American University Graduates
and the Institute of Arab Studies, U.S.A. 1995, p. 64.
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Kuwaiti National Assembly came as a result of the Iraqi invasion in August 1990.
However, political life was restored in October 1992. As mentioned above the
election system the electorate is limited to the adult males who can trace their
ancestry back to 1920.49 The State of Kuwait is the only country in the GCC which
has a different ruling system. Kuwait is a constitutional monarchy and the main
positions of power in the political leadership are held by the Amir assisted by the
Crown Prince (Prime Minister), the members of the government and the elected
National Assembly (.Majlis al-Ummah). There is an independent judiciary which
constitutes the third branch of the government.
There are no parties allowed, but there are three principal opposition
groupings. The first group is an alliance of secular politicians who espouse varying
degrees of commitment to pluralistic principles, and who are generally referred to as
Arab Nationalists (Nasserists, Bd thists and Haraklyyin). The principal organisation
of this group is the Kuwaiti Democratic Forum. The other two opposition groupings
are centered on two Sunni groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafiyya who
are the majority, and the minority of Shi'a who have support from Iran.50
49. Peterson, J.E. op.cit. pp. 37-47.
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The State of Qatar
General Geographical Description
The state of Qatar is a small country situated half-way along the eastern coast of the
Arabian (Persian) Gulf, with a total land area of approximately 4,000 square miles
(11,000 square kilometres). It is a limestone peninsula projecting north from the
Arabian mainland into the Gulf. The Peninsula of Qatar borders with the Arabian
(Persian) Gulf and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and has a total land boundary of 25
miles. Until the early 1970s, the state of Qatar had a boundary with the United Arab
Emirates, but the agreement of 1974 between Saudi Arabia and the ruler of Abu
Dhabi dissolved the United Arab Emirates border with Qatar in favour of Saudi
Arabia (for more details see Chapter 5). The other country close to Qatar is the
Republic of Iran, which is situated 120 miles across the Gulf.51 (see map no.3).
Population
The population of Qatar grew from some 70,000 in the late 1960s to 369,000 at the
time of the 1986 census. In 1992, the population was estimated to be 450,000. The
indigenous Qataris are believed to number around 100,000. Qatar is the smallest
country in the Arab world in terms of population. The population is divided into two
groups; Bedouin and Hadar, both categories being of Arab origin. There are also
certain immigrants settled in the towns, in particular Persians and Africans who
migrated during the 1920s and 1930s. Qatar is divided into nine administrative
divisions or Municipalities: al-Doha, al-Ghuwayriyah, al-Khawr, al-Wakra, ar-
Rayyan, Jarayan, al-Batinah, Madinat al- Shamal and Umm Salal. 52
51. El-Mallakh, Ragaei. Qatar, Energy and Development. Croom Helm, London, 1985. p. 6 and the
Encyclopedia ofInternational Boundaries, op.cit. p. 445.


































/ renegotiated z nd
\ revised in 195 2;







>uwayhhLambert Conformal Conic Projection,
standard parallels 25°20'N and 30°40'N
801898 (E0044?) 12-95




Qatar's modern history began in 1766. Before that its history is obscure and it had no
real settlements at all except a few groups of nomadic tribes. During the 1760s, the
peninsula of Qatar was settled by a group of Bani ' Utub clans which migrated from
the centre of Arabia. The Ban! 'Utub clans of Al-Khalifah and Al-Jalahimah
established many forts and pearling centers to secure their lands and trade. Until
1782, the year of the Al-Khalifah occupation of Bahrain, the Zubarah area (the north¬
east of the peninsula) was the main centre of Al-Khalifah for collecting and
marketing pearls.53
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Gulf area
witnessed a bloody conflict involving Al-Khalifah, Al-Jalahimah (with their leader
Rahman b. Jabir, earning a reputation as one of the most feared raiders in the waters
surrounding the Qatar Peninsula), Iranians and Omanis. The same period also saw
the rise of British power in the Gulf area as a result of their growing interests in
India. The East India Company vessels attacked what they claimed to be piracy
centres in the Gulf area, destroying towns and forcing hundreds to flee during the
1820s. Britain played a significant role in preventing the attacks of the Al-Khallfah
on the Qatar area.
The Era of the Al-Thani Family
During that time the British role maintained the independence of Al-Thani against
any external attacks especially of the Al-Khallfah of Bahrain.54 The origin of Al-
Thanl, as they claimed, derived from the Tamim tribe and, according to their
ancestors, they had left al-Washm in Najd and settled in the Jibrln oasis in eastern
Qatar late in the seventeenth century. They soon moved to the north and inhabited
Zubarah and later moved to Doha, the present capital and established a small town
with a group of Arab tribes. The rise of the Al-Thani as a prominent family in Qatar
53. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. "The Development of the Gulf States" op.cit. p. 44.
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came as a result of their alliance with Britain during the 1820s and their acceptance
of their allegiance to the Ottomans when Qasim b. Muhammad accepted Ottoman
sovereignty as a qalm maqam in 1872. The conflict between al-Khalifah of Bahrain
and Al-Thani of Qatar soon intensified over the area of Zubarah, when the
inhabitants of the area refused to give their allegiance and loyalty to Al-Thani of
Qatar. There is still conflict and dispute over the islands of Hawar and other small
islands in the Gulf between Qatar and Bahrain (for more details see Chapter 6). 55
Muhammad b. Than! is considered the founder of the al-Thanl Sheykhdom in
Qatar. His rule lasted until his death in 1876 when he was succeeded by his son
Qasim who played a balancing role between the other strong powers of Britain, the
Ottomans, the attacks of Al-Khalifah of Bahrain and the expansion of the Saudis
(Wahhabisj. Sheykh Qasim remained qalm maqam of the Ottoman government until
his death in 1913. 'Abdullah b. Qasim (1913-49) held the title qaim Maqam until the
beginning of the First World War (1914). In 1916 Sheykh 'Abdullah concluded an
'exclusive treaty' with Britain like those already signed by Bahrain, the Trucial
States and Kuwait which put these Sheykhdoms under the direct control and
protection of Britain. It should be noted that the area of Zubarah was not annexed to
the authority of al-Thanl until 1937. This treaty of protection lasted between the two
states until 1st September 1971, when Qatar was declared an independent state.56
At the beginning of the twentieth century Qatar was a poor, small collection of
villages dependent on the pearl banks, and some camel breeding and fishing, and was
settled by a population of 27,000 which was predominantly tribal and nomadic Arab,
consisting of twenty-five clans, largely concentrated in Doha and Wakra. The
majority of the population are Sunni (Wahhabl) save for a few indigenous Shi'as and
425 Persian Shi'a, who are mostly boatbuilders. Oil was discovered in 1939, but its
exploitation was halted between 1942 and 1947. This marked a turning point in the
54. Toth, Anthony. "Qatar" in. Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.) Persian GulfStates Country Studies. U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. Third Edition, 1994, p. 157.
55. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. op.cit. p. 45. See also Toth, Anthony, op.cit. p. 158.
56. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. op.cit. pp. 45-46.
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fortunes of the Qatari population.57 Since Sheykh 'Abdullah's death in 1949, the
Sheykhdom of Qatar has been controlled by many Sheykhs of the al-Thanl family
under the protection of Britain, such as Sheykh 'All b. 'Abdullah (1949-60) and
Sheykh Ahmad b.'AH (1960-72). During 1972 the political system in Qatar
witnessed a real change when Sheykh Khalifah b. Hamad Al-Thani came to power
after a bloodless coup against his cousin, who had lost the support of the Al-Thanl
family when he was outside Qatar in Europe.
Some sources indicate that Saudi Arabia was playing the leading role in
supporting and backing the coup and supporting Sheykh Khallfah, financially and
politically with a show of Saudi armed force at the Saudi-Qatari border during the
time of the bloodless coup. 58 During the early 1970s, as a main result of the British
withdrawal militarily from the region of the Gulf, the Sheykhdom of Qatar entered
into serious negotiations with Bahrain and the Trucial States on forming a
confederation between the Arab Gulf Sheykhdoms. However, the talks failed after
Bahrain pulled out and the Qatari Sheykh announced his independence. (For more
details of the Bahraini pull-out, see chapter 5). Sheykh Khalifah b. Hamad remained
in this position until 1995, when he was deposed from power by his son Hamad in a
bloodless coup in June. The coup followed the same manner as the bloodless coup of
1972, but without any support from Saudi Arabia. The main support came from the
United States, who announced her recognition and support for the new Sheykh in
Qatar. This was followed by the recognition of all the GCC States. Since he came to
the throne Sheykh Hamad b. Khallfah has been seen as a proponent of progress in
instituting political reform internally and externally. He issued a decree easing a ten
year-old censorship law and consolidated his position in order to grant more
participation and responsibility to Qatari Citizens. Externally, Qatar adopted a line of
57. Toth, Anthony, op.cit. p. 159.




foreign policy independent of Saudi Arabia and fostered relations with Oman, Iran,
Iraq and Israel.59
Political life in Qatar is dependent upon decrees issued by the head of the state
(Amir). Since her independence from Britain, Qatar had formed an advisory council
soon after the accession of Sheykh Khallfah b. Hamad. The first advisory council
consisted of 20 appointed members, plus members of the Cabinet, but the number
was expanded to 30 appointed members in 1975. The chosen members came from
three important communities, representing the merchants, the chiefs of the important
tribes and the educated people. The legislative council is like that of the other
countries in the Gulf Co-operation Council with the exception ofKuwait. The debate
on political, economic and administrative policies is limited, but the council can
initiate discussions on social and cultural affairs. The functions of the advisory
council legislatively are to consider draft laws which have been proposed by the
Cabinet. These are referred to the council for recommendations, amendments and
revisions, and then returned to the Cabinet (which may or may not accept the
council's changes). The government is not constitutionally bound to respect the
opinion of the advisory council.60
The leadership of the rulers of Al-Tham in Qatar has been unchallenged since
it emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, with the exception of occasional disputes
with prominent local families, such as the Al-'Atiyyah clan, al-Muhanidah, al-Mani'
and al-DarwIsh, which constitute important clans within the country and whose
members have had serious conflicts with the members of the Al-ThanI over the
domination of economy and army ranks.61
59. The Economist Intelligence Unit 1995. op.cit. p. 21. See also. 'AALAMAL-KHALEEJ. No.48. June
1997, London, p. 3.
60. Peterson, J.E. The Arab GulfStates Steps towards Political Participation, op.cit. pp. 86-89.
61. Lawson, Fred H. "State of Qatar" in: Derbyshire, J. Denis and Ian (eds.) Political Systems of the
World. Chambers, London, 1989. p. 928.
29
Chapter One
The State of Bahrain
Geographical Survey
Bahrain is a group of 34 small islands, situated mid-way along the Arabian (Persian)
Gulf, just off the eastern shore of Saudi Arabia. The islands lie about 24 km from the
east coast of Saudi Arabia and 28 km from Qatar. The archipelago of Bahrain has a
total area estimated at 694 square kilometres and is formed by five principal islands.
The largest and most heavily-populated island is Bahrain itself, which accounts for
83 percent of the total area. The name Bahrain which means "two seas" is derived,
according to the natives of the country, from the existence of two strata of water
located there (see map no.4).62
During the Middle Ages and up until about the early sixteenth century, the
name Bahrain included not only the present archipelago but the entire eastern
Arabian coast from near Bahrain, in the north, to the Trucial coast in the south. The
classical authors referred to the islands of Bahrain by the names of Tyrus and
Aradus; the Muslim writers of the Middle Ages often called it'Awal.63
Population
Bahrain was settled by many groups of Arab tribes and some groups of Persian
origin. Bahraini society consists of two groups, the Sunni minority and the Shi'a
majority. The government of Bahrain has refused to give the correct numbers of the
two groups, but the only census, which was taken in Bahrain in 1941, showed that
the Shi'a population was 64,359 and the Sunni one was 41,984.64 The majority of
Shi'a in Bahrain constitute the poorer part of the population. The ruling family of Al-
Khallfah and most wealthy merchants are Sunni. Bahraini society is divided into four
principal groups. The Bahrainis are of Sunni Arab tribal origin, which is centred on
62. Larsen, Curtis. E. "Life and land use on the Bahrain Islands" The Geoarchaeology ofAncient
Society. University of Chicago, Chicago, 1983, p. 6.
63. Abu-Hakima, Ahmed M. op.cit. p. 40.
64. Al-Rumayhl, Muhammad. Al-Bahrctyn, Mushkilat al-Taghayyur al-SiyasIwal-Ijtima'i. Dar Ibn
Khaldun, Beirut, 1976, p. 35.
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the ruling family and their tribal allies. The Sunni hawala come next in social rank,
being families of Arab origin who migrated to the Persian side of the Gulf in the
distant past and then entered Bahrain at various times. The Shi'a majority are divided
into the Baharinah (originally Arab) and the 'Ajam (Persians). There are also Shi'a
foreign labourers including Iranians, Pakistanis and Iraqis.65
The conflict between the two major societies, Shi'a and Sunnah, dates back to
the occupation of the islands by the Al-Khallfah. The roots of this conflict came
about as a result of the different doctrines of the two sects, in addition to the Sunni
minority dominating the power in Bahrain. The conflict between the two sides
became quite dangerous, especially after the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic
Revolution in 1979. It should be noted that the majority of Shi'a in Bahrain still
continue to be the main direct threat to the Sunni Al-Khalifah regime.66 The
population, according to the latest statistics, is estimated at 500,016. The State of
Qatar has a similar population.67
Bahrain was the first oil state in the Arab Gulf. Oil was first discovered in
1932, and was first exported in 1934. The Sheykhdom of Bahrain has the oldest
education system in the Arabian Peninsula. It was established in 1932. At the present
time the state of Bahrain is the only Arab Gulf state which exports very little oil.68
65. Hottinger, Arnold. "Political Institutions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain" in: Chubin,
Shahram (ed.) Security in the Persian Gulf: Domestic Political Factors. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower, Westmead, England, 1981. p. 7. And see. Peterson, J.E.
op.cit. p. 63.
66. Rathmell, Andrew. "Bahrain: the pearl loses its lustre" Middle East International. 28 April 1995,
London, 1995. pp. 18-19.
67. Economic Bulletin. Secretariat of the GCC, Riyadh, op.cit. p. 189.






The modern history of Bahrain began when the 'Utub Arab tribes occupied the
islands in around 1780. Prior to the 'Utub tribes, control of the islands had alternated
between the Omanis and the Persians. During the second half of the eighteenth
century, the Al-Khallfah of Zubarah (which is a few miles away from Bahrain on the
peninsula of Qatar) launched attacks on the Bahrain islands and, having successfully
conquered them, expelled their Arab governor who then derived his authority from
Persia. On the 28th July 1783, the Al-Khalifah (the present royal family of Bahrain)
were able to gain control the islands.
The development of the Al-Khaltfah political system has the same origins as
the Al-Sabah in Kuwait, particularly as the two clans come from the same 'Aniza
tribal confederation which migrated together from central Arabia to the shores of the
Gulf area.69 Ahmad b. Muhammad, the first Al-Khalifah ruler in Bahrain (1783-96),
adopted policies that enabled Bahrain's ports to develop into prosperous trade and
pearling centres. Under the subsequent Al-Khalifah rulers relations between Al-
Khalifah and the British government were further consolidated and they concluded a
series of treaties agreeing that Britain protect their authority against the Persians and
Omanis and the attacks of the Saudis (Wahhabis).
Family rivalries prompted Britain, then the paramount power in the area, to
appoint their first Resident Political Agent in Bahrain. After 1868 Britain became
more involved in the internal affairs of Al-Khallfah, supporting Sheykh 'All b.
Khallfah (1868-69) in his conflict with his cousin, who refused to accept the
legitimacy of the victor's rule of Sheykh 'Isa b. 'All (1869-1923). The other factions
were supported from Persia. 70 The previous treaties ensured the succession of the Al-
69. Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, The
United Arab Emirates and Oman. Unwin, Hyman, London, 1989, p. 82.
70. Hooglund, Eric. "Bahrain" in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.) Persian Gulf States Country Studies.
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1994, p. 111.
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KhalTfah rulers and provided a more stable framework for the ultimate independence
of Bahrain under British protection. These treaties gave the British Political Agent
the right to conduct Bahrain's foreign policy and advise the Sheykhs on domestic
matters. After the end of the First World War the Political Resident became the real
ruler of Bahrain. Bahrain, during the nineteenth century and until the early 1970s,
was considered a most important centre by British governments and was used to
control and supervise all the protected Sheykhdoms of the Arab Gulf States.71
During the late Sixties and early Seventies, the Sheykhdom of Bahrain,
together with Qatar and the Trucial States, commenced negotiations for the United
Arab Emirates Federation. However, the negotiations between the Arab Sheykhdoms
of the Gulf failed as a result of the internal difficulties between the Sheykhs and
external pressures from Iran and Saudi Arabia. On August 1971 Sheykh 'Isa b.
Salman (the present ruler) and the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir Geoffrey
Arthur, exchanged notes ending the previous "Exclusive Agreement" between
Bahrain and Britain, and declaring the independence of Bahrain, terminating the
British government's responsibility for defence and foreign relations after 100 years.
On the same date the ruler of Bahrain signed a 10-year treaty of friendship with
Britain. 72
Democracy and Political Leadership
The Constitutional Experiment
The development of the Bahraini political constitution goes back to 1919 when the
Sheykhdom held a Municipal election. This was followed by the election of a health
and education council in 1956. During the early 1970's, as a result of the British
decision to withdraw from the Gulf region, the Sheykhdom of Bahrain witnessed
widespread riots demanding a permanent constitution and free direct elections,
following clashes between the people and the government. On December 16 1971,
71. Shata, Hashim. A. op.cit. p. 79.
72. Al-Baharna, Husein M. op.cit. Second Edition, p. XXVIII.
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the day that Bahrain formally became independent, Sheykh 'Isa b. Salman said that
the country would have a constitutional form of government. Six months later he
issued a decree providing for the election of representatives to a constituent
assembly. In December 1972 a 40-member committee was elected. 20 of the
candidates were elected democratically, eight members were appointed by the ruler
while the other 12 members of the committee were taken from the ministerial cabinet
who already held posts in the government.73 The state of Bahrain was the second
state in the Arab Gulf to form an elected parliament. In December 1973, the state of
Bahrain formed a first national assembly containing 30 elected members plus the
non-elected members of the ministerial cabinet. The new national assembly was
dominated by radical Bahraini organisations and Shi'a religious groups. In spite of
the prohibition of any political parties, most of the candidates of the national
assembly were representative of the three informal political activities of the Arab
Nationalists (Ba 'thist and Nasserist), the Popular Front of Bahrain (Marxist) and the
Shi'a. The short-lived national assembly had a Shi'a majority.74
The End of the Constitutional Experiment
After nineteen months of the Bahraini constitutional experiment and as a result of
internal and external influence, especially the conflict between the royal family of
Al-Khallfah and the members of the national assembly,75 Sheykh 'Isa b. Salman
issued a decree abolishing the national assembly and suspended some articles of the
constitution. The decree promised the establishment of a national assembly within a
period of four years. The Bahraini Parliamentary experiment, which lasted from
December 1973 until 1975, was never looked on with favour by Saudi Arabia,
because Riyadh never intended to have an elected parliament and disliked the
Bahraini and Kuwaiti experiments along these lines. The other, internal reason for
abrogating the assembly was the fact that a vocal minority of deputies began
73. Majid, al-Majid. Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khallji Azmat al-Siyasah wa-al-Shar'iyyah. Taha
Publications, London, 1990, pp. 11-12.
74. Lawson, Fred H. "State of Bahrain" in: Derbyshire, J. Denis and Ian (eds.) Political Systems of
the World.. Chambers, 1989, London, p. 74.
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questioning, in public, the prerogatives of the ruler and his family. The press played
its usual role of publicizing and amplifying the claims of the opposition deputies.76
In 1993, as a result of many political developments in the Gulf region such as the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, political developments in Saudi Arabia, the establishment
of the Majlis al-Shura. and the renewal of the Omani consultative body, Sheykh 'Isa
b. Salman issued a decree establishing a consultative body in Bahrain consisting of
30 members with powers similar to the consultative bodies in the Gulf Co-operation
Council States.77 On the first of June 1996, the ruler of Bahrain announced an
increase in the number of members in the council and gave it more extended
powers. 78
75. Middle East Economic Disest. (MEED) Vol. 36. No.50. 18 December 1992. p. 3.
76. Hottinger, Arnold, op.cit. p. 6.
77. Lawson, Fred H. op.cit. p. 140.
78. The Middle East Newspaper. Vol. 18 No. 6396. Sunday, 2 June. London, p. 1.
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The United Arab Emirates
General Geographical Description
The UAE is located in the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. It is a federation
formed from the seven Sheykhdoms of Abu Dhabi (the capital), Dubai, Sharjah,
'Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-Khaimah, who joined the federation
after six months. The total area of the UAE is approximately 77,700 square
kilometres. The federation has land boundaries of 876 km and borders with the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the west with a total boundary of 346 miles (586 km)
and with the Sultanate of Oman in the south with a total boundary (un-demarcated)
of 336 miles (540 km).
Some maps continue to show the UAE as adjoining the state of Qatar in the
area of Khawr al-'Udaid. However, according to the border agreement of 1974
between Saudi Arabia and Sheykh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, the border corridor of
Khawr al-Udaid is given to Saudi Arabia, which means that there is no border
between Qatar and the UAE (for more details see Chapter 5).79
The federation stretches for more than 1,400 kilometres along the southern
shore of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. Abu Dhabi is the largest Emirate and accounts
for 87% of the UAE's total area. The Emirate of 'Ajman is the smallest with a total
area of 259 square kilometres. In spite of the formation of the federation, most of the
Emirates have a history of conflict and border disputes, and the borders of these
Emirates are still unresolved and undemarcated. The most complicated borders are in
the al-Hajar al-Gharbl Mountains (Western al-Hajar Mountains), where five of the
Emirates contest jurisdiction over more than a dozen enclaves (see map no 5).
79. Meri Report. United Arab Emirates. Middle East Research Institute. University of Pennsylvania.





































































The United Arab Emirates had an officially estimated population of 2 million in
early 1993. Only about 12% of the total were federation citizens. The number of
foreign workers has increased dramatically since 1968 from 36% of the population to
88% in 1985.80 Most of the population of the UAE is concentrated in the coastal
strip extending along the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and the majority of the citizens are
Sunni. A minority of Shi'a (originally Persians) are concentrated in the Emirate of
Dubai and migrated from the Iranian coast of the Gulf during the 1930s and 1940s.81
The Union of the seven Emirates societies included major merchant families of
Persian, Indian and Baluchi ethnic origin. These groups have dominated commerce




The historical record of the UAE as a federation state began in December 1971.
Before this date these Sheykhdoms had been known as the Pirate Coast, the Trucial
Coast States, the Trucial States, Trucial Oman or the Oman Coast.83 The early
history of these Trucial States was as a part of Omani territories. The appearance of
the Qawasim, as a strong maritime power in the Gulf during the eighteenth century,
marked the first and main stage of independence from the influence of Omani power
80. Hooglund, Eric and Toth, Anthony. "United Arab Emirates" in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.) Persian
GulfStates Country Studies. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1994, pp. 204-
208.
81. Peck, Malcolm. C. The United Arab Emirates A Venture in Unity. Westview Press, Boulder,
Colorado, U.S.A. 1986, pp. 4—6.
82. Lawson, Fred H. "United Arab Emirates" in: Derbyshire, J. Dennis and Ian (eds.) Political
Systems ofthe World. Chambers, 1989, London, p. 1170.
83. The name of Trucial States is derived from the treaty of 1835, which was termed a Perpetual
Maritime Treaty. Under the terms of this treaty, the chiefs of the different Gulf tribes granted
Britain the right to manage their foreign relations. See Al-Samarrai, Bashir. op.cit. p. 18.
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in the Trucial States. The present seven Trucial States were, then, no more than small
towns inhabited by various Arab tribes.
The Qawasim
The Qawasim's power became more influential over these tribes as a result of the
Omani civil war which provided the opportunity for the Qawasim to establish their
state.84 Sheykh Sultan b. Saqr al-Qasiml (1803-66), who dominated the politics of
the Omani Coast in the first half of the nineteenth century, took Sharjah as an
alternative capital after British vessels destroyed the Qawasim capital of Ras al-
Khaimah in 1819. Sharjah became the main political and economic centre of the
Qawasim State until the end of the nineteenth century. By 1892 the conflicts between
Sheykh Sultan's sons became more intensive and divided the Qawasim state into the
two branches of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, leading to the independence of many
tribes of Ru'us al-Jabal (now the Peninsula of Musandam), Hamriyyah and Fujairah
(which became independent under the Sharqiyyin tribe, the tribe which still controls
power in the Emirate). The power of the Qawasim began to decline after the
destruction of Ras al-Khaimah in 1819. This was followed by many treaties that were
signed between Britain and the QasimI Sheykhs such as the 1820 general peace
treaty, in which the Qasimi Sheykh pledged not to attack British ships navigating in
the Gulf, and the treaty of 1835 called the Perpetual Maritime Truce.85 The name of
Qawasim is derived from Sheykh Qasim, the grandfather of Sheykh Rashid b.
MutlTq, the first founder of the Qawasim state in the Trucial States. Qawasim
authority extended to the Persian Coast of the Gulf and controlled the areas of
Lingah, Kunj and Luft.86
84. AI-Baharna, Hussein M. The Arabian Gulf States, Their Legal and Political Status and their
International Problems, op.cit. p. 22. The family of al-Qawasim originally migrated from the
borders of Iraq in 1730 and settled on the northern coast of Oman. They claim that they are
descendents of the family of the Prophet Muhammad.
85. Abdullah, Muhammad Morsy. The United Arab Emirates A Modern History. Croom Helm,
London, 1978, pp. 90-91.
86. Howley, Donald. The Trucial States. Allen and Unwin, London, 1970. p. 91.
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The Sheykhs ofAbu Dhabi
The Ban! Yas have traditionally been the main rivals of the Qawasim. The tribe of
BanI Yas originally came from Najd in the seventeenth century and, as they were the
most numerous tribal group in the area of the Trucial States, they came to control
most of what is now Abu Dhabi and this town became the seat of the Al-Bu Falsah
clan of Ban! Yas which still control the Emirate, as it has since the 1790s.87 The
Ban! Yas began to reach the peak of their power during the rule of Zayed b. Khalifah
(1855-1909) of Abu Dhabi. He consolidated the power of the Bani Yas and extended
his influence and authority over the neighbouring tribes of the Manaslr, the Na'Im
and Dhawahir, thus becoming a potent force in the town of Abu Dhabi. By the time
of his death Zayed b. Khalifah had seven sons, the eldest of whom Khalifah did not
wish to succeed him so the second son ruled for three years until his death. The next
ruler was Hamdan b. Zayed (1912-22). His brother Sultan b. Zayed (1922-26)
murdered him and then seized the throne for himself. In 1926, when Sheykh Sultan
invited his brother Saqr to dinner, the latter fired on him killing him instantly. After
many years of struggle between the family of Al-Bu Falasah of Abu Dhabi, Sheykh
Shakhbiit b. Sultan became ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1928 and ruled until 1966. He
attained a degree of internal security in Abu Dhabi against the opposition of the sons
of Saqr b. Sultan. The relations between Sheykh Shakhbiit and Britain (the protector
of the Trucial States) deteriorated because Shakhbiit refused to modernise in his
society. In 1966, with support from the British government and many tribes, Sheykh
Zayed b. Sultan the present ruler of Abu Dhabi and the President of the United Arab
Emirates, overthrew his brother Shakhbiit in a bloodless coup.88
The Sheykhs of Dubai
The contrast between Al-Bu Falah (sub-clan of BanI Yas) which is known today as
Al-Nahayyan of Abu Dhabi, and the Al-Maktum (sub-clan of Al-Bu-Falasah) which
87. Peck, Malcolm, op.cit. p. 32.
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is known today as Al-Maktum of Dubai, is striking, particularly in view of the fact
that they are both members of the Ban! Yas tribal grouping. The Al-Bu-Falah (al-
Nahayyan) reflect their Bedouin roots, while the latter have a decidedly urban
approach which is directly linked to the geographical location and characteristics of
the town of Dubai. The present ruling family in Dubai was established in 1833, when
two members of the BanI Yas migrated with around 800 followers from Abu Dhabi.
The ruling family have recently started to refer to themselves as the Al-Maktum from
Sheykh Maktum b. Hasher, who ruled Dubai from 1894 to 1906. Since 1912 the
Emirate of Dubai has became the main port of the U.A.E. following the immigration
of a foreign population from India and Persia. Dubai, at the present time, is ruled by
Sheykh Maktum b. Rashed the ruler of Dubai and Vice-President of the United Arab
Emirates. 89
The Sheykhs ofAjman
The ruling family of the 'Ajman Emirate belong to the Al-Bu-Khurayban branch of
the Na'Im tribes, a large and important tribe which includes settled and nomadic
people scattered over large areas from as far away as the Omani area in al-Buraimi.
The present ruler is Humaid b. Rashid al-Na'iml (1981- ) who succeeded his father,
who ruled the Emirate from 1920 until 1981. During the nineteenth century the
history of this family witnessed conflicts and assassinations.
The Umm al-Qaiwain Sheykhs
Similar to 'Ajman, the tiny Emirate of Umm al-Qaiwain has an area of only around
480 square kilometres. It has no oil or gas and, economically and financially it is
dependent on the federation government of the United Arab Emirates. Since 1820,
when it entered the British Treaty System, the Emirate has been ruled by the Al-
Mu'alla (sometimes call Al-'AII). In 1929 Sheykh Ahmad b. Rashid (1929-1981)
88. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. The Establishment ofthe UnitedArab Emirates 1950-85. Croom Helm.
London, 1987. p. 8. And also see. Zahlan, Rosemarie S. op.cit. pp. 42-45.
89. Zahlan, Rosemarie S. op.cit. pp. 95-105.
42
Chapter One
became ruler and remained in power until his death in 1981. During the pearling era
he had distinguished himself as a very successful pearl merchant. He was succeeded
by his son Rashid, the present ruler ofUmm al-Qaiwain.
The Fujairah Sheykhs
The Fujairah Emirate lies on the Batinah Coast of the Sultanate of Oman. The history
of this Emirate witnessed a direct struggle between the Al-Qawasim and the tribe of
Al-Sharqiyyin (the ruling family of the Emirate). In 1952 the British government
recognised the authority of Sheykh Muhammad b. Hamad al-Sharqi as the ruler of
the Trucial State of al-Fujairah. The Emirate of al-Fujairah has been ruled, since
1975, by Sheykh Hamad b. Muhammad.90
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Trucial States'
economy has been dependent on four things: the growth of the pearl industry, the
emergence of Dubai in 1930 as the main port on the coast, the new revenues derived
from the rent of Sharjah airport and the conclusion of the oil concession during the
1930s.91
Direct British Rule
From 1952 to 1968 the British government became more involved in the Trucial
States. In 1952 the Trucial States Council was formed by the British government and
consisted of the seven rulers (Sheykhs), chaired by the British Political Agent. In the
1950s Britain proposed the creation of a federation in the Trucial States, similar to
the South Arabian Federation, in order to strengthen the region politically, militarily
and economically.92 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Arab Sheykhdoms of
the Gulf entered on to a new stage after the British government's decision to
withdraw from the Gulf in early 1971. The Gulf area witnessed a direct and serious
threat locally and regionally at that time. Iran threatened to annex Bahrain as part of
90. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. op.cit. p. 16.
91. Abdullah, Muhammad M. op.cit. p. 103.
92. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. op.cit. p. 16.
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her national territory, and occupied three islands belonging to Sharjah and Ras al-
Khaimah. Saudi Arabia refused to recognise any federation until she had resolved her
territorial disputes with Abu Dhabi. The other external threat was the activity of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.93
Federation
The period between February 1968 and July 1971 witnessed an intensive and
extensive series of negotiations between the rulers of the seven Trucial States and the
Sheykhdoms of Qatar and Bahrain to form a federation. The outcome was the
establishment of a federation comprising only six of the Sheykhdoms. The whole
series of negotiations started with the agreement, in February, between Abu Dhabi
and Dubai (the most important Emirates in the federation) to unite under one flag.
The Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, in their agreement, extended an invitation to
all the Arab Gulf Sheykhdoms (Trucial States, Qatar and Bahrain) to join the
federation. After six meetings the nine rulers (Sheykhs) elected Sheykh Zayed b.
Sultan of Abu Dhabi as President, Sheykh Rashid b. Sa'id Al-Maktum of Dubai as
Vice-President and Sheykh KhalTfah b. Hamad Al-Thani, the Qatar Crown Prince
(later the ruler of Qatar) as Prime Minister. Abu Dhabi was to be the temporary
capital of the federation until the permanent capital was ready.
The federation of the Nine Emirates, however, did not materialize because of
the difficulties facing negotiations between the Sheykhs of the Arab Sheykhdoms on
the one hand and political pressures from Iran and Saudi Arabia on the other. Iran
encouraged the ruler of Bahrain to declare his independence and recognised Bahrain
as an independent state. Saudi Arabia refused to recognise the federation until she
had resolved her claim to al-Buraimi with Abu Dhabi. The ruler of Qatar later
announced his independence following the lead of Bahrain. The factors leading to the
suspension of the Nine Arab Gulf Emirates Union were as follows:
(a) limits and authorities of the federal government; (b) representation rate in
the national federal council; (c) site of the federal capital; (d) principle of voting in
the council.
93. Kelly, J.B. Arabia, the Gulfand the West. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980. p. 77.
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The rulers of the Trucial States met in Dubai over the period 10-18 July 1971. At the
conclusion of their meetings, they announced that the six states of Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
'Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah and Sharjah had agreed to form a federation.
They decided that the new federation would be called the United Arab Emirates.94
The history of the UAE as a nation only began on the second of December
1972; the federation became the eighteenth member of the Arab League and the one
hundred and thirty-second member of the United Nations.95 The Emirate of Ras al-
Khaimah was the only Trucial State to initially ask for more time but, after two
months, she joined the federation. The reluctance of the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah,
Sheykh Saqr b. Muhammad al-Qasiml came as a result of the Iranian occupation of
the two Tunb islands (belong to Ras al-Khaimah) and Abu Musa (belonging to
Sharjah). The other reason was Sheykh Saqr's reluctance to accept the domination of
Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the federation.96
Political Structure and Leadership
Political Developments
The federation of the United Arab Emirates formed a provisional constitution which
was amended in 1972 to reflect the inclusion of Ras al-Khaimah into the federation.
This constitution described the Union as a federal state and specified the nature of
the relationship between the federal entity and the individual Emirates, who retained
sovereignty over their own territories and territorial waters.97 The federal nature
guaranteed powers to the individual Emirates except for those explicitly reserved for
the federal government: foreign policy, defence, security, immigration, and
communications and federal administrations. Internal sovereignty, and existing
political, economic and local administrative institutions, were left in the hands of the
94. Al-Alkim, Hasan Hamdan. The Foreign Policy ofthe United Arab Emirates. Saqi Books, London,
1989, pp. 10-12.
95. Peck, Malcolm, op.cit. p. 21.
96 Zahlan, Rosemarie S. op.cit. p. 195.
97. Peterson, J. E. The Arab GulfState, op.cit. p. 92.
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individual ruling families of the Union.98 The provisional constitution of the union
provides for the separation of power into Executive, Legislative and Judicial
branches. This temporary constitution was extended twice, in 1976 and 1981. In
1996 the seven Emirates finally agreed to make the constitution permanent and
accepted the city of Abu Dhabi as their capital. The most effective federal institution
is the Supreme Council or the Council of Rulers, representing the supreme authority
in the state and consisting of all seven rulers or their deputies. The council functions
as the highest authority in executive and legislative capacities.99
The Political System
The Supreme Council is empowered to elect the President and Vice-President of the
state from its members for five-year renewable terms, admit new members to the
federation and appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and Judges of the Federal
Supreme Court. It also ratifies all federal laws. The Supreme Council meets formally
once a year although informal meetings are much more frequent. Decisions by the
Supreme Council must be approved by a majority of five out of seven and those five
must include Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 100 The two Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai
still have the leading role and are the mainstay of the federation's structure as well as
in substantive issues. The federation also contains a Council of Ministers, in which
all the seven Emirates in the Cabinet are represented. Under the provisional
constitution, the Union has a national council, the principal legislative body, but its
role in the governmental process is limited to consultation. The national council
consists of 40 members. These members are appointed by the rulers of the seven
Emirates, eight each from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, six each from Sharjah and Ras al-
98. Meri Report, op.cit. p. 20.
99. Hooglund, Eric and Toth, Anthony, op.cit. pp. 241-242 and The Economist Intelligence Unit "The
United Arab Emirates Country Profile 1996-97" p. 4. Thereby the new development in the United
Arab Emirates confirming the prominence of Abu Dhabi as the leading Emirate of the Union. The
federal revenues are supposed to be made up of contributions from all seven Emirates but in
reality Abu Dhabi pays around 75% of contributions, Dubai around 20% and Sharjah the rest.




Khaimah and four each from Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah and 'Ajman. 101 The seven
Emirates of the federation have individual consultative councils. The powers of these
councils are more than those of the federation council, whose members serve solely
at the pleasure of the seven rulers.
On many occasions, the federation council has criticized the numerous
obstacles in the path of federalization. The members have called for an expansion of
the federal council's base in the context of endorsing democratic principles in the
Union. 102 The federation body is also responsible for a Federal Supreme Court,
which is appointed by the Supreme Council and consists of five Judges who, at the
request of individual emirates, adjudicate between them or between the emirates of
the federal government and decide on the constitutionality of federal laws. The
federal laws often depend on further legislation in the individual emirates. 103
Since the establishment of the UAE the union has been affected and threatened
by many internal and external threats, such as the Saudi claim to al-Buraimi, the
Iranian occupation of three islands (the two Tunbs and Abu Musa), the activities of
the Popular Front for the liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf and the eight-year
war between Iraq and Iran. The last, especially, has had an effect on the United Arab
Emirates people, especially in Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. Internally, the
border disputes between the members of the union have remained the most negative
factor in the conduct of internal and external policies. 104 The other important internal
threat facing the union is the huge number of migrant workers. The local newspapers
of the federation have described the migrant workers as the "fifth column" for any
external or internal threats to the federation. 105
101. Peck, Malcolm, op.cit. p. 68. And Hooglund, Eric and Toth, Anthony, op.cit. pp. 241-242.
102. Peterson, J. E. op.cit. p. 102.
103 The Economist Intelligence Unit "United Arab Emirates" EIU Country Profile 1994-95. p. 6.
104. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian
Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula" op.cit. p. 26. During the 1960s and early 1970s many members
of the PFLOG (most of whom were Dhofaris) were living in the UAE as soldiers in the Omani
Coast force which was controlled by British Officers. Most of these people were arrested in the
early 1970s and handed to the Omani government by British Intelligence Officers and jailed there
until the end of the 1970s.
105. The Economist Intelligence Unit. "United Arab Emirates" Country Profile 1994-95. London,
1995, pp. 6-7.
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The Sultanate of Oman
Chapter One
General Geographical Description
Oman during the early stages of its history, was known by various names such as
"Majan", "Mazoor" and Oman. The name 'Oman' probably means "the land",
although there are local traditions which assert that the region was named after one "
'Uman b. Qahtan". Wendell Phillips, in his book "Oman a History", says that the
origin of the name is not clear. Some have thought that it means "peace". However,
the thirteenth-century Arab Geographer Yaqut al-Hamaw! says, in his Geographical
Dictionary, (Mil jam al-Buldan) that "Oman" is derived from such words as a'mana
meaning 'to stay in a place'. But many Omani historians claim that Oman refers to a
Valley called Oman, and others claim that "Oman" refers to the son of Prophet
Ibrahim or to 'Uman b. Saba or Sheba b. Yaghthan b. Ibrahim. 106
The Sultanate lies at the extreme south-east of the Arabian Peninsula and
occupies a land area of some 120,000 square miles. The Sultanate is bordered in the
north by a strategic entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, in the east by the Arabian Sea,
in the west by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (420 miles; 676 km) and the United
Arab Emirates (336 miles; 540 km) and in the south by the Republic of Yemen (179
miles; 288 km), with a coastline which extends for 1,700 kilometres from northern
Oman to the southern province of Dhofar (see. map no 6) 107
The country can be divided geographically into the three "Muhafazat"
(Governorates) of Muscat, Dhofar and Musandam and the five "Manatiq " (District
areas) of al-Dakhiliyyah, al-Batinah, al-Zahirah, al-Sharqiyyah, and al-Wusta. The
Sultanate is divided, administratively, into 59 Wilayat (local governorates).
106. Wendell, Phillips. Oman a History. Longman, London, 1976. pp. 1-2. And see. Oman 95. Issued
by the Ministry of Information, Muscat, 1995. p. 40.
107. The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries, op.cit. p. 412 and see Clements, F.A. Oman the




Omani society consists of five basic categories: the people of the coastal areas, who
live by fishing, seafaring and trading; the agriculturists of the Batinah coast and the
south; those of the interior who employ the aflaj system of irrigation; the mountain
people of Dhofar and the Musandam Peninsula; and finally the Bedouin of the desert
areas. The Omani population was estimated in the last official census, which was
conducted in December 1993, to be about 1.5 million. 108
Most Western and Arab writers maintain that the Ibadls are the majority in
Oman. But J.E. Peterson, the most experienced authority on the Arabian Peninsula
and on Oman in particular, says "even though Sunnis form a narrow majority of the
Omanis, the small Ibadi sect has provided the traditional form of government".
There is no official census of Omani sects, which consist of the two majority sects of
Sunnah and Ibadi and a minority of Shi'a, originally a majority of them non-
Arabs. 109
108. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Oman Yemen" Country Profile 1995-96. London, pp. 8-9,
and Al-Watan Newspapers. No. 3927. December 1993, Muscat, p. 1.
109. Peterson, J.E. "Security Concerns in the Arabian Peninsula" in: Ahrari, M.E. (ed.) The Gulf and
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The history of Oman, as a state, is dominated by three stages, the first stage being
that of the Arab tribes who immigrated to Oman, the second stage the struggle
between the Ibadls (Imamate) and the foreign powers, and the third stage the
establishment of the Sultanate ofMuscat and Oman by the present dynasty of Al-Bu-
Sa'Id, which has controlled the country since 1749.110 Oman is one of the oldest
civilizations in the Arabian Peninsula and much of its history is a record of tribal
struggles.
The Al-Bu Sa'Id Period
The modern history of Oman started with the election of Ahmed b. Sa'Id, the
founder of the Al-Bu-Sa'id dynasty, as the Imam of Oman in 1749. Imam Ahmad
first came to historical light as a Wall{governor) of Sohar, having been appointed to
that position by the Ya'rubl Imam Saif b. Sultan, one of whose daughters Ahmad
married. The Ya'rubi dynasty controlled Oman from 1615 to 1744. The new Imam
came to power as a result ofmany internal and external conflicts witnessed in Oman.
Internal stability became threatened during the middle of the 18th century when the
Ya'rubl family lost control over the country and a civil war between the Omani tribes
took place after the contrived election of the Imam. This civil war also resulted in the
emergence of the two factions ofHinawTand Ghafarl, who were to play a significant
role in modern Omani history, in favour of or against the central authority in Nizwa
and Rustaq (the old capitals of the Ibadi Imamates) or in Muscat.
An external threat emerged when the Persians occupied the main Omani Coast
and the port cities of Muscat and Sohar. The new factions of the Hinawis and
Ghafaris agreed on the election of Ahmad b. Sa'id as the Imam of Oman due to his
110. Wilkinson, J.C. "The origins of the Omani State" in: Hopwood, Derek (ed.) The Arabian





success in resisting the Persian occupation. 111 After the death of Ahmad b. Sa'id in
1787, a power struggle developed among the al-Sa'Id family for control of Oman.
Oman would not experience unified rule until 1804, when Imam Ahmad's grandson
Sa'id b. Sultan, who ruled from 1804 until 1856, began to build a new state in
Muscat. Omani influence also reached Zanzibar and some ports in East Africa in
addition to parts of Persia and Baluchistan. Muscat became an important commercial
centre and the meeting point for the entire Gulf area. Sa'id b. Sultan also ignored all
the events in the Omani interior and abandoned all claims to the Ibadi Imamate.112
After the death of Sa'id b. Sultan in 1856, the Omani Empire was divided into two
parts, Asian Oman and African Oman, as a result of a dispute between the two sons
of Sa'id b. Sultan, Majid and Thuwaini. In 1857, they reached an agreement with
British mediation for Thuwaini to give up his claim to Zanzibar for 40,000 Maria
Theresa Dollars (MT$).113 British influence in Omani internal affairs was the main
reason for the division the Omani Empire into two parts. British involvement in
Omani affairs began with the decline of Al-Bu-Sa'Id fortunes following the death of
Sa'Id b. Sultan in 1856. Since that time Britain and the Sultans ofMuscat and Oman
concluded several agreements, through which Britain became the principal power in
Omani internal and external policies. 114
The British Intervention
The historical record of British contact with Oman goes back to 1645 when Imam
Nasir b. Murshid invited the English East India Company to trade formally at Sohar
and Seeb. As a result of these early contacts, Imam Nasir and Philip Wydle, the
111. Keely, J.B. "A Prevalence of Furies: Tribes, Politics and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman"
in: Hopwood, Derek (ed.) The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics. George Allen and
Unwin Ltd, London, 1972. p. 107. See also Barth, Fredrick " Complications of Geography,
Ethnology and Tribalism" in. Pridham, B.R. (ed.) Oman: Economic, Social and Strategic
Development. Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 27
112 Kumar, R.P. "The Dismemberment of Oman and British Policy Towards the Persian Gulf'
Islamic Culture, an English Quarterly. Vol. XXXVI. No.l. January 1962,. pp. 11-12.
113. Whelan, John. Oman A MEED Practical Guide. Routledge, London, 1981, pp. 11-14.
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representative of the company, concluded an agreement in Sohar in January 1646. A
second agreement was also signed in 1659 to establish a factory for the English
Company in Oman. It was not until 1798, some 139 years later, under the Al-Sa'id
dynasty, that a fully-fledged commercial treaty giving extensive facilities to the
British government was concluded. 115 Oman did not sign any formal treaty with
Britain, fully establishing relations until the agreement of 20 December 1951, after
the conflict over al-Buraimi, which led Sultan Sa'id b. Taimur to sign a full
agreement with Britain to protect Oman's border against external Saudi influence. 116
The situation, after the division of the Omani Empire, became more critical to
the al-Bu-Sa'id dynasty in Oman, when the two factions ofHinawi and Ghafari, with
the support of IbadI 'Ulama' (religious Scholars) elected 'Azzan b. Qais of the Al-
Bu-Sa'id family as Imam and drove the branch of the family of al-Bu-Sa'Id out of
Muscat. The Imamate forces ruled the country until 1871 when British government
intervention restored Muscat to the Sultan. In 1866 Salim b. Thuwaini was
recognised as Sultan in Oman with support from Britain. 117 In 1871, with strong
support from Britain, Turk! b. Sa'Id resumed power after he had subjected most of
the Omani interior. Britain became more involved in the defence of the Al-Bu-Sa'id
regime against the two factions of Hinawi and Ghafari, who caused a real threat to
them and threatened to establish an IbadI Imamate in Oman. Sultan Faisal b. TurkI
was the first Al-Bu-Sa'Id ruler to mount his throne peacefully in 1888, and his rule
lasted until his death in 1913. In 1895, as a result of financial problems and the
competition between the two factions of Hinawi and Ghafari, the Omani tribes took
Muscat for a month until it was restored to the Sultan when he received strong
114. Peterson, J.E. "Oman's Odyssey: From Imamate to Sultanate" in: Pridham, R.B. (ed.) Oman:
Economic, Social andStrategic Development. Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 8.
115. Muhammed, Reda Bhacker. Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar Roots of British
domination.. Routledge, London, p. 32.
116. Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability Saudi Arabia, the
Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, op.cit. p. 427.
117. Allen, Calvin H. Jr "The Sultanate ofOman and American Security Interest" in: Stookey, Robert
W (ed.) The Arabian Peninsula Zone ofFerment. Hoover Institution Press. Stanford University
Press, Stanford, California, p. 6.
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support from Britain. 118 Sultan Taimur b. Faisal succeeded to power after his
father's death in 1913. The reign of Sultan Taimur was a most important period
during which the IbadI Imamate was restored in the Omani Interior.
The struggle between the 'Ulama' of the Ibadls (with the support of the two
factions of Hinawi and Ghafari) revived during the period of Sultan Taimur. As a
result of the election of a new Imam in May 1913, a revolt broke out in most of the
IbadI areas against the Sultan because of his relationship with Britain. This struggle
led Britain to act as a mediator between the two parties. The negotiations between the
two sides posed a real threat and saw attacks on Muscat by the opposition party.
Through the mediation of the British Political Agent at Muscat a delegation of tribal
and religious leaders met the representative of Sultan Taimur (the British Consul in
Muscat, Wingate, I.C.S.) at Seeb near Muscat, where a written agreement was signed
by both sides on 25 September 1920. The treaty did not recognise the independence
of the interior of Oman, but it settled and maintained peace in the conflict between
the Sultan and his factions for nearly 35 years, during which the interior of Oman
gained a virtual autonomy under a revived IbadI Imamate. 119
The Reign of Sa'Id b. Taimur
In 1932 Sultan Taimur b. Faisal abdicated in favour of his son Sa'Id b. Taimur, who
controlled Oman for 38 years, and maintained a policy of strict isolationism, which
was totally against any social or economic development and kept Oman largely
isolated from the rest of the world until 1970. No developments or difficulties
threatened the authority of Sultan Sa'Id b. Taimur in the interior of Oman, until the
Saudi occupation of the Buraimi Oasis in 1952.
During the early 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia was the main threat to the
authority of Sultan Sa'Id b. Taimur. After the occupation of al-Buraimi in 1952, the
second threat consisted of the strong Saudi support of the IbadI Imamate between
118. Kechichian, Joseph A. Oman and the World The Emergence ofan Independent Foreign Policy.
Rand-Santa Monica, 1995, p. 55.
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1954 and 1959. In addition there was Saudi military support for the Dhofari rebellion
during the early 1960s (Dhofar Liberation Front). 120 Oman has been involved in two
civil wars since the 1950s. The first was the revolution of Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar in
which the western tribes who supported the Ibadi Imamate were backed by Saudi
Arabia and Egypt. The second civil war was the Dhofari revolution, which caused a
serious threat and was backed by many Arab countries including Iraq, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and South Yemen in addition to China and the Soviet Union. 121 During the
early 1950s, Sultan Sa'Id b. Taimur realised that he could not ensure the
independence of Oman unless he brought under his control its interior, which was
controlled by the Ibadi Imam supported by the Ehnawl and Ghafarl factions. As a
result ofmany factors such as the Saudi occupation of al-Buraimi in 1952, the refusal
of the Imam to allow the British Oil Company to search for oil in the Omani interior
and the fact that the Sultan had gained a lot of money from the oil companies and
had strong support from the British government, Sultan Sa'id b. Taimur's forces,
with strong military support from Britain, attacked and conquered the Ibadi Imamate
of Nizwa in December 1955.122 The Imam and some of his followers escaped to
Saudi Arabia in 1959 after the Sultan's and the British forces destroyed the Imam's
forces in Al-Jabal Al-Akhdar in 1959.
The Omani Imamate organised the main opposition to the Sultanate in Saudi
Arabia and Cairo, where 'Abd al-Nasser adopted the position of the Omani
opposition. The Imam and his followers succeeded in gaining Arab League support
for the Imamate of Oman, and various attempts were made to bring the "Omani
question" before the United Nations General Assembly for many years with the
support of the nationalist Arab regimes in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. 123
119. Kelly, J.B. "A Prevalence of Furies: Tribes, Politics and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman"
op.cit. p. 120.
120. Rigsbee, Wallace Lynn. American Foreign Policy Towards the Sultanate of Oman 1977-1987.
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University ofCincinnati, U.S.A. 1990, pp. 44 and 59.
121. Cordesman , Anthony. The Gulfand the Search for Strategic Stability... op.cit. p. 426.
122. Skeet, Ian. Muscat and Oman the end ofan era. Faber and Faber, London, 1974, p. 163.




The other main threat to the authority of Sultan Sa'Id b. Taimur was the Dhofari
rebellion during the early 1960s. It should be noted that Dhofar during its early
history was a semi-independent region. Dhofar, between 1207 and 1829, was
governed by numerous local and Hadrami rulers. Omani control over Dhofar was
first asserted in 1829 by Sa'Id b. Sultan, but was not accomplished. Dhofar did not
come under the Omani control of Al-Bu-Sa'Id until the period of Turk! b. Sa'Id in
1879, when the Sultan allied himself with some of the tribes of Dhofar, in spite of
the resistance ofmany Dhofari tribes to the new ruler. 124 The Dhofarl rebellion came
as a result of the Sultan Sa'id b. Taimur's policy of isolation which forced thousands
of Omanis to seek jobs and education outside the country, where they witnessed the
rapid changes taking place in the Arab Gulf States and were affected by the various
ideological currents flowing through the Arab world. The Dhofar rebellion (1965-
1975) began as a tribally-based rebellion by the Dhofar Liberation Front (DFL). On
26 April 1966 a group of Dhofari soldiers attempted to assassinate Sultan Sa'Id b.
Taimur, but the attempt failed. 125
The birth of the Dhofari movement for change came about through the
unification of many Dhofari groups such as the Dhofar Charitable Association, the
Arab Nationalist movement and the Dhofari Soldiers Organisation. These groups
united in June 1965 to become the Dhofar Liberation Front. On 9 June the Dhofar
Liberation Front announced its manifesto, which was to liberate all the Dhofari
territories, and announced an armed revolt against the Sultan and his followers.
However, the situation changed when a group ofNationalists, backed by South
Yemen, took over the leadership of the Front and called a second congress of the
Front in 1968 where they adopted a new Marxist ideology. The Front changed its
name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf. Internal
stability in Oman became threatened to an even greater degree after the unification of
124. Townsend, John. Oman: The Making of Modern States. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1977, p. 25. See also. Allan, Calvin H. Jr. op.cit. p. 11.
125. Rigsbee, Wallece Lynn, op.cit. p. 45 also see Peterson, J.E. "Oman's Odyssey" op.cit. p. 12.
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the Omani National Front in North Oman with the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Oman and the Arab Gulf in the early 1970s. This unification was supported by
many Arab Nationalist regimes and many liberation movements in the Arabian Gulf,
especially the leftist movements in Bahrain and Kuwait. The rebellion was victorious
in most areas of Dhofar by the end of 1960 and the early 1970s, except for some
parts of the coastal areas near Salalah. During the early 1970s the Dhofari revolution
was supported and backed first by China and later by the Soviet Union via the
Marxist regime in Aden. The deterioration of the situation in Dhofar and the
mounting ofmany attacks by the rebels in the North and South of Oman accelerated
the British government's determination to change the situation in Oman. 126
The Coup of 23 July 1970
On the evening of 23 July 1970 Sultan Qaboos b. Sa'id seized power in Oman after a
small bloodless coup, when his father refused to abdicate and exchanged gunfire with
the supporters of the coup. Sultan Sa'Id b. Taimur finally, on the same day, signed
his abdication in front of the British Officer who led the 23 July coup. Sultan Sa'id b.
Taimur was exiled to England and died there in 1972. The coup of 1970 ended not
only the 38 year reign of Sa'id b. Taimur but also a social structure which had not
changed very much in over a thousand years. 127 Sultan Qaboos's first act was to call
on all the Omani people to return, to change the country's name from the Sultanate
of Muscat and Oman to the Sultanate of Oman and to release most of the political
prisoners. 128 During the early 1970s, Sultan Qaboos faced a real threat from the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman which was directly backed by the
neighbouring Marxist government in Aden. However, Sultan Qaboos has been
successful in gaining the support of the tribal leaders and has adopted a policy of
rapprochement and appointed many tribal leaders to ministerial posts. The
126. Document of the National Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf. The Gulf Committee,
London, 1974. pp. 7-9. And Shahdad, Ibrahim M. Al-Sira' al-Dakhillfi 'Uman Khilal al-Qarn
al- 'IshrTn. Dar al-Awza'i, Qatar, 1989, pp. 262-269
127. Skeet, Ian. op.cit. p. 63.
128. Allen, Calvin H.. Jr op.cit. p. 427.
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government continues to pay tribal and opposition subsides. The new Omani
government obtained financial assistance and military equipment from Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Britain, and Jordan, who supported the Sultan's forces against the Dhofari
rebellion.
The Nixon Doctrine for the containment of Communism played a significant
role in assisting Saudi Arabia and Iran to destroy the Dhofari revolution in the south
of Oman. The Shah of Iran supplied the Omani government with more than 3,000
men to support the Omani forces. On 11 December 1975, Sultan Qaboos announced
that the war in Dhofar was over. 129 It should be noted that, since 1970, when Sultan
Qaboos come to power in Oman, the Sultanate has transformed itself from an
isolated and backward territory into a modern and forward-looking state and played a
significant role internally, regionally and internationally. The Al-Sa'Id ruling family
in Oman is considered the oldest ruling family in the Arab region in modern history.
In 1994 the 250th anniversary of the rule of the Al-Sa'Id family in Oman was
celebrated. 130
Political Leadership
The Political System Developments
The Sultanate of Oman's political system is an absolute monarchy. On the 6th of
November 1996 Sultan Qaboos of Oman issued a decree (Decree No. 101/96)
promulgating the Basic Statute of State. The new Basic Statute of State, which has
been given the name of the White Book, consists of 81 Articles and contains seven
chapters. 131 The Sultanate is ruled by decrees issued by the Sultan himself, who is
advised by an appointed Cabinet of Ministers chosen from the tribal leaders and
129. Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulfand the Searchfor Strategic Stability...op.cit. p. 437.
130. Oman 95. op.cit. p. 36.
131. The Basic Statute ofState. Sultanate of Oman. The Omani Embassy, London. The Omani Basic
Statute of the State came as a result of the political development witnessed in the Arab Gulf
States since the second Gulf crisis. The Omani decree came into force on the date of its issue, but
the Basic Statute is subject to new laws which will be issued by the Omani government. Some
sources indicate that the Omani Basic Statute will come into force by the beginning of 2000.
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merchants. No political parties or unions are recognised and the press is subject to
strict censorship by the government. 132 Omani consultative bodies have been
through two stages of development; the first one started in 1980 when Sultan Qaboos
issued a decree to set up the Majlis al-Istishari lil-Dawlah (The State Consultative
Council). The council originally consisted of 45 members including the chairman,
who was appointed separately. The membership of the State Consultative Council
included 17 members representing the government, 17 representing the Omani
Wilayat (provinces), and 11 members representing the private business sector. All
members were appointed by Sultan Qaboos personally, via royal decree. 133 In 1983
Sultan Qaboos issued a decree increasing the number of SCC members to 55. The
Wilayat increased to 25, the government representatives to 18, and the business
community representatives to 12. Most of the government representatives were
nominated because of their official positions as under-secretaries of various
ministers. (It should be noted that the members of the SCC did not have any legal
power to participate in legislation with the government on their policies; the
members were only empowered to present their opinions and recommendations.
The Shura Council
As a result of the country's political development, Sultan Qaboos announced, on 18
November 1990, the setting-up of a Majlis al-Shura to replace the 1980 State
Consultative Council. By 25 November 1991, the new council had been established
and its powers and operating framework were defined by Sultan Qaboos in a decree
on 12 November 1991.
The system of the new Majlis al-Shura was to be wholly elected with no
government members. Each Wilayat (local governorate), of which there are 59
132. The Economist Intelligence Unit, op.cit. p. 6.
133. See Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma "The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States:
The Omani Consultative Council" The Middle East Journal. Vol.50. No.4. Autumn 1996.
London, p. 560. See also Peterson, J.E. The Arab GulfStates, op.cit. pp. 102-103. and Al-Haj,
Abdullah Juma. op.cit. p. 560. The aim of the SCC was to advise on and recommend policies
concerning economic and social development issues in Oman. These recommendations and
opinions were then submitted by the chairman of the SCC directly to Sultan Qaboos.
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throughout the country, sent one elected member to the Majlis. Each Wilaya
nominated three citizens as candidates for election to the Majlis (council). The
nominations are administered by a committee consisting of respected citizens of
experience and ability in the Wilayat. One of the three nominees is selected by the
government for membership for three calendar years. This may be renewable for
another term or more according to the respective procedures. The president of the
Majlis is appointed by Royal decree. The function of the Shura Council is to review
all social and economic draft laws prepared by the ministers before their enactment.
The council also participates in setting up development plans and in following up on
their progress. The council of ministers and the president and Bureau committee
members of the council meet every six months to review the council's progress. The
Council includes many committees which specialize in legal, economic, health,
social welfare, educational, cultural and local affairs (the committees prepare reports
on agenda items for full Council consideration). 134 Sultan Qaboos, in his first speech
before the first members of the council, declared that the "council would step on the road
ofparticipation which will serve the aspirations and ambitions of the citizens throughout Oman."\35
The council has no power to question foreign and defence policy, and the
legislators of the Omani Council have the same rights and powers as in other GCC
bodies except in Kuwait, ft should be noted that, during the final stages of the
selection, one of three nominees will be chosen by the government. 136 In 1994, the
Omani government announced that the membership of the Majlis (council) would be
increased to 81 members to reflect the last census in 1993.137 The Omani Shura
Council is the only council in the GCC States which contains women among its
134. GulfReport. "Country Profile: The Democratisation of the Gulf' November Issue, 1993. The
GulfCenter for Strategic Studies, Londo, p. 5.
135. The Speeches ofH.M. Sultan Qaboos b. Sa'id, Sultan ofOman, 1970-1990. Muscat: Ministry of
Information, 1991, pp. 215-216.
136. Joyce, Mariam. The Sultanate ofOman A Twentieth Century History. Praeger, London, 1995,
p. 119.
137. According to the new regulations, each Wilayah (province) with a population of less than 30,000
had to elect two representatives, one of whom was then nominated to membership. The Wilayah
(province) with more than 30,000 citizens elected four representatives, of whom two were
nominated as members of the Council. Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma. op.cit. p. 562.
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members. The present council of 1994-1997 has two women from the Capital city of
Muscat. In an interview Sultan Qaboos declared that:
"Women candidates will not be confined... to the Muscat Governorate,
but will gradually be extended in accordance with circumstances in other
Governorates and Wilayats"138
It should be noted that the establishment of the Shura Council in November 1991,
followed by the Basic Statute of State in November 1996, was a part of the Omani
government policy of portraying the Omani State to the international community as a
progressive political system where the people participated in the decision-making
process in order to attract international investment companies to invest in Oman. 139
Political Movements
The Opposition
Oman has witnessed more real opposition to the ruling family than any other country
in the Arabian Peninsula. Since the early twentieth century, the Omani Ibadi
Imamate has provided the oldest opposition to the central government of Muscat.
This opposition led the government of Muscat and Oman, in 1920, to conclude a
settlement agreement with the Omani Imamate and interior tribes which permitted
local autonomy, but did not recognise the Omani interior as a separate entity
independent from Muscat. Nevertheless, the Ibadi leaders (religious and tribal
Sheykhs) in Nizwa (the Ibadl-Capital) seized every opportunity to express their
autonomy until the troops of Sultan Sa'Td b. Taimur, with strong support from
Britain, destroyed their base in the interior in 1959.140
138. Kechichian, Joseph A. Oman and the World The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy.
op.cit. p. 55. It should be noted that the women candidates were extended in all the other
Governorates (Wilayat) in 1997. In October 1997 the women candidates were extended to all the
Omani Wilayat, but were unsuccessful in these Wilayat except in the capital ofMuscat.
139. Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma. op.cit. p. 564.
140. Joyce, Mariam. op.cit. pp. 28 and 57.
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The second opposition group to appear in the Southern region of Oman
(Dhofar), during the early 1960s, consisted of a number of groups which united in
1968 to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. This Front adopted a
Marxist-Leninist ideology and was backed by the South Yemeni regime. A third
opposition group consisted of a Nationalist faction in North Oman called the
National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman which unified with the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in 1974. In addition to this there was a
group called the Arab Workers Party of Oman. 141 It should be recorded that all the
Omani opposition factions ended their opposition and returned to Oman at the end of
the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, except for some people who still claim to
represent the Omani opposition in Yemen and Syria. During the late 1980s, the
Islamic movement became more active in charity associations, mosques and social
occasions.
The Omani government announced, in 1994, the arrest of an Islamic group
which had tried to overthrow the government of Oman. Many newspapers estimated
the group to be over 400 persons in size. However, the Omani government did not
jail any more than 200 persons. Some sources alleged that the Islamic group had
links with the Muslim Brotherhood movement (for more details see Chapter no 4).
However, as a result of many events such as the 25th anniversary (Silver Jubilee) of
the accession of Sultan Qaboos to the throne in 1995, the effect on the Omani
economy of the low price of oil, the increase of inflation and budget deficits, and the
demands for amnesty from the tribal Sheykhs, Sultan Qaboos issued a decision to
release all Omani political prisoners in November 1995.142
141. Shahdad, Ibrahim M. op.cit. p. 276.




Conclusion of Chapter One
The first chapter of this thesis concentrated on historical, geographical and political
developments in the GCC states. The aim of this chapter is to define the most
important political developments in the history of those six Arab Gulf states who
created a Gulf Co-operation Council in May 1981. Most of the ruling families of
these states trace their roots back more than two centuries. The rise of the Saudi
ruling family can be dated from their alliance with the WahabI movement in the mid-
eighteenth century. The Al- Sabah of Kuwait and the Al-Khallfah of Bahrain both
have their origins in tribal migrations from central Arabia in the eighteenth century.
Al-Thanl of Qatar established their dynasty in the 1860s. The seven states (Sheykhs)
of the UAE, are the Al-Nahayyan (of Abu Dhabi 1800s) and Al-Maktum (of Dubai
1830s). The other important power, the Al-Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras Al-
Khaimah, trace their origins to the powerful Qawasim tribal grouping of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The other ruling families were established by the
end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Al-Bu-Sa'id dynasty of
Oman was founded in the 1740s and is the oldest dynasty in the Arabian Peninsula
143.
There are many historical factors which have played an important role and
accounted for the survival of these families. First, the British role: all the GCC states
were (with the exception of Saudi Arabia ) under direct British protection for nearly
150 years; Britain, from the 1820s, played a significant role in the protection of all
these states against internal and external threats, especially from the most powerful
regional countries such as Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia, who put forward territorial
claims at various times. 144 The British protection of this area came under the pretext
143. As Fred Halliday mentions, Oman was never officially a British protectorate, but it was, to all
intents and purposes as much under British control as the other Gulf states. The Sultanate of
Oman, was known before 1970 as the "Sultanate of Muscat and Oman" is a fully independent
sovereign state. Since 1798, the Sultanate has maintained close treaty relations with UK. Oman
relations with Britain are based on the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 20
September 1951, and on the Agreement of 25 July, concerning military, technical and economic
assistance to the Sultanate. For more details see Al-Baharna, Husain M. op.cit. p. VII.
144. Britain signed the "Exclusive Agreement" with Bahrain in 1880, the Trucial States in 1892,
Kuwait in 1899 and Qatar in 1916. For more details see Hasant, Seyd Farooq, Security Problems
in the Persian Gulf. Progressive Publishers, Lahore, Pakistan, p. 15.
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of protecting the British maritime trade routes to India. From 1947 until the early
1970s, the British Foreign Office in London assumed direct responsibility for Gulf
affairs, and there was a resident British Commissioner in Bahrain and Political
Agents, in Bahrain, Muscat, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Sharjah respectively.
Secondly, Islam and tribal rule: all of the Arabs of the Gulf state monarchies
used the rhetoric of Islam and tribalism as symbols to legitimate themselves against
any internal or external threats or crises. Islam and tribalism were interpreted by
these regimes to legitimate their rule domestically and internationally. The historical
record of the Arab tribal system in these states played a main part, with support from
Britain, in creating these states during the eighteenth century. Britain was the main
creator of the four artificial states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates. Since the early 1950s Britain had tried many times to create a union
between these Sheykhdoms (with the exception of Kuwait); however, the British
attempts paved the way for the creation of a union consisting of the seven Emirates
of the UAE in December 1972. Despite the lack of political participation, the
political history of these Sheykhs (becoming royal families during the early 1970s)
was full of conflict and assassinations.
Thirdly, the discovery and exploitation of oil: it should be noted that oil not
only ushered in a period of rapid modernisation but strengthened the position of the
ruling families (oil was discovered at different times in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
Bahrain in the 1930s, in Qatar in 1940, in Abu Dhabi and Oman in the 1960s, in
Dubai and Sharjah in the 1970s and in different quantities); oil gave the Arab Gulf
states the means to create the structures ofmodern states and to become dispensers of
wealth and welfare in the early 1970s. The Arab Gulf states' political systems are
family-based, whereby power is concentrated in the hands of the ruling families. The
decision-making in these countries comes in three stages, the first circle exclusively
comprising members of the royal families and their close associates from the
political elite who hold senior posts; the second including the other members of the
executive authority, namely the members of the council of ministers; and the third
encompassing the bureaucrats involved in the formation and execution of policies.
Since the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, Shi'a political opposition
constitutes the main internal threat to these regimes especially in Bahrain and
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Kuwait. By the end of the 1970s, the nationalist movements in the Gulf area became
less influential after the destruction of the PLFO. Since the mid-1980s two important
factors have changed the socio-economic and political conditions under which the
"social contract" between the Arab Gulf states and their societies exists. First, the
collapse and stagnation of oil prices. Second, in response to regional military and
political threats, the acquisition of a huge amount of expensive weapons.
The Arab Gulf states, with the exception of Kuwait, have responded to
previous developments by allowing a certain level of political participation which
can absorb the growing public dissatisfaction without threatening the power of the
ruling families. All of the consultative bodies in the Arab Gulf states, with the
exception of Kuwait, are no more than a symbol of political participation. All these
councils have an advisory role, and all members are appointed by the King (in Saudi
Arabia), the Sultan (in Oman) and the Sheykhs (Amirs) in Bahrain, Qatar and the
UAE. The number of members in these councils is not representative of the
population and the powers of the council must be endorsed by the heads of the states.
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The Development and Origins of the GCC
Introduction
After the British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early seventies, the Arab Gulf
States faced many direct internal and external threats to their stability. Many of them
felt that there was a 'vacuum of power' after the withdrawal of the British umbrella,
which had protected them for so many years. At the same time many voices in the
Arab Gulf States were calling for a new wave of national consciousness and for a
greater co-ordination of efforts and strengthening of bonds between them. These
States were Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and the most
important one, Saudi Arabia, which played a very significant role in the creation of
the GulfCo-operation Council. 1
The attitudes and motivations which led to the establishment of the Gulf Co¬
operation Council vary. Some people believe that the Council was founded because
of the political developments in the Arab Gulf States after Britain's withdrawal.
These developments were based on the wish of such countries to achieve the utmost
co-operation between themselves at all levels, politically, socially and economically.
Others believe that the establishment of the Council was due to the political and
security developments that took place in the Gulf area. The main developments of
this kind were the fall of the Shah's regime, and the outbreak of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran under the leadership of Khomeini, the invasion of Afghanistan by
the Soviet Union and the Iran-Iraq war. The first was disastrous as the Shah had been
the main ally of the Arab Gulf States.
A third group believes that the creation of the Gulf Co-operation Council was
mainly due to a desire to become a part of the capitalist system, with Saudi Arabia
leading the way in order to build stronger relations with the West and especially with
I. 'Atiyyah, Husyan Afandi "Majlis al-Ta'awun Wa-Zahirat al-Takamul al-Duwall" Al-Ta'awun
Magazine. Vol. 1312. GCC Secretariate, al-Riyadh, 1989, pp. 20-21.
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the United States of America, their main supporter. The political developments
mentioned above had a great effect on the growth of the idea for the establishment of
the GulfCo-operation Council.2 Its creation was a unique event in the modern history
of the Arabian Peninsula.
The histories of both Arabia and the entire Arab nation show that the formation
of the GCC represents only one of many efforts for the establishment of greater co¬
operation between the Arab Countries. There were, for example, the unsuccessful
attempts to form a "collective Security plan" between the countries of the Gulf and
Iran and Iraq. The Arab Gulf States agreed, after many meetings and conferences, to
found a Council, in which they would co-ordinate their activities in economic, social,
media, and security matters. The six heads of the Arab Gulf States gathered in Abu
Dhabi in May 1981 and declared the foundation of the Arab Gulf Co-operation
Council.3
The Definition of the GCC
In spite of the fact that the council has been established since May 1981 legal
consultants still disagree on the legal nature of the council, a matter which is
considered the most essential challenge to the council's progress in making decisions.
Various Definitions of the Council
There are various definitions of the legal nature of the council. The Council Charter
has not defined it in a specific way as other international organisations usually do.
Some specialists think that the GCC is an international-regional organisation with
limited membership, because its member states have common features and
distinguished relations it is also national.
2. Al-Anbari, Tawflq N. Majlis al-Ta'awun Li -Duwal al-Khaljj al-'Arabiyyah wa-Tatawwur al-
Nizum al-Iqlimiyyah. M.A. Thesis. The Arab Organisation of Education, Culture and Science,
Cairo, 1988. pp. 342-351.
3. Etaibi, Ghalib Tulhab. The GulfCooperation Council: Arabia's Model ofIntegration. Unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, 1984. p. 1.
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It is considered a governmental organisation with a general function, and its members
as an international body. It is active in many different fields.4 Other people believe
that the GCC is an international and regional organisation, which has general
functions due to the presence of major factors that should be present for the
establishment of international and governmental organisations.
Bishara's Definition of the Council
The former Secretary-General of the GCC, 'Abdullah Bisharah, (1981-1992)
explained in a symposium held by him in Abu Dhabi in 1985, that there was no prior
agreement between the Member States concerning a unified legal definition for the
Council. He said that the first summit of the Council, held in Abu Dhabi on 26 May
1981, stated that the council was not a con-federal or federal organisation, but just a
co-operative council. During the third summit held in May 1983, however, he
explained that the council was a con-federal structure, the aim being confederation,
despite the fact that the council did not embody any political theory. He added, "each
member state wants to maintain her own charter, legislation and sovereignty".
However, during the Kuwaiti Summit of 1985 he said, "A year and a half ago I
described the co-operative as being similar to the con-federal system, but after the
Kuwait summit I have come to believe that the council is a co-operative between six
states which are similar in their ruling systems, economics, geography and associated
by their fate and future".
The council, according to Bisharah's definition, is neither a gathering nor a
coalition nor an alliance, but is just a co-operative framework which depends on
economic co-ordination, defensive co-operation and political rapprochement.
Bisharah believes that the reason for such a definition of the council is that the
Kuwait summit (1985) did not deal with theories because people in the Gulf do not
tend to make theories; they only confirmed the co-operative form of the council
4. Rajab, Yahya Hilmi. Majlis al-Ta'awun Li-Duwal al-KhalT] al-'Arabiyyah Ruya Mustaqbaliyyah
Dirasah Siyasiyyah Iqtisadiyyah. Dar al-'Urubah, Kuwayt, 1983. p. 91.
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without involving it in the complexity of theories, and adopted the well-known Gulf
methodology, which is a pragmatism free of linguistic transcription.
'Abdullah Bisharah confirms that the member states have no intention of considering
the co-operative council as a federal or con-federal framework or anything
subordinate to the Arab League or even as a supplement to it. They intend to define
the council as a co-operation, provided that this form is very flexible concerning the
its decisions. The nature of the council is one of the most important challenges facing
it, because the member states are not bound by its decisions unless they are agreed on
them, because they coincide with their local rules and regulations. The flexibility and
acceptability of these decisions encourage these states not to take them seriously. It is
clear that most of the economic agreements signed by the council have no validity if
they are contradictory to the local laws of the member states. An example is the
unified economic agreements and the security agreement which Kuwait and Qatar
refused to sign and approve recently.
The flexible nature adopted by the officials of the council represents one of the
major obstacles to reaching any concept of co-ordination either at a political,
economic or social level. 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Rawas defines the GCC as a council that
has been formed by a group of countries with homogenous political, social and
economic systems. These countries have agreed to co-operate in all fields. The
council is not federal or con-federal but is just a kind of co-operative between its six
member states.5 Hassan al-Alkim defined the GCC as a Sub-Regional Organisation.6
Gulf nationals believe that the council is just a functionless meeting with no positive
benefits for the lives of the people of the member states: just an excuse for ministers
to meet seasonally as a yearly summit of the region; following these meetings there
are common communiques formulated and issued by a committee composed of the
foreign ministers of the member states in co-ordination with the council Secretariat.
They have the same content and formulation without affecting the lives of the
ordinary people at economic or social levels. In its 17 years, the GCC has not been
5. Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Rawas. op.cit.




able to achieve those objectives for which it was established (except for co-operation
in the field of internal security) either at an economic, political or defense level. The
structure and nature of the GCC are considered some of the other stumbling-blocks
hindering the council's progress. The GCC does not represent the supreme power of
these countries. However, it does represent a framework for co-operation dependent
on economic co-ordination, defence co-operation and a compromise of political
points of view, and the sovereignty and interests of these countries.
The former Secretary-General 'Abdullah Bisharah considers the council's
experience to be based on a realistic formula, which does not depend on
constitutional systems or strict obligations. No doubt, the nature and structure of the
council have restricted the council's efficiency in realising any progress at the
political, economic or defensive levels.7
The Structure of the GCC
The legal structure of the GCC is one of the main obstacles to the process of
decision-making in the council. For example, the issue of national sovereignty is still
very dear to the people and leadership of each of the six members. The GCC, as a
regional integration institution, does not have power over national entities: there is,
as yet, no GCC super-national government through which regional development
priorities can supersede national ones.8 Voting and Membership are the main
hindrances to council activities. Article 9 of the charter states that resolutions of the
Supreme Council, in substantive matters, shall be carried by a unanimous approval of
7. Mitkis, Huda. "Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khalljl wa-Maba'ad al-Azmah al-Waq'i', wa-al-Tahaddiyat
wa-al-Afaq" Al-Mustaqbal al-'ArabI Year 15. No.168, February 1993. p. 97. For more details
see Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press.
1991. p. 762.
8. See Angell, Nicholas B "Impact of the GCC on the Developing Legal Systems of the Gulf
Countries" in: Sandwick, John A. (ed.) The GulfCooperation Council Moderation and Stability
in an Interdependent World. Westview press, Boulder, Colorado. 1987, p. 129 and El-Kuwaiz,
Abdullah Ibrahim "Economic Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the
Gulf: Challenges, Achievements and Future Outlook" in: Sandwick, John A (ed.) The Gulf
Cooperation Council Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World. Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado, 1987. p. 77.
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the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters
shall be carried by a majority vote.
The system of voting makes things difficult for the decision-makers and makes it
possible for one country to veto the rest on important issues.9 Under its Charter the
GCC has three basic structures, the Supreme Council (al-Majlis al-A'la) the
Ministerial Council (al- Majlis al-Wizarl) and the Secretariat General (al-Amanah al-
'Ammah). The Council also consists ofmany specialized Committees.
The Supreme Council
The Supreme Council is composed of the heads of State of the six member countries
and is chaired by its members on a rotating basis. Each member has one vote. The
Supreme Council may pass resolutions at properly-convened meetings at which a
quorum of two-thirds of its members attends. Resolutions dealing with substantive
matters require the unanimous vote of all those members attending, while a majority
vote will pass a resolution dealing with a procedural matter. The charter provides that
the Supreme Council may: examine any question of interest to the member states;
draw up major GCC policy; examine recommendations, reports, studies and joint
ventures referred to it by the Ministerial Council; discuss reports and studies prepared
by the Secretary-General; adopt policies for dealing with other nations and
international organisations; and finally amend the charter. Its sessions are governed
by rules of procedure that are concurrently approved by the charter. The Supreme
Council meets once a year although special sessions may be called if requested by
any one member and seconded by another.
The first session of the Supreme Council was held in Abu Dhabi in May 1981,
and it has held sessions (commonly called summits) each November and
December. 10
9. For more details of Article 9 of the Voting in Supreme Council see Appendixes p. 459.
10. Since its establishment in May 1981, the Supreme Council of the GCC has not held any special or
exceptional sessions. During December 1995, the Qatari government delegation withdrew from
the final session of the Supreme Council in Muscat as a result of the appointment of the Saudi
candidate to the office of Secretary-General of the Council. Some sources mentioned that the




The Ministerial Council, the most active body, consists of the foreign ministers of the
member states. The Ministerial Council holds a session every three months and, like
the Supreme Council, its chairmanship rotates. Its meetings are governed by the same
quorum and voting requirements as are the Supreme Council meetings. The
Ministerial Council is empowered to: initiate policies and studies relating to the co¬
operation and co-ordination between the member states in various fields; make
recommendations to the Supreme Council on the co-ordination of existing activity;
submit its recommendations to the relevant ministers for implementation; encourage
private sector co-operation between the member states; submit proposals to
specialized committees for study; recommend amendments to the charter; prepare for
Supreme Council summits, and finally examine matters referred to it by the Supreme
Council.
The Secretariat General
The Secretariat General is composed of the Secretary-General who is assisted by
three assistant-generals in the fields of political affairs, economic affairs and military
affairs. The Supreme Council appoints the Secretary-General.
The Secretariat General is provided with the authority, under the charter, to:
prepare studies relating to the co-operation and co-ordination of the programs of the
member states; prepare reports on GCC activities; supervise implementation of
resolutions of the Ministerial Council and Supreme Council; prepare reports and
conduct other activities at the request of the Ministerial Council or Supreme Council;
draft the administrative and financial regulations governing the GCC; and, finally,
prepare the GCC budgets and final accounts and prepare the agendas and final
resolution for the sessions of the Ministerial Council. 11
Saudi Arabia (the head of the Saudi delegation) and the Qatari Amir Sheykh Hamad. See. The
Economist Intelligence Unit. "Qatar Country Report 1st quarter 1996" pp. 23-24. Documents of
the charter of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. See Angell, Nicholas B.
'Impact of the GCC on the Developing Legal Systems of the GulfCountries' op.cit p. 130.
11. Documents ofthe Charter, op.cit. and see Angell, Nicholas B. op.cit. p. 131.
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The Secretariat General contains a number of departments that prepare reports
and conduct research on specific types of issues: the office of the Secretary-General,
Legal Affairs, Economics, Political, Man and the Environment, Information,
Military, Finance and Administration, and the Information Center. The member states
contribute equally to the budget of the GCC Secretariat General.
Following the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council, 'Abdullah
Bisharah (Kuwait) headed the council from 1981 to 1992, Fahim Al-QasimI (UAE)
from 1992 to 1995, and Jamil Al-Hujaylan (Saudi Arabia) from 1995. Besides the
three basic bodies, the GCC also contains a number of specialized committees
established to deal with particular problems or subject matters: Oil, Health, Power
and Electricity, and Finance and Economy. The GCC bodies, official representatives
and employees, including the members of the Secretariat, are given the same
diplomatic privileges and immunities that are accorded to members of similar
organisations under international law. The Secretariat members are not
representatives of their individual countries, but are regional bureaucrats with the
primary responsibility of furthering the interests of the GCC. In the performance of
their duties, they are not subjected to any influence or pressure from any of the
member-states. They are also pledged not to reveal any secrets that might damage the
GCC, either during or after their tenure in office. 12
The basic objectives of the Charter are defined by the council as co-operation
between the member-states in all fields including economics, finance, health, social
welfare, information, tourism, legislation and administration. The internal and
external security of the six states has been the most visible preoccupation of the GCC
leaders. In fact, it has continued to remain the guiding factor behind its multifarious
activities. 13
'Abdullah Bisharah the former Secretary-General of the Council commented on
some of the issues which represent real challenges and obstacles to the effectiveness
12. Dietl, Gulshan. Through Two Wars and Beyond: (A Study of the Gulf Cooperation Council).
Lancers Books, New Delhi, India, 1991, pp. 15-18.
13. For more details of the basic objectives of the Charter of the GCC article 4 of the Basic Structure
of the Council. Security cooperation is not mentioned in the areas of cooperation of article 4. See
also Dietl, Gulshan. op.cit. p. 12.
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of the council when he said "I personally feel that, since the formation of the council
in 1981, Gulf unity has not been included in the negotiations and does not represent
the pivot of the arguments and discussions. It does not play the role of the arbitrator
in settling any dispute." Bisharah added, "I can say that the territorial considerations
for each country of the member states and their urgent interests are the prevailing
arbitrator which settles the disputes between these countries; particularly in the
deliberations of the technical committee and working teams the territoriality and
interests of the member states are considered to be the most difficult challenges
facing the council". He explained that the Co-operative Council was an organisation
which could deliberate between but not unite these states; "It is decorated with fine
expressions and impressed by protocols", and that the Co-operative Council was an
organisation which speaks but does not make any progress. Because of the
ambiguous legal nature of the council, which represents one of the challenges to the
council's relationship with the member states, 'Abdullah Bisharah explained that the
council members had selected the co-operation form as a compromise between the
six member states in order to agree on a unified concept for the council. He said,
"The selected co-operation form does not have the features and nature of a bloc,
alliance or organisation. The issue is limited to the general framework of co¬
operation; the final objective has been determined as the unity of these countries at a
final stage". Bisharah stated that, due to this flexible approach, the council had
become too weak to take on board any of the decisions issued by its specialized
councils. For example the economic, political and security projects and agreements
adopted by the council, since its foundation, are still being debated and are, as yet,
unimplemented by the six member states because they oppose and contradict their
local systems. 14
14. Bisharah, 'Abdullah "Humum Majlis al-Ta'awun" Maiallat al-Ta'awun. No. 28. December 1992.
The Secretariat-General, Riyadh, p. 66.
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Underlying Elements ofUnity Between these Countries
Introduction
The establishment of the GCC came about through the accumulation of significant,
economic, social and political factors. At that time there was already co-operation
between the members of the GCC: many government specialists and administrators
were already holding conferences and meetings for co-ordination and co-operation in
their own fields: social welfare, trade and industry, public works, public health,
agriculture, finance and education. The Arab Gulf States have a common language,
religion and geography with similar natural resources and political systems and have
free enterprise economies linked with the industrialized democracies of the West.
The six countries pursue a foreign policy of co-operation with the League of Arab
States and the Islamic Conference Organisation. Long before the emergence of the
GCC, member states of the council, at both the regional Arab level the sub-regional
and Gulf sub-regional level, entered into joint projects.
The formation of the council, however, further stimulated this trend and opened
up new possibilities for the GCC region. The moves towards integration among the
Arab Gulf States date back to the early 1960s, but a political integration between the
six Arab Gulf states (excepting the experiment of the UAE) began to be considered
seriously only on the eve of the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1971.
Before the establishment of the GCC, the Arab Gulf States were co-operating with
each other in many areas of economics, social, and cultural affairs, trade and the
media, both in the Arab region and more specifically in the Gulf.
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The main joint organisations in the field of social and cultural affairs:
1). The Permanent Committee for Communications in the Arab Gulf (1971)
2). The Arab Gulf Bureau of Education (1976)
3). The Arab Gulf Health General Secretariat. (1976)
4). The General Secretariat for the Agricultural Ministers of the Arab Gulf States
5). The University of the Gulf. (1980)
The field of the Media:
1). The GulfNews Agency (1976)
2). The Joint TV Production Institution (1976).
3). The GulfTV Corporation (1977)
4). The Gulf Centre for Information and the GulfData bank (1981).
The field of Economic and Technical affairs:
1). The Gulf Air Company (1950)
2). The Gulf International Bank (1975)
3). The Gulf Post Organisation (1977)
4). The Gulf Institution of Industrial Constitutions (1976)
5). The Gulf Aluminum Company (1981)
6). The Arab Navigation Company Limited (1976)
7). The Arab Gulf Chamber of Trade, Commerce and Agriculture
8). The Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting (1976)
9). The Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation (1976).15
15. Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah. Al-Itar al-Qanunlwa-al-SiyasILi-Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khaliji. Al-Nahdah
al-'Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1988.op.cit. pp. 109-125. And Al-Muhanadi, Mohammed Essa. The Gulf
Cooperation Council: A mechanism for the security of the Citizens of Its member States. Pacific
Lutheran University, M.P.A,. 1982, Michigan, U.S.A. p. 15 and see. Nonneman, Gerd "The Gulf:
Background Assessment" in: The Middle East and Europe The Search for Stability and





The significant social factors which link these countries are the common Arabic
language, Islam (the majority of Muslims are Sunni, with a minority of Shi'a (except
in Bahrain and some Ibadis in the north of Oman), a closely comparable social
structure, and similar political systems (monarchies). In addition to this, all of these
countries have evolved from the Arab tribal system. 16
Politically the significant links between the Arab Gulf States have a long history
springing from the time of British domination. All the Arab Gulf States, with the
exception of Saudi Arabia, had been under the umbrella of British protection for
more than a hundred years. The other important political example was the
negotiations between the Arab Sheykhdoms of the Gulf (Trucial States, Bahrain and
Qatar). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, these states entered into serious
negotiations to form a federal union, encouraged by the British government. 17 In
1971 the Dubai agreement was reached, under which Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial
States were to consider joining together in some kind of federation or union.
However, the negotiations collapsed as a result of external pressures from Iran and
Saudi Arabia in addition to the border disputes between the Sheykhs of the smaller
Arab Gulf states (for more details see Chapters 5 and 6). The seven Trucial states of
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah formed
a federation known as the United Arab Emirates in December 1971,while the two
sheykhdoms of Qatar and Bahrain declared their independence.
By the early 1970s all the Arab Gulf states had become independent and Oman,
with her new leader, Sultan Qaboos, was in a new position to build more links
between these countries. 18 The experiment of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 had
16. Christie, John. "History and Development of the Gulf Cooperation Council: A Brief Overview" in:
Sandwick, John A (ed.) The Gulf Co-operation Council, Moderation and Stability in an
Independent World. Boulder, Colorado, 1987. p. 9.
17. Al-Alkim, Hasan Hamdan. The Foreign Policy ofthe UnitedArab Emirates, op.cit. p. 8.
18. Christie, John A. op.cit. pp. 7-8.
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amply illustrated that Arab Co-operation, especially in the Gulf area, was indeed
possible between these states at both on official and popular levels. 19
During the mid-seventies, as a result of direct internal and external threats to the
stability of Gulf security, many Arab Gulf States officials called for more co¬
ordination between the countries of the Gulf, particularly in the area of security.
Many initiatives had been taken to discuss co-operation in areas of common interest.
In 1976 Sultan Qaboos of Oman took the initiative and organized a meeting in
Muscat for the foreign ministers of the three regional powers, Iran, Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, and the foreign ministers ofOman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. The
object of the meeting was to discuss a co-ordinated policy for regional security and
defence. However, a dispute between the Iranian and Iraqi delegations on the security
question led to the failure of the Omani initiative. The fear of the Arab Gulf States
being dominated by Iran and Iraq also led to the collapse of the talks.
Another attempt was made when King Khalid of Saudi Arabia made a state
visit, in April 1976, to all the other Arab Gulf States. The aim of the Saudi King's
visit was to promote closer relations, particularly in regard to security. King Khalid's
visit came after the a successful conclusion of the visit of the Saudi Interior Minister
to all the Arab Gulf States in March 1976. He had proposed a security plan with the
smaller Arab Gulf States. 20
Between 1976 and 1979, there was an improvement in the relationships between
the governments of the Arab Gulf States. Following the lead of Saudi Arabia a
number of security plans were made. By the end of 1979, the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia had concluded some serious security agreements with all the Arab Gulf
States, establishing permanent foundations for security and co-operation. Saudi
influence and political predominance in the Gulf region became even stronger after
19. Peterson, Erik. R. op.cit. p. 26. See The Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Its
Charter, Structure andAchievements. GCC Secretariat, Riyadh, 1987. pp. 17-19.
20. Zahlan, Rosemarie Said, op.cit. p. 137. It should be noted that Iranian and Iraqi proposals failed to
attract support from the conservative rulers because each country's proposal was intended to
curtail the influence of others in the Gulf region. There was no consensus between Baghdad and
Tehran over the security of the Gulf on the one hand and between the Arab Gulf states and
Baghdad and Tehran on the other.
78
Chapter Two
the Intelligence Departments of the Arab Gulf States were linked to the Saudi
Security Department.21
Between 1976 and 1979 many officials in the Arab Gulf States called for more
recognition and mutual links, most of these initiatives being concerned with security.
The first initiative was advanced early in 1976 by Sheykh Jabir al-Ahmed, the
Kuwaiti Prime Minister and Crown Prince (now Amir ofKuwait). He called for:
"The establishment ofGulfUnity with the object of realising co-operation in all
economic, political, educational, and informational fields and the creation of a
form ofunity or a union with solidfoundations to serve the interests and stability
ofthe people in the region. " 22
The Kuwaiti initiative followed a tour by Sheykh Jabir of the Arab Gulf States in
which they discussed joint actions for the preservation of security and stability in the
Gulf region against the competition of external powers and the threats from the
radical Arab regimes. Many other efforts were undertaken by the various states to
bring about co-operation and understanding in the Gulf region. High-ranking officials
issued individual and bilateral initiatives in joint communiques after their visits to the
Arab Gulf States and following on from the visit of the Kuwaiti Prime Minister and
Crown Prince to all the capitals of the Arab Gulf States in December 1978. All these
countries and Kuwait called for the facilitating of greater co-operation and swift
action to consolidate the efforts of the states in the region to unify.23 Extensive
contacts and initiatives continued on all levels throughout the latter part of the 1970s.
An Omani initiative called for a project to establish a naval force owned by the Arab
Gulf States and supported by Japan and the West, so that Gulf security could be
protected, especially in the area of the Strait of Hormuz. The Omani initiative was
rejected and Saudi Arabia called for more co-operation and integration among the
21. Kechichian, Joseph A. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Security in the Persian Gulf.
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1985. p. 2.
22. Christie, John, op.cit. p. 9.
23. Etaibi, Ghalib Tulhab. op.cit. p. 39. For more details on the Kuwaiti communique with the other




Arab Gulf States to unify their armies by confining themselves to one source when
buying arms.24
During 1979 many statements were issued by officials in the Arab Gulf States
regarding co-operation. As for the emergence of the GCC, it should be pointed out
that no official record exists stating the intent of the six Gulf States to form an
integrated community, prior to February 5, 1981. Some Kuwaiti sources claim that
the idea of setting up the GCC was presented by Kuwait during the Arab Summit
meeting in Jordan in November 1980. During the Arab Conference the heads of these
countries held a separate meeting to discuss the situation in the Gulf, especially after
the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War.25 The statement, released by the Islamic Conference
Organisation, which was held in Ta'if in Saudi Arabia in January 1981, was the first
indication that the Arab Gulf States leaders were interested in adopting a joint co¬
operation especially on security matters; said:
"We affirm our collective conviction that the security and stability of the Gulfas
well as the safety of its waterways are the absolute responsibility of the Gulf
States without anyforeign interference "26
'Abd al-'AzIz Al-Rawas said, in an interview, that the Muscat meeting of 1976, for
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all eight countries of the Gulf (the six Arab Gulf
states plus Iraq and Iran), considered the first principle that led to the foundation of
the GCC and the establishment of the first security mechanism in the Gulf. Al-Rawas
stated, in the same interview, that Sultan Qaboos of Oman played a major role in
establishing the GCC when he convinced the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of its
importance during the Arab Summit held in Amman in 1980. Al-Rawas said that
Sultan Qaboos was more than a half an hour late for the meeting held by the leaders
of the Arab Gulf States in Amman in November 1980, because of his meeting with
24. Ramazani, R.K. The Gulf Co-operation Council. Record and Analysis.. University Press of
Virginia, 1988. p. 3.
25. Al-Anzi, Abdulla Meshail A. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Reasons and Challenges, Critical
and Analytic Study. Ph.D. Thesis, Claremont Graduate School, U.S.A. 1986. p. 55 and See
Etaibi, Ghalib T. op.cit. p. 47.
26. Dietl, Gulshan. op.cit. p. 9
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the Iraqi President. This meeting was to convince the Iraqi President of the
importance of the establishment of the GCC, in spite of the fact that there were no
relations between Oman and Iraq at all. The Omani Minister of Information added
that the name of the council, "the GulfCo-operation Council of the Arab Gulf States"
resulted from the name Sultan Qaboos gave it and this was before the establishment
of the council.27
The Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) claimed, in a book published in May 1981,
that the 1976 Kuwaiti initiative evolved into nearly three-and-a-half years of
extensive diplomatic effort to bring about a general consensus and accord between
the six Arab Gulf states. The second serious attempt took place in January 1981
during the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Taif in Saudi Arabia
in February 1981. The leaders of the Arab Gulf States gathered, in a separate
meeting, to discuss a consensus view on security matters in the Gulf in particular and
the Middle East in general. The statement of the OIC was the first indication that the
Gulf leaders were interested in adopting a joint policy.
The first meeting paving the way for the creation of the GCC was held in
Riyadh on 4 February and was attended by the foreign ministers of the six Gulf
States.28 Following this meeting, a committee of experts from the six states met
twice: in Riyadh on 24 February and in Muscat on 4 March. The purpose of these
meetings was to draft a charter and the by-laws for the Council. This would then be
reviewed by the foreign ministers. At the conclusion of the Muscat meeting, on 8
March 1981, the committee of experts had agreed on a draft charter that included
three structures; a supreme council, a ministerial council and a secretariat-general. On
9 March, the foreign ministers met in Muscat and approved the basic structure and
draft charter with minor amendments. Specifically, the ministers approved three of
the documents: the by-laws of the co-operation council, of the supreme council and
of the ministerial council.
They made four recommendations: 1) to hold the meetings of the supreme council in
May and November every year; 2) to hold the first session of the supreme council in
27 .Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Rawas. op.cit.
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Abu Dhabi on 26-27 May 1981; 3) to hold a meeting of the committee of experts in
Abu Dhabi on 20 May 1981 to finalize the by-laws for the Commission for the
Settlement ofDisputes; and 4) to agree, in principle, that the Secretary General of the
GCC should be from Kuwait. The Committee of Experts met in Abu Dhabi on 19-20
May to prepare for the Summit and to discuss the by-laws for the Commission for the
Settlement ofDisputes. The meeting of the foreign ministers followed on 23 May and
accomplished what it set out do; it approved the by-laws, nominated 'Abdullah
Bisharah from Kuwait as the Secretary-General and prepared the agenda for the
impending Summit. On 25th May 1981, the heads of the Arab Gulf States, Saudi
Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab
Emirates held the first summit of the newly created GCC. The Summit lasted for two
days.29
The leaders of the GCC concentrated on the three proposals submitted by Saudi
Arabia, the Sultanate ofOman and the State of Kuwait. The Saudi proposal called for
the setting up of a Gulf Organisation and suggested that the Arab Gulf countries
should buy weapons from the same source as this would make training easier and
improve understanding. The project also called for a wider co-operation among the
internal security agencies instead of establishing a military pact. The Saudi proposal
asked that regular armies should take part in reinforcing the authority of every
country and preserving the laws and the entire security system. The Omani proposals
dealt with the extremely sensitive issues of defence and security in essence, they
called for close military co-operation among the member states, leading to full
military integration in terms of command, communications, supply and strategy. The
proposal contained a suggestion to set up a common maritime force to protect the
Strait of Hormuz. The Kuwaiti proposal, which became the main proposal for the
structure of the Gulf Co-operation Council, called for more co-operation and co¬
ordination in all fields, whether economic, social, petroleum or cultural. It should be
recorded that the Kuwaiti proposal became the focal point which led the Arab Gulf
28. Ramazani, R. K. The GulfCooperation Council Record andAnalysis, op.cit. p. 1.
29. Cooperation Councilfor the Arab States ofthe Gulf. Bahrain Government Printing Press, Bahrain,
1983. pp. 17-19.
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States to define their fields of responsibility and encouraged the GCC states to
achieve military independence.30
The final Communique of the Abu Dhabi Supreme Council Summit, from the
heads of the GCC, mentioned inter alia the relationships and co-operation between
the Arab Gulf states, especially on security. It stated that:
"Their Majesties and highnesses reviewed the current situation in the area. They
reaffirm that the region's security and stability are the responsibility of its
peoples and countries and that this council expresses the will of these countries
and their right to defend their security and independence in the region from any
source. They call for keeping the entire region free of international conflicts,
particularly the presence of military fleets and foreign bases, in order to
safeguard their interests and the interests ofthe world"31
The Gulf Region's Strategic Prominence and Growing Economic
Importance
General Geographical Survey of the Gulf
The Gulf region's strategic prominence and its growing economic importance came as
a result of the strategic position of the area. David Newton, Under-Secretary of State
for Political Affairs in the Carter Administration, described the area as follows:
If the world were a flat circle and one were looking for its center a good
argument could be made that it would lie in the Gulf, Arabian or Persian,
depending on your perspective.
The Arabian (Persian) Gulf lies in a strategic geographical position, connecting the
trade and communication routes of Asia, Africa and Europe. The Strait ofHormuz is
30. See. Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah, op.cit. pp. 23-24 and 'Ubayd, Nayif 'All. Majlis al-Ta'awun li-Duwal
al-KhalT] al-'Arabiyyah Min al-Ta'awun ila al-Takamul. Arabian Union Studies Center, Cairo,
1996. pp. 131 and 196 and see Christine, John "History and Development of the GulfCooperation
Council: A Brief Overview" op.cit. p. 11.
31. Ramazani, R.K. The GulfCooperation Council Record and Analysis, op.cit. p. 28.
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one of the busiest waterways in the world. Most of the shipping of the great industrial
countries of the world passes through this gate (see map no. 8)32
The region known to the Arab countries as the Arabian Gulf,3 3 is a shallow
marginal sea of the Indian Ocean lying between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. The
Gulf extends 614 miles north-east from the Gulf of Oman in the south through the
Strait ofHormuz to the Shatt al-Arab in the north. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and
Kuwait border the Gulf in the south-west, while Iraq borders it in in the north-west
and Iran in the north-east. The Gulf occupies 92,254 square miles in area and is 210
miles wide at its widest point, which is between Bandar-el-Maqam in Iran and Ras
al-Sila on the coast of the UAE.34 The Gulf countries cover an area of over 1.8
million square miles and have borders with eight countries whose population is
greater than 75 million people (see map p. no. 89). GCC countries have a population
of approximately 19 million people and a land area of about 2,653,000 square
kilometers.35
Petroleum Reserves in the GulfRegion
The economies of the Arab Gulf States (GCC) are dominated by the production of
petroleum, which is the major export of the region and its link to the western world
and Japan. The Gulf area, today, still remains vital for world geo-politics. The Gulf
countries currently provide 25% of all the petroleum moving in international
32. The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow and curved channel connecting the Arabian (Persian) Gulf to the
Indian Ocean, is approximately 100 nautical miles long. The Strait is a geological depression
bounded by Oman (Musandam Peninsula) in the South and Iran in the north. The deep-water
channel of the Strait passes close to the Omani shores. For more details see Mujtahed-Zadeh,
Perouz. Political Geography The Strait of Hormuz. The Evolution of Iran's Role (1970s and
1980s). Geography Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,
1990, p. 10 and Al-Anazi, Abdulla M. op.cit. p. 68.
33. Amin, S.H. Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf. Royston Limited,
Glasgow, 1984. pp. 81-82. The difference over the Gulfs name, whether Arabian or Persian, is
not only one of phonetics, but covers a political conflict of deep strategic dimensions which
relates to the vital question, who is capable of dominating the Gulf regional system. For more
details on the Gulf name see 'Abdullah, 'Abdulkhallq. "Al-Nizam al-Iqliml al-KhalljP' Maiallat
al-Siyasah al-Duwaliwah (International Politics Magazine) 114, October 1993, Cairo, p. 30.
34. Joyner, Christopher C. "The Geography and Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf' in. Joyner,
Christopher C. (ed.) The Persian GulfWar. Green wood press, London, 1990, pp. 2-3.
35. Al-Mashshat, 'Abd al-Mun'Im . Al-Havah Newspaper. No. 11467, Date 11-7-94, London, p. 7.
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commerce, and the region of the Gulf contains 65% of the world's reserves. Nearly
30% of Western Europe's oil imports and 65% of Japan's originates there. As
regards the United States, its 1989 figure for oil imports was 52%, with around 18%
of those imports or 9% of the total coming from the Gulf. The demand for oil is
going up in the Western countries and the supply is being fulfilled by a rise in the
production of the GCC Countries. Considering the fact that production in the United
States has been declining and the fields in North Sea have matured, the world
economy is becoming increasingly dependent on the oil of the Gulf region. The
industrial countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) share 10.6% of the proven oil reserves in the World compared with 46.1%
the GCC.36 The GCC States also have reserves totaling more than 10.5 billion cubic
metres of natural gas, equal to about 14% of the world's total reserves.37 The most
exciting oil developments occurred in the years after the British withdrawal and the
increasing importance of the Gulf countries oil came about after the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War. The increase in the level of production and the size of the reserves of oil
and gas, in addition to the increasing needs of the great industrial countries in
particular, and the world economy in general, made Gulf security all the more
important. It was not only for the eight countries looking over the Gulf, but also
because an international and regional obsession developed in a way that nobody
expected. The Arab Gulf States, by the mid-1970s, became a most important area for
the rest of the world, especially for the great industrial countries.38
36. Al-Faris, Abdul-Razak Faris "Forecasting the Demand for Gasoline in the GCC Countries" in. Gulf
Energy and the World Challenges and Threats. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and
Research. Abu Dhabi 1997. p. 117, and Kavery, Benjamin, op.cit. p. 56; see also. Joyner,
Christopher, op.cit. p. 5.
37. Carter, Laraine Newhouse "Gulf Co-operation Council" in Narop, Richard F (ed.) Saudi Arabia, A
Country Study. Foreign Area Studies, The American University, U.S.A. 1984. p. 355. See.
Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf' op.cit. p. 66.
38. Idris, Muhammad al-Sa'Id. "Dawr al-Amn wa al-Ta'awun al-'Askari fi-Tatawwur Majlis al-
Ta'awun al-Khalljl Ka-kiyan Iqllmi" Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabl. Vol.215. January 1997. The Arab




Oil Output 1990 (Billion Barrels) 39




5 United Arab Emirates. 92,2
6 Venezuela 58,5
7 Soviet Union. 58,4
8 Mexico 56,4
9 United States 34,1
10 China 24,1
Table No: 2
Oil Reserves (million barrels) in Gulf Co-operation Council from 1985-1991(40)
Country U.A.E. Bahrain Saudi
Arabia.
Oman Qatar. Kuwait G.C.C.
1985 33,0 0,16 169,20 4,00 3,30 92,50 302,2
1986 33,0 0,14 169,60 3,90 3,90 97,50 308,0
1987. 98,10 0,13 170,00 4,00 3,10 94,50 369,90
1988. 98,00 0,11 252,40 4,10 3,10 94,50 452,40
39. Rogers, Paul and Donald, Malcolm. A Violent Peace, Global Security After the Cold War.
Brassey's, London, 1992, p. 93.
40. Al-Ta'awun, Quarterly Journal. Issue No. 32. Eighth Year. Department of Information. The
Secretary General ofGulf Cooperation Council, Riyadh, 1993, p. 169.
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1989. 98,10 0,17 254„90 4,10 4,50 97,00 456,00
1990 98,10 0,14 260,00 4,30 4,50 97,00 464,00
1991 98,10 0,15 260,90 4,30 3,75 96,5 463,70
Table No.3.
Natural Gas Reserves in the Gulf Co-operation Council, 1985-1991
(000 billion cu. ft) 41
Country U.A.E Bahrain Saudi-
Arabia
Oman Qatar Kuwait G.C.C.
1985 32,8 7,1 130,2 7,7 148,1 36,6 362,5
1986 18,2 7,1 139,9 8,2 156,7 41,2 371,2
1987 203,5 6,7 145,8 9,4 156,7 42,6 564,7
1988 201,5 6,4 183,5 9,3 156,7 48,7 606,1
1989 200,8 6,5 183,5 9,3 163,1 53,6 543,4
1990 200,4 6,1 114,7 7,3 163,1 53,6 543,4
1991 " 5,9 184,5 12,2




Oil Production in the Gulf Co-operation Council, from 1985-1992.
Thousand 000 B/D42
Country U.A.E. Bahrain Saudi
Arabia
Oman Qatar Kuwait G.C.C.
1985 1056,8 41,9 3174,8 498,0 290,0 1061,3 6122,8
1986 1308,9 42,4 4178,2 560,0 334,6 1416,0 8446,2
1987 1417,7 41,7 4142,0 582,0 293,1 1465,0 7923,5
1988 1509,5 43,0 5200,0 619,0 341,0 1463,0 9175,5
1989 1857,8 42,7 5100,0 640,5 380,5 1741,0 9762,5
1990 2059,9 42,2 6400,0 685,0 397,0 1222,0 10806,1
1991 2388,0 38,0 8100,0 716,0 391,0 193,0 11834,0
1992 2292,0 42,1 8331,0 708,2 397,0 1056,0 12826,3
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Chapter Two
Crucial Factors leading to the Foundation of the Gulf Co-operation
Council
The Emergence of the Iranian Revolution
The concept of security in the Gulf area was greatly affected by the events of 1979.
The Iranian revolution had three main implications for the Arab Gulf states. First, it
removed the Shah of Iran, the main effective regional deterrent to Soviet Union
advances in the region. Secondly, Khomeini consolidated the power of Iran and
sought to export his revolutionary ideology through the Shi'a in the region. Third,
there always was the suspicion that the new Iranian regime might act aggressively
against some of the states. The royal families of the conservative States of the Arab
Gulf felt that the main support of the twin pillars, Iran and Saudi Arabia had
undergone changes in favour of Iran, Iraq and the radical Arab regimes against the
Arab Gulf States.43
Iran, under the revolution as under the monarchy, remains a state ambitious in
foreign affairs, keen to play a role on the regional and international scene. More
significant, however, is the sectarian split between the two shores of the Arabian
(Persian) Gulf. Iran is the only state based on Shi'ism a distinctly nationalistic
expression of Islam. Bernard Lewis has suggested that a major distinction between
Shi'a (Iran) and Sunni (the Arab Gulf States) is that 'Sunnism is associated with the
status quo, Shi'ism with a rejection of the status quo. 44
Since the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, the Iranian leaders have frequently
announced their intention of enlarging their Islamic revolution beyond their border.
Iran adopted a new policy with the Arab Gulf states and encouraged Shi'ite residents
and dissidents in the Gulf region to export the revolution to these countries.
43. Ramzani, R.K. The GCC Record and Analysis, op.cit. p. 6, and See Al-Marhuby, Abdullah Amor.
Prospects for Collective Security in the Gulffollowing the Kuwait crisis. U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, U.S.A. 1991, pp. 12-13.
44. Chubin, Shahram "Iran and regional security in the Persian Gulf' Survival. Vol. 34. No. 3, Autumn
1992, London, op.cit. p. 68.
91
Chapter Two
She also supported the anti-government demonstrations of the Shi'a community in
Bahrain and Kuwait. On 18 April 1980 Ayatollah Khomeini condemned the Iraqi
President and declared that he would overthrow the Iraqi regime.45 Sadlq Tabatabai,
Under Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior stated that the victory of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran gave the Shi'ite movements in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf
countries momentum to revolt against those governments. A very important speech,
which caused a great deal of alarm among the Arab Gulf States, was delivered by
Sadiq Ruhani, an Iranian revolutionary official, on 18 April 1980. He said:
"Iran will claim Bahrain again if Iraq insists on claiming the three Islands
(which were seized by Iran in 1971). The Shah's Parliament, which surrendered
the Iranian claim on Bahrain, was not legally empowered to do so. " Ruhani also
threatened that if Bahrain would not adopt an Islamic government it would be
annexed to Iran.46
The Iranian Revolution had new implications for Gulf security and American
regional policy. The Iranian revolutionary government adopted a policy of opposition
to America and the West (those countries which had the most allies among the Arab
Gulf States). The success of the Iranian Revolution greatly encouraged the Shi'ite
population everywhere in the world, especially in the Arab Gulf States.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s violent demonstrations were held by
Shi'ites in most Arab Gulf States. During the demonstrations they shouted anti-
American slogans and pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini were displayed openly.47
There was always a suspicion that the new Iranian regime might accelerate its
aggression against the conservative countries of the Arab Gulf.48
It should be noted that, before the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, all
the Arab Gulf States had recognised the security, both internal and external, of the
Gulf region as the responsibility of the Shah of Iran with the assistance of Saudi
45. Feste, Karen A. The Iranian Revolution and Political Change in the Arab World. The Emirates
Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi 1996. p. 9.
46. Al-Anazi, Abdullah M. op.cit. pp. 73-74 and see Ramazani, R.K. op.cit. p. 7.
47. Mahmood, Fazal. Threat Perception of the GulfArab States A Study of the Emergence of the
Gulf Co-operation Council. Center of West Asian Studies, Aligrah Muslim University, India,
1990, p. 28.
48. Al-Marhuby, Abdullah A. op.cit. p. 12.
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Arabia and support from Washington. The fall of the Shah in 1979 constituted a real
internal and external threat to the conservative Arab States as well as posing a real
threat to the interests of the United States: she could no longer act as the region's
policeman and use Iran as a buffer state between the Soviet Union and the Gulf.49
Iran's style of Islam was revolutionary, militantly anti-Western and activist, and
it repeatedly clashed with the Arab Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, who sought
to use Islam pragmatically to bolster the status quo. 50 The Iranian revolution, under
Ayatollah Khomeini, brought a direct threat to the Arab Gulf States' regimes by its
impact for political change.
The Events in the Holy City ofMecca in 1979
The most important internal threat which faced Saudi internal security was the
seizure of the Grand Mosque. Some 200-300 persons occupied the Holy Mosque in
Mecca on 4 November 1979 and held the area of the Mosque for more than two
weeks. The group, which was commanded by Juhayman al-'Utaibl, called itself the
Muslim Revolutionary Movement in the Arabian Peninsula.51
The seizure of the Grand Mosque was a new stage of internal threat to the Arab
Gulf States and was a serious challenge to the Saudi royal family, as this was the
main holy place of the Muslims. The occupation of the Mosque seemed to be part of
a growing Islamic tide in the Arab Gulf States, especially among those who disagreed
with Saudi foreign policy and her relations with the West, and in particular, the
United States. During the recapture of the Mosque 102 insurgents and 127 soldiers
were killed. Later, in January 1980, 63 members of the group who had been captured
were beheaded at public executions held in various cities throughout the country.
Many sources indicate that Special Forces from the West, especially from
France, played a significant role in the battle with the Juhayman force. During the
fighting in the Grand Mosque there were riots and demonstrations by Shi'a dissidents
49. Christie, John, op.cit. p. 9.
50. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Iran - Saudi Arabian Relations and Regional Order"
Adelphi Paper 304, London, 1996. p. 15.
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in the Eastern Province and over 20,000 troops, including some from Pakistan, were
required to restore order and prevent the unrest from spreading to the Shi'a
communities in the rest of Saudi Arabia.52 This event led directly to the co¬
ordination of the royal families in the Arab Gulf States towards strengthening their
internal security against Islamic movements, especially Shi'ite ones. Since 1979
Saudi Arabia has played a significant role in co-ordinating the Intelligence
Departments of the Arab Gulf States on matters of security through treaties and
agreements. 5 3
Shortly after the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, the Shi'a of the Arab Gulf,
with strong support from Iran, became more militant. Some Shi'a, from Saudi
Arabia's Eastern Province, established an "Islamic Revolution Organisation for the
Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula". This organisation was often involved with
secular dissidents in various anti-regime activities. Some sources indicate that, by
1986, there were about 900 political prisoners in Saudi Arabia.54
Disunity and Breakup of the Arab World
The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 had a considerable effect on Arab policies
and the Arab co-operation system, especially on the countries of the Arab Gulf. This
development led to the emergence of a strong tide of nationalism, and the radical
(revolutionary) Arab States of Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and South Yemen, as well as the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, launched a strong campaign against Egypt and
those Arab countries with good relations with the United States.
The Arab Gulf States hesitated a great deal before joining the Arab Summit of
1978, which was held in Baghdad to discuss Egypt's planned peace treaty with Israel.
51. Mahmood, Fazal. op.cit. pp. 31-32.
52. Jane's Sentinel Newsletters: The Gulf States. 1995, London, p. 25.
53. Salame, Ghassan. op.cit. "Assessing Alternative Future Arrangements for Regional Security" in:
Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross (eds.) Powder Kegs in the Middle East The Struggle for
GulfGulfSecurity. Roman and Littlefield Publisher, Inc. Langham, Maryland, U.S.A. 1995, pp.
40-41.
54. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles " Iran - Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" Adelphi
Paper Issue No. 304. The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1996, London, p. 16.
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However, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf countries were in no position to
boycott the conference. Egypt, who had been the main ally of the Arab Gulf States
under the regime of Sadat, no longer had any importance for the Arab countries,
particularly the conservative regimes of the Gulf. All the countries of the Arab Gulf
severed their diplomatic relations with Egypt and rejected the Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty, with the exception of the Sultanate of Oman, who welcomed the Treaty and
maintained its relations with Egypt.55 During the late 1970s, the Arab Gulf States
had to assure their security and stability without any security umbrella after the axis
between Cairo, Tehran, and the Arab Gulf States became redundant. After the many
events which took place in the Gulf area affecting the stability of the Gulf
monarchies, splits and polarization in the Arab system became prevalent, particularly
at the start of the Iran-Iraq war, when Syria and Libya supported Iran.56
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980
The crucial and immediate threat to direct security in the Arab Gulf States, which led
to the setting up of the Gulf Co-operation Council, was the War between the two
largest regional countries, Iraq and Iran in September 1980. The war began after a
period of deteriorating relations between these two historic rivals, dating from the fall
of the Shah and his replacement by the Iranian Islamic Revolution.57
The political hostilities between Iran and Iraq took a decisive step when Saddam
Hussein (who had become the Iraqi head of state in mid-1979), took the formal step
of abrogating the 1975 accord between Iraq and Iran which was signed under the
auspices of the Algerian President Bu Madyan for sharing the sovereignty of the
55. Mukhles, Ahmad A. Majlis al-Ta'awun Li-Duwal al-Khalij al-'Arabiyyah Dirasah Siyasiyyah.
Arabian Gulf Studies Center. University ofBasra, Iraq, 1986, p. 85.
56. Abe, Hiroyuki. Regional Integration in the Gulf The background to the Formation of the Gulf
Co-operation Council. The Institute ofMiddle East Studies, Japan, 1987, p. 74.
57. Tartter, Jean R. "Regional and National Security Consideration" in: Metz, Helen Chapin (ed)
Persian Gulf States Country Studies, op.cit. p. 325.
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Shatt el-Arab between the two countries. The Iraqi President declared that Iraq's
sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab had been restored.58
The speech which best explains the effect of the Iran-Iraq war on the Arab Gulf
States security is that of the former Secretary-General of the GCC, 'Abdullah
Bisharah:
The Iran-Iraq war has always been our major concern. It is a nightmare that
sleeps with us, has breakfast with us, comes to picnic with us. However, we have
an expertise in war management—to head off the crisis, to contain it, to minimize
the damage and to scare away the threat. We have outsmarted the war, outwitted
it through juggling. We are not going to be dragged into it, no matter how it
intensifies. 59
From the outbreak of war to the time of the establishment of the GCC, the conflict
went through four distinct phases: the period before September, escalating tensions
and incidents on the border; the Iraqi attacks of 22 September; the Iranian strikes in
November on the Iraqi oil infrastructure; and a period lasting up until May 1981 in
which no major victories were achieved by either side. It should be recorded that the
Iran-Iraq war, which lasted for eight years from 1980 to 1988, resulted in an estimated
400,000 deaths and 1 million wounded on the Iranian side and 300,000 deaths and
800,000 wounded on the Iraqi side. By 1987, Iran had suffered more deaths in battle
than the United States did in World War II, and Iran only had a third the population
of 1945 America.60
Power Struggle in the GulfRegion
The Gulf area has, for centuries, attracted the attentions of the leading nations of the
world. The Portuguese, Ottomans, Dutch, French, Russians, British and the United
States are some of the major players in the history of the Gulf region. The modern
58. Peterson, Erik R. "The GCC and Regional Security" in: Sandwick, John A.(ed.) The Gulf
Cooperation Council, Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World. Westview Press,
Boulder, Colorado, p. 170.
59. Dietl, Gulshan. op.cit. p. 53.
60. Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert. Politics in the Middle East. Fourth Edition, 1994. p. 386
and see. Al-Marhuby, Abdullah A. op.cit. p. 14.
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history of power struggles and competition in the Gulf region started in the period
after the end of the Second World War, except for British involvement.
The Gulf region became an important area for these powers after the discovery
of oil. The presence of Britain, followed by the United States after the end of the
Second World War, gave the other great powers, especially the Soviet Union, the
pretext to become involved in the Gulf region.61 Historically, the Soviet Union has
viewed the Gulf region, the area adjacent to its south-eastern borders, as a tempting
area for expansion. Soviet involvement in the Arabian Peninsula came as a result of
her support for the revolutionary regime in North Yemen and her relations with
Nasser of Egypt. The conflict in North Yemen (between the revolutionaries backed
by Egypt and the Soviets and the Royalists backed by Saudi Arabia and the United
States) was the first Soviet step in gaining a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula and
the Gulf. 62
The Soviet strategic aim was to stretch her authority as far as the warm waters
of the Gulf, with consideration given to geographic, ideological, and increasingly
economic factors. Soviet behaviour was also influenced by ideological competition
with the West. This resulted in her support of anti-western movements in the Arabian
Peninsula and other parts of the Middle East through the Leftist, Communist and
Nationalist Parties in Iraq, South Yemen and the People's Front for the Liberation of
Oman.63 The growing Soviet strategic link with Iraq (in 1972, the two countries
signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation), South Yemen and Ethiopia caused a
direct threat to the Arab Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia and Oman, who were
affected by the perceived Soviet threat from neighbouring South Yemen and the
activities of the Dhofari rebellion in the south of Oman, which was directly supported
by South Yemen and the Soviet Union. The struggle for power become more critical
during the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union and her allies, Cuba and East Germany,
established a regular presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia, supported by her
61. Al-Anazi, Abdullah M. op.cit. 57.
62. Muqallid, Isma'Tl S. Amn al-KhalT] Wa-Tahdiyyat al-Sira' al-Duwali. Al-Ruby'an Publication,
Kuwait, 1984. p. 3.
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acquisition of military facilities in Aden, Socotra in South Yemen and the Dahlak
islands in Ethiopia.
The struggle over the Gulf region become more intensive during the late 1980s,
as the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block were faced by severe oil shortages. The
Siberian fields had become depleted and, like the West, they too became dependent
on supplies from the Gulf area.64 During the late 1970s, direct and indirect Soviet
intervention across the geographical zone spanning southern Africa and south-east
Asia presented a pattern which greatly concerned Western policy-makers: radical
leftist regimes were appearing in countries such as Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Angola
with close economic, diplomatic and military links to the Soviet Union. Many
Western scholars could see the Soviet Union gaining momentum in the third world,
in contrast to the relatively rapid decline in the Western position in that area.65
The American presence in the Gulf area, from the early 1950s, came as a result
of her relations with her allies, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Baghdad Pact
of 1955 was the first American exercise in foreign policy in the Gulf region. The
Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 was the first step towards ensuring America's rights to
post military forces in the area to block any expansion of the Soviet Union into the
Gulf region and the Middle East. The American policy aim was to secure the alliance
of the conservative regimes in the Gulf by attaching them, uncompromisingly, to the
Western world with respect to their military and economic interests.66
During the years from 1957 to 1967 Arab radicalism posed a real threat to the
Arab Gulf States. They feared the threats posed them by political forces backed from
outside, Ba'thists, members of the Arab nationalist movements, and the Arab migrant
63. Mottale, Morris Merhrdad. The Arms Buildup in the Persian Gulf. Lanham University Press of
America, London, 1986, p. 46.
64. Acharya, Amitav. The GulfCo-operation Council and Security: Dilemmas ofDependence. 1981-
88. GulfCenter for Strategic Studies, London, 1989. pp. 6-7.
65. Litwak, Robert and Macfarlane, Neil "Soviet activism in the Third World" Survival. Vol. XXIX
No.l. pp. 21-23.
66. Murray, Gordon. Conflict in the Persian Gulf. The Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1987, p. 21.
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workers, especially Palestinians, Iraqis and Yemenis.67 (for more details see chapter
no. 3 and 4)
The Soviet Invasion ofAfghanistan
The second major event which represented a direct external threat to the Arab Gulf
States was the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan in 1979. The presence of over 100,000
Soviet troops in Afghanistan brought this external threat closer to the Arab Gulf
States (since the distance from Afghanistan to the Gulf region is only 450 miles).68
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coincided with a shift in the balance of power in
the Middle East in favour of the Soviet Union. At the time of the Soviet invasion, the
United States was in no position to protect the Arab Gulf States against any invasion
from Afghanistan.
The United States had no tangible policy and virtually no military capability in
the region to counter additional Soviet advances toward the area of the Gulf.69 The
situation in Afghanistan led to an intensive effort between the Arab Gulf States and
the United States to counter the Soviet expansion. In Washington, President Carter
declared the Gulf region to be a vital region for the United States and created a new
force (DIF) to protect the Gulf from aggression or any attempt by the Soviet Union to
seize the Gulf oil fields and cut off the West's vital oil lifeline. He also encouraged
the Arab Gulf States to form closer relations in order to help cope with the Soviet
external threat.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a new level in the relations between
the Arab Gulf States and Washington and American troops were stationed in the
67. Halliday, Fred. "The GulfWar and its Aftermath: First Reflections" International Affairs. Vol. 67
No. 1 January 1991. The Royal Institution of International Affairs, Cambridge, 1991, p. 99.
68. Magnus, Ralph H. "Afghanistan and the Gulf Security: A Continuing Relationship" in: Darius,
Robert G and others (eds.) GulfSecurity into the 1980s. Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions.
Hoover Institution Press, Standard, California, 1984. p. 26.
69. Teicher, Howard and Teicher, Gayle Radley. Twin Pillars to Desert Storm America's Flawed




Arab Gulf States on a permanent basis to protect the countries from internal and
external threats.70
Views Behind the Emergence of the GCC
The most important reasons for the foundation of the GCC as mentioned by the
Secretary-General ('Abdullah Bisharah) of the GCC, are as follows:-
1) The radical changes in international economic relations which transferred the oil
power from the companies and major consumers to the producers. These changes
were crowned by the British withdrawal from the Gulf region and the rise in the
importance of the oil of the Arab Gulf states after 1973.
2) The changes in the Arab countries which brought into force the concept of Arab
security unification, a matter which convinced the six Arab Gulf states that they
should make collective efforts for the security of the region.
3) The Iran-Iraq war, the clear message of which was that the Arab Gulf countries
should think and deal in a non-traditional way. In other words, they should
depend on their own means and abandon the old concepts ofArab security.
4) The nature of the region, its political and economic advantages and its
international importance.
5) The problems of development, manpower, similarity in economics and the social
and political structure. These states are well aware of the importance of being less
dependent on oil and of diversifying the sources of their income.71
Dr Hassan Al-'Alklm believes that, in addition to the previous reasons for the
establishment of the GCC, Saudi Arabia desired to legitimise her dominant role over
the other Arab Gulf states and enhance her position in the sub-Gulf regional system
and the regional system in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-'Alklm also believes that,
among the causes of the establishment of the GCC, was the wish of the U.S.A. to
70. MacDonald, Charles G "U.S. Policy and Gulf Security" in: Darius, Robert and others (eds.) Gulf
Security into the 1980s Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions. Hoover Institution Press,
Stanford, California, USA, 1984, p. 93.
71. Bishara, 'Abdullah Y. Tajrubat Majlis al- Ta'awun al-Khalijl khatwah aw 'Aqabah fi Tarlq al-
Wahdah al-'Arabiyyah. Muntada al-Fikar al-'Arabl, 'Amman, pp. 32-33.
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bring about a system of security for the allied countries so that they could look after
themselves until the arrival of American military supplies.72
It should be noted that the South-East Asian League including Thailand, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei (who enrolled in 1985),
which was founded in 1967, is considered as the organisation most similar to the
GCC in its regional developments, and foreign political tendencies. The main
objective of this League was to confront Communist expansion in south-east Asia.
The United States of America played a major role in supporting the establishment of
the league in order to resist the Communist expansion supported by Moscow and
Peking. But the South-east Asian League, with an initiative from Malaysia in 1975,
gave the economic side a great deal more importance than the political one as far as
the relations between these states went. The political tendencies, which led to the
foundation of the South-east Asian League, are similar to those of the GCC, which
opposes Communism and supports Western policies.73
Regional and International Reactions to the Foundation of the GCC
Arab Reactions
All the Arab Gulf States (GCC) claim that the Co-operation Council is considered as
a "brick in the Arab building" and not an alliance or an axis directed against
someone. It is just a regional organisation working within and according to the Arab
League objectives.74
The Council was welcomed by the newspapers in Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, and
Egypt, and was considered as a step in the right direction. Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya
and Algeria were more reserved, however. Libya, South Yemen and Syria adopted a
rather cautious official approach towards the foundation of the GCC, neither
72. Interview with Hassan Al-Alkim. op.cit.
73. Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah. Al-'Alaqat al-Duwaliyyah Li-Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khaliji Dhat al-SalasIl
Publication, Kuwait, p. 38 and Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah. Al-lttar al-Oanuni.op.cit. p. 168.
74. Rajab, Yahya Hilml. op.cit. p. 71.
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supporting it nor condemning it outright. They took note of the emergence of this
regional body against a backdrop of increased American presence in the region. Her
naval activity in the Indian Ocean had increased and the Rapid Deployment Force
(RDF) and new naval bases had been established in Oman and Bahrain.75
The official Arab positions varied according to the interests and strategic
relations of those states with the Arab Gulf States of the GCC.76 Chedli Klibi, the
Secretary-General of the Arab League, described the Council as a pioneering step in
the Arab world. Al-Habib Al-ShatI, the Secretary-General of the Islamic
Organisation, considered the foundation of the Co-operation Council of the Arab
Gulf States as a new and important factor, a solid support for the Arab nation.77 Iraq,
which was the only non-GCC country with borders on the waters of the Gulf,
emphasized that the freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the maintenance of
security in the Gulf region was the responsibility of the states bordering the waterway
and declared her opposition to any regional alliance. Although Iraq had her
reservations about the establishment of the GCC, she was not in a position to mount
serious opposition because she had just started a war with Iran and needed to improve
her relations with the GCC states and the other Arab states in order to obtain aid from
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Iraqi foreign minister, Sa'dun Hammady, in an
interview in London in March 1981, commented that "the Gulf Cooperation Council
was an attempt to disregard and emasculate the Arab League"78
Somalia also expressed her opposition to the establishment of the Council after
her application for membership was turned down. The former Yemen Democratic
Republic also criticised the establishment of the Council and called on the Peninsular
States, the States of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa to convene a conference to
75. Al-Moussa, Abdulaziz. The Gulf Cooperation Council: An Experiment in Regional Organization
A Legal and Political Analysis. Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneve,
1988. p. 23.
76. Al-Nufaysl, 'Abdullah F. Majlis al-Ta awun al-Khalijlal-Itar al-Siyasi Wal-IstratijI. (Gulf Co¬
operation Council: The Political and Strategic Framework) Arab Gulf Vol. 15 PT 1, London,
1983, p. 30.
77. Rajab, Yahya Hilml. op.cit. pp. 71-72.
78. Mukhlis, Ahmad 'A. op.cit. p. 115.
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discuss the security issue in the region. In the Arab Republic of Yemen, the San'a
newspapers expressed strong criticism for the Council and considered it harmful to
Yemen. They accused the six states of the GCC of disregarding the interests of
Yemen because they had met to discuss the security of the region without Yemen's
participation as if Yemen had no connection with it. San'a newspapers commented:
"if our brothers in the Peninsula and the Gulf considered that Yemen was a non-oil
state and that was the only reason for excluding it from the security scheme and from
the Gulf Co-operation Council, the Council should rather been called the Oil Gulf
States Co-operation Council.79
During the council Summit, held in Doha in December 1996, the Republic of
Yemen submitted an application to join the GCC, but the application was rejected.
The council members suggested that they should deal with Yemen according to
special agreements between Yemen and the Arab Gulf states. But Qatar, who refused
to support the separation of South Yemen and supported San'a during the civil war
of 1994, suggested, after long negotiations between the leaders of the GCC countries,
the foundation of a Regional Co-operative Council including both Iraq and Yemen.
This was totally rejected by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Some reliable Gulf sources
mention that some of the Gulf countries of the council, including Oman, Qatar and
the UAE, did not make any reservations about the affiliation ofYemen to the council.
However this did not amount to full support for Yemen's affiliation to the co¬
operation council because of the strong objections by some of the other countries,
particularly Saudi Arabia. She claimed that this matter would represent a very
dangerous precedent and would have negative reactions on the existing homogenous
structure of the member states regarding the similarity in all levels.80
San'a confirmed that the question of their application for membership into the
co-operation council was still on the table. However, the Yemeni leadership
confirmed through the speech of President 'All 'Abdullah Saleh, that the reasons that
made Yemen apply for affiliation to the Gulf Co-operative Council were that Yemen
79. 'Ubayed, Nayif 'All. Majlis al-Ta'awun Li-Duwal al-KhalT] al-'Arabiyyah Min al-Ta'awun ila-
al-Takamul. op.cit. p. 135.
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considers herself an integral part of the structure of the Arabian Peninsula and the
Gulf. When She applied for affiliation to the GCC she took into consideration the
fact that Yemen shares the same geography, history and strategic attitude as the GCC
States. She also took into account the economic and security considerations in
addition to the fact that co-operation between Yemen and the six member states
would serve the peace, stability and security of the region.8l The Yemeni Minister
for Legal Affairs confirmed that the systems of the GCC did not include any
provisions which might hinder the affiliation of Yemen to it. All the main terms and
conditions were satisfied, the most important of which is the historical and
geographical correlation, as no one is allowed to delete Yemen from the map.82
Iran condemned the project of the GCC immediately. 'All Khamenei the
spokesman of the revolution explained the opinion of his government, indicating that
this agreement had been made against Iran, However, no practical reason has been
given by Iran to explain her rejection. Iran, with emphasis on 'neither East nor West',
expressed serious doubt as to the professed goals of the GCC.83 Tehran declared,
before the formal constitution of the council, that the council would be nothing less
than a military alliance under the umbrella of the United States, a substitute for a
treaty organisation. Once the GCC was established, Iran warned that nothing could be
decided in the Gulf region without her consent.84
80. •AALAMAL-KHALEEJ. Issue No. 46. April 1997. London, p. 1.
81. Rose al-YusufMagazine. Vol. 3604. No.72. Monday 7/7/1997. Cairo, p. 29.
82. Some political analysts have explained that the acceptance of Yemen as a member of the GCC
would have meant the acceptance of a revolutionary state which had deep socialist roots in a
conservative, capitalist gathering of hereditary monarchies, a matter which might politically
influence these ruling regimes. However, the Middle East News Newspaper issued in London,
alleged that an American strategy sought to join Yemen to the co-operation council; the
Newspaper explained that the USA considered Yemen as the South-East gate of the Gulf region,
and that its affiliation to the council would allow the deployment of Gulf Forces or Allied Forces
from the Gulf at Bab al-Mandab at the south entrance of the Red Sea. Reuter News Agency. News
issued on 30/2/1997, London. See also 'AALAMAL-KHALEEJ. op.cit. p. 1.
83. Al-Rumaihl, Muhammad. Al-KhalTj Lays Niftan Dirasah fi-Ishkaliyyat Tanmiyah Wa-al-
Wahdah. Kazmah Publication, Kuwait, 1983, p. 117.
84. Braun, Ursula "The Gulf Cooperation Council" in: Maul, Hanns W and Pick, Otto (eds) The Gulf





The United States of America welcomed the establishment of the Gulf Co-operation
Council. The State Department issued a statement which said: "the establishment of
the Council was a initiative which, as far as we know, came from the member States
of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates
without consultation with any states outside the region. That initiative is their
business and we have no right to comment on their goal or on the extent of the co¬
operation between these states. American policy, which generally supports the
concept of co-operation among countries of the Gulf, is an old-established and well-
known policy. We have been able, for a long time, to maintain strong relations with
those countries who have become members of the Council. "85
The Soviet Union
Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, gave the Soviet Union's reactions when
Sheykh Sabah Al-Ahmad, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait, visited Moscow in April
1981, to explain the idea of the Co-operation Council to Soviet officials. The
response of Gromyko, quoted by Pravda, was to criticise the Omani proposal for the
establishment of a common navy to protect the Strait of Hormuz; Pravda also
criticised the Saudi initiative for the "unification of the military potentials of such
countries" saying that this alliance could not serve stability in the region.86 The
Soviets considered that the establishment of the GCC could not have taken place
without American support and that the United States and her allies in NATO were
trying to create an alliance similar to their own in the Gulf region. They believed that
85. Rajab, Hilmi. op.cit. p. 70. See also. Mukhlis, Ahmad 'A. op.cit. p. 116., and See. Wathaiq Majlis
al-Ta'awun al-Maslrah wa-Tahdiyyat. The GCC Secretariat Publications. 1986, pp. 63-64.
86. 'Ubavd. Navif'A. op.cit. p. 136.
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the GCC could not serve stability in the Gulf or the interests of the Arab people. 87
The Soviet media adopted a negative attitude towards the GCC by calling it "a rich
men's club of conservative Arab oil-producing countries".
Radio Moscow said that the Riyadh Conference, at which the establishment of
the council was decided, had not devoted its attention to the presence in the region of
a huge naval fleet of the USA and its NATO allies. Nevertheless the Soviets, while
remaining critical of the council, found it preferable to avoid any expression of open
or direct attack against it at this time. The Soviet Union supported, however, those
countries in the region with a pro-Soviet orientation, and encouraged them to join
together as a counter-weight to the GCC. One such move was the South Yemen,
Libya and Ethiopia treaty. 8 8
In a report published by Kuwaiti Al-Anba Newspaper on 30 December 1984 on
Soviet attitudes to the GCC, it stated that the indifference of Moscow to the council
was due to the following reasons:
1) Five of the Co-operation Council states have no diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc Countries. Some of these five states still insist
on not establishing diplomatic relations despite the many attempts of the Soviet
Union regarding this matter.
2) Those countries which refuse to establish any relations with Moscow, however,
have close relations with the USA.
3) Despite the fact that the Co-operation Council has an economic bias towards Gulf
co-ordination and integration, the Gulf military and security side has became one of
major interest, especially, as this Gulf military interest is similar to U.S plans of
containing the Soviets.
One of the Soviet officials gave his opinion on the Co-operation Council: "the Co¬
operation Council is a kind of regional coalition, and one of Washington's ideas was
to establish Arab military coalitions in the Middle East, and that these coalitions
should be hostile to the Soviet Union". The official added that the Co-operation
87. Mukhlis, Ahmad 'A. op.cit. p. 117.
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Council was one ofWashington's concepts, and that the Council was established on
an economic basis not on a military one. However it would gradually become one of
the military fronts associated with Washington.89
Britain
In London the former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, welcomed the
establishment of the GCC and paid tribute to its members and called for closer
relations especially on the issue of security in the Gulf area.
Other countries such as Pakistan, India, Turkey, China, Japan, South Korea, France,
West Germany, Holland, Belgium and Austria welcomed the establishment of the
GCC.90
Conclusion of Chapter Two
This chapter focuses on the political developments which paved the way for the
establishment of the GCC in May 1981. Despite the talk that the GCC foundation
came as a result of the joint factors existing between the Arab Gulf states such as
Arabic, Islam, similar regimes (monarchies), similar economies, social affairs,
culture, and shared geography, in reality internal and external security provided the
main reasons which caused these states to create a foundation between them.
The British decision to withdraw from the Gulf region in the early 1970s was
one of the main events that caused the Arab Gulf states to find some form of co¬
ordination amongst themselves in order to cope with threats to internal security
(coming from the PFLO, the rise of the Shi'a (supported by Iran), the nationalist
movements and expatriates) and external security (coming from the fall of the Shah
88 Al-Moussa, Abdulaziz. op.cit. pp. 26-27.
89. However, in 1985, the relations between Moscow and the Arab Gulf states witnessed some
progress in the diplomatic field, shown by the decision of both Muscat and Abu Dhabi to establish
diplomatic relations, followed by Riyadh and Manamah subsequently. It should be noted that,
before 1985, Moscow did not have diplomatic relations with any of the Arab Gulf states except
Kuwait. See Wathaiq Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Masirah wa-Tahadiyyat The Secretariat of the GCC
Publications, The University of Kuwait, 1984, pp. 59-60.
90. 'Ubayd, Nayif 'Ali. op.cit. p. 137.
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of Iran, the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War).
On May 25, 1981, six Arab Gulf states-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain,
the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman-signed a charter establishing a
regional entity called "the Co-operation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf'
otherwise known as the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The formation of the
GCC was aimed at shoring up the security of the Arab Gulf states and their regimes.
Following a number of incidents of political violence, particularly the attempted coup
in Bahrain in late 1981, "security", internal or external, became the most prominent
priority for Arab Gulf regimes and the council agenda. In fact the idea of establishing
a Gulf regional organisation began in 1976 when Muscat hosted a regional
conference for the eight countries of the Gulf (GCC + Iraq and Iran). After some
consultations between the eight countries there were many proposals and projects that
contributed to the founding ofGCC.
The foundation of such a council and the restriction of its membership to the six
conservative Arab states gave rise to regional and international reactions ranging
between anger, acceptance and support. The USA and Britain were the countries that
most welcomed the foundation of such a council and encouraged the efforts and
objectives for which was established; on the other hand some of the progressive Arab
countries, as well as Iran and the Soviet Union, believed the foundation of the GCC
to be an expansion of American and British domination in the Gulf area.
The basic charter of the council mentioned co-operation between the six states
in every aspect; economic, social, political, cultural, and trade. However, most of the
basic charter, which was signed in 1981, did not make much progress, except for the
close co-operation on internal security between their intelligence departments
(internal security co-operation between the GCC states, in fact, remains one of the
most developed forms of co-operation within the Gulf community). Since the early
1970s the Arab Gulf states have made many attempts to reach political co-operation;
however these attempts have failed as a result of the following:
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a) the lack of political participation by these countries; b) the disputes over
borders; c) the concept of sovereignty for the individual state; d) the nature of the
royal families' regimes; e) outside powers' attention and rivalry; f) the nature of
domestic politics and finally; g) the low degree of economic interaction and the
political disputes over foreign policy.
The Omani Minster of Information said that the main objective of the Muscat
conference of 1976 was to allow co-operation between the eight Gulf countries
(GCC+ Iraq and Iran) and reach a common security between them. But the
ideological differences, between Iran and Iraq on one side and Iraq, Iran and the Arab
Gulf states on the other, stood in the way of the realisation of such an objective. The
Minister added that there was no doubt at all that, for the benefit of the six states,
there should be a joint co-ordination between them. This should be on a political and
economic level and should be limited to the six states only. 91
The importance of this council came as a result of oil, as all the GCC states sit
on the world's largest known reserves of crude oil. The region's production is about
14 million barrels per day. Many political analysts considered that the formation of
the GCC, in May 1981, might encourage the six Arab Gulf states to benefit from the
1970s experience concerning Gulf security. They might understand those lessons,
particularly that the balance of power was in favour of Iran and Iraq as compared to
the power of the six Arab Gulf states.
The objective of the GCC's establishment was the creation of a third power in
the region, starting with the concept of security and ending with common economic
and political integration between the council member states. These aims have not
been achieved, and the council has failed to carry out the collective security function.
The Arab Gulf states began to build up their own military power individually. The
consensus between these countries did not go beyond the establishment of the
"Desert Shield" Force.
There were continuous discussions on the necessity of developing military co¬
operation between the GCC states as well as collective co-ordination in the security,
political and economic fields. The GCC summits continued to repeat many claims
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without making any practical application to them. Since the foundation of the GCC
in 1981, the security of the Arab Gulf states has just remained appeals and slogans.
The six countries realise that Gulf security is the responsibility of the Gulf peoples
despite the extensive Western military presence in the region.
Regarding the basic proposals which might activate the role of the GCC,
Ahmed Yusuf Al-Harthy, the Chancellor of the Arabian Department at the Omani
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believes that the council's role is to realise the objectives
for which it was founded. They are superior objectives seeking integration between
the six countries in order to achieve social, economic and political security for their
peoples, a matter which must be realised through the application and the
implementation of the unified decisions of the GCC, especially in the supreme
council.
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons there is the popular and
governmental desire in the Gulf countries, who view the council as a sort of refuge,
to conserve the political and social identity of the six separate states. This formal and
popular concurrence forms the basic reason for the existence and the continuation of
the GCC.
I myself think, as a Gulf citizen who believes absolutely in a link between
causes and results, that the GCC has responded to some of its objectives. I mean that
it has conserved the political identity of the six states during serious threats to its
security in the form of the political events witnessed by the region during the past
two decades, such as the Iranian Revolution, the eight year war between Iran and Iraq
and, more recently, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and her liberation. The GCC
provided the political protection for the security and organisation ofKuwaiti refugees
who fled to the other GCC states. Moreover the GCC countries defended their case
with all their power. To say that the council has realised most of the objectives for
which it has been established, however, is a dream and not a reality.
Therefore, the GCC can be considered as a political, co-operative formulation
between the six members to conserve the features and the characteristics of their
91. Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Rawas. op.cit.
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countries as well as their internal independence and realise a degree of co-operation
between them in the economic, security, defensive and political fields. The creation






The security equation in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf is complex and involves the
global and regional balance, as well as questions of national defence and internal
security. 1 Security (internal and external) in the Gulf region is one of the most
important challenges facing the Gulf Co-operation Council States. The rivalry
between the great powers has been one of the main features of Gulf history.
The Portuguese became the first Western country to be involved in the Gulf
region, in 1506. They remained a dominant power in the area for more than a
hundred years. The Ottoman Empire attempted to extend its sovereignty over the
Gulf region many times (for example in 1538 and 1581). In the aftermath of the
crushing military defeat of the first Saudi State and the destruction of the WahhabI
Fort of Diriyah in 1818, the Ottomans were able to further expand their influence in
Arabia. Oman and the Trucial States remained relatively independent of Ottoman
domination. The Ottomans secured their influence in Arabia, by recognising the
authority of several Sheykhs throughout the various regions. However, their influence
in Arabia had declined by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth century. From 1622 until the beginning of the eighteenth century the Dutch
became the paramount power in the Gulf.
With the rise of the British East India Company, the Gulf became more
important to the imperial policy of Britain, especially during the Seven-Years war
with France in the eighteenth century (1756-1763).2 Britain's influence and presence
in the Gulf area grew on the pretext of British Commerce and the free movement of
international trade. Britain especially wanted to protect the route to India against any
of the other powers such as Holland, Russia, France and Germany.
1. MacDonald, Charles G "U.S. Policy and Gulf Securitv"op.cit. p. 98.
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In 1763 Britain began to impose colonial rule by establishing a port at Bushire
and appointing a British Political Resident. Britain's major involvement in the Arab
(Persian) Gulf region began with the 1798 treaty with the Sultan of Muscat and
Oman. From 1800 the British government in India concluded a series of agreements
with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the other Sheykhs of the Trucial States,
Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain. The exclusive agreements between Britain and the rulers
of the Arab Gulf forbade any foreign contacts or agreements with countries other
than Britain except with British consent and approval. They were to refrain from
ceding, selling or letting any part of their respective territories, in any manner or
under any circumstances, to any foreign states without prior British agreement. They
were also not allowed to grant concessions for the exploration of oil or any other
mineral to any foreign country or company without prior consultation and agreement
with the British government.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain had earned international
recognition for making the vast area of eastern and southern Arabia her own sphere
of influence. This recognition was confirmed through bilateral treaties between
Britain and the Ottoman Empire, Germany, Japan and Russia.3 In return the British
government undertook to defend the sheikhdoms or Emirates against any threat,
whether internal or external, and to control their foreign policy on their behalf.4
In fact, the British political and military presence in the Gulf region provided a
regional security umbrella for the Arab sheikhdoms for more than a hundred years.5
2. Al-Baharna, Husain M. op.cit. p. 507, and Al-Ash'al, 'Abdullah. Al-Itar al-Qanuniwa-al-SiyasiLi-
Majlis Al-Ta'awun Al-Khallji. op.cit. pp. 61-66.
3. Etaibi, Ghalib Tulhab. op.cit. p. 23.
4. Al-Alkim, Hasan H. The GCC States in An Unstable World. Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Small
States. Saqi Books, London, 1994, p. 35.
5. In the British perspective, the Gulfwas seen as part of the larger imperial strategy which focused on
India. Until Indian independence in 1947, Britain's Gulf duties were administered by the India
Office, with British political officers of the Indian civil service staffing Gulf posts. After 1947, the
Gulf was entrusted to the Foreign Office and, in view of Britain's commercial (especially oil)
interest in the region, the focus of policy became ensuring local stability and fulfilling treaty
requirements. See Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-
1973", Review of International Studies Vol.11. No.4. October 1985. (ed.) Jones, Roy E.
Butterworths, London, p. 249, and Kelly, J.B. Arabia, The Gulfand The West, op.cit. p. 99.
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Her presence and the control she exerted until her withdrawal from the area ensured
the Gulfs security until December 1971.6.
American Involvement in Gulf Security
By the end of the Second World War, and as a result of the new American policy in
the world, and following the Roosevelt and Truman Doctrines, the United States of
America sought to improve and strengthen its political, military and economic
relations with the rulers of the Arab Gulf states, particularly the two regional powers
of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The American policy in the Gulf region focused on two
strategic levels, oil and containment of Communist expansion in the Arabian
Peninsula and the Gulf. 7
The military intervention of the United States in the Gulf area began during the
Second World War with the adoption in 1941 of the ports of Khorramshahr and
Shahpur in Iran as bases for the supply of military equipment to the Soviet Union,
and the establishment of Al-Zahran base in Saudi Arabia as a supply base for the
American airforce. American strategy also involved supporting Iran and Saudi Arabia
through arms sales, military training and oil investments.8 The United States
continued to build her position in the region, following the Second World War,
through diplomatic contacts, intelligence activities and economic and military
assistance to friendly governments.
The first American involvement in the Gulf came as a response to the Soviet
Union's attempts to establish puppet States in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdestan after
the Second World War. In 1947, the United States President Harry Truman declared
a Doctrine which became known as the Truman Doctrine. It was to provide economic
6. Petersen, J.E "The GCC and Regional Security" in: Sandwick, John A. (ed.^l The GulfCo-operation
Council Moderation andStability in an International World. Westview press, Boulder, Colorado,
U.S.A. 1987. p. 169.
7. Mukhlis, Ahmad 'A. op.cit. p. 59.
8. Dhahir, Ahmed J "The U.S. Relations with the Arab Gulf" in: The Arab Gulf Studies Center




and military assistance to Iran, Turkey and Greece to help them fight against Soviet
expansion in their countries.9
During the Eisenhower administration in the mid-1950's, the United States
created a new Doctrine to oppose Soviet expansionism in the world. The Eisenhower
doctrine consisted of an alliance comprising those countries situated along the
southern flank of the Soviet Union. The original members of the alliance, beside the
United States and Britain, were Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan. However, the United
States was not recognised as a member in order to avoid confrontation with the
Soviet Union. On 24 February 1955, Iraq and Turkey signed a bilateral treaty of
mutual co-operation establishing the Baghdad Pact. Baghdad and Ankara invited
regional states to join them in fostering peace and security in the Middle East and the
Arabian (Persian) Gulf regions. Britain, Iran and Pakistan joined the Pact in the same
year and a permanent secretariat was established in Baghdad. The Pact, linking
medium size powers, was initiated by the United States to protect the "Northern Tier"
from potential Soviet expansion. The emergence of the Baghdad Pact was the first
idea for regional security in the Gulf area and was the first attempt to unite two gulf
states, Iraq and Iran, in a move to curb overt and covert Soviet influence in the Gulf
region. American policy makers had, for some years, recognised the strategic
importance of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, more particularly the oil of the Gulf, to the
defence of Western Europe and for Western interests generally. In 1957 President
Eisenhower wrote to an adviser that 'should a crisis arise threatening to cut the
Western world off from Mideast oil, we would have [Eisenhower's emphasis] to use
force. 10 This pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) 11 and its
9. Mukhlis, Ahmad 'A. op.cit. p. 58.
10. Kechichian, Joseph A. Security Efforts in the Arab World: A BriefExamination ofFour Regional
Organizations. Prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for policy. RAND, USA. p. 10.
Cordesman, Anthony, op.cit. p. 68. See also Gregory Gause, F "British and American Policies in
the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" Review of International Studies. Vol.11. No.4. October 1985. p.
258.
11. Kechichian, Joseph A. Security Efforts in the Arab World: A BriefExamination ofFour Regional
Organizations, op.cit. pp. 11-12.
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headquarters then moved to Ankara after a nationalist military coup in Iraq in 1958.12
However, the first test for the Eisenhower doctrine came in 1958, when American
troops landed in Lebanon after the overthrow of the pro-western monarchical regime
in Iraq. On this occasion, however, the Lebanese crisis was solved internally, and
American intervention proved unnecessary. 13
The United States presence in the Gulf region became more firm after the
security relations between Washington and the Shah of Iran became stronger and
closer following an incident in 1953 when American intelligence assisted the Shah of
Iran in overthrowing the government ofMussadeq and saved the Shah's throne. More
significantly, the alliance between Iran and the United States was formalised in 1959
when the two countries signed a bilateral security pact. The Pact provided for
continued American military and economic aid to Iran as well as an American
commitment to take appropriate action including the use of armed forces to assist the
Iranian government if Iran was attacked. 14
In the seven years following the Shah's return to power after the downfall of
Mussadeq in 1953, the United States donated more than $400 million in subsidies to
the Iranian defence budget. From 1953 to 1960, Iran's army grew from 120,000 men
to 190,000; the air force doubled to 8,000 men and the Navy to more than 4,000 men.
The price of the Iranian defence expansion increased from 2.5 billion rials in 1953-54
to 14.2 billion in 1959-1960 (7.2 rials equaled one dollar). From the mid-1960s, the
Shah of Iran pursued a foreign policy designed to make Iran the strategically
dominant power in Western Asia and a pillar of American interests in the Middle
East. Writing toward the end of the Shah's period, Fred Halliday said:
Iran is an expansionist power, the most important factor is directly
political in that the Iranian regime is concerned to prevent any movement or
state from emerging in the region which could weaken Iran's own strategic
position. This means that Iran will intervene to crush any nationalist or
revolutionary forces outside its boundaries which it regards as a threat to it, and
12. Gordon, Murray "Arc of Crisis : Threat to U.S. Interests" in. Gordon, Murray (ed.) Conflict in the
Persian Gulf op.cit. pp. 17-20.
13. Edward, Raise. al-Tawassu al-AmrlklSiyasiyyan Wa- Askariyyan Fi-al-KhalTj. Translated by AI-
Dalayml, Muwaffaq. Dar al-Taqaddum, Moscow, 1989, pp. 9-15.
14. Acharay, Amitav. U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf: Origins and Evolution Under the Carter and
Reagan Administrations. Routledge, London, 1989, p. 3.
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Iran is an expansionist power, The most important factor is directly political in
that the Iranian government which it believes it has a reasonable chance of
suppressing. This outlook provides the basisfor an extremely ambitious policy of
intervention, one that has already provided legitimization for a number of
aggressive actions and which could do so again in the future. No third world
state has a record of intervention outside its frontiers comparable with Iran's in
the period since the mid-1960s 15
On the other side of the Gulf, the United States influence had become stronger in
Saudi Arabia, especially after the American government had obtained military
facilities in Al-Zahran during the Second World War. The Arabian American
Company (ARAMCO) became an important channel of communication in Saudi
Arabian international affairs, particularly in its relations with the American
government in the wake of the Second World War. Raymond and Hollis summarise
ARAMCO's links with the Saudi Royal family during the 1930s and 1940s as
follows:
In all ofSaudi Arabia's relations with the United States government the
Arabian American Oil Company has played a major role. Company officials
frequently serve as informal advisers to the king and his ministers and perform
the function of unofficial ambassador in Washington where the company
maintains an office. This type of relationship, although admittedly subject to
abuse, appears to have been quite advantageous for a government, which until
the last few years has had little diplomatic or economic contacts with the outside
world. Moreover, so long as the foreign oil policy of the United States coincides
more or less with that of the oil company, the arrangement may continue to be
useful to the United States government. 16
Saudi Arabia was the first country in the Arab World which allowed an American
presence on its territory. On 23 June 1947, Saudi Arabia signed a military agreement
with the United States. This agreement was renewed twice, once in 1949 and once in
1959. The Al-Zahran base in Saudi Arabia was the first American military base in
any of the Arab countries. Nevertheless, the Saudi authorities deny this and say that
15. Feste, Karen A. The Iranian Revolution and Political Change in the Arab World. The Emirates
Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi 1996. pp. 8-9 and Mottale, Morris
Mehrdad. The Arms Build up in the Persian Gulf, op.cit. p. 3.
16. Al-Shamsi, Saeed, M. The al-Buraimi Dispute: A Case Study In Inter-Arab Politics. Unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis. The American University, Washington D.C. 1986, pp. 85-86 and see also Reese,
John N. Towards Collective Security in the Gulf: An Evolving United States Role in Support of
the GCC States. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, USA. 1991, pp. 15-17.
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there is only an American military team there dealing with the training of the Saudi
forces. 17
Following the end of the Second World War the Gulf area became of strategic
significance to rival external powers because of its political, economic and strategic
importance, especially after the discovery of oil. The end of the Second World War
brought about a change in the balance of power; the United States became the sole
western power succeeding the British, to rule not only in terms of leadership, but also
in terms of an a new imperialistic hegemony .
Soviet Involvement in the Gulf region
The Soviet interest in the Gulf area began during the early 1950s and she became
more involved during the early 1960s with the rise of nationalist and left-wing Arab
regimes in Cairo and Baghdad. Thus, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet
Union and her allies in the Middle East, Iraq and Egypt, were the greatest direct
threat to Gulf security. Moscow's involvement in the early 1960s, in the North
Yemen Civil War between the Royalists (backed by Saudi Arabia and America) and
the Republicans (backed by Naser's Egypt and the Soviet Union), was one of her first
involvements in a third world conflict. The situation in North Yemen during the
1960s was a severe challenge to security in the Gulf, especially to that in Saudi
Arabia. The Soviet involvement in North Yemen, supporting the Republicans, was
the first time that a communist country had extended military assistance to a non-
communist country. 18
The security of the Arab Gulf states, during the period of competition between
the super-powers in the Middle East after the Second World War, was in the hands of
the British. Britain's political and military presence provided a security umbrella
against any internal or external threat. After the British withdrawal in the early 1970s
17. Musa, Husayin. Al-Ittifaqiyyat al-Muwaqqa ah Bayn al-Wilayat al-Muttahidah Wa-Duwal Majlis
al-Ta awun. Al-Haqlqah Press, Beirut, 1987, p. 7. For more details concerning Saudi and United
States relations since the early of 1940s see Gormly, James L "Keeping the Door Open in Saudi




the Gulf region became the centre of international politics and competition. The
Soviet threat to the conservative Arab Gulf States became critical after a number of
States granted facilities to the Soviet navy. The close relationship the Soviets
developed with the Iraqi government at the end of the 1960s allowed them to
establish a presence in the port of Umm Qasr in the Gulf. In addition, through her
influence in South Yemen, the USSR had naval facilities in the Arabian peninsula,
and an opportunity to support the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). This caused a serious internal threat to the
Gulf region in general and threatened Omani internal security for more than ten
years. The Omani Front changed its name in 1974 to the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Oman (PFLO). Soviet expansion in the third world also took the form
of backing states in the Horn of Africa, an area close to the Gulf region. Somalia was
the first country in the Horn of Africa in which the Soviet Union enjoyed a
considerable influence. She had the use of port facilities in Berbera up until 1977.
After the Ogaden war between the Marxist regime in Ethiopia (which came to
power after a military coup, backed by the Soviet Union, which overthrew the pro-
Western monarchy in 1974) and Somalia, Soviet influence increased in Ethiopia. She
became, with South Yemen, the most important country in the area for the Soviet
Union and Warsaw Pact countries. From the early 1970s the Soviet Union concluded
many treaties of friendship and co-operation with Iraq, South Yemen, Somalia and
Ethiopia. 19
The Concept ofGulf Security
The concept of the security of the Gulf region changes according to the needs of the
time and the perspectives from which we tackle the subject. To the Western
countries, the concept of security in the Gulf focused on securing their vital oil
18. Al-Masaed, Mishel A. USSR-GulfStates Relations Since the British Withdrawalfrom East ofSuez
in 1971. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University ofDenver, USA, 1990, p. 102.




supplies and protecting the monarchies regimes in the Gulf against any internal or
external threat.
Some Arab countries saw oil as a means of serving general Arab causes,
foremost of which was the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, Iraq was an exception to
this and aimed to dominate the oil-producing countries in order to protect them from
countries like Iran and from the West. The Iranian concept of Gulf security on the
other hand, during the Shah's era, concentrated on the superiority of Iran in the Gulf
region; during the revolution it aimed to dominate the area with the support of the
Shi'a in the Arab Gulf States. The other Arab Gulf states had a different concept of
security and Saudi Arabia, the most important Gulf power, aimed to bring all the
Arab Gulf States under its umbrella and link their security with her own via
individual security agreements with them.20
Not every GCC country was affected by every threat. On the contrary, only
Saudi Arabia is exposed on all fronts (Iraq, Iran, and Yemen). Oman and Kuwait
(who had a different view, during the 1970s and 1980s, on the security concept in the
Gulf) could expect attacks from outside the Gulf region (Iraq is a danger to Kuwait
and South Yemen to Oman) while the other GCC countries, UAE, Qatar and
Bahrain, are only exposed to threats coming from within the Arab Gulf States (Saudi
Arabia and Oman).21 There have been three principal stages in the development of
the concept of security in the Gulf region since 1971.
The first stage began with British withdrawal in 1971 and continued until the
end of 1979, the second stage with the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in 1979
until the late 1980s, and the third stage with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990
until the mid-1990s.
20. Al- Aqqad, Salah. al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyyah Fi-al-KhalTj al- 'Arabi Min Bidayat al- 'Usur al-
Hadithah HataAzmat 1990-1991. Al-Anglo al-Misriyyah, Cairo, 1992, p. 456.
21. Guazzone, Laura "GulfCooperation Council: The Security Policies, op.cit. pp. 139-140.
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External Threats to Gulf Security
British Withdrawal from the GulfRegion
As a result of the many events faced by the British government at the end of the
1960s such as the economic crisis in Britain, her failure to resolve the dispute
between the Arabs and Israel and the rise of Arab resentment over British presence in
the Arab Gulf (some sources indicated that the continued British presence would
serve as a target for radical domestic opposition to the traditional rulers, and was
unacceptable to the increasingly nationalistic states in the region),22 the British
Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, declared that the British government had
decided to withdraw all her forces, by the end of 1971, from East of Suez and the
Gulf. It was not until the 1960s, especially with the advent of the Labour Party to
power in 1964, that British commitments east of Suez in the Middle East and Far
East were called into serious question. They were the remnants of the post-war period
of decolonization, and included a British presence in Singapore, Malaysia, Hong
Kong and South Arabia along with the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. A combination of
budgetary constraints, the opposition of the left wing of the governing Labour Party,
and a general (but not universal) consensus that Britain must seek her future in
Europe rather than in empire contributed to growing pressures on the governments of
Harold Wilson which lasted until 1970 to end the 'east of Suez' role. In response, on
2 March 1965, 20 Labour backbenchers introduced an amendment calling for 'greatly
accelerated progress in the reduction of Great Britain's overseas commitments'. The
economic crisis of 1967 in Britain accelerated the government's decision before the
House of Commons to withdraw from East of Suez by the end of 1971.23
22. James Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern Affairs said that US viewed
the British withdrawal from the Gulf as not only inevitable but beneficial for Western interests:
'Its departure meant a net gain for Gulf stability'. See. Gregory Gause III, F "British and
American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" op.cit. p. 261.




British presence in the Gulf region had traditionally been involved in the
management of military and foreign affairs, training and the supply of weaponry.
Britain had been the main protector of the conservative Arab Gulf states for more
than one hundred years (1820-1971).24 This involvement had been codified in many
conventions and treaties between Britain and the Arab Gulf rulers.25 The British
influence, at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Gulf region, was
summarised by the then British Viceroy in India, Lord Curzon, when he visited the
Gulf area, in one of the addresses which he delivered in the Sharjah Emirate on 2nd
November 1903, before the Sheykhs of the Trucial Coast:
Sometimes I think that the record of the past is in danger of being
forgotten, and there are persons who ask why Great Britain continues to
exercise these powers. The history ofyour families, and the present condition of
the Gulf, is the answer. We were here before any other power, in modern times,
had shown its face in these waters . ... It was our commerce as well as your
security that was threatened and called for protection.. . . The peace of these
waters must still be maintained. . ., and the influence of the British Government
must remain supreme.26
Sir Jeffrey Arthur, one of the most important British Political Residents in the Gulf,
said in a lecture at the University of Durham in 1973:
When Britain tried to investigate all the contracts and agreements which
connect her with the Arab Emirates in the Gulf it was unable to gather it, and it
followed that it was sufficient to do away with all agreements without collecting
them, when Britain began to give independence to these countries.21
The British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early 1970s was not a full
withdrawal. Britain retained a presence in many areas of the lower Gulf including
bases in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. At that time these
states faced a real threat from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the
24. Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early of 1970s, Gulf security has become
the most popular topic among analysts, scholars and writers concerned with the strategic
dimensions of Middle East policy. See Hooglund, Eric "Rethinking Persian Gulf Security?"
Middle East lnsizht. Vol. XII. No.2. January-February 1996. p. 31.
25. Gregory Gause III, F " British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" op.cit.
p.251. See al-Masaed, Mishel A. op.cit. p. 2.
26. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. Bahrain Islands A Legal-Diplomatic Study of the British-Iranian
Controversy. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1955, p. 188.
27. Al-Rumayhl, Muhammad. Al-KhalT] Lays Naftan. op.cit. p. 98.
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Arabian Gulf. The presence of approximately 800 officers and soldiers along with the
training they provided and the occasional manoeuvres carried out by the Central
Treaty Organisation (CENTO), helped to deter threats to the Gulf region.28
The Nixon Doctrine (Twin Pillars)
The United States of America assumed responsibility for protecting its interests in the
Gulf area and filled the security gap after the British withdrawal in 1971, when
Washington, under the Guam Doctrine or Nixon Doctrine, encouraged the
development of an indigenous security system in the Gulf This led the American
administration to adopt the Twin Pillar policy in the area, consisting of Iran as the
prime regional country and Saudi Arabia as her historical ally. From the early 1970s
until 1979, the two countries became militarily the largest and strongest pro-western
states in the Gulf region to assume the primary burden of ensuring the stability of the
other small conservative Arab states and assist in protecting Western oil interests in
the area.29
During the early 1970s the United States administration was unable to replace
the British troops in the area because of the American involvement in Vietnam at that
time. The Nixon administration also did not want to be involved in any confrontation
with the American Congress and the American public.30 However, as a result of
28. It should be recorded that the Sheykhs of the Arab Gulf States were not happy with the British
withdrawal from the Gulf region. Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan of Abu Dhabi told the British Minister
of State, Goronwy Roberts, that he and his fellow Trucial rulers would be willing to bear the
entire cost of maintaining British forces in the area. Also Sheykh Rashid b. Sa'Id of Dubai
reaffirmed Sheykh Zayed's offer. See. Kelly, J.B. Arabia, the Gulfand the West, op.cit. pp. 49-50
and The Times 22 January 1968. London, p. 1. See also. Gregory Gause III, F. "British and
American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" op.cit. pp. 253-256 and Ali, Abdul-Jaleel
Kassim. The Gulf Co-operation Council and Regional Integration: An Analysis of Cultural
Origins, Political Evolution and Collective Security. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. The Catholic
University of America, Washington D.C. 1987, p. 5. For more details of the British position on
the withdrawal from the Gulf region see Gregory Gause III, F "British and American policies in
the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973, op.cit. pp. 249-258.
29. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. p. 10.
30. Stoddard, Philip "The U.S. Approach to the Gulf: Vital Interests in Search of a viable Strategy"
in: The Arab Gulf Studies Center Publications. The Arab Gulfand the World. University of Basra,
Dar-al-Hikmah, Baghdad, 1991, p. 37. The US administration (Johnson) had actively opposed the
British government's (Labour) progressive withdrawal from east of Suez. For more details of the
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Britain's declaration, in 1968, that it would withdraw from the Gulf by the end of
1971, President Nixon announced in Guam in 1969 that:
The United States will keep all its treaty commitments. We shall provide a
shield ifa nuclearpower threatens thefreedom ofa nation allied with the United
States, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the
security ofthe region as a whole. In cases involving other types ofaggression we
shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as
appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the
primary responsibility ofproviding the manpowerfor its defence.
The Nixon Doctrine was specifically concerned with the future of American
commitments in the Far East. It stated that the United States would help the regional
powers ensure local stability through military assistance programs, rather than
through the direct military involvement of America. Kissinger, the architect of the
Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf, perceived that the local balance of power had to be
stabilised through helping friends of the West build themselves up militarily. He saw
Iran, at that time the largest and apparently most stable American ally in the region,
as a perfect candidate for becoming the balancing force in the region, and said:
It was imperativefor our interests and those ofthe Western world that the
regional balance ofpower be maintained so that moderate forces could not be
engulfed, nor Europe's and Japan's (and as it later turned out, our economic
lifeline fall into hostile hands). We could either provide the balancing force
ourselves or enable a regional power to do so. There was no possibility of
assigning any American military forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the
Vietnam War and its attendant trauma. Congress would have tolerated no such
commitment; the public would not have supported it. Fortunately, Iran was
willing to play this role... And this was achievable without any American
resources, since the Shah was willing to pay for equipment out of his oil
reserves.31
The Shah of Iran's Ambitions in the Gulf
With the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf area, the Shah of Iran, the
"Superpower" of the Gulf countries, was eager to fill the power vacuum. He made no
secret of his ambitions and ability to become the guardian of the interests of the
American policy pre-Nixon Doctrine See Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in
the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" op.cit. pp. 258-260.




United States and the West in the Gulf and protector of the other pro-Western Arab
States. The Shah claimed that Iran could provide the Gulf with as much protection as
the British forces in the area at the time.32
Iran's opposition to the continued British presence was voiced immediately
after the January 1968 decision of the Labour government and reiterated frequently in
the subsequent years. It was no secret that the Shah intended to make Iran the
dominant regional power, and wanted no competition from Britain or the United
States. In order to smooth the way, he even dropped the Iranian claim to sovereignty
over Bahrain, an issue that had blocked the development of co-operative relations
with Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf States.33 The Shah of Iran expressed his
role in the Gulf region as follows:
Our responsibility is not only local; we also have a role to play as
protector of 60 percent of the world's oil reserves. Western interests in the Gulf
are strategic ones, involving the security of the West, America and Japan. These
states cannot, however, defend their interests, so we must do the job for them.
Should the struggle in Oman succeed, imagine what would confront us in
Muscat, which lies opposite the Straits ofHormuz.lA
When the British troops withdrew from East of Suez, the United States, with the
support of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf states, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia,
started to assume responsibility for the area's security under the provisions of the
Nixon Doctrine. In August 1971, in response to a request from the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, the State Department made the first official statement of
American policy in the Gulf after the British withdrawal:
U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf recognises that the littoral states,
particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, intend to assume primary responsibility for
the security ofthe Gulfonce operational British forces are withdrawn ...It is our
policy to encourage this determination, to urge the cooperation ofSaudi Arabia,
32. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. p. 21 and Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States
and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration" United States Army Foreign Military Studies
Office. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, 1991, p. 2. The Shah of Iran was particularly pleased
with this concept since it fitted in well with his view that Iran could and should play the dominant
role in the Gulf region following the withdrawal of the British and that there was no power
vacuum because of Iran's presence and capability.
33. Gregory Gause III, F "British and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" op.cit. p.
256.
34. Documents ofthe National Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf, op.cit. p. 84.
125
Chapter Three
Kuwait and Iran in assisting the orderly development of the Gulf states and to
support them as appropriate in this role...35
Since the Shah of Iran had assumed the task of maintaining security in the Gulf
region, he launched a campaign, which focused on economic co-operation,
diplomacy, trade and cultural exchanges in order to improve his relations with
conservative Arab states. From the early 1970s, the United States set up many naval
units in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to secure the route through the Strait of
Hormuz. She also established many fleet facilities in Bahrain (Jufair military base),
Sa'udi Arabia (al-Zahran military base), and Oman (Masirah military base). The
facility in Bahrain became America's headquarters in the Middle East.36
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia (as a result of the rapprochement policy, which was
mediated by the United States at the end of the 1960s) became supporters of the
United States' new policy in the region. It should be noted that military relations
between Saudi Arabia and Iran did not begin in the 1970s. Their relationship goes
back to 1929, when King 'Abd al-Aziz b. Saud proposed a military pact between
Riyadh and Tehran. Iran rejected the Saudi idea of building an independent military
force. The Shah of Iran, in his visit to Riyadh in 1957, was content to sign a mere
friendship accord. The Saudi-Iranian military co-operation became unequivocal
during the Yemen civil war of the early 1960s when they fought against the
revolutionaries who were backed by the Nasser regime in Cairo.37
America's policy in the Gulf during the 1970s focused on the idea that Iran
should protect the conservative Arab states from any internal and external threats
(thus the Iranian military intervention in Oman in 1973 backed the Omani
government against the Marxist revolution, which was backed by South Yemen and
the Soviet Union). Saudi Arabia, in the meantime, made contributions to the material
needs (especially after the oil crisis of 1973, when she gained a lot of money), and
35. Gregory Gause III, F "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973" op.cit. pp.
263-264.
36. Harb, Usamah GhazalT "Al-Amn Wa-al-Sira' Fi-al-Khallj al-'Arabl" in. Maiallat al-Sivasah al-
Duwaliwah (International Politics) Year 16, Issue 62, October 1980, Cairo, p. 11.




supported American policy in the Middle East in general and in the Gulf area in
particular. Saudi Arabia, during the 1970s, came to be accepted as a major power in
the Arab world.38
As a result ofNixon's visit to Tehran in May 1972, the Shah of Iran was able to
conclude a secret agreement with the American President providing for the supply to
Iran of unlimited quantities of arms she might need. Nuclear and chemical weapons
were exempted from this. Iranian arms purchase from the United States in the period
from 1950-72 were about $1.6 billion. In 1972, $590 million of weapons were
supplied to Iran in one year; in 1973 it reached $2.2 billion, and in 1974 it soared to
$4.2 billion. The value of the Shah's requirements for American weapons, during the
period between 1972 and 1978, reached more than $20 billion in all, and American
arms sales to Iran during the reign of the Shah were more than those to any other
allied country. (It should be noted that the American administrations dealt directly
with Iran without approval or supervision from the Pentagon or the Secretary of
State, as a result of the decree of the American National Security Council issued in
1972.)39 Between 1971 and 1978 the size of Iran's armed forces grew from 191,000
to 430,000 personnel, with a similar increase in the number of main/medium battle
tanks and combat aircraft. Between 1973 and 1978 Iran spent $43 billion on its
military budget. In 1975 Iran became the largest armament importer in the world. At
the time of the Shah's downfall, some $12 billion in United States military sales was
awaiting delivery to Iran for the next five years.40
The most important threat facing the Gulf States during the early 1970s was the
Soviet influence in Iraq, South Yemen and the Horn of Africa. The only internal
threat was the activity of the Omani revolution in the southern part ofOman (Dhofar)
which caused a serious threat to Omani security during the early 1970s. When it
succeeded in gaining control of many areas in the mountains of the Dhofar province
38. Harb, Usamah Ghazall. op.cit. pp. 11-12
39. Edward, Raise, op.cit. p. 127.
40. Furtig, Henner "Iran's Gulf Policy During the 70s" in.: The Arab Gulf Studies Centre Publications,




it became a threat not only to the Omani government but to all the other Arab Gulf
States.4l
As a result of this threat the Shah of Iran said in an interview:
We consider what is happening in Dhofar as a form of aggression and
oppression. Can you imagine the consequence if those savages-the... insurgents
- took control of the other side of the Gulfentrance, namely the Strait ofHormuz
on which our lives and livelihood depend. Those barbaric people fighting the
Sultan are heinous creatures and may be far worse than even the Communists
themselves.
Some sources maintain that the Shah's occupation of the three islands of Abu Musa
and the two Tunbs was the greatest direct threat facing the conservative Arab states
in the Gulf, but the Iranian occupation of the three islands came as a result of a
previous accord between Iran, Britain and the United States to help the Shah to
secure the area of the Gulf, especially the entrance to the Strait ofHormuz.
Some sources, however, suggested that the Iranian claim on Bahrain was
abandoned under an Iranian-Saudi bargain to improve their relations in the early
1970s.42 The main implementation of the Nixon Doctrine policy in the Gulf came
when the Shah of Iran sent troops to Oman in the early 1970s to combat the Popular
Front for Liberation ofOman (PFLO). In 1973 the Shah, "the policeman of the Gulf',
at the request of Sultan Qaboos of Oman, sent 3,000 soldiers backed by artillery,
helicopters and strike and reconnaissance aircraft to the Dhofar province to assist and
support the Omani Army against the activities of the PFLO. The latter was supported
and backed by South Yemen and the Soviet Union.43
The Iranian military presence in Oman was encouraged and supported by the
United States as well as by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, who backed
41. El-Reyyes, Riyad N. Riyah al-Sumum al-Sa 'udiyyah Wa-Duwal al-Jazirah Ba 'd Harb al-Khaly
1991-1994. Riyad El-Reyyes Publications, London, 1994, p. 411.
42. Al-Na'Iml, 'Abd al- Rahman. Al-Sira' 'ala al-Khaly al-Arabl. Dar al-Kunuz al-Adabiyyah,
Beirut, 2nd edn, 1994, p. 140.
43. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. 30.
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the Sultan of Oman financially. The Saudi government aid programmes to the Omani
government during the struggle in Dhofar were estimated at about $3 billion .44
Dissident Omani sources in Aden claimed that the Iranian intervention on
Omani soil was the implementation of a secret pact concluded by ThuwainI b.
Shihab, Sultan Qaboos's representative to the Shah of Iran in 1972. This treaty
empowered the Iranian military to contribute to suppression of the revolutionary
activity in Dhofar. This was to be balanced by Oman conceding control of the
strategic island ofUmm al-Ghanam, which was located at the entrance of the Gulf in
the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz.45 Muscat, Tehran and London shrouded the
Iranian presence in Oman, which lasted until the time of the Iranian Islamic
Revolution in 1979, in great secrecy. Iranian soldiers were ordered not to enter
Omani cities and were kept away from any public gathering. By the end of 1974,
Iranian forces in Dhofar had reportedly grown to between 1500 and 3,500 troops, but
Iran's role became even more pronounced in 1975 when the total reached between
3,500 and 5,000 troops. Iranian Phantom F-5's patrolled the South Yemeni borders
from their base at Thamrait (80km north of Salalah). Iran's presence in Oman was
obliquely criticised by almost all the Arab countries, who saw this presence as a
living proof of Iran's expansionism. Conservatives governments in the Arab world
introduced several schemes to reduce Iranian forces arrangement, but the Omani
government denied the entire matter and Iranian influence in Oman. Saudi Arabia
and Egypt sought to replace Iranian troops by Arab forces.46 The Shah's forces, as
the main pillar of American policy, also became involved in many other areas; for
example, Iran provided logistics and troops to support the Pakistani government
44. Dawisha, Adeed I. "Security in the Middle East" Wells, Samuel F. & Bruzonsky, Mark A. (eds.)
in: Regional Change andGreat Power Strategic, p. 91.
45. The PFLO claimed at that time that the Sultan had allowed Iran to build a naval base on this island.
The radical Arab states launched a massive propaganda campaign against this suspected See.
Mojtahed-Zadeh, Perouz. Political Geography ofthe Strait ofHormuz. op.cit. p. 36.
46. Mojtahed-Zadeh, Perouz. Political Geography of the Strait ofHormuz. op.cit. p. 31. The Iranian
troops remained in Dhofar until they were pulled out by the new regime in Iran in 1979. op.cit. p.




against the Baluchi insurgents, and to support Somalia in its war with Ethiopia,
which was backed by Cuba and the Soviets.47
The Saudi Role in Gulf Security
The Saudi participation in Gulf security with the United States and Iran during the
1970s came as a consequence of the historical relations between Saudi Arabia and
the United States. However, the Saudi role in Gulf security came about without any
agreements or official pacts with the United States. The Saudi Royal family's aim
was to avoid any confrontation with the Saudi Islamic Scholars by claiming that
Saudi Arabia was opposed to any foreign troops on Arab soil; in fact, behind the
scenes, it had a strong and lasting relationship with the United States and her allies.48
The Saudi role in the "Twin Pillar" policy in the Gulf was focused on giving
financial support to other pro-western countries. Saudi Arabia was able to exercise
regional and international influence through its foreign aid programmes, especially in
most of the Arab countries, Muslim countries (Pakistan and Bangladesh) and other
countries in the third world. The Saudi aid programmes were consistently used to
combat destabilising agents and ideas in their own region as well as in the wider
international arena. The main aim was to support countries against Soviet and
Communist influence. Moreover, Saudi aid programmes went to such distant
countries as South Korea, Taiwan, and Zaire because of their virulent anti-
Communism.49 Between 1950 and 1964, the total sales agreements between Saudi
Arabia and the United States totalled $87 million. In 1965 alone they equalled $342
million. A decade later the total was over $2 billion and in 1980 reached $35
billion.50 In the early 1970s joint Saudi-Iranian efforts were concerned with Gulf
security as well as the external implications of these problems. In 1974 these
countries were joined by Egypt, Morocco and France and together they formed a
secret security club, which concentrated on intelligence activities in the Gulf region,
47. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. p. 27.
48. Edward, Raise, op.cit. pp. 191-201.
49. Dawisha, Adeed I. op.cit. pp. 91-92.
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the Third World and Europe. This club did not have a centre or headquarters, but the
French pledged to harmonize its activities under the command of Conte Alexandre
de-Marche. This intelligence co-operation continued and was supported until the fall
of the Shah of Iran in 1979.51
The concept of Gulf security took a strategic turn, especially on the Arab side,
after the Arab - Israel war of 1973, when the Arab oil countries and in particular
Saudi Arabia took the initiative to impose an oil embargo on some of the Western
countries who had supported Israel in her war against the Arab countries. In the
wake of this, and after the oil crisis which resulted, Gulf security became connected
to the security of oil. Many American officials floated plans to seize the Arab Gulf
States' oilfields as a reaction to the 1973 oil embargo. Henry Kissinger, the architect
of this plan, is reported as saying that the "military option could not be ruled out, if
the Arabs refuse to co-operate with us ".52
As a result of the 1973 oil sanctions on some western countries, and because of
the strong American reaction to them, especially where Saudi Arabia was concerned,
Riyadh and Washington concluded a bilateral agreement in January 1974. This
agreement included the establishment of joint commissions in many fields,
particularly security and defence. An example of this was the joint commission on
security co-operation, headed by the Assistant Secretary of Defence for National
Security Affairs and the Vice-Minister of Defence, Prince Turk! b.'Abd al-'Aziz. The
Saudi-American agreement was agreed to at the highest level, headed by Crown
Prince (later King), Fahd b.'Abd Al-'Aziz and the United States Secretary of State,
Henry Kissinger. Saudi Arabia became the second pillar of American policy in the
Middle East; the vast United States military sales to Riyadh included the supplying of
American advisers and training for many years.53
50. Peterson, J.E. op.cit. p. 183.
51. Ba-Dhib, Said M. op.cit. p. 174.
52. Jha, Ajay N "Gulf Co-operation Council: An Economic Grouping or Security Alliance? " Asian
Profile. Vol. 14 PT 4, 1986, p. 363.
53. Musa, Husain. op.cit. pp. 21-22.
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Attempts at Collective Security of the Gulf
The concept of a comprehensive collective security in the Gulf area did not appear
until after the British withdrew from the region (except for the federation between the
Trucial States, which became known as the United Arab Emirates). The Arab Gulf
States developed their own perception of security, which was moulded by thoughts of
national benefit as well as by necessity. This led to a number of contradictions in the
plans of these countries for reaching a common platform for collective Gulf security,
since each country had its own political and ideological thinking.
The interests of some of these countries had sometimes agreed and sometimes
disagreed with those of the great powers, which was of significance in the Gulf
security pact, especially for the United States and the Western European Countries.54
The United States, with the support of the Shah of Iran, tried on many
occasions after the British withdrawal from the Gulf to form a pact between the Arab
Gulf States and Iran. However, the American proposal failed to materialise due to the
Saudi fear that Iran would dominate the newly independent Arab Gulf States. In
addition, the radical Arab nationalist countries might attack this pact and lead to a
further deepening of the existing rifts in Arab world. As a result of this, Washington
focused her efforts on promoting the Shah of Iran as the prime actor in defending
Gulf security and Western interests against any internal or external threat.55
As the leader responsible for the development of security in the Gulf area, the
Shah of Iran called the rulers of the Arab Gulf States to co-operate on Gulf security
and sign a military co-operation pact with Iran (excluding Iraq). The Iranian proposal
failed after the Saudis refused. Oman was the only Arab Gulf State to welcome the
Iranian suggestions.56
The second initiative of the Gulf security plan took place in November 1976
when the foreign ministers of the eight countries of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq
54. Muhammad, Jasim. Al-Istratijiyyat al-Amniyyah fi-Mintaqat al-KhalT] al-'Arabi. The Arabian
Gulf Studies Center, University of Basra, 1983, p. 63.
55. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. p. 21.




Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) agreed, during the
Islamic Conference in Jeddah in 1975, to hold a meeting in Muscat in the Sultanate
of Oman at which they could try to find a united formula for security in the Gulf. At
this meeting Sultan Qaboos of Oman called on the conference members to reach a
formula for collective security and to define an area for co-operation between the
countries of the region. At the meeting various plans put forward by all the eight
states of the Gulf were discussed without any agreement being reached. The Omani
proposal centred especially on the Strait of Hormuz, and a continued dependence on
the support of western countries and Japan as well as Iran. However, all the Arab
Gulf States rejected the proposal, particularly Iraq, who launched a campaign against
Oman: Iraq was still, at that time, a supporter of the Omani opposition.
The Saudi rejection of the Omani proposal was because she feared an Iranian
domination of the Arab Gulf States. This fear intensified after the Iranian troops'
arrival in Oman in 1973.57 Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states were wary of
Iranian and Iraqi ambitions to dominate the area. (Nevertheless, it should be noted
that after the Iraqi agreement with Iran, which settled the issue of the border, the
conservative Arab states concluded many economic, cultural and social agreements
with Iraq).58
57. During the November meeting of the eight foreign minister in Muscat in 1976 Iraq was not trusted
by the other seven because of her radical Ba'thist ideology and history of attempted subversion in
the region. Iran was suspect because she was non-Arab and because of fears that the Shah's
military buildup was the rebirth of a centuries-old drive for Persian hegemony over the Gulf. See
Peterson, J.E. "The Future of Gulf Security After the Kuwait War" op.cit. p. 65. Rusi Journal
Defence Year Book. 1992. p. 136. Al-Makhawi, Rashid A. The Gulf Co-operation Council A
Study in Integration. Ph.D. thesis. University of Salford, England, 1990, p. 26.
58. Al-Samarrai, Bashir. Military Buildup and Political Instability in the Gulf 1965-1974. Ph.D.
Thesis, University of Denver, USA, 1978. p. 52 and see. Peterson, J.E. Defending Arabia. New
York, St. Martin's Press, 1986, p. 217.
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The American Presence in the GulfRegion
The American policy towards the Gulf area became more active during the mid-
1970s, as a result of the arms sales programmes to the Gulf States, especially to Iran
and Saudi Arabia. By 1977, defence-related personnel constituted about one-fifth of
the 30,000 Americans living in Saudi Arabia, although most of these Americans were
described as civilians.
In Iran defence-related personnel constituted about one-third of the 40,000
Americans there.59 Most Americans were deployed at the most sensitive domestic
sites such as oil wells or oilfields and areas where political and religious opposition
groups were active.60
Pakistan and Jordan, who have a long history of security co-operation with the
United States and the Arab conservative states, were to play a significant role in the
Arab Gulf states' Security. After the mid-1970s, Pakistani troops became more
important for the security of the Saudi Royal family and supported the other Arab
Gulf states with training. Jordan had a similar position in American strategy in the
Gulf region under the Nixon Doctrine. In the early 1970s, Jordan was the only Arab
country which sent troops to Oman to support the Omani Sultan against the rebellion
in the Dhofar province. Additionally Jordanian army personnel were assigned to
training duty to the engineering units in Oman.61 During the early 1970s Jordan was
the main supporter of the other small Arab Gulf states, and had already established
substantial security links with them supplying officers and military intelligence as
well as personnel, infrastructure and training missions.62
In fact, with the encouragement and support of the American administrations of
Nixon, Ford and Carter, the Shah of Iran became the main pillar of the Nixon
Doctrine, along with Saudi Arabia, who was the other pillar. Thus, the two countries,
59. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. p. 31.
60. Shuker, Zuhair. Al-Siyasah al-Amrikiyyah fi al-Khall] al-'Arabl Mabda Carter. Dar al-Inma al-
'Arabl, Beiriut, 1982. p. 130.
61. For more details of the Iranian and Jordanian intervention in Oman see Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz.
Political Geography of the Strait ofHormuz. op.cit. p. 31.
62. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. pp. 141-145.
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with the support of other Arab Gulf states, were able to dominate American strategic
policy until the fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of the Iranian Islamic
Revolution in 1979.
There is no doubt that the Arab Gulf states rulers did not approve of the Shah's
imperialistic attitudes towards the Arab Gulf states, but a strong monarchical and
pro-American Iran was seen as a useful guarantee for them against any internal or
external threat in the Gulf region. It should be noted that the fall of the Shah in Iran
not only removed that guarantee but also caused the Iranian revolution to call for the
destruction of all monarchical regimes in the Gulf and the elimination of the Western
and American presence in the Gulf area. 63
The exciting oil developments occurred a few years after the British
withdrawal. Gulf oil became increasingly important after the 1973 war, due to the
size of the reserves and the level of production, in addition to the increasing needs of
the world and the great industrial countries in particular. These developments made
Gulf security not only an obsession for the eight countries of the Gulf but also an
international and regional obsession that developed in a way that nobody expected.
The Arab Gulf States disagreed during the 1970s on the internal and external
sources of the threat to the Gulf security. During the 1970s there were many sources
for the threats to Gulf security, the most important of them being the radical Arab
regimes and Arab nationalism represented by the Republic of Iraq in the North and
the Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. There were also nationalist
opposition movements and Marxist movements which spread in the states of the
region, the most important being the popular movement for the liberation ofOman.64
63. Rizvi, Hasan Askari "Gulf Co-operation Council" Pakistan Horizon. Vol. 35, London, 1982, pp.
30-31.
64. Idrls, Muhammad A "Dawr al-Amn wa al-Ta'awun al-'Askari fi-Tatawwur Majlis al-Ta'awun al-
Khalljl Kakiyan Iqllml " Al-Mustaqbal al- 'ArabI. Issu No. 215. January 1997. The Arab United
Studies Centre. Beirut, 1997, p. 42.
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Gulf Security Since the End of 1979
Direct American Involvement in Gulf Security
Introduction
A major political change in the Third World took place in 1979, during the
Presidency of Jimmy Carter, particularly in the so-called "arc of crisis", which
extends from Pakistan in Asia to Ethiopia in the African Horn. These changes were
epitomised by the success of the Iranian revolution and many military coups, which
proved to be pro-Soviet and anti-Western. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was the
main example of these changes, and removed the main pillar of American strategy in
the Third World. 65
During the late 1970s there were many military coups against pro-western
regimes such as that of Haile Mariam in Ethiopia in 1977, which was supported by
the Soviet Union and destroyed the pro-western regime of Haile Selassie. In
Cambodia the Pol Pot regime fell in 1977 as a result of Vietnamese military
intervention. The emergence of Iraq as a military power even greater than Egypt was
a great event at that time, and when the Egyptian - Israeli Camp David accord was
reached, Iraq led the Arab hard-line platform against Egypt in two conferences held
in Baghdad. This resulted in the radical Arab regimes (Syria, South Yemen, Algeria,
Libya and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation) forming the so-called Front of
Arab Solidarity and Confrontation .66
During the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of its geographical position and the
Soviet and Cuban presence in South Yemen, which supported the Omani rebellion in
the Dhofar province, Oman was the Gulf country most concerned about Gulf
65. During the end of 1979 and 1980s the concept of security in the Gulf region meant for the Arab
Gulf States and their allies in the West the containment of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq
War and its consequences, the Soviet expansion in Afghanistan and the securing of a free flow of
oil, especially for the industrial countries. See. Kechichian, Joseph A. Security Efforts in the Arab
World: A BriefExamination ofFour Regional Organizations. op.cit. p. 18.
66. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit.. pp. 37-40, and also al-Na lml, Abd-al-Rahman M. Al-Sira 'ala al-Khaly
al- 'Arabl. op.cit. pp. 67-68.
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security, and she called for many security initiatives between the Gulf countries. In
September 1979, the Omani government proposed a plan for regional security co¬
operation between the Gulf States with the participation of United States, Britain,
West Germany and Japan. The Omani proposal called on the Arab Gulf States to
raise a $ 100 million to bolster the defence of the Strait of Hormuz. The money was to
be spent to purchase minesweepers and radar equipment to protect the Strait of
Hormuz. It also envisaged the creation of a multilateral naval force drawn from the
US, Britain and West Germany "to provide a presence outside of the Gulf' as a
supplementary force capable of guaranteeing the security of the Strait.67 But these
countries rejected the Omani proposal. It was discussed by the foreign ministers of
the Arab Gulf States (Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE) at a
special meeting held in Ta'if in Saudi Arabia on 16 October 1979. The consensus at
the meeting was to concentrate on potential domestic uprisings and to heed the
Iranian leader's calls of spreading its revolution to the Arab Gulf States. The Iraqi
reaction to the Omani proposal became more intensive, when Baghdad described the
proposal as a bid to create a new western alliance to replace CENTO and openly
criticised its intentions.
The Omani Role in Gulf Security
As a reaction to the Soviet threat and presence in many bases in South Yemen such
as Socotra, Khawr Maksar and al-'Aber and the outbreak of the Iranian revolution,
Oman concluded a facilities agreement with the United States on 4 June 1980. This
agreement provided many facilities for American troops in large areas of Oman such
as Masirah island in the Arabian Sea, the Khasab base in the Musandam peninsula,
which was located close to the Straits ofHormuz, the Seeb air base in Muscat and the
Thamrait air bases in Dhofar.68
67. Chubin, Shahram. Security in the Persian Gulf: The Role of the Outside Powers. IISS, London,
1982. p. 154
68. Regsbee, Wallace Lynn op.cit. pp. 78-86.
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Sultan Qaboos announced that the United States Air and Naval facilities in the
Sultanate were only:
To be used at the request of the majority of the Gulf co-operation states,
in case ofa direct threat, which they cannot repulse with their own forces.69
During 1981-1987, the most costly programme undertaken by the United States in the
Omani airforce facilities was estimated at $259 million. The Omani forces carried out
many military exercises with American troops on Omani soil.70
At a press conference held on 15 December 1979, Sultan Qaboos said:
If the big powers find that their interests in the region (meaning the Gulf
region) are threatened, they will not seek permission from me or anybody else to
intervene.
In another interview, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak of
the Iran-Iraq war while the Gulf Co-operation Council was still awaiting its first
summit, Sultan Qaboos said:
Why are countries friendly to the West, that have strategic locations,
possess vital resources for the industrial world and hold common interests with
the west, not invited to join NATO as associate members or observers, thus
becoming an integralpart ofthe Western defence system?! 1
During late 1979 and throughout 1980 Oman was very clear and unequivocal about
its relations with Western countries and the United States. The Omani foreign affairs
minister emphasised this fact when he said:
There is a tactical accord that Oman gives the United States the right to
intervene ifOman is attacked by the Soviet Union, Ethiopia or South Yemen.12
The Omani-American bilateral accord was explained away and disavowed by some
of the main officials: for instance the Omani Minister of Information once said:
69. Wingerter, Rex B "The Gulf Co-operation Council and American Interests in the Gulf" American
Arab Affairs Vol. 16, June 1986, London, p. 17.
70. Regsbee, Wallace Lynn, op.cit. 86.
71. El-Reyyes, Riad N. Oman's Role in the Gulf Co-operation Council and the Region. Oman;
Economic, Social and Strategic Development. Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 198.
72. Al-Nalml, Abd al-Rahman M. op.cit. p. 87.
138
Chapter Three
There are no American military bases in Oman; the agreement
concerning such facilities emanates from the concept of Omani national
independence and sovereignty. These facilities do not mean that the Americans
can come at any time they may wish to. They are rather dependent on the Omani
people and country's free will. No American plane or otherwise can ever
contemplate landing in an Omani airport without prior Omanipermission.
He indicated the purpose of the Omani-American accord as follows:
The Gulfregion is now, more than at any time in the past, more exposed
to foreign intervention - our national and domestic potentials are known and
limited and we cannot resist any intervention precipitated by a world
superpower. So we contemplated and suggested that a solution may be sought in
an accord that does not impinge on our national sovereignty, and such an
accord should be a device at our disposal to be employed whenever we might
wish.. It should be a strong stick that we wave in the face of the Soviets who are
now present in South Yemen, which they brought under their domination via a
military pact. 73
The Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, as a result of the Baghdad summit decisions in
1979 and to exert pressure on the Arab Gulf states and especially Oman, issued a
charter called the Arab Charter. This called for the creation of a collective Arab Gulf
Security Force, as a supplement to the Arab League Joint Defence Pact, and of a joint
military command which would control the force as an independent unit financed by
the participating member states. However, the Iraqi security plan was not accepted by
the other Arab Gulf states except Kuwait, who called, without success, for a study of
the Iraqi plan. Many sources indicate that the Iraqi plan was intended to contain the
Omani security plan of 1979.74
The Critical Period for Gulf Security
The security of the Arab Gulf States by the end of the 1970s witnessed a real direct
internal and external threat brought about by the following events that took place in
the vicinity of the Gulf:
1) The fall of the Shah of Iran and the rise of the Iranian Islamic Revolution
(January 1979).
2) The North and South Yemen War (February 1979).
73. Shuker, Zuhair. op.cit. p. 145.
74. Ramazani, R.K. The GulfCo-operation Council Record andAnalysis. op.cit. p. 5.
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3) The seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca (November 1979)
4) The Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan (December 1979)
5) The outbreak of the Iraq - Iran War (September 1980).
The events of 1979 had far-reaching geopolitical implications in the region and
caused a direct threat to the Arab Gulf States and Gulf oil supplies to Western
European countries. The event which most changed the balance of Gulf security in
1979 was the Iranian revolution. This had ended the Shah's regime and the United
States efforts to promote Iran as the dominant regional power and as the focal point
for a United States security belt along the southern border of the Soviet Union. It also
damaged the security umbrella which protected the Arab Gulf States.
Some sources claim that the Shah's collapse smoothed the way for the Soviet
Union to invade Afghanistan in December 1979.75 The United States Strategy in the
Middle East and South Asia was also negatively affected in Turkey and Pakistan,
after serious strains developed between the United States and these two countries,
especially after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 which created a deep rift with
Washington. As for Pakistan, her decision to go ahead with the building of an atomic
bomb caused the United States to cut off the economic and military assistance given
to her.
The Security of the Gulf region became more critical after the United States,
the main partner of the Arab conservative States in the Gulf, lost many partners and
allies in the Gulf region, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Asia and Africa. All
these events of 1979, especially the fall of the Shah in Iran, prompted experts from
the American administration to propose new security plans to deal with and confront
the new situation in the world, particularly in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. 76
75. Mahmood, Fazal. op.cit. pp. 16-17.
76. Gordon, Murray, op.cit. p. 16
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The Carter Doctrine (Rapid Intervention Force)
On January 23, 1979 the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, reacting to
fall of the Shah and the Iranian revolution, made the following statement in an
address on the state of the Union:
Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to
gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests ofthe United States ofAmerica, and such an assault will be repelled by
any means necessary, including militaryforce.
The American President concluded a litany of projected United States responses to
potential Soviet aggression by declaring:
Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to
share a co-operative security framework that respects differing values and
political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security andprosperity of
all.ll
Since the fall of the Shah of Iran and the demise of the Nixon Doctrine of the Gulf,
the Carter administration adopted many new plans for dealing with the situation in
the Gulf. The Egyptian president Anwar Al-Sadat adopted the role the Shah had had
and, from early 1979, the Carter administration adopted a programme of arms sales to
Egypt. The other support of the American strategy in the Gulf was Pakistan, who
hurried to send troops to Saudi Arabia to protect the Saudi Royal Family. Pakistan
and Egypt were to play a significant role in American strategy in the Gulf during the
late 1970s and early 1980s. The two countries agreed to provide military facilities for
the United States to use in defending the Arab Gulf States. Egypt would provide
facilities in the Qana and Ras Banas bases.78
The advisers and experts of the American administration adopted three plans in
reaction to the 1979 events, for the consolidation of America's position in the Gulf.
The first initiative consisted of a strategic plan for rapid intervention in the Arabian
(Persian) Gulf region or any other remote part of the world. This plan focused on the
77. Brzezinski, Zbigniew "After the Carter Doctrine: Geostrategic Stakes and Turbulent Crosscurrents
in the Gulf' in: Sindelar, Richard III and Peterson, J.E. (eds.J Crosscurrents in the Gulf, Regional
and Global Interests. The Middle East Institute, Washington. D.C. 1988, p. 5.
78. Al-Nalml, Abd al-Rahman M. op.cit. p. 78
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expansion of air and maritime transportation systems, and called for more facilities in
the Indian Ocean for the American fleet. The second plan mainly consisted of the
arrangement of a new command entrusted with recruitment, training and planning for
the intervention of American troops in overseas regions. The third initiative included
diplomatic moves which aimed at getting hold of selected military facilities in the
Gulf.79 However, they finally decided to deal with the situation in the Gulf by
establishing a Rapid Intervention Force.80 The use of force had been discussed and
considered in American military circles since 1977, as a way of protecting the
oilfields in the Gulf area. The establishment of this force came about as a result of a
direct threat to American and Western European interests in the Gulf. It was also
established to protect the regimes of the Arab Gulf states against any internal or
external threat.
Many military and political analysts conclude that the main reason for the
setting up of the rapid intervention force was to occupy the oil fields in the Arab Gulf
states in case of an external intervention from countries such as the Soviet Union,
Iran and Iraq or internal threats within the Gulf regimes.81 The security of the Arab
Gulf States was severely threatened, following the fall of the Shah of Iran. The
Iranian Islamic Revolution, which adopted a hostile policy against the United States,
starting with the taking hostage of the American citizens in the American Embassy in
Tehran, also adopted a new policy towards the Gulf states. It sought to export the
Islamic revolution and encourage the local Shi'ite leaders in the Arab Gulf to support
Khomeini's regime.
From early 1979, most of the Arab Gulf states, especially Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, faced many internal problems caused by the Shi'ite people in
their countries especially in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and many places in
79. Record, Jeffrey. Rapid Intervention Forces, op.cit. p. 85.
80. The Carter Doctrine was accompanied by the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force (RDJTF) at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida on 1 March 1980. This was a permanent
military force designed to deploy rapidly into the region to respond to contingencies threatening
US interests, specifically threats to Persian Gulf oil. The RDJTF evolved from a planning concept
which was then called the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).
81. The idea of occupying the Arab Gulf States oil fields, especially the Saudi oil fields, came from the
former US Secretary of State Henry Kissenger. Al-NalmT, Abd al-Rahman M. op.cit. p. 80.
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Kuwait. These problems included bomb attacks. Bahrain was the country which
faced the greatest threat from the Shi'a. Ayatollah Sadeq RuhanI threatened to annex
Bahrain unless she adopted an Islamic government after the Iranian model. The Shi'a
in Bahrain constitute the majority of the population.82
American Roles in the Establishment of the GCC
As a result of the Iranian threat, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the outbreak
of the Iran-Iraq war, officials from the Arab Gulf states and Washington called for
the creation of some kind of security link between the Arab Gulf states, the main aim
of this being to counter the Iranian revolution through the assistance of the United
States and the Western European countries. The most important initiative was that of
the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and prime minister Shaykh Jabir Al-Ahmad (the present
Amir) who called for the establishment of a Gulf Union with the object of realising
co-operation in all fields economic, political, educational and information, in order to
serve the interests and stability of the people of the region.83
The establishment of the GCC officially took place between the 4th February
and the 25th May 1981. Many sources indicate that the establishment of the GCC
was the result of an American initiative (for more details see The American position
towards the establishment of the GCC in Chapter no 2).
However, the Kuwaiti political writer 'Abdullah Al-NufaysT, in his paper which
discusses the Symposium held in Kuwait in 1981, states that the Saudi government
took the initiative to establish the GCC, comprising Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain
and the United Arab Emirates. One of the strategic goals of this council was the
setting up of a common defence and security system between these states and the
United States. The most important part of this was the bargain made between the
United States and Saudi Arabia to provide the AWACs. These bargain became an
integral defence umbrella for all the GCC States which was, essentially, an alliance to
82. Ramazani, R.K. op.cit. p. 7.
83. Peterson, J.E. op.cit. p. 172.
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counter the effects of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the events in
Afghanistan. 84
The Lack of Consensus Over the Arab Gulf Initiatives
During the first meeting, which led to the establishment of the council, the States of
the Gulf Co-operation Council, especially Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, were not
able to overcome their differences and conclude a unified security agreement.
The Omani proposal focused on naval security in the Strait of Hormuz and
requested that the Council should finance the acquisition of naval units with the co¬
operation of Western countries. The Kuwaiti plan concentrated on the collective
security of the Arab Gulf states, both internal and external. The different views of
these two proposals led to a separate Saudi proposal, which called for closer internal
security relations between the member states. The Saudi plan, which represented the
main branch of Saudi policy towards the other Arab Gulf states from the early 1970s,
suggested that the security co-operation between Arab Gulf states should be on the
basis of bilateral agreements between the GCC states. The Saudi proposal came as a
reaction to the attempted coup by the Shi'a in 1981 in Bahrain.85
As regards the first summit meeting between the GCC States, held in Abu
Dhabi in 25 May 1981, five principles were agreed upon guiding their security
policy. First, the welfare and security of each state's people must be maximised;
second, an attack against one state was to be seen as an attack against all the council
states; third and fourth, 'internal supervision' and outside intervention must be
prevented; and fifth, the military policy of the GCC countries should be inseparable
from that of the Arab nation.86 The council has not been able to achieve any more as
regards these five principles since its establishment in 1981. The events which have
taken place in the GCC states have no force against any external threat irrespective of
84. Al-Nufaysi, Abdullah F. op.cit. p. 15.
85. Sallm, Muhammad A "A Ru'ya al-Saudiyyah Li-Amn al-Khalij" in: Al-Mashshat, Abd al-
Mun im (ed.) Amn al-Khalij al- 'Arabi Dirasah fi-al-Idrak wa al-Siyasah. Center for Political
Research and Studies, Cairo, 1994, pp. 53-54.




whether it comes from Iran or Iraq. The best example is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in 1990.
Thomas McNaugher of the Brookings Institution in the United States noted
that:
the GCC can be expected at best to police the Peninsula - to deal with various
threats from the Yemens and hopefully to settle disputes among themselves
amicably. But they cannot hope to defend the peninsula against external attack .
. . [which] they can hope at best to deter by promising some damage to the
attacker, to limit damage initially, and thus to buy time until reinforcements
arrive. 87
Since the early 1980s and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf area has become
one of the most tense areas in the world. This war presented the super powers with a
great numbers of pretexts to intervene in the area. The status of the GCC became the
prime security issue in every common or bilateral meeting held during that period.
However, the rulers considered security as an individual problem and failed to devise
a common or plural mechanism to deal with it. As regard US policy towards security
in the Gulf, the Reagan Administration believed that the fundamental threat to peace
and stability in the region was not from the Arab-Israeli conflict (especially since
Egypt and Israel were moving towards the implementation of the Egypt-Israel Peace
Treaty as scheduled) but the Soviet Union and its policies. The Reagan
administration introduced the concept of "strategic consensus" which called for the
regional states, from Pakistan to Egypt, to cooperate with Washington and amongst
themselves in opposing the common Soviet threat.88
Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait, the most important members of the Gulf Co¬
operation Council, each had a different perspective on security and each sought to
resolve this predicament in different ways. The Iran-Iraq War escalated in 1982, 1984
and 1986, when Iran scored some initial victories. GCC States, particularly Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, felt obliged to encourage and support Iraq directly with an
estimated $30 billion in aid. Kuwait was the GCC country most affected by this war
and this prompted her to ask the United Nations Security Council to intervene and
87. Peterson, J.E. op.cit. p. 199.
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protect her oil tankers. The United States and the Soviet Union responded positively
to this Kuwaiti request.89
American Facilities in the Arab Gulf States
Saudi Arabia, the most important country in the Gulf Co-operation Council,
requested military protection from the United States and Pakistan soon after the war
broke out between Iran and Iraq. Saudi Arabia's air defence was enhanced by the
developing American military presence in the country and the deployment of
American AWACS. They also provided her with great intelligence support.90 The
American administration approved the immediate deployment of four AWACS early
warning aircraft accompanied by 300 United States airforce crew and ground support
personnel.91
As a result of the American policy of having a Rapid Intervention Force in the
Gulf area, Saudi Arabia provided many facilities for them in Saudi bases. These
included Khamls al-Mushayt located in the south-western province ofAsir, just north
of Yemen, Tabuk, situated just south of the Jordanian border near the Gulf of
'Aqaba, Sharura on the edge of the Rub al-Khali desert near the Yemeni border, King
Khalid Military City located at Hafr al-Batin, just south of the Iraqi-Saudi Neutral
Zone and Asad Military City at al-Kharj, south of Riyadh.
88. Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush
Administration" op.cit. p. 3.
89. Yetiv, Steven A. The U.S. Strategic Position in the Persian Gulf (1978-1990): The Impact of the
Iranian Revolution, the Afghanistan Intervention and the Iran-Iraq War. Ph.D. Thesis, Kent State
University, U.S.A. 1990. pp. 52.
90. As a response to the Arab Gulf States security, the United States sent four AWACS aircraft to
Saudi Arabia during the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 to assist Saudi Arabia to defend its
territory from a possible escalation in that conflict. Later, in support of the Reagan administration
of the American policy in the Gulf region, AWACS aircraft were sold to Saudi Arabia. For more
details of the Saudi Arabia and the United State bargain on the AWACS, see Reese, John N.
op.cit. p. 18.
91. In January 1983, the RDJTF formally became CENTCOM. CENTCOM was organised as a unified
command with a broad and continuing mission focused on an Area of Responsibility (AOR) that
included the Northern Tier from Iraq to Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Jordan and the
Horn of Africa including Kenya and Sudan. CENTCOM has responsibility for all military
activities and crisis military operations within the Area of Responsibility. See. Reich, Bernard and
Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration"
op.cit. p. 3. Acharya, Amitav. op.cit. p. 129.
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On the other hand many sources indicate that the Pakistani government
provided more than 20,000 troops after the outbreak of the Iranian revolution to
protect the Saudi Royal Family against any internal problems. This became especially
necessary after the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca, the Shi'a riots in the
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 1979 and the Yemeni border conflict in 1979.
Many reports claim that most of the Pakistani troops were stationed near the Saudi-
Yemen border.92
Initiatives by the GCC Leaders
During the late 1980s, and as a result of the end of the Iran-Iraq war which had lasted
eight years, the leaders of the GCC agreed to fix up of security Committee in 1990 to
work out a common security plan. The Committee was headed by Sultan Qaboos of
Oman and consisted of one member (minister) from each country of the GCC. By
October 1991, the Omani plan had taken shape. It envisaged a force of more than
100,000 troops, with a Command independent of any one of the GCC member
governments, and would be answerable directly to the GCC. At the twelfth Summit
in Kuwait in December 1991 Sultan Qaboos was thanked for his efforts, and the plan
was shelved. Since that time no action has been taken over collective security among
the GCC, except the security agreements signed between the GCC States and the
United States, Britain and France. The new security committee, created at the Doha
summit in December 1990, held its first meeting in Salalah in March 1991, but there
was no tangible outcome then or at its meeting in May 1991. Likewise, the GCC
foreign ministers' meeting in Kuwait in May 1991 to work out the details for a Gulf
peacekeeping force produced little more than a statement welcoming UN deployment
along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Their next meeting in Dhahran in June 1991 had the
same result. 93
92. Peterson, J.E. op.cit. pp. 178-183
93. Tripp, Charles " The Gulf States and Iraq" Survival. Vol. 34. No. 3, Autumn 1992, London, p. 47
and see Peterson, J.E "The Future of Gulf Security After the Kuwaiti War" op.cit. p. 132 and see.
Rusi Journal Defence Year BooL op.cit. p. 137. For more details over security agreements
between the GCC states see Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulfand the Search for Strategic: Saudi
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Feisal al-Mazidi in his book The Future ofthe Gulf. The Lesacv ofthe War and
the Challenges ofthe 1990s describes the differences between the GCC states:
The problems relating to sovereign as opposed to collective decision¬
making are not unique to the GCC, but they are likely to become increasingly
pressing if common GCC external policies are to evolve. The danger is that in
the absence of such institutionalised means for foreign policy development,
differences between the GCC states could lead to a serious crisis. 94
The Iraqi Invasion ofKuwait
Since the termination of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989, the lack of trust between the
countries of the Gulf and Iran has grown. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war in July
1988, the Republic of Iraq faced immense problems. Iraq's total international debt
was estimated at $80-85 billion and debt servicing required an annual $8 billion,
while her foreign reserves were no more than $2,000 million. Added to this was the
fall in world oil prices, from about $28 per barrel in July 1985 to $13-16 per barrel in
1988-89. This caused further economic damage to the Iraqi economy. It should be
noted that about $16 billion of this debt was owed to Kuwait.95 All the Arab Gulf
States supported Iraq militarily and financially. The Iranian media launched a hostile
campaign against the members of the GCC, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By
mid-1990 the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, as a result of loans (during his war
with Iran) from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, launched a blistering attack on Kuwait and
the UAE for what he maintained was a conspiracy with the United States to wage
economic war on Iraq by causing oil prices to fall. He also accused Kuwait of border
violations. Since 1989, United States goals in the Gulf region have been concentrated
on maintaining stability in the region; preventing either Iran or Iraq from dominating
the region; preventing the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism; and reducing the
Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, op.cit.
p. 27, and "Role of the Outside Power" op.cit. p. 153.
94. Al-Mazidi, Feisal. The Future of the Gulf The legacy of the War and the Challenges ofthe 1990.
I.B. Tauris, London, New York, 1993. p. 33.
95. Allocke, John. B and others. Border and territorial disputes. 3rd edn, Longman, 1992. P. 186.
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threat of terrorism from and in the region. The Bush administration continued to rely
on both diplomatic and military approaches in its Gulf strategy.96
The government of Kuwait rejected the Iraqi accusation in an identical letter
sent to the Arab League on the 19th of July 1990. During July 1990 many Arab
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Mubarak visited Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi
Arabia on a one-day tour on 24 July), intervened to mediate between Kuwait and Iraq
and held a meeting between the Kuwaiti heir apparent and the Vice-President of Iraq
on 28-29 July. But the negotiations in Jeddah did not resolve the disputes between
the two parties and helped pave the way for Iraqi troops to invade Kuwait on 2
August 1990. On 25 of July 1990 the Iraqi President and his foreign minister Tariq
Aziz met with A. Glaspie, the US ambassador to Iraq. During this meeting the two
Iraqi leaders complained bitterly to Glaspie about Iraq's tenuous economic situation.
In one exchange, Saddam Hussein complained that the drop in the price of oil had
cost Iraq $6 to $7 billion, which was, in his words, a "disaster." In direct response,
Ambassador Glaspie said: "I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I
admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We
understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild
your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border
disagreement with Kuwait." Some people claim that US tried to provoke Saddam
into invading Kuwait on 2 ofAugust 1990. 97
Most countries in the world, especially the United States and the West,
condemned the Iraqi occupation and called for her unconditional withdrawal from
Kuwait. The UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning Iraq, demanding
that Iraq withdraw all its forces immediately and unconditionally to the position in
which they were located on August. On the Arab side they held a Summit Conference
in Cairo on 10 August 1990. But the Summit showed that there were rifts between
the Arab Countries on the Summit resolutions.
96. Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H. op.cit. p. 5 and see Snow, Charles "The Political
Scene" ATEES. Vol. XXXIII. No.42, 23 July 1990, pp. CI-C2.
97. Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert. Politics in the Middle East, op.cit. p. 389 and see Snow,
Charles "The political Scene" MEES. Vol. XXXIII. No.42. 23 July 1990, p. C2.
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The GCC States as well as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia and
Djibouti voted in favour of the resolutions of the Summit. Jordan, Sudan and
Mauritania tried to create a middle ground where none existed by expressing
reservation. Algeria and Yemen abstained and Libya and the PLO joined Iraq in
voting against the resolutions of the Arab League Summit (it should be recorded that
this was the first time in its history that the Arab League had passed a resolution by
majority vote rather than consensus).98
Since the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait the security of the Arab Gulf states
(internal and external) became more critical for the rulers as they faced a real threat
provoked by internal demands for change and participation in political affairs. Many
blamed their governments for the huge influx of non-Muslim troops in their lands,
especially in Saudi Arabia. Also the governments of the Arab Gulf States were
unhappy about the hundreds of thousands of troops which had taken up a defensive
position in their lands. It should be noted that the Arab Gulf States (GCC) were not
able to defend their external security against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which
resulted in the demand for outside troops (US and Western) to protect them and
liberate Kuwait from Iraq.99 The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (on 2 August) lasted
until the International Coalition, led by the US, liberated the state of Kuwait and
defeated the Iraqi troops in mid-February 1991.100
98. Snow, Charles "The Political Scene" MEES. Vol. XXXIII. No.44. 6 August 1990, Cuprus, 1990.
p.Cl. The Arab Summit of Cairo coincided with the first American troops landing in Saudi Arabia
see Snow, Charles "The Political Scene" MEES. Vol. XXXIII. No.46. 20 August 1990, p. CI.
99. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Bahrain Country Profile 1996-97" p. 6 and see The Economist
Intelligence Unit "Qatar Country Profile 1996-97" p. 33 and see The Economist Intelligence Unit
"Kuwait Country Profile 1996-97" p. 7.
100. Bill, James A and Springborg, Robert. Politics in the Middle East, op.cit. pp. 390-392.
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Security Of The Gulf Region From the Liberation Of Kuwait To the
Mid -1990s
The American Security Proposal for the Gulf Region
Since the defeat of Iraq and her withdrawal from Kuwait, the search for new security
arrangements in the Gulf region has led in a number of directions. The members of
the GCC and the United States have been pursuing a multi-tiered approach to
regional deterrence and defence: strengthening the national armed forces of the GCC
member states; enhancing the GCC countries' collective capacities to deter and
defend against outside threats; expanding the co-operative defence links between the
GCC members and their regional partners, especially Egypt and Syria; and getting
guarantees for the commitment of the international coalition's great powers,
primarily the US, Britain and France, to the GCC region's defence. 101
Several security schemes were introduced for the Gulf area during and after the
second Gulf war of 1991. The most notable of these was a US proposal. On 6 March
1991, President George Bush, speaking to a joint session of the US Congress, defined
four key challenges that had to be met in the Middle East: 1) The creation of shared
security arrangements in the region with the help of the US. This would include US
participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces and the
maintenance of a US naval presence in the region. 2) Controlling the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and missile systems. 3) putting an end to the Arab-
Israeli conflict with a comprehensive peace based on the UN Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle for peace. 4) Fostering economic freedom
and prosperity for all the people of the region.
101. Reese, John N. Towards Collective Security in the Gulf: An Evolving United States Role in
Support of the GCC. op.cit. pp. 36-37 and see Anthony, John Duke "The GCC, Iran, and Iraq
Gulf States Deal with Twin Threats to Security" Middle East Insight. Vol. XII. No.2. January-
February 1996. p. 34.
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The European Proposal for the Gulf
The second security proposal was made by France, Italy and Spain. This project was
based on the European experience in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe. The idea was to hold a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the
Middle East to guarantee existing borders in the area, encourage economic co¬
operation and regional integration, control the local arms race, and promote
democracy and respect for human rights.
The Iranian Proposal for the Gulf
The Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani made the third security proposal in a
speech on 21 September 1990. Rafsanjani called for an Islamic Peace Project based
on security agreements between the GCC countries and Iran. The project called for
the replacement of "foreign" forces in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf with Arab i.e. Gulf
Arab and Iranian forces. It also called for an Islamic Court of arbitration to resolve
conflicts in the area. Finally, the project called on the Arab and Persian states to pay
for the reconstruction of Iran and Iraq.
The Egyptian Proposal for the Gulf
The Egyptian project called for a new Arab order based on a reinvigorated Arab
League, in which the Arab partners who took part in the international coalition to
liberate Kuwait would form part. They would be the main safeguards of security in
the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. 102
The Damascus Declaration
After the termination of the second Gulfwar and the liberation of Kuwait in February
1991 by the American and international coalition troops, Egypt and Syria, with strong
support from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, sought to build a new political and security
102. Aly, Abdel Monem Said and Saleh, Hassan "Conflict in the Gulf: Views from the Gulf
Cooperation Council" in. Powder Keg in the Middle East The Struggle for GulfSecurity, (eds.)
152
Chapter Three
system to deal with security in the Gulf area. This charter came to be known as the
Damascus declaration and was signed by the foreign ministers of the eight countries
concerned in Damascus on 5 and 6 March 1991. The text of this declaration was
concerned with co-operation between the participating countries in developing
security arrangements in the Gulf region, and it proposed that the Egyptian and
Syrian forces, which had taken part in the liberation of Kuwait and were still in the
Arabian Peninsula, would form the nucleus of the regional Arab security forces in the
Arab Gulf region.
The Damascus declaration reflected the common view of the participating
countries that they should go beyond the crisis of the occupation of Kuwait. Its
purpose was to build a new Arab Order and reach an agreement on security
arrangements, while leaving the declaration open to the other Arab countries who had
refused to take part militarily in the liberation of Kuwait. The declaration defined the
aims of the co-operation between the GCC States, Egypt and Syria in three main
areas: Politics, Economics, and Security. These were the prime causes which led to
the convening of the meeting. 103
The details of the Damascus declaration generally did not depart from
traditional Arabic political rhetoric as it dealt with co-operation between the Arab
countries to face the challenges and threats which lay before them. However, what
was new in the Damascus declaration, which came as a result of strong reactions and
political endeavours from some of the Arab Gulf states after the liberation of Kuwait,
was that it was the first time an Arab charter had discussed the setting up of a peace-
force to deter threats and guarantee peace and security for the Arab countries.
But only two months after the signing of the Damascus declaration, the
Egyptian President made a U-tum and announced the withdrawal of all Egyptian
troops from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It was a decision which, he said, would take
place one month after the signing of the declaration.
Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Gross. American Association for the Advancement of Science,
Washington. 1995. pp. 199-200.
103. Butt, Gerald "The Damascus Declaration: Eight Pairs of Eyes on Iraq" Middle East International.
22 March 1991, p. 10.
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Following the Egyptian forces' withdrawal, the Syrian troops also withdrew
from the Gulf region. The Damascus declaration altered after the withdrawal of the
Egyptian and Syrian forces in July 1991, particularly in its security aspects.
A long debate took place between the participating Arab factions over the
Damascus declaration. This was in spite of the accusations which were used to justify
this alteration being rejected, particularly these concerning the security charter which
was the core of the Damascus declaration. 104 The Arab press highlighted the details
of the Egyptian decision to withdraw her troops from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the
UAE.
It stated that the main reason for this was the friction between Egypt and
Kuwait, which came as a result of Kuwait granting the contract for her reconstruction
to foreign companies from America and Britain. Further, the Egyptian government
was dissatisfied with the Kuwaiti treatment ofEgyptian labourers.
According to political analysts, the main reason for the Egyptian decision to
withdraw was the announcement by the American Defence Secretary Dick Cheyne,
during his official visit to the GCC countries, of their acceptance of American
suggestions on the security arrangements after the second Gulf war. The American
Secretary also announced that there would be an agreement signed between
Washington and the GCC countries in this respect. These agreements took into
consideration the financial, administrative, technical and political needs of the peace-
force. In addition, the fears of the GCC States in the organisation towards countries
such as Syria and Egypt, which were considered radical by the organisation, were
also given a thorough appraisal. The United States position also showed a lack of
enthusiasm towards the Damascus declaration, which contradicted the American
strategy and her security arrangements in the Gulf region. 105
Despite the silence of the Egyptian government on the defence agreement
between Kuwait and the United States, some sources known to be close to President
Mubarak suggested that there was more to the pact between Kuwait and Washington
104. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" Survival. Vol.34.No.3, Autumn 1992. p. 46 and see
MEES. Vol. XXXIII. No.21. 25 February 1991. pp. C3-C4.
105. Sallm, Muhammad A. op.cit. p. 64.
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than had been announced. Cairo argued that this accord was the end of the Damascus
Declaration and the notion of a joint Egyptian/Syrian commitment to Arab Gulf
security. 106 In addition, Iran strongly objected to the Damascus declaration and
rejected the presence of Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Gulf area. (A fundamental
Iranian strategic principle is that Persian Gulf politics should be dissociated from
Arab politics).
The Shah opposed Nasserist inroads in the Gulf for this reason (as Tehran
today opposes the model of the Damascus Declaration): neither of these countries
were part of the Gulf region, and both of them faced great difficulties and problems.
For instance Syria was having a problem with Lebanon, while Egypt was in the grip
of economic hardship and confrontations with Islamic movements. This suggested
that neither of these countries could play a positive role in the protection of Gulf
security.
The GCC States were unwilling to commit themselves to arrangements that
might limit their own resources, and the concerns of Egypt and Syria were not
sufficiently similar to those of the GCC to allow for anything other than an arm's
length approach. The other reason for the failure of the Damascus Declaration
formula was the reluctance of the GCC governments to become embroiled in the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
The GCC countries would have liked to distance themselves as much as
possible from this dispute. 107 The former secretary-general 'Abdullah Bisharah said,
"Trust is the most important element in co-operation among states, that is, our
relations must be based on trust and confidence'. In addition, he noted, 'There is no
106. Kechichian, Joseph A. Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula, op.cit. p. 87.
107.'AlawI, Mustafa "Tartibat al-Amn fi-al-Khalij Ba'd al-Harb" in. Al-Sayyid, Mustafa Kamil (edy
Hatta La-Tanshub Harb Arabiyyah- Arabiyyah Ukhra Min Durus Harb al-Khalij. Centre of
Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 1992, pp. 664-668. See also Tripp, Charles "The
Gulf States and Iraq" op.cit. p. 47. It should be noted that Israel has much more to offer the GCC
governments in military and Intelligence capabilities than does Syria and Egypt. Israel's access to
the U.S. is also helpful in facilitating U.S. military sales to the GCC. Israel could also receive
considerable benefits from close connections with the Arab Gulf governments. See. Salame,
Ghassan "Assessing Alternative Future Arrangements for Regional Security" op.cit. p. 79.
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such thing as free Arab money or open borders, we do not accept this. We are
countries in every sense of the word'. 108
In reaction to the Damascus Declaration, two days after it was announced, the
Iranian Senior Vice-President, Hussein HabibI, and the foreign minister 'All Akber
Velayati arrived in Damascus to find out and discuss more about the declaration and
the new alliance between the eight Arab countries. Hafiz Al-Asad of Syria declared
that the Syrian participation in the new Damascus declaration alliance was in no way
meant as a threat to Syrian-Iranian relations. 109
In spite of repeated attempts on behalf of the officials of the countries which
took part in the Damascus Declaration there were considerable difficulties faced by
the Gulf States over the inclusion of Syria and Egypt in this Arab security pact. As a
result the Damascus Declaration was invalidated only a few months after its
inception. The six states of the GCC revoked the formula of the collective security
arrangement made between the Gulf Co-operation Council states, Egypt and Syria.
Instead it became known as the bilateral agreement between the GCC States on the
one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other hand. Oman was the least enthusiastic of
the Gulf States over the conditions set in the Damascus Declaration.
Oman considered that the presence of the Egyptian and Syrian forces would
weaken the solidarity of the Arab Gulf states, and thus she openly drew attention to
the important role of Iran in the security arrangements of the Gulf region, because it
was one of the most important countries in the area. 110 Certainly, Oman made her
position very clear by placing severe reservations on Arab participation in Gulf
security. When differences came to the surface between the signatories to the
Damascus Declaration, Oman approached the remaining members of the GCC states
with a view to altering it, particularly concerning the clause on Egyptian and Syrian
forces in the Gulf area, such that, if any country of the GCC wished to station
108. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" op.cit. p. 46 and see Chubin, Shahram and Tripp,
Charles "Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" Adelphi Paper 304. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies 1996. Oxford University Press, p. 25.
109. Chubin, Shahram "Post-War Gulf Security" Survival. Vol. XXXIII No.2. 1991. p. 145, and Butt,
Gerald, op.cit. p. 10.
110. Alawl, Mustafa, op.cit. p. 668.
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Egyptian or Syrian forces on its soil, then Oman preferred that it should be included
in the bilateral arrangements between the concerned parties. The significance of
Oman's stand is that she was the only country in the GCC states who did not station
any Arab forces on her soil during the second Gulf crisis.
On 15 July 1991, after the meeting between the foreign ministers of the
countries who signed the Damascus Declaration in Kuwait, they declared that they
had all unanimously agreed on fundamental changes in the specific statement
concerning military co-operation, such that the previous statement was repealed and
became a sub-clause in the issue ofmilitary co-operation.
The previous text read as follows:
The presence of the Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Gulf region
resembles the nucleus of the Arab security force to guarantee the peace and
security ofthe Arab Gulfcountries.
This statement was replaced by another part, which says:
However, it is within the prerogative of any country in the Gulf Co-operation
Council states to seek help from the Egyptian andSyrian forces if it wishes. 111
This collective co-operation is replaced by selective bilateral relations between the
countries involved in the Damascus Declaration, which had collapsed after the
Egyptian government decided to withdraw all her forces from the Gulf region in
April 1991. It should be noted that the foreign ministers of the Damascus Declaration
held many meetings in May, July, September and November 1991 after the
substitution of the original statement; however these gatherings did not achieve any
result to do with security in the Arabian Gulf area. Following the November meeting,
an Egyptian publication went as far as to say that the Damascus Declaration
signatories had abandoned the idea of forming an Arab force to be deployed in the
Gulf, that they saw the Gulf crisis as 'a thing of the past' and that they would now be
turning their attention to 'spontaneous co-operation'.
111. Idris, Muhammad A "Ru'ya 'Uman wa al-Imarat wa-Qatar wal-Bahrayn Li-Amn al-Khallj" in:
Al-Mashshat, Abd al-Munlm (ed.) Amn al-Khali] al- Arab!Dirasah fi-al-Idrak wa al-Siyasah.
Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo, 1994, p. 215.
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The Egyptian Foreign Minister said that certain differences existed among the
signatories and suggested that it was 'better to admit this and to seek to solve them
honestly'. 112 A year after Kuwait's liberation, the Damascus Declaration was not
officially dead but seemed for all practical purposes to have been shelved. The
attempts by the GCC States to create a self-reliant force (based on Sultan Qaboos's
plan of 1991 to establish an integrated military force called Peninsula Shield,
consisting of 100,000 soldiers, under a unified command) were unsuccessful.
The Growing Presence of the USA, Britain and France in the Gulf
The failure of the GCC States to establish a collective security system or to sustain a
regional force caused these countries to increase their reliance for security on
international powers, especially the United States, Britain and France. It should be
noted that this growing dependence on the West did not represent any change by the
GCC States in their security policy. 113
However, the concept ofGulf security has taken on a different role in American
strategic policy towards the Gulf region since the liberation of Kuwait. The Bush
administration's plans after 1991 to protect Gulf security were based on the
stockpiling of large stores of American equipment in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait along
with the presence of American divisions. The United States also sought to set up
support equipment for five or six fighter wings consisting of approximately 400
aircraft as well as naval support. 114 (Historically, American efforts in the Gulf region
have been directed at maintaining the balance of power between the two dominant
112. Sayigh, Yazid "Regional Security in the Gulf 1. The Geopolitical Realities" Middle East
International. 31 May 1991, London, p. 17 see also Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq"
op.cit. pp. 45-46.
113. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf' op.cit. p. 64.
114. Reese, John N. Towards Collective Security in the Gulf: An Evolution United States Role in
Support of the GCC States, op.cit. p.6, and see The Times. No.56620 Monday, July 1 1996.
London, p. 15, and Gold, Dore "The US and Gulf Security" Middle East Military Balance. 1992,
1993. London, 1993, p. 87. For more details over the US policy in the Middle East see Reich,
Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush
Administration After the GulfWar" Rusi Journal Defence Year Book 1992. p. 153.
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states, Iran and Iraq. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait clearly showed that these efforts
were unsuccessful.
During 1991, the United States signed new defence memoranda with all of the
GCC states except Saudi Arabia which was reluctant to sign a special memorandum
and instead based her post-war defence relationship on the 1977 Military Training
Mission Treaty between the two countries. 115 In the aftermath of the second Gulf
crisis the United States concluded many security arrangements with the Arab Gulf
states. In a speech on 6 March 1991, President Bush outlined the United States
objectives in the Gulf area:
We must work together to create shared security arrangements in the
region . . . This does not mean stationing US ground forces in the Arabian
Peninsula, but it does mean American participation in joint exercises involving
both air and groundforces. It means maintaining a capable naval presence in
the region, just as we have for over 40 years. Let it be clear: our vital national
interests depend on a stable and secure Gulf. 116
Kuwait, the only Arab government during the 1970s and 1980s to criticise the
American presence in the Gulf region, concluded a military agreement with the
United States on 9 September 1991. This agreement officially covers such matters as
United States access to Kuwaiti ports, the legal status of American forces in Kuwait,
arms prepositioning and joint training and manoeuvres. The agreement also
concluded a deal for American engineers to make Kuwait's two airbases inter¬
operable with the United States airforce, the idea being to enable the rapid
deployment of substantial American forces in Kuwait when needed, rather than
basing them there permanently. The agreement was valid for ten years. 117
115. The US constituted in April 1991 a joint Saudi-US security study team to determine the security
need of the Kingdom over the next five to ten years, including the identification of potential
threats. See. Reich, Bernard and Gotowicki, Stephen H "The United States and the Persian Gulf in
the Bush Administration after the GulfWar", op.cit. p. 9.
116. Al-Alkim, Hasan H. The GCC States in an Unstable World Foreign-Policy Dilemmas ofSmall
States, op.cit. p. 147.
117. It should be recorded that the Kuwaiti-American defence co-operation was the main factor which
suspended the working of the Arab collective security of the Damascus Declaration. See Jabir,




The Kuwaiti Council Ministers declared that the agreement was intended 'to
maintain the country's security, safety and stability and ensure the safety of its
borders against the expansionist ambitions of the Iraqi regime. 118
The Kuwaiti Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Darl al-'Uthman said that:
The ten years accord was aimed at achieving close co-operation between
the two countries to boost the military capabilities of the Kuwaiti armed forces
through programs and training.. ...to deter any aggression or threat to Kuwait's
sovereignty. 119
The Kuwaiti-American defence agreement was followed, on 11 February 1992, by a
British-Kuwaiti memorandum of understanding on security co-operation. The
agreement involved mutual consultation and co-operation with Kuwaiti armed forces
in the defence of Kuwait, as well as provision for training and joint exercises. Like
the US-Kuwaiti agreement, it was to run initially for ten years, but unlike the other
agreement, there was no provision for the storage or prepositioning of military
equipment. 120 Kuwait also signed two defence agreements with France on 18 August
1992 and Russia on 29 November 1993. The other GCC States, Qatar, Oman,
Bahrain and the UAE 121 signed individual agreements similar to the Kuwaiti one
with the United States during 1991 and 1992. Kuwait also signed defensive
agreements with Britain, France and Russia .122
Iran condemned the Kuwaiti-American agreement, and the Iranian government
officially denounced it. Tehran radio said on 9 September:
The Kuwait-American pact is bound to encourage more military
intervention from the United States in the region and will certainly not serve
Kuwait's interest. 123
118. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" op.cit. p. 49.
119. Butt, Gerald "Kuwait and Iraq: A Shabby Episode" Middle East International. 13 September
1991, London, p. 9.
120. Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" op.cit. p. 49, and Kechichian, Joseph A. Political
Dynamics andSecurity in the Arabian Peninsula, op.cit. p. 87.
121. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Oman Country Profile 1996-97" p. 5.
122. Gold, Dore. op.cit. p. 87, and Tripp, Charles "The Gulf States and Iraq" op.cit. p. 49.
123. Haeri, Safa "Kuwait and Iran Angered by Kuwait?" Middle East International. No. 404, 13
September, 1991, London, p. 9.
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Colin Powell, the American chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported the
national military strategy of the United States in January 1992 as follows:
Because of the changes in the strategic environment, the threats we
expect to face are regional rather than global. We will, of course, deter and
defend against strategic nuclear attacks as we have for the past forty years. We
will also retain the potential to defeat a global threat, should one emerge.
However, our plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and
fighting regional rather than global wars.
Since 1990 the United States has built a new security arrangements by extensive arms
sales to the Gulf region countries. After the liberation of Kuwait she supported the
Arab Gulf states in building these forces, particularly Saudi Arabia, and reached the
conclusion that the Kingdom should aspire to enlarge her armed forces from 90,000
to 200,000 men.
The GCC Army Purchase
From August 1990, the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, to late 1992, arms orders
for the Middle East reached $32.3 billion. Most of these arms orders were sent to
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Kuwait was reported to have
dedicated some $12 billion to weapons purchases over the next decade. King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia announced in 1993 that Saudi defence spending would rise by 9%.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has become the largest single customer for
American military contractors, larger than the Pentagon. 124 According to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oman spends about 15% of its gross
domestic product (GDP) on defence and security, which makes it the biggest defence
spender in the Middle East in GDP terms. 125 Gulf security even in the aftermath of
Kuwait's liberation, is still threatened by the two big regional countries, Iran and
Iraq. 126 However, the latter is not capable at the present time of making any direct
124. Kenneth, Katzman. op.cit. pp. 15-16, and MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.18. 1 February 1993. p.
All. and also MEED. Vol. 39. No.11. 17 March 1995. p. 18. and see SWB. BBC Monitoring.
Summary ofWorld Broadcasts. 18 February 1997. p. 6.
125. MEED. Vol. 36. No.9. 6 March 1992. p. 21.
126. Potter, Lawrence G "The Need for Confidence-Building Measures in the Persian Gulf' Middle
East Insizht. Vol. XXI, No. 2. January-February 1996. p. 27.
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threat, because of the American presence in the Gulf and the United Nations
sanctions.
Since the defeat of Iraq in the second Gulfwar Iran has emerged as a real threat
to the Arab Gulf states and the American and Western countries' interests in the Gulf
region. The government of Iran, despite its domestic economic difficulties, has begun
an intensive military build-up from Russia, China and North Korea. Many Americans
have pointed however to the fact that post-Khomeini Iran was still spending less
money than in the days of the military build-up under the Shah .127
The Unified Force of the GCC
Although the Gulf Co-operation Council had been created specifically to bring about
the co-ordination of all the Arab Gulf States' security, economic and political
policies and despite the good relations between the GCC States, especially during
and after the crisis of Kuwait in 1990, the Gulf states were not able to reach any
unified plan for external Gulf security. During 1991 Sultan Qaboos of Oman, headed
a security committee consisting of one minister from each of the GCC countries. This
Committee was established after the Doha summit in 1991.
The Omani military security proposal suggested in brief the establishment of a
force from the members of the GCC States, which should consist of 100,000 men.
The purpose of this force, as the Omani proposal mentions, was to protect the Arab
Gulf states from any direct threat or invasion until they could get foreign assistance
from friendly countries (meaning the United States and other Western countries,
especially Britain). The Omani proposal (presented by Sultan Qaboos during the Abu
Dhabi Summit in 1992) mentioned that the new Arab Gulf force should be made up
from the regular forces of the Arab Gulf States and that the citizens of the GCC
Countries should be free to join up. The proposal also affirmed that the numbers of
this force will not be limited equally between the members, but entry would be
allowed for any citizen of the GCC states. However, the Omani security plan was
127. Gold, Pore, op.cit. pp. 79-81, and see Anthony, John Duke "The GCC, Iran, and Iraq Gulf States
Deal with Twin Threats to Security" op.cit. p. 34.
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shelved after the summit without any result. Many political circles mentioned that the
failure to approve the Omani proposal was due to Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti
reluctance because they feared that Oman would dominate the force. This was
probably because most of the force would consist of Omani citizens. Saudi Arabia
also feared that she might lose her domination and supervision of the council in the
future. 128
States of the GCC, since it was established, have not been able to agree on any
unified security or military plan for the confrontation of external threats or invasion,
because of the differences between the interests of the individual states of the Arab
Gulf. Since 1982, two initiatives have firmly established the imperative of a security
dimension in the GCC. The first one was the Council's military mission to Oman to
solve the Omani situation. She was threatened by South Yemen at the time, backed
by the Soviet Union. The second initiative involved internal security co-ordination
and was prompted by the attempted coup in Bahrain in 1981.129
The GCC was not able to conclude any military arrangement, except for the
Peninsula Shield Force which came as a result of the attempted coup in Bahrain in
1982. This force was established from small armed units from each of the Council
members in November 1984, to be the nucleus of a Gulf force and to intervene and
assist any member needing help. However the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait confirmed the
failure of this force to protect the GCC from any external threat. 130 A comparison
between the GCC, and Iran and Iraq demonstrate their military weakness.
128. El-Rayyis, Riyad N. Riyah al-Sumum. op.cit. pp. 83-84. See also. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military
Security and Political Stability in the Gulf' op.cit. p. 61, and MEED. Vol. 39. No.ll. 17 March
1995. p. 9.
129. Idris, Muhammad S. op.cit. p. 152.





The GCC Military Capabilities Compared with Iran and Iraq(131)
Country Iran Iraq S.A. Oman Kuwait U.A.E. Bahrain Qatar
Total
Armed
513,000 382,000 104,000 42,000 16,000
1,00
8,100 0,100
Army 345,000 350,000 70,000 25,000 10,000
7,000
6,800 ,500
Reserves 350,000 650,000 ... ... 23,700 - ... ...
Navy 18,000 incl




4,200 2,500 ,000 600 00





18,000 3,500 2,500 ,500 700 00
Artillery 2,300 1,500 170
Tanks 1,245 2,200 770 73 164 25 ... -
Aircraft 213 (100 serviceable) 260 253 57 34 00 24 8
The other table shows that the GCC states are the smallest and weakest organisation
compared with main regional countries like Iraq, Iran, Israel and Turkey.
Table No. 6
The GCC as an Organisation Compared with Iran, Iraq, Israel and Turkey(132)












The GCC. 17, 1 225,5 20 ,5 9,2 (average) 56600 10,3
Iraq 19,7 382 650 0- 8,6 109670 -
Iran 56 473 350 ,5 4,3 18800 9,6
Israel 5 176 430 ,4 6,8 23700 22,4
Turkey 56 480 1104 5 56100 10,
131 Al-Mashshat:, 'Abd al-Mun'Im Al-Hayah Newspaper. No. 11467, Date 11-7-94, London, p. 4.
132. Al-Mashshat, Abd al-Mun'Im 'Al-Havah Newspaper . op.cit. p. 4
133 Al-Mashshat, 'Abd al-Mun'im Al-Havah Newspaper, op.cit. p. 4.
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Dual Containment Policy in the GulfRegion
Since coming to power in January 1993, the Clinton administration has given top
priority to an American Foreign Affairs Working Paper on issues pertaining to the
Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. This policy is known as dual containment 135 and
aims to bring about a direct co-operation between the members of the GCC. This
policy was first raised during the political address delivered by the President's
advisor on Eastern and South Asian affairs in the National Security Council, Martin
Indyk, on May 18 1993, in Washington. This dual containment policy aims to protect
the Arab Gulf state monarchies, and American and European interests in the Gulf,
especially as Iran and Iraq are thought to be a threat to the Gulf oil producers. The
aim to keep them weak and prevent them from increasing their power. The main
emphasis of American policy in the Middle East and the Gulf, according to Indyk's
address, is concentrated in many challenges:
1) The protection of Israel by ensuring the security of Israel's military superiority in
the region and the bringing about of a permanent peaceful settlement between the
Arabs and Israel.
2) Dual containment policy against Iran and Iraq preventing them from building
arsenals, in order that they will not pose a threat to the Arab Gulf States.
3) Confronting the extreme Islamic movements, terrorists and Muslim fanatics who
claim to cover themselves with a religious robe, according to Indyk's interpretation.
135. More details of this policy see Katzman, Kenneth. Beyond Dual Containment. The Emirates
Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 1996. pp. 10-19., and see Burrows, Sir Bernard and
others " Towards a Security Community in the Gulf' in: Nonneman, Gerd (ed.)77ze Middle East
and Europe The Search for Stability and Integration. Federal Trust for Education and Research,
London, p.p.65-66. As far as Arab reactions to the dual containment policy in the Gulf, are
concerned four states) of the GCC (UAE, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain), have unofficially expressed
serious reservations about the wisdom of a policy that seems, at least to them, to be unduly
confrontional. All of these countries stated that the continuation of UN sanctions was hurting the
civilian people in Iraq. See Hoogland, Eric "Rethinking Persian Gulf Security?" Middle East
Insisht. Vol. XXI. No.2. January-February 1996. pp. 31-32 and The Economist Intelligence Unit
"Kuwait Country Profile 1st Quarter 1997" p. 15; see also The Economist Intelligence Unit "Oman
Country Profile 1996-97" p. 5. For full text of the United States policy on Iraq, Iran and Islam see
the Appendixes. The statement was delivered on 27 July 1993 before the Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. See MEES. Vol. XXXVI.
No.44. 2 August 1993. pp. D1-D3.
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These factions came about as a result of the vacuum created by the fall of Soviet
power and the defeat of Iraq.
Martin Indyk, addressed this policy to the three countries in the Middle East
who are close friends of the United States and are the main supporters of this policy.
These were Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. 136 The United States proposed several
steps to promote stability in the Gulf:
(1) Imposing the GCC states' overall defensive capabilities and accelerating the
integration of their plans and programmes for the defence of their territory;
(2) Strengthening US military ties with the GCC states;
(3) Maintaining a limited military presence in the peninsula;
(4) Working with the GCC states to develop a greater role for the regional and extra-
regional powers such as Egypt, Syria, the United Kingdom and France. 137
Dual containment was envisaged not as a long-term solution to the problems of
Gulf stability, but as a way of temporarily isolating the two chief opponents of
American-sponsored regional order. Regarding Iraq, the policy involved the
maintaining of full-scale international economic sanctions and military containment,
including a no-fly zone in southern Iraq and a protected Kurdish enclave in the north.
On Iran the dual containment policy initially involved the mobilisation of
international political opposition against her, together with limited unilateral
economic sanctions. The Clinton administration asserted that it was not trying to
change the Iranian regime but rather her behaviour, particularly as regards her quest
for nuclear weapons, her support for terrorism and subversion in the region, and her
opposition to the peace process. 138
William J. Perry, the Former American Secretary of Defense, in a report
prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations in May 1995, explained the
136. El-Reyyis, Riyad N. Riyah. al-Sumum. op.cit. pp. 441-443 and Rathmall, Andrew "Middle East"
Jane's Intelligence Review. Vol. 7. No.3. London, p. 16. For more details of the reasons for the
dual containment policy, See. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations
and Regional Order" op.cit. p. 22.
137. Munro, Alan "Gulf Security The War and its Aftermath" Rusi Journal Defense Year Book
1993, 138, IV, London, pp. 9-10.
138 Brzezinski, Zbigniew "Differentiated Containment" Foreisn Affairs. Vol. 67. No.3. May/June
1997. Washington, pp. 22-23.
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implementation of a dual containment policy in the Gulf region on the basis of three
strategies:
The Dual Containment Policy is to bolster the individual defence
capability of the Gulf States. We have bilateral defence working relationships
with each ofthese countries. The purpose of these is to consider arms purchases
and to plan joint training andjoint exercises. The secondpart ofour strategy is
working to bolster the collective capacity of the Gulf nations to defend
themselves through the Gulf Co-operation Council. Some strides have been
made in this area in the last several years, but I have to confess to you that it's
hard to be too optimistic on this point. The GulfCo-operation Council is not, nor
will it ever be, NATO or anything remotely comparable to NATO. It is
maintaining the significant forward-deployed forces in the region. Today we
have enough equipmentpre-positioned on the ground in the GulfStates. Besides
. . . equipment in the Gulf states, we have additional pre-positioned Army and
Marine Corps equipment afloat in the Indian Ocean andpre-positioned aircraft
support supplies in several locations, including Saudi Arabia and Oman. 139
It should be noted that the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the United States
unprecedented freedom of action, while the Madrid Conference, sponsored by the
Bush administration, inaugurated a fundamentally new phase in the Middle East
peace process. The external security of the Arab Gulf States as can be seen from the
events and crises of the last few years, direct or indirect, cannot be the responsibility
of its countries, because they are incapable of protecting themselves from any
external invasion from neighbouring countries such as Iraq and Iran. The Gulfs
security is, in fact, dependent on friendly outside powers such as the United States
and other Western countries, particularly Britain, the former protector of the area, in
partnership with the GCC, who would provide the facilities for American and
Western troops during any direct external threat. 140
Since the second Gulf war ended, most of the GCC (except Oman) and in
particular Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have preferred the security of the Gulf to be
realised through the concept of bilateralism and unilateralism rather than collective
security. They prefer to strengthen national self-defence and support this with
139. Perry, William J."Working With Gulf Allies To Contain Iraq and Iran". Report. Prepared
Remarks of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the council on Foreign Relations, New
York, May 18, 1995 pp. 1-6. See Katzman, Kenneth. Beyond Dual Containment, op.cit. p. 10.
140. For more details of the US dual containment policy in the Gulf region see Brzezinski, Zbigniew et
al "Differentiated Containment" Foreign Affairs. Vol.76, No.3. May/June 1997. Washington, p.
22. Background Papers The GCC: A New Departure in Arab Politics; A Troubled History
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bilateral defence within the GCC as well as agreements with external (non-Arab)
powers especially the western powers.
The GCC States Defence Agreements with the Western Countries
Since 1991 the three western powers (the United States, United Kingdom and
France) have come to play the major external role in co-operative security, partly as a
result of the GCC's reluctance to consider collective alternatives, and partly to serve
their own interests.
The following external bilateral agreements have been signed since the
termination of the second Gulfwar. 141
1) United States-Kuwait (September 1991). The 10-year US-Kuwaiti agreement
provides for joint training and exercises, defence sales and the pre-positioning of
US military equipment in Kuwait for contingency use. The agreement also sets
up a US-Kuwaiti Defence Review Group, with the task of developing a 10-year
plan to defend Kuwait and deter external aggression.
2) France-United Arab Emirates (September 1991). Described as a framework
agreement' that allows for joint manoeuvres and arms sales.
3) United States-Bahrain (October 1991). Expands previous arrangements to include
a joint exercise programme, US access to ports and airfields, and the pre-
positioning ofUS military equipment in the Emirates.
4) United Kingdom-Kuwait (February 1992). Provides a memorandum of
understanding on security co-operation, including mutual consultation and co¬
operation in the defence of Kuwait, the establishment of a joint defence
committee, and provision for United Kingdom sales and training support for
Kuwaiti forces. The 10-year agreement does not provide for the pre-positioning
Overcome Through Co-operation. In: Gulf Center for Strategic Studies. The Gulf in the 1990s
Seminar. London, August, 1992, pp. 127-128.
141. Al-Mazidi, Feisal. op.cit. p. 73, and Potter, Lawrence G "The Need for Confidence-Building
Measures in the Persian Gulf' Middle East Insisht. Vol. XII. No. 2. January-February 1996. p.
30. Like their Iranian counterparts, the Omani leaders have said publicly that peace in the Gulf
can come only from a regional agreement among all the Gulf states. Sultan Qaboos ofOman, in an
interview, confirmed that isolating Iran or Iraq would not bring peace to the Gulf. See. Al-Havat
Newspaper. January 24, 1993 and Kenneth, Katzman. op.cit. p. 24.
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of UK forces or supplies in Kuwait, although facilities will be offered to UK
naval forces operating in the area (the Armilla patrol).
5) United States-Saudi Arabia (June 1992). An Agreement was reached on
expanding the 20-year-old military training agreement as the legal basis for
renewed military co-operation, rather than the new memorandum of
understanding which was initially envisaged by the United States. Saudi
reluctance to appear as a US protectorate was further emphasised by a refusal to
allow the direct pre-positioning of US military equipment or troops, and Saudi-
US differences over a 'status of force' memorandum which would have defined
US military rights of access in the Kingdom. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia did
subsequently allow US and UK aircraft to use Dhahran air base for operations
designed to enforce the no-fly-zone south of the 32nd parallel in Iraq;
6) United States-Qatar (June 1992). This provides for arms sales and joint exercises.
7) United Kingdom-Bahrain (July 1992). This Defines areas ofmilitary co-operation
between the two countries.
8) France-Kuwait (July 1992). The 10-year agreement provides for military co¬
operation, the drawing up of training programmes, the exchange of expatriates and
the presence of French experts and technicians on the Kuwaiti defence staff. It does
not include permanent French troops or supplies in Kuwait. The agreement also
stipulates the direct defence of Kuwait by France in the event of Kuwait being
subject to renewed external threat. 142 In December 1995 the UAE signed a defence
treaty with France in which France agreed to come to the defence of the UAE if it
were attacked by a third party. The move followed the UAE purchase of over $3.62
billion of French armaments in 1993.143 The UAE also signed a military co¬
operation agreement with Germany in 1997, which provides for the exchange of
expertise in technology, armaments and armament servicing. The accord is less
142. Al-Mazidi, Feisal. op.cit. pp. 73-75. When the Kuwaiti Ministers adopted the agreement on
cooperation with the United States, they declared that it was intended to maintain the country's
security, safety and stability and ensure the safety of her borders against the expansionist
ambitions of the Iraqi regime. See Tripp, Charles "the Gulf States and Iraq" op.cit. p. 49.
143. The Economist Intelligence Unit "United Arab Emirates Country Profile 1996-97" p. 4. French
Military sources refused to give more details of the December accord with the UAE and said no
details were available for public release. See. Reuter News Agency. 26 December 1995.
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comprehensive than those already reached with the UK, the USA and France, but
does provide a platform for German defence contractors to break into the lucrative
UAE market. 144
During early 1997, the UAE and Britain concluded a defence agreement after
many years of dispute between the two countries over the formulation. Britain was
reluctant to sign any formal agreement because she blamed the government of the
UAE for purchasing most of her weapons from France in addition to the dispute over
the validity of the agreement. 145 The United States has developed defence and
security arrangements with the GCC states along with aggressive programs for the
procurement of US military presence, pre-positioning of equipment, and the
development of the Fifth Fleet, all measures to demonstrate the US commitment to
Gulf security and the containment of Iran and Iraq. 146
The United States' current position towards Gulf security is based on:
1) dual containment of Iraq and Iran
2) broadening the base of the bilateral defence agreements with GCC states
3) supporting the GCC efforts to achieve greater military integration and co-operation
4) allowing the GCC access to high technology US weapons systems
5) encouraging United States allies (particularly the United Kingdom and France) to
expand their military role in the area.
(6) maintaining an effecting force capable of intervening in the Gulf. 147 At present,
the most immediate and visible military threats to the GCC states come from the two
largest regional states, Iraq and Iran. Since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iran and
Iraq agree completely on at least one issue-that the US and other outside powers
should be excluded from a role in Gulf security. Iran and Iraq believe that a system
limited only to the Gulf States gives each the best chance of emerging as the
144. The Economist Intelligence Unit "United Arab Emirates Country Report 2nd quarter 1997"
London, p. 14.
145. Al-Shara al-Awsat. No. 6574. Wednesday 27/11/96. London, p. 5.
146. Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S "The Gulf Security Dilemma: The Arab Gulf States, The United States, and
Iran" in. (ed.) Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S. Iran and the GulfA Search for Stability. The Emirates Center
for Strategic Studies and Research. Abu Dhabi, UAE, p. 332.
147. Al-Mazidi, Faisal. The Future of the Gulf The Legacy of the War and the Challenges of the
1990s, op.cit. p. 14.
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hegemony. CIA estimates suggest that Iraq still has some 7000 scientists with
experience in its nuclear program and that, if the UN's inspections were lifted, Iraq
could produce nuclear weapons within 5-7 years, restore its chemical warfare
production in less than a year, and produce biological weapons in 'a matter of
weeks'. Iraq is also suspected of retaining a residual long-range missile capability
and may have hidden stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. 148 In August
1996, US officials began to talk openly of attacks against Iran if it were found to be
complicit with terrorist activities against US citizens and military, whether in Saudi
Arabia or elsewhere. 149
Since the termination of the second Gulf War the relations between the GCC
states and Iran have improved, but Iran's strengthening its influence and sovereignty
over the three islands, especially Abu Musa has a negative effect. The Iranian policy
to build up its military strength, as well as growing co-operation between Iran and the
Islamic fundamentalists in Sudan, Algeria, Gaza and the West Bank, the struggle for
power amongst Iranian leaders, the extremists and the moderates, also cause
worry. 150 Iranian-encouraged activists are attempting to aggravate domestic tensions
that might otherwise have been successfully addressed by these states and this
threatens the Arab Gulf states. The main activities and policies contributing to this
concern include: a) Iran's continued occupation of the UAE islands; b) ongoing
Iranian programmes to develop a conventional military arsenal and to acquire nuclear
weapons; c) Iranian sponsorship of extremist groups and covert operations around the
world; d) Iran's active role in attempting to destabilise Arab Gulf governments; e)
Iranian public opposition to the peace process between Israel and the Arab states; and
I) Iran's nationalist quest to expand Persian influence and attempt to dominate the
Gulf region as the sole hegemonic power. All of these factors have played a major
role in any rapprochement of relations between the Arab Gulf states and Iran. 151
148. Katzman, Kenneth, op.cit. p. 15, and for more details see Al-Mazidi, Feisal. op.cit. p. 8.
149. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian
Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula" op.cit. p. 20.
150. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf' op.cit. p. 59.




Dr Al-'Alkim summarised the difficulties that hinder the GCC members in
reaching a common security formulation as follows: different attitudes towards the
security of the region amongst the GCC states; the prevailing competition between
the GCC states and the division of the Council states into different camps; the lack
of consensus on the sources of external threats and the difference of the internal
threats; the Western military presence, especially the United States, a matter which
increased the level of competition between the GCC members. 152
152 Interview with Hassan Al-Alkim. op.cit.
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Internal Security of the Gulf
Introduction
The Arab Gulf States have, historically, experienced a low level of political violence.
This is was as a result of the nature of their political systems, the presence of the
British and the enormous boom in oil wealth they experienced during the 1970s and
1980s. However, since the early 1990s, significant internal and external
developments have changed the dynamics of the political processes in the region and
these developments represent a serious threat to the power bases of the Arab Gulf
States.
PFLO and Nationalist threats
Until the British withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1971, the most serious internal
threat faced by the Arab Gulf states was the activities of the People's Front for the
liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLO). They became active in 1965 under the
leadership of a group from the Dhofari tribes known as the Dhofar Liberation Front
(DLF). The aim of this Front was to fight the authority of Sultan Sa'id b. Taimur and
gain Dhofari independence. The Front was taken over in 1968 by a group ofMarxists
and renamed the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf
(PFLOAG).
During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Front had strong links with the
pro-Soviet Arab nationalist regimes, especially in South Yemen, Iraq, Algeria and
Libya, as well as with the nationalist opposition in Bahrain and Kuwait, and
particularly with the Arab nationalist movement Harakat al-Qawmiyym al-'Arab.
The People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf changed the
Front's name for a second time to the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman.
— Chapter Four
This came as a result of the Kuwaiti government's pressure on South Yemen,
the main backer of the Omani opposition.
During the early 1970s the Dhofari rebellion constituted the main internal
threat to Gulf stability. The Shah of Iran described the situation in Oman as follows:
"Should the struggle succeed in Oman, imagine what would confront us in Muscat,
which lies opposite the Strait of Hormuz".l With the support of Iran and Saudi
Arabia as well as the other Arab Gulf States, the United States and Britain, the
Omani government forces were able to destroy the rebellion's activities in the Dhofar
region in 1975.2
During the 1960s and 1970s the nationalist Arab regimes in Cairo and
Baghdad, backed by the Soviet Union, were the most important internal threat to the
Conservative Arab Gulf states. The Naserist and Ba'thist movements in the Gulf area
were supported by Egypt and Iraq and aimed to destroy all monarchical regimes
there. Naser's involvement in the North Yemen civil war during the early 1960s was
a direct threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Sheikhdoms for the Egyptians
supported many nationalist groups in Oman, Yemen and the other Sheikhdoms.3
Since the revolution of 1958 Iraq has aspired to having greater involvement in
the Arab Gulf states and has hoped to gain more influence as well as access to the
Gulf waters. In 1961, the revolutionary government claimed that Kuwait had been an
integral part of Basrah province during the time of the Ottoman Empire. This claim
posed a direct threat to the Arab Gulf states and become more severe following the
involvement of the Great Powers in the region. The United States, the Soviet Union
and Britain spread their troops along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border to protect Kuwait from
any Iraqi invasion.
The Iraqi-backed internal threat to the Arab Gulf states continued under the
Ba'thist regime which supported many nationalist and leftist groups in the Gulf area,
especially the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman. Many sources indicate that
1. Documents ofthe National Struggle in Oman and the Arabian Gulf, op.cit. pp. 16-20
2. Peterson, J.E. op.cit. p. 169 and Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the
Gulf' op.cit. p. 55.
3. Regsbee, Wallace Lynn, op.cit. p. 13.
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the improvement of relations between Iraq and the Arab Gulf states during the mid-
1970's was an Iraqi tactic to support and finance the pan-Arab and Ba'athist cells that
had been previously active in the Gulf against the ruling families.4
The second internal threat was the outbreak of war between North and South
Yemen in February 1979. The war became critical to the Arab Gulf because of the
Soviet and Cuban support for South Yemen. The two countries entered into a short
war over a disputed border and as a result of the differences between them. Saudi
Arabia, the other Arab Gulf States and the United States played a significant role in
supporting the North Yemen regime and stopping the South Yemeni advance in the
North. This war turned into a proxy conflict between East and West, in which the
South Yemen regime tried to help support the Socialists of North Yemen to
overthrow the tribal regime.5 Oman and Bahrain were the two countries in the Gulf
most threatened by leftist opposition groups. These included the People's Front for
the Liberation of Oman and Bahrain. Cells of these groups were arrested several
times in Oman and Bahrain after they tried many times to disrupt the internal security
of the two countries.
In November 1985, Oman revealed that she had discovered a military group
backed by the Omani opposition in South Yemen. The Omani government declared
that this military group aimed to disrupt the internal stability of Oman. The group
was made up of Dhofaris who were all identified as members of the People's Front
for the Liberation ofOman and totalled between 200 and 250 persons.6
Shi'a activities over Gulf Security
During the 1970s the two parliamentary countries, Kuwait and Bahrain, suspended
their experimental Parliaments, because of the direct threat to royal families from
pan-Arab groups in Kuwait and the influence of the Shi'a in Bahrain. During the
4. Day, Alan J. Border and Territorial Disputes. Longman, London, 1987. pp. 246-247.
5. Mahmood, Fazal. op.cit. pp. 28-33 and Kechichian, Joseph A "Islamic Revivalism and Change in
Saudi Arabia" The Muslim World. Vol. 80. No.l. (January 1990) p. 21.




1970s many attacks were carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain and this group was linked with and supported by the Omani opposition.
The conflicts between the governments (in Kuwait and Bahrain), and the
opposition groups in the parliaments of the two countries, accelerated the decision¬
makers in both countries to dissolve the parliamentary experiment.7 However, Gulf
internal security was exposed to a real direct threat with the events of 1979, namely
the fall of the Shah of Iran, "The policeman of the Gulf Region", and the outbreak of
the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The Iranian Islamic Revolution, which brought the
Khomeini regime to power, actively encouraged the Shi'ite population living or
working in the Arab Gulf countries to rise up against them.
During late 1979 and early 1980 many violent anti-American demonstrations
took place and the Shi'ites actively supported Khomeini in many areas of the Arab
Gulf, especially in Bahrain (where they constituted the majority population), the
Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Iranian media also started a
campaign against the American presence and the monarchies. In November 1979 in
Saudi Arabia, where the Shi'ite population is estimated at 350-400,000, bloody
clashes took place between demonstrators and the Saudi National Guard resulting in
the killing, injuring and arrest of more than 600 people. In October 1993, the Saudi
government reached an agreement with exiled Shi'a leaders of the community, in
which resistance activities abroad were stopped in exchange for greater civil liberties
at home and promises to address longstanding complaints about discrimination.
However, this agreement appeared to break down in 1996, following the June 1996
bombing, when a Shi'a Newsletter, published in Washington, complained that none
of the provisions of the 1993 agreement had been adequately implemented. In
September 1996, Saudi Shi'a Clergymen inside the Kingdom, calling themselves the
Grouping of the 'Ulama', publicly urged the release of 23 Shi'a Clergy and a leading
clergyman, Hashim Muhammad Al-Shaykh.8
7. Hottinger, Arnold "Political Institutions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain" in: Chubin, Shahram
(ed.) Security in the Persian Gulf 1: Domestic Political Factors. Gower Publishing, England,
1981, pp. 7-9.
8. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97" p. 8.
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The Iranian revolution also coincided with a most traumatic domestic threat
to the royal family of Al-Sa'ud, in particular, and the other monarchies of the Arab
Gulf states in general. The Grand Mosque was seized on 20 November 1979 by some
200-300 armed persons and was held by them for two weeks. This group, in a
statement published in Beirut, called themselves the Muslim Revolutionary
Movement in the Arabian Peninsula; they also revealed that the action was directed
against the royal family of Al-Sa'ud and claimed that the Al-Sa'ud regime had lost its
right to rule because it had strayed from the tenets of the WahhabI Islam which the
Kingdom had been built on. Saudi security was also affected by many violent Shi'a
demonstrations which took place during the Hajj in 1981, 1984 and 1987. The
Iranian Pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca against the Saudi state and the American
presence in the Gulf area and launched a campaign in support of the Iranian Islamic
government.
The 1987 confrontation in Mecca between Iranian Pilgrims and the Saudi
security forces resulted in the death of 402 people, including 275 Iranians. Iran's
reaction was to hold mass demonstrations in Iran and sack the Saudi Embassy in
Tehran. The Iranian leaders also threatened to avenge the deaths by overthrowing the
Al-Sa'ud dynasty. These events persuaded the Saudi government to limit the number
of pilgrims entering the country in 1988. This was one of the decisions which was
adopted by the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) and paved the way for the
break in diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran in 1988.
It should be noted that Iran subsequently boycotted the 1988 Hajj.9 Bahrain,
with a Shi'a majority population of between 60% and 70%, witnessed a real internal
threat to the Sunni royal family. Conflicts and tensions between Sunnis and Shi'as in
Bahrain have a long history, further exacerbated following the outbreak of the Iranian
Islamic Revolution in 1979. The conflict between the Shi'a movements backed by
Tehran and the Bahrain authorities backed by Saudi Arabia still continues until the
present day, as is shown by the violent riot ofMay 1995.10
9. MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.25. 21 March 1994. p. C3.
10. Hottinger, Arnold, op.cit. p. 7.
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In early 1979 and 1980 large Shi'a demonstrations took place in Bahrain
supporting the Iranian revolution. In October 1979 the Bahrain government expelled
Hadl-al-MudarsI the self-professed representative of Imam Khomeini in Bahrain.
Then in April 1980, Bahrain witnessed a large Shi'a demonstration following the
execution of the Iraqi Shi'ite Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Iraq. 11
The Iranian threat to Bahrain became clearer when Ayatollah Sadeq Ruhani
threatened the annexation of Bahrain unless she adopted an Islamic government after
the Iranian model. The Government of Bahrain, on 13 December 1981, arrested a
number of Shi'a after the discovery of an attempt by an Iranian-backed group to
assassinate a Bahraini official. Bahrain disclosed that this group belonged to the
Islamic Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiyyah), which had its headquarters in Tehran, and
that it consisted of 73 Shi'ite members: 60 Bahrainis, 11 Saudi dissidents, 1 Omani,
and 1 Kuwaiti; there were no Iranians in the group. 12
The Prime Minister of Bahrain, Sheykh Khallfah b. Salman, stated in an
interview that:
The external danger is Iran and the present regime in Tehran. This Iranian
regime is instigating the Shi 'ites in Bahrain and in the Gulfunder the slogans of
the Islamic revolution and with a sectarian motive against the Arab Gulfstates
and their regimes. The regime in Iran is exploiting the Shi'ites in Bahrain and
the Gulf, encouraging their political ties with the ruling Ayatollahs in Tehran,
training them in the use of weapons and acts ofsabotage and sending them to
their own countries to foment chaos and shake security. 13
All the Arab Gulf states condemned the 1981 coup attempt in Bahrain; Saudi
Arabia was the country most affected after Bahrain. Nayif b. 'Abd al-Aziz, the Saudi
interior minister, stated that:
We had hoped that Iran, our neighbour and friend, would not have such
conspiratorial intentions. But after what has happened in Bahrain, our hopes
have unfortunately been dashed and it has become clear to us that Iran has
become a source of danger and harm to Gulfnations and their security. At the
11. Mahmood, Fazal. op.cit. p. 29.
12. Al-SuwaidI, Muhammad Ahmad. Al- Sira' al-Duwall Hawl al-Bahr al-lqllmlwal-Jurf al-Qar fi
al-Khalij al-'Arabl Dirasahfi al-Jughrafiya al-Siyasiyah. M.A. Degree. Cairo University, 1983.
pp. 59-60.
13. Ramazani, R.K. op.cit. pp. 7 and 34.
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very beginning of their revolution, the men in power in Iran said they would not
be the policemen of the Gulf. Today they have unfortunately become the
terrorists of the Gulf \ A
The chain of political violence was started in August 1994, when some riots broke
out and led to instability in Bahrain. Some of the unemployed, most of whom were
Shi'a, demonstrated and gathered together in order to attack the Employment
Department. This resulted in clashes with the Bahraini police and then developed 15
into demonstrations in December 1994 calling for the release of 'All Salman, one of
the Shi'a 'Ulama' in Bahrain, who had been arrested for security and political reasons
(he distributed a petition signed by thousands of Bahrainis calling on the Bahraini
government to restore the Parliament, dissolved in 1975, and the constitution, which
was suspended in 1975). The demonstrations in Bahrain reached their peak at the
beginning of 1995 particularly after a repatriation policy was applied by the Bahraini
government to many religious leaders of the Shi'a including 'All Salman, Hamza al-
Diri and Haydar al-Sitrl, who had all been accused of instigating acts of sabotage and
riots in Bahrain. This policy was conducted between Iran and Bahrain in an
atmosphere of high tension. The events occurred intermittently up to the end of April
1995. On 25 September 1995, the state of Bahrain again witnessed a real internal
threat when political violence broke out again amongst the Shi'a. The cause of this
violence was the arrest of one of the Shi'a 'Ulama', namely 'Abd al-Amlr al-Jamri.
The confrontation between government security forces and the Shi'a resulted in
the death of 13 persons. Damage and losses were estimated in millions of dollars. On
3 June 1996, the government of Bahrain announced that it had foiled a plot by radical
Islamist forces to overthrow the of Al-Khallfah regime. According to the government
14. Ramazani, R. K. The GCC Record andAnalysis, op.cit. p. 35
15. During November 1994, according to the Bahraini opposition (Shi'a) as many as 4,000 Saudi
security officers entered Bahrain to support the Bahraini police against the demonstrations which
were led by Shi'a clergymen. Jordan is the other country which consistently supports Bahraini
security. Around 1,500 Jordanian nationals are in Bahrain's security and defence forces. In early
1995, Bahraini opposition movements accelerated their demands and protests against the
government and exploded many bombs in different areas in Bahrain. As a reaction to that the
Bahraini Crown Prince issued a statement warning that the Bahraini Defence Force was prepared
to impose martial law to end the unrest once and for all. See. The Economist Intelli2ence Unit.
"Bahrain Country Report 1st quarter 1996" pp. 8-10
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a group named Hizbullah Bahrain, which had links with Iranian-backed
organisations, was involved in the disturbances. 16 The opposition movement in
Bahrain is not limited to the Shi'a, it includes other opposition movements. In
addition to the Islamic Front and the People's Liberation of Bahrain Front, there is
the Coalition of the Constitutional Front which sprang up in 1992 and has 30
members such as the national representatives of democratic and religious trends. The
claims of this movement have been laid down by 'Abd al-Amlr al-Jamri (Shi'a),
'Abd al-Latlf Mahmud (Sunni), and Dr Ahmad al-Sha'lan (SunnI). Its demands are
as follows: (a) activation and restoration of Parliamentary life through general
elections to constitute a new legislative council; (b) repatriation of Bahraini exiles
who have been exiled to Kuwait, Lebanon and other countries; (c) recognition of the
civil and political rights of Bahraini women; (d) equality between Bahraini people,
whether Shi'a or Sunnah.
Bahrain is the member of the GCC which contains the greatest number of
opposition movements, the most important of them being: the Islamic Movement for
the Liberation of Bahrain, a Shi'ite movement based in Tehran, considered the most
important opposition movement; the Free Bahraini Islamic Movement, a Sunni
movement residing in London; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which
is a leftist movement associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
and considered as one of its branches. It was based in Damascus and Baghdad; the
Bahrain National Liberation Front, a leftist opposition movement based in Damascus
and Baghdad; the Committee for the Defence of Political Arrests in Bahrain, which
resides in London and Western Europe and includes both Shi'a and Sunni members;
the Bahrain Liberty Movement, which is based in London; the Bahrain Constitutional
Movement. The most important organisations are the Shi'ite opposition organisations
because they are the most powerful, active and dominant. This is due the fact that the
majority of the unemployed people are Shi'ites.
16. Dr 'Abd al-Latlf Mahmud was arrested in Bahrain in December 1991 after his return from a
conference in Kuwait where he delivered a paper criticizing the Gulf regimes and calling for
directly elected legislatures with real powers in the Gulf states. He was released shortly thereafter.




It should be noted that the new Legislative Council of Bahrain consists of an
equal number of Shi'a and Sunni members, as does the Ministerial Council. The
Bahraini crisis was very complicated. It was a mixture of reactions to the internal
situation where people demanded democratic reforms and the restoration of
parliament and the Constitution in addition to the provision of job opportunities to
solve the problem of unemployment.
The other main reason was the influence of the Iranian government in
supporting the Shi'a in Bahrain and encouraged them to demand their rights which
the Bahraini government had suppresed. As a reaction to the seizure of the Grand
Mosque and the abortive Bahrain coup attempt, Saudi Arabia hurriedly concluded
several bilateral security agreements. During an official state visit to all the Arab
Gulf states in February 1982 Prince Nayif signed bilateral security agreements with
all the GCC states except Kuwait, who rejected the security agreement. Many sources
stated that the Kuwaiti rejection of the Saudi proposal stemmed from a desire to
reject the Saudi hegemony and avoid confrontation with Iran and the Shi'a groups.
However, Kuwait was the GCC country most affected by Shi'a attacks during the
1980s. The Kuwaiti rejection stemmed from the fact that Article 12 of the Security
Agreement contradicted the Kuwaiti Constitution. The Saudi bilateral security
agreements with the GCC provided an opportunity for the exchange of equipment,
expertise and training, as well as the extradition of criminals and border co-operation.
During the November 1982 Summit, Saudi Arabia tried to conclude a comprehensive
internal agreement with the other Arab Gulf states. The plan failed to win approval
from some of the council states, however. This agreement did not win approval until
1994 when it was signed by four of the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman
and the United Arab Emirates); Kuwait and Qatar remained reluctant to sign; Qatar
out of protest against border clashes with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait because her
Assembly did not approve it. 17
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The Economist Intelligence Unit reported that:
The GCC security pact effectively buries the Damascus Declaration, which was
signed after the Gulfwar. Kuwait and Qatar, in declining to join the latest pact,
have indicated their continuing underlying distrust ofSaudi Arabia. 18
Since 1982 the GCC states have held many joint military, naval, and air force
exercises. 19 The State of Kuwait is the only state of the GCC with a long history of
representative institutions and has the freest political climate among these countries.
However, Kuwaiti democracy witnessed a real internal threat following a number
explosions and attacks on the ruling Al-Sabah family. The Kuwaiti Parliament was
suspended and dissolved many times as a result of the confrontations between
members of the Parliament and the government and, in particular, the Al-Sabah
family.
Some media sources mention that, as a result of the refusal of the Amir of
Kuwait, Sheykh Jabir Al-Ahmad, to accept the Kuwaiti petition of 1989 for the
restoration of constitutional rule in Kuwait (signed by 30,000 Kuwaitis), Saddam
Hussein of Iraq was able to exploit the confrontation between the government and the
Kuwaiti people and he thought that the Iraqi invasion might meet with a measure of
popular support in Kuwait. The democratic movement of Kuwait contains many
other political movements and still plays a significant role in Kuwaiti society. The
most important of these movements are:
1) The Representatives' Block" (takattul al-nuwwab), three groups which emerged
from Islamic social organisations;
2) The Islamic Constitutional Movement (al-haraka al-dusturryya al-islam'iyyah), a
Sunni group connected to the Muslim Brotherhood;
3) The Popular Islamic Alignment (al-tajammu' al-Islamlal-Sha'bl), the political
wing of the Sunni Salafi movement;
17. For details over the Kuwaiti reactions of the internal security agreement see Al-Anzi, Abdulla
Mashell. op.cit. pp. 127-130
18. Al-Makhawi, Rashid. The GulfCo-operation Council: A Study in Integration, op.cit. p. 74.
19. Ramazani, R.K. op.cit. pp. 34-35 and also see The Economist Intelligence Unit. Oman, Yemen 1st
quarter 1995 January 31, 1995, London, p. 8.
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4) The National Islamic Coalition (al-itilafal-Islami al-Watani), representing Shi'a
Islamists;
5) The Constitutional Alignment (al-tajammu' al-dusturl) a movement very close to
the Al-Sabah family and consisting of the merchants from the Kuwaiti families;
6) The Kuwaiti Democratic Forum (al-minbar al-dimuqrati al-Kuwyatl), which
represents Western-style liberals and old Arab Nationalists (Harakiyym, Ba'thist and
Nasserist). In addition to all of these there are prominent figures who are not
affiliated with any political movement and form an independent group (majmu 'at al-
mustaqillm). Most of these are very close to the government ofAl-Sabah.
During the 1960s and 1970s, there were dissident groups operating inside
Saudi Arabia as well as from locations outside the country such as Egypt. The most
notable of these were the Committee for the Liberation of Saudi Arabia, the Hijaz
Union of the People of the Peninsula, the Revolutionary Najd Party, the Union of the
People Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Voice of the
Vanguard (a movement of Saudi Students in the United States).20 The stability of the
Saudi government faced a complex long-term problem, especially from Islamic
groups (Wahhabi western-educated liberals, the Shi'a dissidents and the ethnic
conflicts between Najdis and Hijazis.
The founding of the GCC in May 1981 did nothing to protect the internal
security of the council against terrorist attacks. Bahrain and Kuwait suffered many
major assaults on their internal security. The first attempt took place on 12 December
1983, when the targets of the attacks included the French and the United States
Embassies in Kuwait City. Other targets included American business offices, the
airport control tower, the Ministry of Electricity and Water, a major petro-chemical
refining complex and other facilities. Responsibility for these attacks was claimed by
Islamic Jihad. The second assault involved the hi-jacking of a Kuwaiti airline in
December 1984. The third and most serious assault on Kuwaiti internal security was
the attack on the motorcade of the Kuwaiti head-of-state Sheykh Jabir Al-Ahmad on




25 May 1985, in which two guards were killed and several others injured. Again
Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. The fourth violent attack took place in July
1985, when popular cafes in Sharq and Salmiyah in Kuwait were bombed: 11 people
were killed and 89 injured. This time a revolutionary group of Shi'a, who already
during that time claimed responsibility for many attacks on diplomats from Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates in Europe and India, claimed
responsibility.21
The State of Kuwait has not approved any of the Saudi and Omani security
proposals over the internal and external threats to the Gulf area since the
establishment of the GCC. However, since the emergence of the Iranian revolution,
the Iranian leaders, in an attempt to export the revolution, began offering training and
military and financial assistance to many of the Shi'a groups living or working in the
Arab Gulf states. These groups include the Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain, the Islamic Front and the al-Da'wa Party in Iraq.
According to the Iranian ex-prime minister Mir Husain Musavl, who was a
supporter of these movements:
The fight against imperialism should take place all over the World, (which
means the Arab Gulfstates as apart ofthe world) 22
Direct Shi'a attacks did not happen in the other Arab Gulf States like Oman, Qatar
and the UAE except for tension between the Shi'a and Sunnis who supported
opposite sides in the eight-year war. Dubai was the only Emirate to have good
relations with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and this was only because most of the
merchants in Dubai are of Iranian origin.23 The three Gulf countries mentioned above
arrested many Shi'a groups backed by the Iranian government during the 1980s.
Shi'a political activities in the GCC were one of the most serious internal threats that
affected the stability of these countries.24
21. Al-Makhawi, Rashid. op.cit. p. 34, see also Gregory Gause III,F. Oil Monarchies, op.cit. pp. 90-
92.
22. Ramazani, R.K. op.cit. p. 29.
23. Mahmood, Fazal. op.cit. p. 29.
24. Al-Makhawi, Rashid. op.cit. pp. 82-83.
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The Foreign Population of the GCC States
During the boom which followed the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the
Arab Gulf states during the fifties and sixties, many people migrated to the Gulf.25
The infrastructure projects lured expatriate workers from Arab countries and from
South Asia. Many of these people came from Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria,
Yemen, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Indonesia and Korea.
However, the greatest number were from Palestine during the 1940s.26
The phenomenon of the flow of foreign manpower to the Arab Gulf Countries
has been associated with the discovery of oil. Gulf societies began to move from the
primitive phase to the urban phase, which depends on a modern economy and the
development of oil fields. The foreign manpower that has been recruited brought
with them their own traditions and customs. These traditions and customs might
affect and influence life in the Arab Gulf States and affect the economic, social and
political security of these countries.
During the early 1950s and 1960s large numbers of Iranian workers crossed
the Gulf to Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Most of these
groups settled down and became citizens of these countries. The demand for
immigrant labour dramatically increased with the expansion of the Arab Gulf states'
economy and the growth in construction activity during the early 1970s.27
25. There were two main reasons for the shortage of the national work force in the GCC countries. The
first was small national populations. In 1975, the total national population of the GCC countries
was estimated to be little more than 6 million. The largest national population was in Saudi
Arabia-estimated about 4.6 million-and the smallest in Qatar, with only 60,000. The second
reason was very low rates of labour force participation. See Winckler, Onn "The Immigration
Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 33. No. 3.
July 1997. Frank Cass, London, p. 480.
26. Winckler, Onn " The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" Middle
Eastern Studies. Vol. 33. No.3. July 1997, Frank Cass, London, p. 487 and see. Bill, James A and
Springborg, Robert . Politics in the Middle East. 4th edn, Harper Collins, 1994, New York, pp.
377-378.
27. For more details on the foreign population in the Arab Gulf States (GCC) see Winckler, Onn "The
Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" See. Bonine, Michael E
"Population and Labor after the Gulf War" Middle East Insisht. Vol. XII. No.2. January-
February 1996. pp. 37-38. Middle Eastern Studies, op.cit. p. 480 and Middle East Journal "Saudi
Arabia: Jobs for the Boys" No.225 (July 1993. p. 26 and see Middle East Economic Digest
(MEED), Vol.40. No, 14. 5 April 1996. p. 55 also see Hill, Alan G. Population Migration and
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Foreign immigration and foreign labour in the Arab Gulf states posed the
main internal threats to the Gulf societies, politically, economically, socially and
culturally.
Politically the growth of foreign labour during the 1970s and 1980s led to the
presence in the Arab Gulf states of hundreds of thousands of foreigners who might be
used by their countries of origin or opposition parties against the local authorities.
The population growth during the years 1975-1985 was the highest that the Gulf area
has ever experienced. In fact it was one of the highest in the entire world for that
period.28 In a seminar on co-operation developments in the Gulf, held in Kuwait in
April 1982 under the auspices of the University of Kuwait, Dr 'Abdullah Al-NufaisI,
one of the Kuwait University staff, stated that the presence of foreign workers in the
Gulf had political, security, cultural and social consequences in the region. Whereas
Asian immigrants used to come to the Arab Gulf in order to work and gain a living,
the use of oil as a weapon against Western countries and the latter's ambitions in
respect to Arab Gulf oil led to South Koreans, Taiwanese and Filipinos being brought
to the region for reasons which had nothing to do with work but had political and
even military objectives.
Al-NufaisI added that the United States was responsible for the dispatching of
thousands of South Koreans and Taiwanese who had military training to work in the
Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. These immigrants were being prepared for military
operations as an attempt by America to occupy the sources of oil in the Arab Gulf
area. The South Korean government allows army personnel wishing to work in the
Arab Gulf states a leave of absence. The personnel, according to reports from the
Saudi security police, are well trained in fighting, as shown during the clashes which
occurred between them and the Saudi police in al-Kharj region in 1981.
Development in the Gulf States in: Chubin, Shahram (ed.) Security in the Persian Gulf 1:
Domestic Political Factors. Gower Publishing, England, 1981, pp. 64-67.
28. For more details over the foreign population in the Arab Gulf States (GCC) before and after the
'oil boom' see Winckler, Onn " The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
States" op.cit. p. 481.
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Indians and Pakistanis constitute the majority of the foreign labourers in the
Arab Gulf states. These two governments have on many occasions criticised the Arab
Gulf states for the mistreatment of their nationals. During a visit by the former Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the Arab Gulf states she criticised the policy, carried
out by some Gulf states, of replacing Indian workers with Muslim ones from
Pakistan. The Indian Prime Minister also criticised Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for their
mistreatment of Indian workers.
It is noted that some of these manpower-exporting countries tried to intervene
in the rules issued by some Arab Gulf States governments against foreign workers
who did not abide by their labour laws. In 1980, the Indian government protested
against a law issued in the UAE stipulating the expatriation of illegal residents for
large numbers of Indian workers were illegally present in the country. This problem
was discussed in the Indian Parliament and the Prime Minister made a visit to the
UAE and was successful in stopping the laws being carried through.29
During late 1992, in protest against the destruction of the Mosque in
Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, India, thousands of Pakistanis and Indian Muslims closed
their shops in most of the Gulf Co-operation Council cities. In the United Arab
Emirates hundreds of them marched and condemned the Indian government's
position toward the Hindu extremists who had destroyed the Mosque. The case of the
Mosque in India united the Indian and Pakistani Muslims against the Hindus and
became the main internal threat, when these people refused to work or open their
shops to demonstrate their anger against the Indian government.30
In statistical form, the following table shows that foreign labour was
estimated at 40% of the total population of the GCC states, i.e. about 7 million, out
of 17,6 million in 1992. Furthermore, foreign labour is estimated at 70% of the
labour power in the Arab Gulf states (GCC).
29. Al-NufaisI, 'Abdullah F. Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khalljlal-Itar al-SiyasI wa al-lstratijl op.cit. pp
64-65. In a conference held by the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Abu Dhabi (UAE) in
September 1997, he declared that India has 3 million workers in the GCC countries 1.3 million in
Saudi Arabia, 1.2 million in the United Arab Emirates, 320,000 in Oman, 115,000 in Bahrain, and




The Foreign Labour Power in the GCC Countries (31)
Country Citizens Non-Citizens Proportion ofNon-
Citizen Population
Total
Bahrain 330,000 134,000 29% 464,000
Kuwait 387,000 803,000 67% 1,190,000
Oman 1,062,000 380,000 26% 1,442000
Qatar 141,000 272,000 66% 413,000
S. Arabia 8,066,400 4,192,000 34% 12,259,000
U.A.E. 513,000 1,294,000 70% 1,825,000
Source: Hardy, Roger. Arabia After the Storm: Internal Stability of the Arab Gulf States. A Middle
East Programme Report. The Royal Institution of International Relations, London, 1994, p. 48.
During the internal incidents of the early 1980s Kuwait expelled some 20,000
persons.32 Kuwait was the country most affected by the presence of Iraqis and
Palestinians who constituted an important and active minority, most of whom
occupied high-ranking positions, such as local government officials and consultants
to the royal family. Until the Iraqi invasion in 1990 they were estimated to be more
than 450,000 persons, which was 25% of the Kuwaiti population. The Kuwaiti
government blamed Palestinians several times, during the dissolution of the Kuwaiti
Assembly, because they were close to the Kuwaiti opposition, the Pan-Arab
Movement. As a result of the second Gulf crisis, the government of Kuwait expelled
300,000 Palestinians33 following her liberation in 1991 as well as a large number of
30. Al-Alkim, Hasan H. The GCC States In An Unstable World, op.cit. p. 49, and The Economist
Intelligence Unit "UAE Country Profile 1996-97" p. 18.
31. Hardy, Roger. Arabia After the Storm: Internal Stability of the GulfArab States. A Middle East
Programme Report. The Royal Institution of International Relations, London, 1994, p. 48. The
statistics quoted from Barkner and Partners, Report of the Market of the GCC in 1992.
32. Al-Makhawi, Rashid. op.cit. pp. 83-84.
33. The principal target groups were the 350,000-375,000 Palestinians and the 250,000-300,000
bedoon (stateless). Beside this many thousands of Arab peoples whose governments backed Iraq
have also suffered, including Yemenis, Sudanese, Algerians and Tunisians. See Whitly, Andrew.




Sudanese, Jordanians and Yemenis. The other GCC States were not affected by the
Palestinian presence in the same way as Kuwait.
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, expelled nearly 800,000 Yemenis 34 as well
as a number of people from Jordan and Sudan in response to their government's
reaction to the Iraqi invasion and the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia.
Egyptians and Syrians replaced the Yemenis and the Palestinians, as citizens of the
two Arab countries who most supported Saudi Arabia against the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990.35
Since the early 1980s many officials in the GCC states have warned of the
social and internal security consequences of immigrant labour. The United Arab
Emirates is the country most affected by immigrant labour in social, criminal and
internal security matters. In a symposium held in Sharjah on the dangers of
immigrant labour, the ruler of Sharjah said that foreign labour amounted to 90% of
the country's labour force and that this was a threat to internal security.36
Economically, many financial sources reported that the money transferred by
immigrant labour out of the Arab Gulf states was over $20 billion each year.37 The
GCC States, in which foreign manpower-maintained its productive capacity during
the seventies and eighties, face a serious unemployment problem among their own
nationals, especially Secondary School and University graduates, and must work to
solve it. Economic reports have shown an increase of unemployment in Bahrain, the
Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia, and these three form four-fifths of the
population of the GCC Countries, which some estimate at 18 million.38
34. Bonine, Michael E "Population and Labor after the GulfWar" op.cit. p. 39.
35. Hardy, Roger. Arabia after the Storm: Internal Stability of the GulfArab States, op.cit. p. 50 and
Al-'Alkim, Hasan op.cit. p. 30. For more details on the expatriates in the Arab Gulf States see
Bonine, Michael E "Population and Labor after the Gulf War" Middle East Insizht. Vol. XII.
No.2. January-February 1996. pp. 37-40.
36. Bu- Haliqah, Ihsan All "Al-Amalah al-Wafidah fi al-Qimah al-Khalljlyyah" Maiallat al-
Maiallah. Issue No. 825, December 1995. p. 55
37. Winckler, Onn "The Immigration Policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States" op.cit.
pp. 480-481.
38. In a report (GCC Market Report 1992) issued by Birks Sinclair & Associates, the Mountjoy
Research Center estimated the total number of the non-national people in the Gulf Cooperation
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Since the Second Gulf War (1990-1991) the Arab Gulf States (GCC) have
begun to set up economic policies to provide more job opportunities for nationals,
but these policies conflict with private sector interests. They prefer to employ
foreigners, due to their skills and educational qualifications, in addition to the low
wage they demand. Nationals claim high wages and, when they are paid, do not abide
by the instructions given to them by the private sector. 39
We should note that foreign workers dominated the private sector in the Arab
Gulf States. The private sector could not dispense with them, because they
represented 90% of the labour force in the UAE, 83% in Qatar, 82% in Kuwait, 69%
in Saudi Arabia and 60% in the Sultanate of Oman and Bahrain. Studies and official
statistics show that the total population of the GCC States, including expatriates, will
increase to 39.4 million by the year 2010 and will include about 9 million foreign
workers, and that the serious effects of unemployment in the Council Countries will
be aggravated in the future, especially amongst those who are under 19 years of age.
These studies suggest that the increase in unemployment could lead to political
problems and internal riots, unless job opportunities are provided within the coming
15 years. A good example of such a situation were the political events witnessed in
Bahrain in 1995-1996.40
and for details of the non-national people in the GCC countries see MEED. Vol. 36 No. 30. 31
July 1992. p. 15
39. In the private sector positions are also increasingly scarce. See Bill, James A and Springborg,
Robert. Politics in the Middle East, op.cit. p. 378.
40. Sabbagh, Rana "Duwal Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khalijl fi Ma'ziq Bisha'an al-'Amalah al-
Ainabiwah" Report Issued by Reuter News Agency. 31 December 1995.
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Islamic Groups and their Opposition in the GCC States
During the 1960s and 1970s, Islamic groups did not play any effective political roles
in the Arabian Gulf region, because of the absence of unification, the domination of
pan-Arab and nationalist Arab ideas in the Arab world and the claims of the Gulf
rulers that their states were subject to Islamic law. During the late 1970s and the early
1980s the Arab Gulf States, with the exception of Oman, encouraged the Sunni
associations to contain the Shi'a expansion in the Gulf area financially. This was to
counteract Iranian support for Shi'a movements everywhere in the world. Since the
late 1980s, political activism among Sunni groups in the Arab Gulf countries has
grown, especially among the new educated generation. The most important activists
have been the students who were educated in Egypt, Britain and the United States.41
The political Sunni Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the
unification movement al-Salafryyah, did not expand in the region as a political
opposition until the end of the 1970s. In Kuwait, however, there was a little freedom
in this respect during the 1960s.
All of the Islamic groups in the Gulf region called for a return to the purest
sources of the religion and were in favour of political, social, and economic
consensus leading to social justice and democracy. The campaigns of the Islamic
movements in the Gulf took the form of criticising the Gulf governments in the
mosques and universities. Mosques were used as strongholds for holding meetings,
recruiting new members and organising propaganda activities.42 The Islamic
movements are now (in the Gulf region in particular and in the Arab nation in
41. All the GCC have used Islamic rhetoric and symbols to legitimate themselves. They have created
an ideology of Islam, based on their own interpretations of these concepts, to legitimate their rule
domestically and internationally. For more details see Gregory Gause III, F. Oil Monarchies
Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab GulfStates, op.cit. p. 10.
42. Ghabra, Shafeeq "Kuwait and the Dynamics of Change" Middle East Journal. Vol.51. No. 3.
Summer 1997. p. 359.
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general) the most significant potential challenge to the legitimacy of the Arab
regimes and the royal families of the Arab Gulf States.43
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the GCC is likely to accelerate with the
general political evolution in the area. The ruling families are anxious about this
because they believe that the rise and evolution of these movements in the Gulf will
reflect negatively on these societies and will leave them badly fragmented. A good
example of these frictions is the struggle between those demanding a greater role for
religion in these states and those demanding more modernisation.44
The second Gulf crisis (the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990) caused a
negative reaction by the scholars ('Ulama) of the Gulf area. This was particularly
true in Saudi Arabia,45 after King Fahd invited the American troops to protect the
Kingdom from any invasion from Iraq. (It should be noted that the Saudi
government, during the presence of American and international troops in Saudi
Arabia, was careful to defend her policies, soliciting and receiving a fatwa from the
Kingdom's highest religious authority, Shaykh 'Abd Al-'AzIz b. Baz. He approved
the invitation to the foreign forces and the initiation of the conflict with Iraq).
Many scholars in the Gulf area, especially the Saudis, condemned and
criticised the Saudi royal family for inviting American troops on to Saudi soil. The
internal threat and criticism of the Saudi government has come, not from suppressed
groups or marginal individuals, but from the fundamentalist WahhabI 'Ulama' and
those religious activists who hold positions within the state's religious bureaucracy.
43. Hardy, Roger, op.cit. pp. 30 and 39 and see Rashidian, Khalil "Fundamentalism and Islamic State
Stability" The Gulf in the 1990s Seminar.. See. Bu- Haliqah, Ihsan All. op.cit. p. 55, and Center
for Strategic Studies op.cit. pp. 99-100.
44. Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma "The Politics of participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The
Omani Consultative Council" The Middle East Journal. Vol.50. No.4. Autumn 1996.
Washington, p. 568.
45. The most powerful Islamist opposition in the Arabian Peninsula is in Saudi Arabia. The ruling
family of Al-Sa'ud were faced with real challenge from some of the Saudi 'Ulama' (the religious
leaders) during the second Gulf war in 1991. This reaction came as a result of the presence of
hundreds of thousands of non-Muslims in Islam's holy land. See The Economist Intelligence Unit.
"Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97" op.cit. p. 7. Today, the leadership of the Arab Gulf
States is challenged by the Islamic opposition movements which continue to take root and grow in
soil fertilized by the twin granules of corruption and oppression. See Bill, James A and
Springborg, Robert. Politics in the Middle East, op.cit. p. 379.
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These groups have been active since the termination of the second Gulf war in 1991.
In response to the Saudi scholars' criticism of the regime, 'Abd Al-'Aziz b. Baz in
December 1991 publicly condemned the religious scholars and called their assertions
"lies" and "conspiracies against Islam and the Muslims".
Prince Turk! Al-Faisal, head of one of the Saudi intelligence agencies, warned
religious activists not to go too far. King Fahd also warned the Islamic activists and
said in one of his public receptions, in January 1992, that "If matters exceed their
limit, then for every action there is a response." The Committee of Higher ' Ulama'
the senior members of the religious establishment, issued a public statement
condemning a Memorandum issued by the most famous religious scholars (see below
pp. 195-196). In December 1992 as a result of differences among the Saudi religious
and the government (Western news sources reported that the seven were removed
from office for their failure to join in the condemnation of the Memorandum) it was
announced that seven members of the Committee of Higher 'Ulama' had resigned
their position for health reasons and ten younger scholars had been appointed to take
their place. The other main opposition to the Saudi regime and which launched a
strong campaign against the Saudi royal family called the "Committee to Defend
Legitimate Rights" (CDLR) (Lajnat al-difa' 'an al-huquq al-shar'iyyah) was formed
in 1993 by six Saudi Islamic activists, whose exiled members now operate from
London.46 This group is made up of technocrats who clothe their campaign in terms
of western-style human rights but also want a stricter Islamic rule in Arabia. The
activities of this group have caused the Saudi royal family considerable concern.
However their direct supporters in the Kingdom number no more than a few
thousand.47
46. The group purpose of this Committee was to use "legitimate means and methods" to combat
injustices in Saudi Arabia, and it called on Saudi citizens to contact them with information about
such injustices. See Gregory Gause III, F. Oil Monarchies, op.cit. p. 38.
47 Jane's Sentinel Newsletters: The Gulf States. 1995. op.cit. p. 13. See. Gregory Gause III, F. Oil
Monarchies, op.cit. p. 33. See also Al-Hayat Newspaper. Issues December 1992 and Al-Sharq al-
AwsatNewspaper Issues December 1992. The two newspapers mentioned the development of the
Saudi religious Scholars resignation as a view of the Saudi position on this matter. The two
newspapers are controlled by and follow Saudi policy. The two episodes of the Saudi 'Ulama' of
the Memorandum of Advice and the Committee to Defend Legitimate Rights (which was
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Safar Al-Hawali, one of the most famous scholars in Saudi Arabia, who was
jailed in September 1994, stated in one of his orations:
IfIraq has occupied Kuwait, the Americans have occupied Saudi Arabia, and the
real enemy is not Iraq but the West.
Many of the GCC states have witnessed some legislative reforms; thus Saudi Arabia
has issued the Basic System of rule and established the Shura Council. Oman has
established a new Shura council in 1990 and Bahrain set up one up in 1992 after
dissolving the Bahraini Parliament in 1975.48
During 1994, three years after the second Gulf crisis, many countries of the
GCC, especially Oman and Saudi Arabia, revealed that they had arrested many
people belonging to Islamic organisations. They accused these groups of being
subversive clandestine movements that intended to cause domestic instability and
bring about insurgencies in their countries. In August 1994, in an routine press
release, the Omani government announced the discovery of a clandestine Islamic
organisation supported from outside the country, and she claimed that certain
members from some Arab countries were affiliated with this organisation. They were
also accused of receiving millions of dollars from foreign quarters. The membership
of this organisation was said to exceed 400 persons.49 Sultan Qaboos of Oman, after
many requests from Omani tribal sheykhs and as a result of the economic
circumstances in Oman and the 25th anniversary of the Omani National Celebration,
issued an order in November 1995 releasing all Omani political prisoners.50
The government of Saudi Arabia announced in September 1994 that it had
detained more than a hundred people accused of a seditious attack on national unity.
condemned by Ibn Baz) highlighted a strong internal threat to the Saudi royal family's legitimacy
and created some kind of awakening among the Saudi people's demands for rights. The Saudi
government faced a real threat against its stability until it jailed some members of the 'Ulama'.
After the termination of the second Gulf war the Islamic Movement (Sunni) was affected by
strong pressure from the governments of the Arab Gulf States.
48. Hardy, Roger. Arabia After The Storm: Internal Stability ofthe GulfArab States, op.cit. pp. 20-21.
49. Al-Sharq al-Awsat Newspaper, No. 5754, 30 August, 1994, London, p. 7, and Oman News
Asencv: and Oman Radio Station 28 August 1994, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman, also see. Oman
Newspaper. 29 August 1994. Muscat, p. 1. See also Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma. op.cit. p. 567.
50. Oman Observer Newspaper. Issue No. 5291, Thursday 23, November 1995, Muscat, p. 1.
194
Chapter Four
However a London-based Saudi opposition group pre-empted the Saudi public
announcement and alleged that the member detainees actually exceeded one thousand
people and that they were mainly members of the Jama'ah al-Islamlyyah (Islamic
Group).51 The crisis between the Saudi Ulama' and the government became critical
following the clashes between the 'Ulama' and the Saudi Secularists who had
requested, in a memorandum issued in 1990 and signed by 40 persons, the
introduction of modern Islamic law and equality between the Saudi people with more
liberty for women. 52 The Islamic group aimed to contain the secular memorandum
and issued a memorandum signed by the most famous scholars of Saudi Arabia. This
memorandum consisted of 12 articles, which concentrated on:
— the Creation of a Shura or Consultative Assembly empowered to debate and
decide on all domestic and foreign affairs, with its members chosen from
among the most competent possible candidates;
— the Islamisation of all social, economic, administrative and educational systems
in the nation;
— the fundamental reform of the army, through the creation of a modern, strong
and independent Islamic army on the pattern of the Prophet's armies as well as
the diversification ofmodern arms procurement sources;
— the introduction of comprehensive social justice based on Islamic laws which
guarantee equality for all the citizens without exception or exclusion;
— the punishment of all corrupt elements, whoever they are, wherever they are,
without any exception of rank;
— the equitable distribution ofwealth among all members of the nation;
— a total reform of the press; the creation of a strong Islamic media and of
propaganda tools to be used in the service of Islam world wide; and the closure
of the corrupt media;
51. The Independent Newspaper. Issue No. 2477, Tuesday, 27 September 1994, London, p. 5.
52. Hardy, Roger, op.cit. pp. 23-34.
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— the preservation of the Islamic nation's interests, purity and unity by keeping it
out of non-Islamic pacts and treaties; complete reform of the Kingdom's
embassies abroad to bring them into line with the laws and interests of Islam;
— the Radical reform of the judicial system, particularly by the creation of a
Supreme Judiciary Council to implement Islamic laws.
This group included Sheykh Safar al-Hawall and Sheykh Salman al-'Awdah, two of
the most prominent scholars throughout the Arab and Islamic world.53
During recent years Islamic fundamentalist expansion in the Arabian
Peninsula has become the major domestic threat to the conservative Arab Gulf
regimes. The Islamic movement in the Gulf has succeeded, during a short period of
time, in unifying its forces in these countries and forming a political front against the
Arab Gulf regimes. Although the Islamic movements are opposed to the Arab Gulf
regimes, these movements are non-violent and are in favour of political, economic
and social reform. 54
Many sources have reported that the Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and
the Egyptian Intelligence have played a significant role in instigating mass detentions
in the Arab Gulf region in an attempt to suppress and smother the Islamic movement
in the Arab Gulf States, because the Islamic movement in the Gulf plays a significant
financial role in supporting the other Islamic movements in the world.55 The dispute
between the Wahhabis and the western-educated liberals intensified in the aftermath
of the second Gulf war. The western-educated liberals section of society looks for a
more democratic and accountable state, with many of the values of the west, such as
the introduction of rights for women and universal suffrage. On the other hand the
Islamic groups, especially the people of Najd (the heartland of the Wahhabis), the
fundamentalists and the Mutawwa', long at the core of the regime, demand a return
53. Haeri, Safa. " Saudi Arabia A Warning to the King" Middle East International. 14 June 1991,
London, p. 14.
54. Al-Rashidan, Khalil. op.cit. p. 100.
55. The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Oman, Yemen" 4th quarter 1994 EIU Country Report,
November 2, 1994, p. 8.
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to traditional Islamic values. The struggle between the two parties for an increased
influence is certain to intensify and could result in civil disorder. 56
The opposition movements mentioned above might be called the pacific
opposition. But the opposition which has arisen recently in the Gulf region, and
always threatens stability, is the armed opposition. It believes in using violence to
change the existing situation and it considers violence as a legal right similar to Jihad
(Holy War). After the second Gulf war American military offices, training areas and
troops strongholds in Saudi Arabia became targets for many bomb attacks. On 13
November 1995, a van packed with military explosives was detonated outside the
office of the US Programme Managers of the Saudi National Guard in al-Riyadh. The
blast, which wrecked the building and killed seven Americans and Indians, injured
over 60 people. Three obscure radical Islamist groups, the Gulf Tigers, the Islamic
Change Movement and the Partisans of God Fighting Organisation, rapidly claimed
the attack. All the statements of these groups called for the withdrawal of American
troops from the Kingdom and threatened more attacks if their demands were not
met.57
Two months after the November attacks, the Saudi government announced
the arrest of four Saudi citizens for master-minding the attack. Many sources indicate
that the four people were Arab Afghans who had fought in Afghanistan against the
Soviet occupation. A second, more potent car bombing followed in June 1996 at the
air base in Al-Khobar, near the area of Al-Dhahran in the Eastern Province (the Shi'a
area), in which 19 US servicemen were killed and 64 seriously injured. Saudi
officials claimed that 400 people were injured in total. The bomb, like the one in
November 1995, was clearly aimed against the US military presence in Saudi
Arabia. 5 8
In the United Arab Emirates there was no political violence with the
exception of a few minor accidents that might happen anywhere. These events could
not be compared with those that happened in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
56. Jane's Sentinel News Letter: The Gulf States. Vol. 2. No. 1. 1996. (ed.) Beaver, Paul, op.cit. p. 13.
57. Jane's Sentinel News Letter. The Gulf States. Vol. 3. No.l. 1996. (ed.) Beaver, Paul, op.cit p. 2.
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There was one important event which caused an internal dispute in the UAE and that
was the attempted coup of 1987 in Sharjah, when 'Abd al-'AzIz b. Muhammad
deposed his brother Sheykh Sultan b. Muhammad. The coup happened when the
latter was in Britain. This event called into question the legality of all the rulers in the
UAE. Some sources mentioned that Abu Dhabi supported the attempted deposition
of 'Abd al-'AzIz while Dubai supported Sheykh Sultan. The other important internal
threat came when the Emirates' Army took to the streets in December 1992 to deal
with the riots and demonstrations, in most of the UAE cities, of the Indian and
Pakistani Muslims against the Hindus and the Indian government. This came as a
result of the destruction of the old Muslim Mosque by extremist Hindus.
Sectarianism
Sectarianism in all of the GCC countries constitutes the one of most difficult
problems facing them, but the governments of these countries are not willing to
discuss this problem because of its religious nature). Sectarianism, or what is known
in Arabic as Al-Madhhabryyah, has become the most serious internal threat.59 The
region of the Gulf (i.e. the GCC countries, Iraq and Iran) contains three major sects,
the Sunni, Shi 'i and Ibadi. The Sunnah or Sunnis are the minority in the Gulf region,
but among the GCC States they form the majority.60
Shi'ism is the most powerful force, in terms of population in the Gulf region.
The Republic of Iran contains the majority of Shi'a, estimated at 92% of the
population. Iraq and Bahrain are the only two Arab countries which have a majority
of Shi'a. In Iraq they make up over 60% of the population and in Bahrain 65% to
70%. The state of Bahrain is the only GCC State which has a majority of Shi 'ites. It
58. The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97" op.cit. p .7.
59. Martin, Lenore G. op.cit. p. 78.
60. Martin, Lenore G. op.cit. pp. 77-78.
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should be recorded that the Muslim population of the world was estimated, in 1986,
at about 750 million, only 11% of them being Shi'a.61
The Ibadi sect is the third sect of the three major divisions of the Muslim
people in the Gulf region. All the other Islamic sects and the Orientalist writers
describe the Ibadls as being a part of the Khawarij, but the Omani Ibadls have
rejected this definition.62 The Imamah, which also means supreme rulership in the
Ibadi state and law, undergoes four distinctive stages, which are as follows:
Imamat al-Zuhur, "The Stage of Emergence"
This is the first stage, which involves the establishment of a declared Ibadi
government. This development comes in three stages, and after all the crucial
functions of the government have been completed. Also this stage presupposes that
the Ibadi society has complete freedom from all external and alien influence.
Imamat al-Difa "The Stage of Defence"
This is a subordinate stage to the former one. It signifies that the Ibadi followers are
preoccupied with defending themselves and their property more than the goal of
establishing their state.
61. Ramazani, R.K "Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf' in: Cole, Juan, R.I. and Kiddie, Nikki R. (eds.)
Shi'ism and Social Protest. Yale University Press, Newhaven and London, 1986, pp. 30-46. See
Kavary, Benjamin op.cit. p. 77. In general, the Shi'a in most of the Arab Gulf States are known
for their work ethic, and many are highly educated. It can be argued that their search for an
enhanced role in the Arab Gulf states' political and economic life has put them in competition
with the rest of society. The emergence of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak ofwar
between Iraq and Iran created antagonism between the Sunni (majority) and Shi'ite components of
society; the Shi'a loyalty to their governments in the Arab Gulf was questioned at the time. See
Ghabra, Shafeeq "Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change" Middle East Journal.
op.cit. p. 368.
62. The Ibadls, named after 'Abdullah b. Ibad, trace their history to the seventh century. They
recognise only Abu Bakr al-Siddlq and 'Umar b.al-Khattab as legitimate Caliphs. Historically
sources mention that the Ibadis migrated from Iraq to Oman in the eighth century to escape
persecution by the Umayyads during the early years of the Umayyad caliphate. The Ibadls elected
their first Imam in 749 A.D. The Ibadi ideal is to restore Islam to its purest form, as it was at the
time of the Prophet Muhammed. Ibadlsm is a minority form of Islam practiced only in the North
of Oman, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. It is marked by the strict adherence of its followers to its
teaching. See. Al-Haj, Abdullah Juma "The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation
Council States: The Omani Consultative Council" op.cit. p. 560. And see Eickelman, Dale F
"Ibadlsm and the Sectarian Perspective" in: Pridham, B.R. (ed.) Oman: Economic, Social and
Strategic Development, pp. 32-33.
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Imamat al-Shira. "The Stage of Purchase"
This coincides with the second stage in defending and protecting the IbadI followers.
These two stages also involve diligent endeavours to depose the unjust ruler and to
correct all the political situations of the IbadI society and government. This goal
should be achieved even though it involves violence, intrigue and sedition.
Imamat al-Kitman "The Stage of Clandestine".
This is the lowest grade of Jihad (Holy War and initiatives) according to the Ibadi
sect of Islamic law in that it involves the weakening of the IbadI society's political
power. In this stage people would reluctantly acquiesce to the unjust social, political
and public disintegration of society under an unjust ruler, until they are able to revolt.
In such circumstances, the IbadI followers would be compelled to cover their
activities with complete secrecy. 63
From the first IbadI State in Oman (Imamah) until the present time, the IbadI
Imamah has undergone all four political stages, which have oscillated between
strength and demise. However, they were generally very active. In spite of this Oman
has been subjected to the rule of certain families who are not accredited by the IbadI
sect. This discrediting of their families is due to the fact that the IbadI leadership
should be selected and elected from amongst the heads ofAhlu al-Hall Wa- 'aqd (the
people who bind and loosen). The IbadI sect does not warrant hereditary accession to
supreme rulership in their state.64 In 1955, Sultan Sa'Id b. Taimur, through his
military campaign in al-Jabal al-Akhdar and with the support of British troops,
managed to depose the last Ibadi Imam, Ghalib b. 'All. These events took place
despite the existence of the Seeb Treaty between the Imamate and the British signed
63. Jahlan, 'Adun. Al-Fikr al-Siyasi 'ind al-lbadiyyah Min Khilal Ara al-Shaykh Muhammad b.
YusufAtfish. 1818-1914. Maktbat al-Damri, Al-Seeb, Sultanate ofOman, 1991, pp. 149-164.
64. Despite the Ibadi rejection of the Kharijite movement, you can still find many similarities
between them. The Kharjite and the Ibadls reject primogeniture succession of the Quraysh, the
tribe of the Prophet Muhammad, and assert that the leadership of Islam, the Caliphate, should be
exercised by an Imam elected by the community from candidates who possess spiritual and
personal qualities. IbadI leadership is vested in an Imam who is regarded as the sole legitimate
leader and combines religious and political authority. See Mohamedi, Fareed "Oman" in: Metz,
Helen Chapin (ed.) op.cit. p. 264.
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1920 (for more details of this treaty see chapter 1. p.54).65 Most Arab and Western
writers maintain that the Ibadis are the majority in Oman. But J.E. Peterson, the most
experienced authority on the Arabian Peninsula, says, "Even though Sunnis form a
narrow majority of the Omani population, the small IbadI sect has provided the
traditional form of government".66
Discrimination still plays a significant role in all the Arab Gulf States. For
example, employment decisions are on the basis of an applicant's family, tribe,
region, and religious sect rather than his education or experience. In Saudi Arabia,
the Najdi people are more acceptable and preferable to the Saudi royal family for
joining the security departments than the Hijazis who are, in turn, more acceptable
than the Shi'a. The Najdi tribes are considered as the top class of Saudi citizens. The
concept of regional base is the main critical factor between the Najdis and Hijazis. In
all of the other GCC countries, discrimination brings advantages and disadvantages.
The important employment ranks and departments, especially for security matters,
are closed until the applicant proves his identity. In most of these countries, the Shi'a
people are not able to get any important ranks, especially in security departments. In
all of the Arab Gulf States, sectarianism still plays a significant role as a dangerous
secretive movement. It reflects on the life of the people by its social separation of
religious, marriage, burial, educational, cultural and sporting matters.67
65 Kelly, J.B. "A Prevalence of Furies: Tribes, Politics, and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman"
op.cit. p. 130.
66. Peterson, J.E. "Security Concerns in the Arabian Peninsula" op.cit. p. 112.
67. Al-Anzi, Abdullah M. op.cit. pp. 165-167 and Gregory Gause III, F. Oil Monarchies, op.cit.
pp. 155-156. In Bahrain the Sunni-Shi'a population is the key political faultline in the country
because the majority of the indigenous Shi'a population resents the monopolisation of power of
the Sunni ruling family. The Sunni ruling elite is suspicious of the Shi'a who are prevented from
occupying posts in the security forces, although it has made some efforts to co-opt moderate Shi'a




All of the GCC countries have economies based principally on a single commodity-
oil and gas revenues-estimated at 85-90% of their total revenue. Their income is
therefore dependent on the export and sale of this product.68 Both the rise and fall in
oil prices have had significant impacts on Gulf societies and economies. It should be
noted that the Arab Gulf states depend on developed economies to meet their needs,
whether they are industrial, technological or agricultural.69 In the decade of easy
money (1975-1985) there was almost no limit on public spending in the GCC
countries, and they were able to raise their standard of living almost free of charge.
Oil has dominated their economies and shaped their political systems. The era of
abundance came to end in the mid-1980s. The reason for this was the low oil prices
(since the mid-1980s, the collapse and stagnation of oil prices has eroded the Arab
Gulf States revenue), high population, military expenditure and domestic corruption,
especially on the level of officials. Some sources indicate that the royal families and
the ministers of the Arab Gulf States constitute the highest proportion of rich people
in the world. The outcome of these developments has been a sharp fall in the
standard of living in the Arab Gulf States. According to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 20% on average
from 1981 to 1995.70
68. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi have massive oil reserves which should last several
generations, but Bahrain is expected to exhaust its reserves early next century and Qatar's crude
oil production is likely to start declining next decade. Oman's rising production may also be
difficult to sustain into the 21st century. A further worry is the possibility that new technologies
will eventually emerge that will make crude oil redundant. This assessment is increasing the
pressure for the GCC states to diversify away from oil. See MEED. Vol.36. No.45. 13 November
1992. p. 2.
69. See. Al-Anzi, Abdullah M. op.cit. p. 151. By implication, inter state trade in the Gulf is missing to
a large degree. Thus liberalization of trade by itself would not create an economic integration
similar to the European Economic Community, as targeted in both the GCC Charter and the
Unified Economic Agreement. In all of the GCC member states, the question of integration is the
problem of development, which makes economic integration more difficult than in the case of the
industrialized countries. See El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah Ibrahim "Economic Integration of the
Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Challenges, Achievements and Future
Outlook" op.cit. p. 77.
70. Bahgat, Gawdat. op.cit. pp. 5-6.
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Since the end of the second Gulfwar of 1991 all of the members of the GCC
have been running considerable budget deficits compared with the last two decades.
At first they used up their reserves to cover these deficits. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
have been the states most affected by these financial pressures. Before the Iraqi
invasion in 1990, the State of Kuwait's foreign reserves were estimated at over $100
billion, and some sources estimated the Kuwaiti government's expenditure since the
Iraqi invasion at $65 billion. Kuwait also lost over $10 billion of her overseas
reserves as a result of corruption and mismanagement. 71
The World Bank declared, in its annual report in 1994, that the growth rates
in the Middle East and North Africa continue to decline, falling from an average of
4.3% in 1992 to 1.5% in 1993.72 Saudi Arabia (the largest oil producer in the world)
has seen its reserves fall from $142 billion to less than $60 billion over the past five
years, as a result of having to use these up to cover current spending. The Saudi
budget witnessed a deficit of around SR30 billion ($8 billion). In Kuwait defence
spending before the Iraqi invasion of 1990 typically accounted for less than 5% of
GDP. Since the invasion the defence budget has increased every year. Spending on
the armed forces (including internal security) accounted for 20% of total spending in
1995/96. Defence spending increased to 12% of GDP. In Oman defence and internal
security costs account for around one-third of annual government expenditure. In
1995 military expenditure accounted for some $1.8bn (over 16% of GDP). In 1993
the World Bank criticized the Omani government for failing to reduce her spending
in spite of falling oil prices. The Bank also outlined a strategy of reforms to reduce
the government's role in the economy and increase long-term investment. The World
Bank report came as a real criticism to the Omani government to change their
71. Kuwait: the cost of the Gulf Crisis ($ million) Damage at least 20,000, Pledges to US military
13,500, pledges to UK 1,320, pledge GFCCG 3,684, Cost of exile 1,500, total 39,320. MEED.
Vol.36. No.l 1. 22 March 1991. p.5. quoted from the US Treasury Department and UK Treasury.
Gregory Gause III, F. Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf
States, op.cit. pp. 147-148.
72. Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross "Enduring Sources of Conflict in the Persian Gulf Region:
Predicting Shocks to the Systems" in: Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross (eds.) Powder Keg
in the Middle East The Struggle for GulfSecurity.. American Association for the Advancement
of Science, Washington, 1995, pp. 13-14.
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economic policies, which reflect a negative side to the Omani citizens especially the
low-income people, when the government cut-offmost its spending 73
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Arab Gulf States started to borrow
money from pension funds and banks. The Saudi government for the first time in
decades went to the international capital market for loans.74 The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the direct costs of the of the Gulfwar for the Saudis
to be $55 billion. During 1993 all the GCC States were planning on a deficit in their
budgets: Saudi Arabia of $7.4 billion, Kuwait of $3.2 billion, Qatar of $940 million,
the UAE of $708 million, Oman of $170 million and the State of Bahrain of $170
million.75 Some economic sources predicted that the GCC States would suffer from
Iraqi oil exports through both lower prices and lost market shares (Iraq's provisional
quota from OPEC in early 1995 was only 550,000 barrels a day). The Iraqi
government wants to increase its output to more than three million barrels a day, the
level in 1990 before its invasion of Kuwait.76
The GCC economic objectives were set out in five official documents, all of
which have been adopted by the GCC Supreme Council. These are the GCC Charter,
the Unified Economic Agreement, Common Objectives and Policies for
Development plans, the Unified Industrial Development Strategy and Common
Agricultural Policy. Since the establishment of the GCC, the leaders of the council
have created many common regional projects to conclude an integration amongst the
council members. However, the effects of these plans do not make any impression on
73. In Saudi Arabia, of the total budgeted government expenditures, official defence and security
spending consumed 31-34% in 1993-95. Defence and security-related expenditure in the
aftermath of the second Gulf war in 1991 was about 15% of GDP. The Economist Intelligence
Unit. "Saudi Arabia Country Profile 1996-97" op.cit. p. 11. The Economist Intelligence Unit
"Kuwait Country Profile 1996-97" p. 7. See. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Oman Country
Profile 1996-97" p. 5, and also MEED. Vol.38. No.46.18.November 1994. p. 30. For details of
the World Bank report on Oman see MEED, op.cit. p. 30.
74 Al- Mazidi, Faisal. The Future ofthe Gulf, op.cit. pp. 43-44.
75 In Bahrain the 1994/1995 demonstrations and government crack-down on the political opposition
shocked a country with a well-deserved reputation for stability and calm during its 27 years of
independence. The unrest coincided with a petition signed by some 25,000 people calling for the
reconvening of the National Assembly, which was disbanded in 1975. MEED. Vol. 39. No.47. 24
November 1995. p. 26. Gregory Gause III, F. Oil Monarchies, op.cit. pp. 148-149.
76. Bahgat, Gawdat "Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf' op.cit. pp. 58-59.
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the level of the economies of the Arab Gulf states, only on the level of internal
security.77 The object of the GCC was economic co-ordination between these
countries.
On 11 November 1981, the members of the council signed a Unified
Economic Agreement in Riyadh. The aims of this agreement were the development
and expansion of the economic links between them in terms of finance, money,
commerce, the legislation of industries and the customs systems. Its ultimate aim was
to provide a vehicle for the integration of the economies of the individual states into
one large, regional economy. The council members would also set up a Gulf
Investment Corporation (at a capital cost of US$ 2.1 billion) to promote industrial
projects between the Arab Gulf Countries. The Unified Economic Agreement of
1981 consists of a preamble and seven chapters, divided into 28 articles, which cover
and contain all aspects of economic co-operation among the members of the council
including:
(1). Trade exchange (articles 1 and 7)
(2) Movement of capital and citizens and exercise of economic activities, (articles 8
and 9)
(3). Co-ordination of development (articles 10-13)
(4). Technical co-operation (articles 14 and 17)
(5). Transport and communications (articles 18 and 20)
(6). Financial and monetary co-operation (articles 21 and 23)
(7). Closing provisions (articles 24 and 28).78 (for full text of the agreement see
Appendices p. 477)
77. These plans can be divided into six categories: 1) Adopting Common Regional Strategies and
Policies; 2) Building Institutions and Harmonizing Regulations; 3) Creating a GCC Economic
Citizenship; 4) Creating Regional Infrastructures; 5) Developing Joint-Venture Projects; 6)
Coordinating External Policies. For more details see EI-Kuwaiz, Abdullah Ibrahim "Economic
Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf: Challenges, Achievements
and Future Outlook" op.cit. pp.71-80.
78. 'Ubeyd, Nayef A. op.cit. p. 154. For more details over the Unified Economic Agreement between
the GCC states see. El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah Ibrahim (was the former Assistance General-Secretary
for Economic Affairs of the GCC) "Economic Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab
States of the Gulf: Challenges, Achievements and Future Outlook" op.cit. pp. 72-73.
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Since the signature of the Unified Economic Agreement, the members of the
GCC have been unable to achieve many of the basic elements of economic
integration they have set for themselves. The GCC Unified Economic Agreement,
which came into force in November 1981, pledged the states to apply a uniform
customs tariff within five years. Discussion between the Trade Ministers did not
result in any positive steps, because of the differences between these countries over
the common rate of the customs tariff. The United Arab Emirates refuses to join
these countries, because each individual emirate has a different system and different
common rate for the custom tariff. The other GCC states also could not agree on one
uniform rate for the custom tariff. The free movement of labour has also been
restricted.79 Despite the basic objectives of the GCC to bring about more economic
co-operation among its members since its establishment, and although the
communiques and press releases have been about economic co-operation, the urgent
discussions within the GCC have been about defence and internal security. As a
consequence, the security-related activities are being pursued outside the formal
structure of the organisation. The economic co-operation among the GCC members
has not made a difference to the Arab Gulf States' citizens. The mutual trade, taxes,
transports and customs are still restricted as a result of the lack of consensus between
the members of the council. 80
Abdullah Ibrahim El-Kuwaiz summarised the obstacles and challenges facing
the GCC as a group and individually, as a number of very real limitations to
prolonged economic growth:
1) The six member nations are overly dependent on the export of crude oil.
2) Although the private sector has increased its share in the gross domestic product
of the GCC states it is still low.
3) Given GCC geographic and economic constraints the group still faces a chronic
scarcity of human resources, both skilled and unskilled.
79. Rathmell, Andrew "Threats to the Gulf - Part 1 " Middle East. Jane's Intelligence Review. Vol. 7.
No. 3. London, 1995, p.120 and Nonneman, Gerd "The Gulf: Background Assessment" op.cit. p.
58.




4) If the GCC concentrates on international markets, it has to compete vigorously
with the well-established manufacturers of industrial countries and other
developing countries. It also has to enter into contractual agreements dealing with
the very complicated subject of international trade, an area in which the GCC as
an organisation, and the member states individually, does not have any acquired
expertise or long-term experience.
5) Other than hydrocarbons, the GCC has very limited mineral resources and a
scarcity of natural water.
6) Although almost all infrastructure facilities are in place in the Arabian Gulf,
interconnection among these facilities is almost non-existent.
7) Industrial regulations and legislation, as well as industrial incentives, are different
in nature and application in each of the member states.
8) The Arabian Gulf States do not have an indigenous technological base with which
to encourage industrial growth and development. 81
Dr Al-'Alklm summarised these things hindering the economic plans of the
GCC states as follows: the lack of a developmental global plan to educate the
national cadres and the lack of a replacement policy in the GCC states; weakness of
the education levels and ignorance of technological and technical education. 3) The
failure of the Private Sector to employ the national labour force; increase of fertility
in the GCC states, which approaches 3%, one of the highest birth rates in the world.
Population
Despite the GCC countries complaining about their population being small compared
with the regional powers of Iran (54 million) Iraq (17 million) and Yemen (13.5
million), the population increase in the GCC countries has become the main internal
threat to the legitimacy of the ruling families. Manpower in the Arab Gulf States will
81. El-Kuwaiz, Abdullah I. op.cit. pp. 76-77. BBC Radio (Arabic) Interview with Abdullah El-




remain scarce as long as these countries continue to fear national armies as the source
of those coups which have ended monarchical rule in most of the Middle East. 82
The countries of the GCC have the highest population growth rates in the
world. Despite this high population growth development, in all of these countries,
progress has been impeded by a lack of manpower, both of skilled and unskilled
workers, and this shortage remains one of the major problems in the region. The
challenge of the increasing population in many of these countries has had negative
effects on the economic developments during recent years as a result of the
decreasing prices of oil. These problems over population will get even worse in the
next decades, with a growing number of people and the increase of the young
population. 83
Many sources indicate that almost half the national population in the Arab Gulf
States are 15 years of age or younger and, with universal education, there will be an
educated, but unemployed and frustrated populace in the near future. Women in these
countries are becoming more educated, but their participation in both sectors of the
labour force is amongst the lowest participation in the world. Since 1986
unemployment has become a major issue in the GCC countries as a result of internal
corruption, stagnating oil prices, increasing population growth and the huge military
budgets.84 The following table which was issued by the United Nations, Department
of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis-Population Division in
1996 , shows that the population of Kuwait and Bahrain doubled and that of Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Oman increased more than threefold in just 24 years.
That is among one of the highest population growth rates in the world.
82. Salame, Ghassan "Assessing Alternative Arrangements for Regional Security" op.cit. p.75.




Population growth in the Arab Gulf States 1970-2015 (millions) (85)
Country. 1970 1994 2015.
Bahrain. 0,22 00,55 00,82
Kuwait 0,75 01,60 02,48
Oman. 0,65 02,10 04,48
Qatar. 0,11 00,54 00,74
Saudi Arabia. 5,75 17,00 33,25
UAE 0,22 01,86 02,69.
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman face the greatest challenges from their population
as a result of inflation and unemployment.86
In Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer in the world, it is estimated that there
are at least 1 million unemployed or underemployed adult males. According to a
report published in 1992 by Birks Sinclair and Associates of the UK, there are more
than 550,000 10 tol4-year-old male Saudi Arabians, compared with only 83,280 in
the 50-54 age-bracket. These figures suggest that there will soon be a net increase in
84. Bonine, Michael E "Population and Labor after the GulfWar" Middle East Insieht Vol. XII. No.
2. January-February 1996. p. 39, and MEED " Special Report: Oil and Gas" Vol. 39, No. 14. 7
April 1995. p. 24
85. Bahgat, Gawdat. The Gulf Monarchies New Economic and Political Realities, op.cit. p. 5.
Forecasts for the 1990s suggest that real growth will average 3-5 per cent a year for the decade.
This will be accomplied by a sharp rise in regional populations. See also MEED. Vol.36. No.45.
13 November 1992. p. 2.
86. Oman and Bahrain are the countries in the GCC which suffer most from unemployment. Results of
a 1993 census put the number of Omani nationals at 1.48 million out of a total population of 2.02
million, over 73% of the population. The EIU estimates that by the end of 1995, the total
population had reached 2.16 million of which 1.55 million were nationals. A UN Development
Program (UNDP) report estimated that between 1992 and 2000, average population growth rate
would rise to 4.1% per year from an average 3.9% in the previous 32 years. At the 1992 growth
rate, the population is set to double by 2010. The ensuing increase in the dependency ratio,
whereby Omanis under 15 years of age will constitute more than 50% of the population by 2010,
will coincide with declining oil reserves and depleted water resources. See. The Economist
Intelligence Unit "Oman Country Profile 1996-97" pp. 6-7. In Bahrain the last census of 1991
put the total population at 508,037, of whom 63% were Bahraini nationals. A 1995 UNDP report
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the male labour force of about 100,000 people a year in Saudi Arabia alone.87 In
Bahrain the demand for jobs was high on the protesters' agenda and unemployment
in the state of Bahrain is much higher than suggested by the official estimate. The
latest government figures claim that only 1.8% of the working population were out of
work at the end of August 1995-a mere 4,409 out of a workforce of 239,000. An
economic survey published by the US Embassy in June 1995 estimated
unemployment among Bahrainis to be about 15%. The challenge for the government
is to reduce that number, without demanding competitiveness and efficiency in the
private sector. In the state of Bahrain nationals make up 90% of the public sector
workforce and 28.5% in the private sector. Both rates are much higher than anywhere
else in the Arab Gulf States.88
In 1986 Oman's labour force was estimated at 467,000, of which only
167,000 (36%) were nationals. By 1995, the workforce had increased to just over 1
million, with locals accounting for 40% of the total. In the private sector, their share
was only 23% while, in the public sector, their share was 43%. In view of the rapid
population growth, the Omani government is under pressure to create extra jobs for
young people.89 It should be recorded that the Omani government since the mid-
1980s has been under the pressure of unemployment and most of their new
generation are without a job or study scholarships. This is due to the economic
problem of the reduced oil price and the failure of economic plans.
In Kuwait the 1980 and 1985 censuses showed that more than 60% of
Kuwaitis were below the age of 19, while one-third were below the age of nine.
These numbers foreshadow the growing demands on the government to create more
jobs; also, since her liberation, the Kuwaiti economy in the 1990s is not growing in
proportion to Kuwait's employment needs (90% of all working Kuwaitis are
employed in the government sector). With the end of the oil boom in the late 1980s,
projected that by the year 2000, the population would be around 600,000 at an annual growth rate
of 2.5%. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Bahrain Country Profile 996-97" p. 7.
87. MEED. Vol. 36. No.45. 13 November 1992. pp. 2-3.
88. MEED. Vol. 39. No.47. 24 November 1995. p. 26.
89. The Economist Intelligence Unit "Oman Country Profile 1996-97" p. 13 and Middle East
Economic Disest. Vol. 37. No. 10. 12 March 1993. p. 46.
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new graduates began facing employment difficulties. These were exacerbated by the
1990-91 GulfWar. The expense of liberating Kuwait from Iraqi forces and assisting
other Gulf economies led to cuts in social spending and subsequent drops in
employment.
The dramatic growth of modern educational facilities in the Arab Gulf states
since the early 1970s also carries serious political implications and challenges for
these countries as larger and larger numbers of young people from the Gulf acquire
modern higher education. They will then enter the job market with high expectations
and with a newly-developed political consciousness. As they return from abroad in
increasing numbers, they are no longer easily absorbed into the high-level political
positions that they have come to expect and so they will become dissatisfied with
their governments.90
Table No. 9
Youth Population in the Arab Gulf States (000) (91)
1980 1990 2000
Country Total Age % Total Age % Total Age %
pop. group pop. group pop. group
(10-34) (10-34) (10-34)
Bahrain 313 160 51.11 410 196 7.80 515 200 38.83
Kuwait 1,353 600 44.34 2,101 945 44.97 2,524 1,403 55.91
Oman 891 393 44.10 1,208 541 44.78 1,651 758 45.91
Qatar 237 116 48.94 330 136 41.21 425 163 38.35
S. Arabia 8,960 4,059 45.30 12,908 5,776 44.74 17,804 7,965 44.73
U.A.E 726 360 49.58 1,025 402 39.21 1,286 480 37.32
Source: Ramazani, R. K. The GulfCooperation Council, op.cit. p. 198
90. Bill, James "The Politics of War and Revolution in the Persian Gulf' op.cit. p.378. The
Universities are the breeding grounds of this new class and the ruling elite have come to
understand that this class will cause political risks. Besides the Universities in the Arab Gulf
states, the six countries have nearly 100,000 students in western Universities. These individuals
will form the questioning, challenging, professional middle class of the future in the Arab Gulf
countries, op.cit. p. 378.
91. Ramazani, R.K. The GulfCooperation Council, op.cit. p. 198.
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Disputes Between and within Royal Families
The disputes between royal families in the Arab Gulf states present the most
important challenges for the stability and internal security of the GCC. All the
members of the GCC have hereditary monarchies, and the royal families are still the
decision-makers, (see table p. 220 ). The relations between the GCC, especially the
political relations, are not very consensual. From time to time these relations are
shaken by differences, such as on foreign policy (a good example is the Omani
relations with Kuwait during the 1970s and 1980s, the period of greatest conflict
between them, border disputes (all the GCC States have this problem) and family
disputes (for instance relations between Al-Khalifah of Bahrain and Al-Thanl of
Qatar).
These families are known for having internal disputes. Conflicts between
brothers or fathers and sons were often provoked by the desire for power. The
political history of the Gulf Emirates is distinguished by the number of assassinations
among these families. This situation is explained in an amusing way by the historian
Amln al-Rayhanl. Ele says that the reason for such common and familiar disputes in
Arab princely families is polygamy. Hatreds arise between brothers and competition
between mothers, especially if they are from different tribes. Since the creation of the
six monarchies in the Arab Gulf States, they have experienced much irregularity and
violence in the process of transferring power from one ruler to another, as a result of
the absence of an institutionalised mechanism of change. This competition and
dispute between the royal families is a very important factor in the study of the
political structure in the Arab Gulf States. These families, as one political analyst
indicates, represent "political parties", especially after the discovery of oil and the
increase in the size of the families which dominate all the political, economic and
defence institutions within the political systems of the GCC states. A good example
of such a system is the Saudi ruling family.92
The difficulty faced by the ruling families in the GCC states is the increase in
number of their members which will exacerbate problems between them concerning
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the distribution of wealth and important posts. Thus political alliances are created
between different branches of such families. This must reflect negatively on the
political process and, as a result, a ruling family may lose its domination because of
internal disputes.93
The disputes between the royal families in the Gulf have a historical
background; since the establishment of the Saudi state in Arabia, which is controlled
by the al-Saud dynasty, the relations between Saudi Arabia and Oman have been
unfriendly because ofmany differences between the two parties. The first factor, the
Saudi-Omani conflict over the al-Buraimi Oasis, has been in dispute from the time of
first Saudi state until the beginning of 1970. The two countries, i.e the two royal
families are divided by religious and ideological differences, as the Saudis belong to
the Sunni (Hanbali or Wahhabi Sect),) and the Omani royal family to the Ibadi sect.94
The same sort of border dispute has occurred, from time to time, among the other
royal families of the Arab Gulf states. Since the establishment of the Saudi royal
family in Arabia and as a result of the Saudi expansion in Arabia, all the royal
families of the GCC countries have been affected by disputes with the Saudi royal
family.
The dispute between Al-Thani of Qatar and Al-Khalifah of Bahrain is a good
example. This affects the disputed islands of the Hawars and the claim of al-Khallfah
of Bahrain that Qatar was originally the motherland of the Al-Khalifah, especially the
area of Zubarah. The undeclared dispute between Al-Said of Oman and the royal
families of the United Arab Emirates concerns the claims of the Omani royal family
over the Omani Coastal Emirates (Greater Oman). Saudi Arabia still holds to the
concept that all the royal families of the Arab Gulf States except Oman are no more
than tribal sheykhs of these areas. The questions of succession frequently give rise to
disputes within the royal families. In 1964, King Faisal removed his half-brother,
King Saud and ruled the Kingdom until his assassination by his nephew Faisal b.
92 AI-Rumayihl, Muhammad. Al-Khalij Lays Naftan. op.cit. p. 103.
93 Al-QahtanI, Fahad. op.cit. p. 36.
94. Al-Anazi, Abdullah M. op.cit. pp. 34-35.
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Musa'id 1975. There was also a dispute among the brothers of the royal family, when
King Khalid was ill and King Fahd was Crown Prince. Fahd refused to appoint
Prince Abdullah (his half brother) Crown Prince unless 'Abdullah agreed to
surrender his control of the National Guard to Prince Salman (full brother of Fahd).
In Oman Sultan Qaboos assumed power after a bloodless palace coup against his
father.95 The other critical dispute was with his uncle Tariq b. Taimur, the Prime
Minister, who resigned as a result of his differences with his nephew in January
1972.96 In Qatar the Al-ThanT royal family has also their disputes. In 1972 Sheykh
Khalifah b. Hamed, the former ruler of Qatar, seized power from his cousin Sheykh
Ahmed b. 'All. In 1976 this problem started again when the government of Britain
discovered some weapons in London airport en route to Doha.97 The dispute
between the royal family in Qatar become more intense during the 1990s. Sheykh
Hamad b. Khallfah (the present ruler) seized power from his father Sheykh Khallfah
b. Hamed in June 1995. According to the Qatari police quantities of arms and
ammunition were found at the home of the former Minister of Economy and he was
accused of masterminding a coup attempt with the help of members of the former
Amir's (Sheykh Khallfah b. Hamed) 3000-strong personal bodyguard. After the June
1996 coup the bodyguard were incorporated into the army.98 The Qatari government
hinted that Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE might have been behind the attempt.
Qatari requests that the GCC meet to discuss the attempt fell on deaf ears. Only
Oman was sympathetic (Oman, since the 1995 coup in Qatar, has had closer relations
with her) while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE refused to convene a meeting
until Qatar retracted her veiled accusations that they had been involved in the
attempt. Since the bloodless palace coup of 1995 in Qatar relations between Bahrain
and Qatar have entered a new stage, especially after the conference which the ex-
95. Price, David. Oil and Middle East Security. The Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, 1976, p. 18.
96. Dietl, Gulshan. op.cit. p. 40.
97 Price, David, op.cit. p. 18.
98..MEED. Vol. 40. No. 19, 10 May 1996. p. 2, and MEED. Vol. 40. No.44. 1 November 1996. p. 8.
See also MEED. Vol. 40 No. 51, 20 December 1996. p. 35.
214
——— Chapter Four
Amir (ex-Prince)(Sheykh Khallfah b. Hamed) of Qatar held in Bahrain. (The former
Amir made many visits to all of the GCC Countries except Oman to gain support
against his son.) Then he criticised his son for jeopardising GCC unity and pledged
to forge closer ties with Bahrain if he regained power. In apparent retaliation, Qatari
television, which is received throughout the Gulf, broadcast a 90-minute interview in
which two exiled Bahraini opposition leaders were featured.99 The dispute between
the new Amir Hamad b. Khalifah and his father entered a new stage when the new
government confirmed that the deposed Amir (Sheykh Khallfah) controlled a
substantial portion of the country's foreign reserve which was estimated at $3
billion. 100
The new systems of rule established 1992 in Saudi Arabia and in 1996 in
Oman led to new conflict within the royal families in the two countries. The new
system of rule in Saudi Arabia defined that the system was a monarchy and that the
government is vested in the sons of the Kingdom's founder Abd al-AzIz and, as a
new departure, in the sons of his sons. As the King ('Abd al-'Aziz) had about 48 sons
the succession is now open to about 500 of his grandsons. This development was
probably a response to pressure from the younger, better-educated princes who have
been competing for influence within the Saudi family. The Crown Prince has
traditionally been chosen by a consensus of the senior Princes, sometimes as a check
to the King by other factions of the royal family. The new basic system of rule has
now clearly become more competitive and sensitive within the Saudi royal family.
The King, however, was still able both to choose and dismiss the Crown Prince by
royal decree. For the present King Fahd has decided to leave the line of succession
unchanged and appointed 'Abdullah as the Crown Prince, although there are a
number of able and ambitious younger Princes available. 101 The Saudi royal family
does not only consist of the sons of 'Abd al-'Aziz, but also their sons and grandsons
99. MEED. Vol.40. No.4. 26 January 1996. p. 5, and The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Bahrain
Country Profile 1996-97" pp. 5-6. See also 'AALAM AL-KHLEEJ. Issue No. 45. op.cit. p. 1 and
Oman News Asencv. 17-Nov.l996. Muscat.




and the descendants of the allied branches of the extended clan. The clan is estimated
to number roughly 5,000 male members, of whom 200 to 300 are active in the
government. Out of these groups, the 'Abd al-'Aziz group is the strongest; in fact, the
line of succession does not extend beyond this group. It is made up of 30-odd sons,
100-odd grandsons and 500-odd great-grandsons of the founder King 'Abd al-'Aziz.
The Saudi royal family also contains three other divisions who are given the title of
"His Highness": the Sa'ud al-Kablr, the Thunayyans and the al-Julwis, whose still
have the ambition to participate. During the era of 'Abd al-'Aziz, Sa'ud and Faisal,
some members of the three divisions mentioned above played a significant role and
held high ranks in Saudi Arabia especially al-Julwi (who were the Princes of the
Eastern Province).
Abd al-Aziz's sons and grandsons, who constitute the main group of the
Saudi royal family, are also divided in many factions: The "Sudairi Seven", the seven
full brothers, sons of 'Abd al-'Aziz by his favourite wife Hisah Bint al-Sudairi, have
captured powerful positions in Saudi Arabia, and are headed by the Present King
Fahd, Sultan the second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Civil
Aviation, Nayif the Minister of the Interior, Salman the Governor of Riyadh, Ahmad,
Deputy Minister of the Interior, 'Abd al-Rahman, Deputy Minister of Defence and
Civil Aviation, and Turk!, former Deputy Minister of Defence until 1978 when he
was pushed out of the centre of power because of a family feud. 102 The faction of
Abdullah the Crown Prince, the first Deputy Prime Minister and the Chief of
National Guard, are a counter-balance to the Sudairi seven. His mother belonged to
the strong Shammar tribe in northern Najd. 'Abdullah, since becoming a Chief in the
National Guard, has refused to leave the leadership of this force. The tribe in Saudi
Arabia has always has been a powerful variable in the political calculations of the
Saudi rulers. Each of the tribes (especially Najdis) has traditionally enjoyed royal
patronage on the basis of its size, leadership, military power, and geographical
location. The third major group is the Al-Faisal group, consisting of the eight sons of
101. Jane's Sentinel Newsletter. The Gulf States (ed.) Paul, David. 1995. London., op.cit. p. 7.
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the late King Faisal b. 'Abd al-Aziz. The most prominent among them are Prince
Saud al-Faisal, the Foreign Minister, Turki al-Faisal the head of the Sa'udi
Intelligence Agency, Abd al-Rahman, the Commander of the Armoured Brigade, and
Khalid the Governor of 'Asir.103
By the mid 1990s many questions were being raised about the 'coming
succession crisis' in Saudi Arabia when King Fahd leaves the scene after his stroke.
Many observers' reports mention a potential power struggle between the Crown
Prince, 'Abdullah 104 on one side and 'the Sudairi Seven'. Some sources mention
that there is a clandestine alliance between 'Abdullah, the Crown Prince and the third
faction of the Saudi royal family, Al-Faisal. 105
Rivalries within the individual ruling families in the United Arab Emirates
are a source of instability. The historical record of the seven emirates of the UAE is
full of assassinations among the ruling families of these states. Several current
leaders have assumed their positions by means other than natural succession. Rivalry
between the two biggest Emirates (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) has historically been the
largest obstacle in the development of federal unity. During the coup attempt of 1987
in Sharjah, the two Emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, were seen to differ on the coup.
Abu Dhabi was seen as supporting one side and Dubai the other. 106 The most
important factors affecting the relations between the ruling families of the UAE, are
the disputes of these Emirates over borders. These problems are complicated by the
fact that no recorded data exists about where the territory of each Sheikhdom begins
102 Bahgat, Gawdat. The GulfMonarchies, op.cit. p. 18.
103. Dietl, Gulshan. op.cit. pp. 28-29, and Jane's Sentinel Newsletter. The Gulf States, op.cit. p. 7.
104. Abdullah b. 'Abd al-'Aziz the Saudi Crown Prince, has been head of the National Guard since
1963 and has strong ties to the bedouin roots of the ruling family in the Najd region. See. MEED.
Vol.40. No.2. 12 January 1996. p. 2, and The Economist Intelligence Unit "Saudi Arabia
Country profile" 1996-97. p. 8.
105. The new Basic law of 1992 leaves the monarch free to choose his successor from among the sons
and grandsons of King 'Abd al-'Aziz. He can make his selection on the basis of suitability rather
than seniority, which has been the guiding principle in the past. See. MEED. Vol.40. No.2. 12
January 1996. p.3 and Bahgat, Gawdat. op.cit. p. 18. For more details over the new Saudi Basic




and ends, in addition to the tribal loyalties of the seven Emirates. From the 1950s and
until its withdrawal in the early 1970s, Britain tried several times to solve the
territorial problems among the Sheikhdoms of the Trucial States, but the discovery of
oil complicated the situation among these Sheikhdoms and not much progress has
been made on this matter. As an example of these disputes, Abu Dhabi (the biggest
emirate in the federation) claims half the present territory of Dubai. Dubai asserts
ownership of part of the territory of Sharjah. Sharjah also has a similar claim over
Umm al-Qaiwain.107
The border disputes in most of the UAE are still the main sources of internal
instability hanging over the federation's future. Succession in the UAE is also
complicated by the federal nature of the State. The main question here is who is
going to succeed to power in the UAE after Sheykh Zayed's death? Until the present
time (1997) this has not been discussed between the members of the UAE, and the
temporary constitution (in April 1997 the word "temporary" was deleted and
"permanent" was added) of the UAE does not give any answers to the problem. The
other main factor which will aggravate again the increasing size of royal families,
especially in Abu Dhabi which constitutes the main Emirate. Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan,
who is over 80 years old, has many sons from different wives holding a high rank in
the Union. 108
Oman is the only state of the GCC which is ruled by a family who follow a
different religious sect (Madhhab). The Al-Sa'Id family of Oman are members of the
IbadI sect. Until November 6 1996 the Omani State, which had been ruled by Sultan
Qaboos b. Sa'Id since July 1970, had been without any heir apparent. On 6
106. The Economist Intelligence Unit. " United Arab Emirates" Country Profile 1995-96. London, pp.
6-7.
107. Al-Baharna, Husain M. The Arabian Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and their
International Problems, op.cit. pp. 263-264.
108. For the situation in Abu Dhabi see The Economist Intelligence Unit "United Arab Emirates
Country Profile 1996-97" pp. 5.6
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November 1996 Sultan Qaboos b. Sa'id issued a decree establishing the new Basic
Statute of the State consisting of 81 Articles and divided into seven chapters. 109
The new Basic System of Rule (Chapter one) opened a new stage of conflict
among the Al-Sa'Id family of Oman. Article 5 of Chapter one says that the system of
government is Sultan! (Royal) and hereditary for the male descendants of Sayyid
Turk! bin Sa'id bin Sultan, provided that the chosen successor is a Muslim,
judicious, of sound mind and a legitimate son of Omani Muslim parents.110 Sayyid
Turk! b. Sa'Id is the great-grand-father of the present Sultan, Qaboos. Since the era of
Sultan Faisal b. Turk! (son of Turk! b. Sa'id) rule in Oman has passed down from
father to son (Sultan Taimur b. Faisal, Sultan Sa'Id b. Taimur and the present Sultan
Qaboos b. Sa'Id). Another conflict among the Omani royal family may appear since
Sultan Qaboos has not named the heir apparent in the basic Statute of the State.
Article 6 of the Basic System of the rule says: The Ruling Family Council shall,
within three days of the throne falling vacant, determine the successor to the throne.
But if the Ruling Family Council does not agree on the choice of the successor to the
throne, the Defence Council shall confirm the appointment of the person designated
by the Sultan in his letter to the Ruling Family Council. Sultan Qaboos said in an
interview; "When I die, my family will meet. If they cannot agree on a candidate, the
Defence Council will decide, based on a name or names submitted by the previous
sultan. I have already written down two names, in descending order, and put them in
sealed envelopes in two different places". 111 The power and the authority which is
given to the Defence Council is the main obstacle for the members of the Omani
royal family as it means that the Defence Council has the power to confirm the
109..Oman Newspaper. Issue No. 5639, Thurseday 7, November 1996. Sultanate of Oman, Muscat, p.
1.
110. Article five of the Omani Basic Statute of the State. The document issued by the Omani Embassy
in London, p. 2.
111. For more details of Sultan Qaboos' Interview see Miller, Judith "Creating Modern Oman An
Interview with Sultan Qaboos" Foreign Affairs Vol. 76. No.3. May/June 1997. Washington, p.
17. The members of the Defence Council in Oman were appointed by the Sultan's Royal decree in
1996, and consist of the Palace Office Minister, Chief of Staff, Commander of the Royal Navy,
Commander of the Royal Marines and the Chairman of the Omani Internal Security. See. Oman
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appointment of the new Sultan. Very few people in Oman know who is going to
succeed to power.
In Kuwait the royal family of Al-Sabah have a similar dispute to the other
GCC royal families. The best-known example of Al-Sabah's history of dispute
occurred when Sheykh Mubarak (the Great) assassinated his two brothers
Muhammad and Jarrah. The problem of the ruling succession in Kuwait will appear
in the near future as a dispute between the two branches of Al-Sabah (as-Salim and
al-Jabir) both between the branches and within each branch. Certain factions within
the al-Jabir branch have tried to limit the influence of the Al-Silim branch. 112
Table No. 10
The Royal Families of the Arab Gulf States (113)
Emirate/ Date Ruling Family. Tribe. Ruler.
State.
Bahrain 1961. Al-Khallfah. Bani- Sheykh 'Isa b. Salman.
Utub.
Kuwait. 1977. Al-Sabah. Bani-Utub. Sh.Jabir al-Ahmed.
Oman. 1970 Al-Sa'id. Azdl. Sultan Qaboos.
Saudi A. 1982. Al-Sa'ud. 'Anazi. King Fahd.
Qatar. 1995. Al-Thani. Tamlm. Sh.Hamed b. Khalifah.
Abu Dhabi 1971 Al-Nahayyan Banl-Yas. Sh. Zayed b. Sultan.
Dubai 1990 Al-Maktum Bani-Yas Sh.Maktum b. Rashid.
Sharjah 1972. Al-Qasiml. Qawasim. Sh.Sultan b. Muhammad.
'Ajman. 1981. Al-Na'iml. Al-NaTm Sh. Humayd b.Rashid.
News Agency. November 1996 and Article 6 of the Omani Statute of the State. Oman Embassy in
London, op.cit. p. 3.
112. The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Kuwait Country Profile 1996-97" p. 5. Also for more details
over the disputes within the GCC royal families see Robin, Philip. The Future ofthe Gulf
Politics and Oil in the 1990s. Dartmouth Publishing Company, Gower House, England, 1989.
pp.71-74.
113 Dietl, Gulshan. op.cit. p. 24.
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Umm al- 1981. Al-Mu'alla. Al-'AII. Sh. Rashid b. Ahmad.
Qaiwain.
Ras al- 1948. Al-Qasimi. Qawasim. Sh. Saqr b. Muhammad.
Khaimah.
Fujairah. 1974. Al-Sharqi. Al-Sharql. Sh.Hamed.b.Muhammed.
Source: Dietl, Gulshan. op.cit. p. 24
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To judge a political experience as successful or not is a relative matter which differs
from one researcher to another according to the criteria on which they depend. Since
the foundation of the GCC in May 1981, the council has not been able to employ any
collective security initiative. One can clearly see that the six member states continued
building their own military forces individually, but the only action taken by the
Council in this respect has been the Desert Shield Force (5000 soldiers). This was a
symbolic force under Saudi leadership which includes all the member states. This
was the first step towards the formation of a deterrent collective force but its main
objective was to restore internal stability and order within the region's countries
rather than to confront external aggression. Whatever the main objective, the force
proved that it was not adequate, especially when facing an emergency situation like
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Since the foundation of the GCC, the six states have continued to allege, at
the end of each summit, that the security of the Gulf was their responsibility, in spite
of the presence of the navies and military facilities they had given to the Western
countries, especially the USA, Britain and France. (The proof of this is in the
defence agreements concluded during the early 1990s between the GCC states and
the above-mentioned).
The security of a country or region is the function of a multitude of domestic
and external, material and moral factors. Security is no longer perceived in terms of
armaments and weapons but rather as a social and development question.
Since the early 1970s and 1980s these countries have continued to have
different attitudes towards the concept of a security policy in the Gulf region. The
GCC members have disagreed on the sources of the threat. During that period there
have been many sources of threats, concerning oil security or the security of the
ruling system. The most famous of these have been Arab radicalism and Arab
Nationalism as well as the national opposition movements and the spread of
Marxism in the region (PFLOAG).
There was a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to their fear
of Iraq (in the early 1970s) and a rapprochement between Oman and Iran due to their
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fear of South Yemen. There was danger from Iran due to its disagreement with Iraq
over the sovereignty of Shatt el-Arab, the dispute between Bahrain and Iran
regarding the Iranian claim over Bahrain, and the dispute between Iran and the UAE
over the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. Finally there was the
international conflict between the two great powers (USA and the Soviet Union).
The states of the GCC failed during the three phases of the 1970s, 1980s, and
mid-1990s to create any form of collective security, and security has always
remained the responsibility of each country. These countries depend entirely on
Western countries to protect their regimes against any internal or external threats, a
matter which led to the following:
(a) stabilisation of the country's sovereignty in order to sustain the relations and co¬
operation between the member states;
(b) aggravation of the disputes between the council states due to the arms race;
(c) facilitation of the foreign and regional penetration of the member states;
(d) exhaustion of the financial resources for armament programmes.
Due to these factors the council has failed completely to assure its security
functions and as a result it has not developed into a regional entity with geographical
and economic characteristics that can correspond to its people's ambitions in a
unified and strong way. The failure of the council to assure its security functions has
had a negative influence on the performance of the council's integration functions,
whereas individual sovereignty has been enhanced on account of the integral
tendency in other economic and social fields.
The failure of these countries to assure security functions is due to the
following reasons: the relative difference of power, population, and incomes of the
council states as well as the persistence of such countries in conserving their national
sovereignty due to historic accumulations, tribal conflicts and religious differences,
the multiplicity of internal and external threat sources and the priorities of such
threats differing from one country to another, border problems between the GCC
states, foreign intervention in the affairs of the GCC states, the legal and political
nature of the council, a regional organisation whose powers are only consultative
though its leadership meets every year. This council is not given full power to be
active politically, militarily and on the level of security.
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The United States might have succeeded, by military force, in conquering
Iraq after the occupation of Kuwait. However, the military force employed by the
USA during the 1970s and 1980s in the Gulf, directly or indirectly through Iran as
per the Nixon and Carter Doctrines, the creating of Rapid Intervention Forces and the
Reagan principle of forming a Central American Forces HQ in the Gulf did not
succeed in creating stable security in the Gulf region.
After the second GulfWar in 1991, the GCC reviewed the idea of collective
security through the Damascus Declaration or what was known as the (6+2) form,
which added a new Arab dimension to the efforts made for collective security in the
Gulf. This meeting was between the six council states plus Egypt and Syria, and they
decided on increasing the numbers of the Desert Shield Forces up to a hundred
thousand men as mentioned by Sultan Qaboos in the military project formed after the
Doha summit in 1990. But these two formulations did not succeed in activating
collective security between the GCC states. After the failure of these two
formulations the member states of the GCC decided on the expansion of foreign
military support, though the council countries made great efforts to extend the
alliance area on a bilateral basis. Since 1991 three Western countries, USA, Britain
and France, continue to play the major role in supporting Arab Gulf security.
Bilateral defence agreements were signed with foreign parties, according to which
the GCC signed defensive, military and arms agreements with the above Western
countries. In spite of the fact that several years have passed since the invasion of
Kuwait by Iraq, the GCC states have not yet reached any common collective security
formula, which means that the Western countries will remain the main protector
against any internal or external threat to the conservative regimes in the Gulf region.
The dual containment policy applied by Washington against Iran and Iraq
failed. It did not succeed in isolating Iran and did not overthrow the Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein. As a result of this policy Arab Gulf security has become even more
threatened, because both Iran and Iraq agreed to oppose the security arrangements
imposed by the USA. Both countries consider the American presence in the Gulf
region as a direct threat to their national security. The disarmament of Iraq, which is
insisted upon by the USA, disturbs the balance of power in favour of Iran, and this
creates a kind of instability. The Pentagon argues that continued arms sales to
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regional allies are necessary to provide a minimal level of defensive capability as a
deterrent against aggression and as a 'leverage' to promote US interests in the Gulf
region. Saudi Arabia is ultimately the key to US defence strategies in the Gulf
region, following the successful resolution of the Gulf crisis and the destruction of
most of Iraq's military power. It is likely that the GCC states have recognised that
there are no major external military threats facing them for the foreseeable future.
In an interview, 'Abd al-'AzIz Al-Rawas, the Omani Minister of Information,
in answer to a question regarding the capability of such member states to protect
their political systems in case of external invasion, said that there was absolutely no
likelihood of external invasion, as happened in Kuwait in 1990. The Minister did not
give a reason for this, but I suggested that this was due to the western military
presence in the region and the military agreements reached by the council states with
such countries. The Minister also stated that the American policy of dual
containment had failed as the Americans themselves had recognised. The Minister
added that the policy had failed to contain Iran and Iraq because of the benefits to
some Western countries and oil companies. 1
The credibility of the US and Western Europe (Britain and France) as the
ultimate guarantor of the security of the GCC states has been enhanced and their
assurance ofmilitary response to future aggression in the Gulf region has established
an effective deterrent there.
Significant internal developments in the GCC states since the early 1970s
changed and challenged the main basis of internal security in these countries-
developments such as the nationalist movements (the activity of PFLOAG represents
the most powerful challenge) and the rise of the Shi'a since the end of the 1970s in
the Gulf region, with strong support from Iran. The traditional Arab Gulf states still
face many other problems, which can be summarised as follows:
a) the existence of deep social, ethnic, and sectarian divisions;
b) the shortage of indigenous manpower;
c) the challenge of resurgent, populist Islam;
d) the dramatic growth of a professional middle class;
1. Interview with 'Abd al-AzIz Al-Rawas. op.cit.
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e) the existence of conspicuous corruption in many ruling circles;
f) the intimately close relationships between Gulf elites and western governments;
g) the huge gap between economic modernisation on the one hand and political
development on the other hand;
h) the critical issue of succession and political rulership for the future.
It should be noted that peace and stability in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf
cannot be achieved unless a number of other issues are also addressed: internally
(among the GCC states) over more economic co-operation, political participation,
border settlements, and more integration culturally, militarily, economically, and
politically, and externally (between GCC and Iran, Iraq) trustful relationships,
economic co-operation and border settlements.
The GCC states concerned directly with the security arrangements should
have to balance the four following factors which relate to these arrangements:
1) Local factors: the six conservative states should establish a collective security in
their own countries and develop the force of the Desert Shield, and accept Sultan
Qaboos ofOman's project of building a unified military of 100,000 men.
2) Arab factors: this is an indispensable aspect to the GCC countries, according to
the national security criteria, and due to nationalist, geographical and cultural
factors in addition to the role of Egypt and Syria in supporting the Arab Gulf
countries situation.
3) Regional factors: particularly Iran. The six Gulf states agree that Iran should be
involved in any security plans due the fact that it overlooks half the Gulf area and
shares many features with the Gulf states. The past years have shown that the
boycott of relations with Iran is one of the most important reasons for the lack of
stability in the Gulf region.
4) International factors: an international cover for any regional security system is
required to provide the necessary protection for the Arab Gulf states, whenever
necessary, as happened during the Kuwait occupation in August 1990. The United
States and Britain represent this factor as they are considered to be the main pivot of
the Arab Gulf states security.
Among these four factors, the Arab Gulf states must make a balance to reach
a complete, perfect security system, which includes all the advantages of these
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factors and avoids the contradictions existing between them. It is a fact that Arab
security for the Gulf is not enough on its own. The Middle East security, which is
required by America, is not for the benefit of the region, due to the fact that it seeks
to involve Israel in the security system of the Middle East. The regional security,
which is required by Iran, is not balanced enough to achieve all the objectives and
benefits of all the Gulf countries including Iran. The proper picture of the security
arrangements is to have an important Arab role within a regional security system,
which should not ignore the international factor.
In any case, massive arms sales to the Arab Gulf states may have little
positive impact on security in the region. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1990 highlighted the fact that the GCC states are not capable of defending their
countries against any external invasion coming from Iraq or Iran without external
military support from the United States and the Western European countries. The
importance of oil remains the thing which protects the traditional monarchies of the
Arab Gulf states against any internal threats, whether Islamist, nationalist, or any
internal opposition, or external threats (coming from Iraq, Iran and the Yemen).
The GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, will still be the key to United States
defence strategies in the Gulf region. With the successful resolution of the second
Gulf crisis, and the destruction ofmost Iraqi military power and the containment and
boycott of Iran, it is likely that the GCC states have recognised that there are no
major military threats facing them. The credibility of the United States as the
ultimate guarantor of the security of the GGC states has been enhanced and the
assurance of a United States military response to future aggression in the region has
established an effective deterrent there. Since the termination of the second GulfWar
all the GCC states have provided military facilities to the United States, Britain and
France to provide against any internal or external threats to the Arab Gulf
monarchies.
'Abd al-'AzIz Al-Rawas, the Omani Minister of Information, believes that
the most important internal challenges which face the GCC members are that the
vital link is missing between their economic development and progress and the
political development of their governments. These governments have not activated
the role of governmental institutions. He stated that the Omani political pattern is a
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good example of such political progress. It was associated with the economic
progress witnessed by the Sultanate, when she founded the first council for
Agriculture, Industry and Fisheries in the middle of 1975, and then as an advanced
step, declared the foundation of the State Consultative Council in 1980 and the
formation of the Consultation Council (Shura Council) in 1991, and finally the
declaration of the State Council in 1997 under the umbrella of the Oman Council.2
It should be recorded that since Kuwait's liberation in 1991, the concept of
security has become a new concept different from the previous ones. The main
factors of the concept of security include the following: 1) priority has been given to
external security rather than the internal security. 2) The domination of the military
security system by each country rather than by a collective security system for the six
member states, as well as the rehabilitation of their own military power and arms
purchasing. 3) The subordination of the GCC's security to Western external power
and the concentration of the foreign military presence in the region. This military
presence is represented by the Marine and Air Force presence, as well as by the
common military manoeuvres and weapons storage that were agreed to in the
bilateral security agreements between the GCC states and the Western countries
(particularly the USA). 4) The lack of the Arab participation in security
arrangements, especially the Damascus Declaration. The military co-operation
between Egypt, Syria and the council is restricted to bilateral relationships and is not
achieved within the framework of the GCC. 5) The restriction of the Iraqi threat in
the future through the confiscation of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the
application of all international resolutions imposed on Iraq by the United States.
2. Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Rawas. op.cit.
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The GCC Internal Boundary Disputes
Introduction f^dSE>^£'r7
This chapter will concentrate on the disputed borders in the Arabian Gulf-Peninsula
region, as they represent a destabilising factor not only between the parties involved
but for the whole region. Throughout history, states have found many reasons to
make war against each other, and territorial differences have been a cause of war
since time immemorial. However, with the emergence of the western state (the
territorial nation-state) territory has also taken on a mythic or symbolic value. It has
become incorporated into people's ideas about their own identity and has also
become a token of their common political situation as co-citizens in a sovereign state.
Since the French Revolution, the modern state has been defined as 'a territory over
all whose inhabitants it rules and which is separated by clearly distinct frontiers or
borders from other such territories'.1
The problems of geopolitical borders are considered the most important
challenges to face the Gulf region countries at present and in the future. This is
mainly because borders are associated with many economic components such as oil
and water, as well as the regional sovereignty of states which feel obliged to claim
what they consider as their historical rights and which may have been denied by
neighbours during border demarcation disputes. No doubt this insistence of each
party on claiming its rights represents the greatest challenge to these states. Political
efforts frequently fail to find a peaceful solution and the states resort to armed
conflict.2
Boundary disputes have recently become a significant issue in the regional
geopolitics of the Gulf area, between the GCC states themselves on the one hand, and
1. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles "Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf
and the Arabian Peninsula. Survival. Vol. 35. No.4. Winter 1993, London, p. 3.
2. Al-Ta 'awun Magazine. Issue No.42. June 1996. p. 229.
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between the GCC states, Iran and Iraq on the other.3 Until the beginning of the
nineteenth century, sovereignty was not considered a matter of great importance in
the Arab Gulf area. The proof of this is the increased movement among the tribes
inhabiting the desert areas.
The Arab Gulf communities, before the coming of the British, enjoyed many
kinds of social harmony and were composed of three principal communities, two of
them sedentary and the third nomadic. One of the two sedentary communities appears
in the fertile oases, along the eastern stretch of the Arabian peninsula in al-Buraimi
Oasis, Hasa and some areas of Kuwait. The others are found in the principal cities of
the Gulf area. As for the third community, they are the Bedouin: they move about in
the desert in search of water and pasture. With the arrival of the British in the Gulf
region and after the signing of agreements with the sheikhs of these tribes,
particularly the agreements of 1820, the tribes made an attempt to control their areas
of influence, and intensified their zeal towards independence.
These sheikhdoms became petty states which resembled modern states through
the demarcation of geographic boundaries, the issuing of passports and the imposing
of custom restrictions between them, a development unknown to the Gulf
communities before the coming of the British.4
The real border disputes between the Arab Gulf sheikhdoms began with the
participation of these countries in the era of oil concessions and the increased
concern of the international oil companies, who had a great role in exaggerating the
border problems in the Arab Gulf area so as to put pressure on the disputing countries
to grant them greater oil concessions. For instance, in 1933, American Standard Oil
of California obtained some significant concessions in the disputed areas along the
previous borders.5
3. Schofield, Richard "Borders and territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
twentieth century" in Schofield, Richard (ed.) Territorial Foundations of the GulfStates. U.C.L
Press, England, 1994, p. 57.
4. Al-Rumayhl, Mohammad. Al-KhalljLays-Naftan. Dirasah fi-Ishkaliyyat al-Wahdah .op.cit. pp. 41-
42.
5. Schofield, Richard, op.cit. p. 172.
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The rivalry was acute between the United States (on behalf of Saudi Arabia)
and Britain (on behalf of Muscat and the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms) in the search for
oil. Likewise the disputes between the tribes in eastern Arabia became more active,
particularly during the last stage of the Second World War. The border questions in
the Arabian Gulf area became increasingly extraordinary and complicated, especially
with the discovery of oil in the desert lands. At that time every sheikh and his tribe
claimed the right to grant oil concessions in their respective areas. Oil exploration in
the region prompted major American and British companies to make commercial
arrangements with the rulers concerned as well as with some of the tribes in the Gulf
area. 6
In the summer of 1911, the representatives of the British and Turkish
governments held long negotiations over the sovereignty and protection of the
Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf area. These negotiations extended until 29 July 1913,
when both sides agreed to conclude a convention. The 1913 convention between
Britain and Turkey was the first attempt to determine the borders of the Arabian
Peninsula in order to establish the political boundaries of areas subject to the control
of Britain and those eastern areas subject to Turkey.7
The concept of regional sovereignty was not known in these areas as there had
never been established sovereignty there. Instead the loyalty of the tribes depended
on following a tribe or a madhhab, such as the WahhabT Sunnis in Saudi Arabia, and
the other Sunni schools, the Malikis and Shafi'is as well as the Ibadi sect in the north
of Oman. The political loyalty of these tribes depended primarily on the relationship
between the tribal leaders and the rulers of the sheikhdoms in their region. It did not
depend on the basis of the geographical areas which fell under the control of the
rulers. Tribal loyalty was not static. Most often these loyalties either rotated between
6. Al-Shamsi, Saeed Mohammad. The al-Buraimi Dispute: A Case Study in Inter-Arab Politics. Ph.D.
Thesis. The American University, Washington D.C. 1986, pp. 48-49 and 172.
7. Until the establishment of the present Saudi State in 1932, the Arabian Peninsula had never known
the existence of national boundaries separating one part from the other, nor the existence of any
form of national identity other than that of being Arabs. The Arabian Peninsula was inhabited,
even before the rise of Islam, by various Arab tribes that recognised no authority except that of the
tribal Sheykhs and no limits on their movements within their traditionally recognised tribal
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the various rulers or simply remained aloof from the ruling circles.8 Thus some of the
tribes in the al-Zahira area in Oman moved to Ibn-Sa'ud and the tribes of Na'im of
Zubarah in Qatar moved to the Al-Khallfah of Bahrain.
Many of the present borders in the Middle East either were drawn directly by
the western powers, especially Britain, or have come about a result of their influence
over the area during the first half of this century.9 The British government, by the
twentieth century, was playing a major role in the delineating of sovereign authority
amongst the Gulf Sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates (all of these Sheikhdoms being artificial British states). In addition the local
British Residencies in these Sheikhdoms played a significant role in protecting these
Sheikhs from any attack especially from Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Each of these
countries still claims territorial rights in many of these sheikhdoms .10
The Gulf borders in the Arabian Peninsula are as artificial as any in the world.
Saudi Arabia shares borders with all of the Arabian Peninsula countries as well as
Iraq and Jordan. Since the British departed from the Gulf area, many Joint
Committees have been established and many meetings and discussions between the
Arabian Peninsula countries have been organised. 11
The Basic Charter of the GCC includes, in Article Ten, the establishment of a
commission for the Settlement of Disputes between the members of the Council. But
in fact until the present time the Commission has not held any meetings to discuss
any dispute between these countries. This is in spite of the many border disputes
during previous years, most of which led to violent clashes. Some political analysts
territories. See Etaibi, Ghalib Tulhab. op.cit. p. 164, and Kelly, J.B. Eastern Arabian Frontiers.
Faber and Faber, London, 1964, p. 107
8. A1-FI1, Muhammad Rashid "Mushkilat al-Hudud bayn Imarat al-khalij al-'ArabP in. Al-Rumayhl,
Mohammad fed.-) Maiallat Dirasat al-KhalU al-'Arabi. Vol. 8. Second year, University of
Kuwait, 1976, p. 28.
9. Biskhu, Michael B "Iraq's claim to Kuwait: A Historical Overview" American-Arab Affairs. Vol.
37. 1991, p. 77.
10. Joffe, George "Concept of sovereignty in the Gulf region" in: Schofield, Richard (ed.), Territorial
Foundation ofthe GulfState., U.C.L. Press, England, 1994, pp. 85-86.
11. Al-Omair, Ali. The Arabian Gulf: A Study ofStability and Integration in the Realm ofRegional
and International Politics After British Withdrawal in 1971. Ph.D. Thesis. Claremont Graduate
School, U.S.A., 1979, p. 167.
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have suggested that the leaders of the GCC prefer to solve the border disputes
between members of the Council individually rather than collectively because all the
GCC States have the same problem with each other. Most of the GCC border
disputes have been resolved or are still in progress, with mediation being led by other
Arab leaders or Britain. 12
It should be recorded that both the two wars of the Gulf, the first between Iraq
and Iran which lasted from 1980 to 1988 and the second caused by the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in August 1990, erupted as a result of border disputes.
Brief Background of the al-Buraimi Dispute
Shaykh Sirhan b. Sa'Id, the Omani historian, mentions in his book Kashf al-
Ghummah that al-Buraimi in 1728 was recognised as part of Oman and was known
as Towwam or el-Jow. Imam Ahmad b. Sa'Id, the founder of Oman's Al-Bu Sa'Id
dynasty, controlled the area of al-Buraimi in the mid-eighteenth century. In 1800 the
first Saudi State took control of al-Buraimi, after an invasion led by a Nubian slave
named Salim b. Hariq, and subjected the area to its control. But after just three years
the Omani forces recaptured the area of al-Buraimi and drove the Saudi forces back
to Najd.13
Lorimer, in his book The Gazette of the Gulf published in 1900, describes the
area of al-Buraimi as part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. He reports that the
hold of the Sultan on the district was slight but that he maintained a Wall supported
by a garrison at the A1-'Iraqi village of al-Zahira. Saudi Arabia repeatedly attempted
to conquer al-Buraimi and bring it under its permanent sovereignty. During the
period 1800-1851 there was a total of five Wahhabl campaigns into al-Buraimi,:
12. Article Ten of the GCC Basic Charter. Commission for Settlement of Disputes of the GCC
Charter. See the Basic Charter of the GCC in the Appendix p. 462 and Al- Shamsi, Saeed M.
op.cit, p. 55.
13. Schofield, Richard "Extracts from Historical Summary of Events in the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms
and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 1928-1953" in: Schofield, Richard (ed.) Arabian
Boundary Disputes. Vol. 19. Archive Edition, England, 1992, p. 385.
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1800-1818; 1833-1839; 1845-1848; 1849-1850 and 1853-1869. The total Saudi
occupation added up to forty- five years. 14
The al-Buraimi Oasis lies in the plain of el-Jow on the northern edge of the al-
Zahirah district, and is about 37 square kilometres (15 square miles) in size. It is
located approximately halfway between Sohar in Oman and Abu-Dhabi. Al-Buraimi
was the centre of trade for the tribes of the surrounding desert of the Rub' al-Khali
(Empty Quarter). Al-Buraimi is the name of one oasis among the nine oases in the
area. They are: Buraimi, Sa'ara, Hamas, al-'Ain, JIml or Qlml, Hill, Qattarah,
Mu'tirid, and Muwaig'i.15
The Al-Buraimi Dispute, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Abu-Dhabi
(UAE)
British and Saudi Claims
The Anglo-Turkish Conventions of July 29 1913 and March 9 1914 were the first
attempt to draw a border in the East Arabian area. The two sides agreed to mark the
border lines between them. These came to be known as the Blue Line and the Violet
Line (see map p. 241). 16 The Blue Line begins on the Gulf to the west of Qatar,
opposite Zakhnuniyah island, and runs due south to the Rub' al-Khall. Its course took
it roughly down the middle of the Jafrah Desert. 17 After Ibn Sa'ud drove the Turks
from Hasa in May 1913, he rejected the Turkish agreement with Britain, and claimed
back many lands in South-eastern Arabia. In 1915 Britain signed an agreement with
Ibn Sa'ud: he pledged that he would avoid any aggression or interference in the
affairs of the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms, which were all under the suzerainty of Britain.
14. Phillips, Wendell, op.cit. p. 165.
15. Al-Buraimi has long been regarded as the northern gateway to the Sultanate of Oman, which
throughout history has been on the direct route of invaders of Oman from the west. At the same
time it controls the approach from the west to the coastal province of al-Batinah, by way of the
Wadi al-Jize. Kelly, J.B. op.cit. p. 33.
16. Wilkinson, John C. Arabia's Frontiers: The Story ofBritain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert.
I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, London, 1991, p. 57.
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However, Ibn Sa'ud continued to annex many places in the Arab Gulf area. The
Royal family of Saudi Arabia held the view that any lands that had been annexed by
their ancestors during the first and second Saudi states should be under Saudi
influence, since as such it had the right to regain these lands.
Since that time Saudi Arabia has sought the right of sovereignty over the lands
situated near the al-Buraimi areas, Sabkhat Matti, Khawr al-'Udaid, some parts of
Zufar and Hadramaut in addition to some lands within the Qatar Peninsula. The
Saudi view is that the authority of the sheikhs of the Gulf Coast is confined to the
settlements in which they live, while the territory, the deserts and the oases which are
between these settlements and run along the Gulf Coast, plus the interior lands which
extend to the Rub'al-Khall in the south, all belong to Saudi Arabia. 18
In April 1935, the government of Saudi Arabia drew up the first of its territorial
maps in which their border, which became known as the "Red Line" or "Fuad Line",
was situated about 100 miles away from the al-Buraimi Oasis region. According to
the Saudi Red Line the Saudi frontier ran parallel to the lands known as Majann,
Sabkhat Matti, and Kufat al-Liwa, leaving the lands belonging to Kufat al-Liwa to
the Sheikhdom of Abu-Dhabi and claiming the lands to the west for Saudi Arabia. 19
British and Saudi Negotiations
The British government, as a compromise and after a new trend had begun in
international politics, especially in Palestine, sought to develop better relations with
Ibn Sa'ud. In 1936 the representative of the British government re-opened
negotiations with the Saudi government. At the end of this negotiation, Britain
announced a new line in eastern Arabia, which became known as the Green Line or
Ryan Line. The Green Line started at the top of the Dohat al-Salwah, going south-
17. Kelly, J.B. op.cit. pp. 107-108.
18. Shaker, Amln. Mustaqbal al-Khallj al-'Arabi. Al-Inmma Publications, Beirut, 1971, p. 127.
19. Fuad Hamza Saudi representative in the Saudi-British delegations, originally a Druze Sheikh from
Palestine, secured a job as the King's chief executive in foreign affairs, under Prince Faisal b.
'Abd-al-'AzIz. The Green Line, Red Line or Ryan Line, are different names for the same line. The
Ryan line refers to Sir Andrew Ryan, the British Minister at Jeddah in Sa'udi Arabia during the
thirties. See. Kelly, J. B. op.cit. pp. 124-125
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eastward and passing by a point about 5 miles north-east of Sikak, from this point
running south in a direct line, leaving Baynuna 5 miles to the east. Saudi Arabia
rejected the new British Green Line and insisted on the Saudi Red Line.
The situation on the eastern Arabian frontier between Britain (on behalf of the
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Abu-Dhabi, Qatar and Aden) and Saudi Arabia was
suspended during the Second World War.20
As a reaction to the Saudi rejection of the Green Line, the British Minister in
Jeddah, on 25 November 1935, handed the Saudi government a memorandum
proposing a frontier even more unacceptable to Ibn Sa'ud than the Green Line. This
new line began at the top of the Dawhat al-Salwa and ran south-eastwards, skirting
the southern tip of the Sabkhat Matt! and then running eastwards along the northern
edge of the Rub' al-Khali.21
In fact the British and American oil companies played a major role in
exacerbating the border disputes between the Arab Gulf States. During the Crisis
over al-Buraimi the ARAMCO research department began to collect whatever
historical facts were available which might support the authority or influence of the
Saudis in the disputed area. On the other hand, the British Oil companies in the area
followed the same method as the American Oil companies, by preparing for the
coming negotiations over the disputed area, though the British government had its
own well documented archives in the Foreign and Commonwealth office.22
In the wake of the Second World War, Saudi Arabia and Britain exchanged
serious letters on the al-Buraimi dispute. The British government rejected the Saudi
claim; Saudi Arabia, in 1949, claimed that al-Buraimi was under the authority of its
own tribal and village sheikhs, who had no treaty relationships with the British
20. Al-Shamsi, Saaed M. op.cit. pp. 76-78.
21. Britain maintained that the only legal boundaries of its protectorate states with Saudi Arabia and
Yemen were the Blue and the Violet lines that were laid down in the Anglo-Ottoman Conventions
of 1913 and 1914. The Blue line defined the limit of the Ottoman territory in the Gulf, while the
violet line defined the limit of the Ottoman territory in Yemen. However, between 1925 and the
mid-1950s a number of other lines were proposed: in 1935 Saudi Arabia proposed a Red Line and
Britain proposed the Riyadh or Ryan line. See The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries.
op.cit. p. 462, and Kelly, J.B. op.cit. p. 125.
22. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. op.cit. pp. 78-79
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government and also denied the sovereignty of Abu-Dhabi and Oman over al-
Buraimi.23
During the conferences in London in 1951 and Dammam in 1952, convened to
discuss the al-Buraimi dispute between Britain (on behalf ofMuscat, Abu-Dhabi and
Qatar) and the Saudi Government, Saudi Arabia produced many letters from the
Sheikhs of the al-Buraimi area as evidence of Saudi suzerainty in this area. The two
conferences did not come to any agreements.24
Saudi Occupation ofAl-Buraimi
Many Sheikhs of the al-Zahira area visited Riyadh in 1952, and returned to hoist the
Saudi flag and started to issue Saudi travel documents. All the leading Sheikhs
declared their allegiance to Ibn Sa'ud, except for a few at the southern end of al-
Zahira, who were under the influence of the Sultan ofMuscat or the Imam of interior
Oman.25 In 1952 Saudi Arabia dispatched an expedition to invade al-Buraimi under
the Saudi Amir TurkI b.'Utaishan, assisted and escorted by forty men and many
Sheikhs of the al-Buraimi area, especially the Al-Shamsl chief of Hamasa, Rashid b.
Hamad. On his arrival, TurkI b.'Utaishan and his party established themselves in
Hamasa Oasis. The Saudi occupation represented the first Saudi attempt to occupy
al-Buraimi in 83 years.26 During the period of the occupation of the Hamasa Oasis,
Saudi Arabia obtained the signatures of 28 Sheikhs to the following statement in
1955:
We well affirm that the land is our land, and we have expressed loyalty to
our lord His Majesty the Great King. Our affairs are in his hands, and he may
command us as he wishes, for he is the guardian ofour affairs.21
23. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. op.cit. p.p. 91-92.
24. Wilkinson, John C. op.cit. p. 362.
25. Schofield, Richard, op.cit. p. 386.
26. Phillips, Wendell, op.cit. p. 168.




The Saudi claim to the al-Buraimi area was supported by the influential Sheikhs of
the area who supported the Saudis in exchange for money and food.
Wendell Phillips in his book Oman a History, indicates that Sheikh Zayed b.
Sultan, the present ruler of the United Arab Emirates, was offered some 30 million
Pounds by the Saudi Agent, 'Abdullah al-Quraishi, if he would help the Saudis to
weaken the Omani position with Sheykh Shakhbut, ruler of Abu-Dhabi at the time.28
After they had occupied the area of al-Buraimi in 1952, the Saudis refused to discuss
al-Buraimi as a frontier question.
British and Saudi Arbitration
Britain rejected the Saudi view on al-Buraimi, and in October 1953, Britain and
Saudi Arabia reached an agreement to discuss al-Buraimi as an international case and
agreed to appoint three members besides the British and Saudi representatives. By the
end of 1954 the names of the members of the Tribunal were agreed as follows:
Dr Charles de Visscher (Belgium)
Ernesto de Dihiga (Cuba)
Mohammed Hassan (Pakistan)
Sir Reader Bullard (Britain)
Sheikh YusufYassin (Saudi Arabia)
Saudi Arabia, with documents to assure her historical right regarding the
question of al-Buraimi, submitted herself to the international arbitration board. She
depended on three types of documents: the first was the diplomatic correspondence
exchanged between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom through her ambassador
in Jeddah, in addition to the minutes of the conferences held between the two parties.
The second type was the correspondence issued from tribal Sheykhs in the al-Buraimi
region declaring their loyalty to the Al-Sa'ud family, as well as some maps. The third
type was the publication of the zakat (tributes) registers taken from the records of the
al-Hasa district.29
28. Phillips, Wendell, op.cit. p. 171.
29. The Saudi Memorial, op.cit. p. 139
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Following the sessions held in Geneva, many events took place during the
discussion of al-Buraimi: the dispute between the arbitrators, especially between the
Saudi and British representatives, the Saudi influence over the al-Buraimi Sheikhs,
and the attitude of the Arab nationalists against Britain.30
However, other sources indicate that the most important reason leading to the
final collapse of the al-Buraimi Tribunal was the incident when the Saudi member
Yusuf Yassin was discovered attempting to influence witnesses and offering bribes to
neutral arbitrators. The international arbitration on al-Buraimi collapsed after the
resignation of the former Judge of the International Court of Justice, Dr Charles de
Visscher, together with the Cuban and British members.
After the collapse of the international tribunal Britain issued a statement on the
proceedings at Geneva, and claimed that Saudi Arabia had breached the arbitration
agreement. However, Saudi Arabia claimed that, when the British government found
that it was losing the case on al-Buraimi, it withdrew from the arbitration
commission and supported the Omani and Abu-Dhabi forces in capturing the area of
al-Buraimi in 1955.31
The U.N. and the Question of al-Buraimi
Since then the al-Buraimi dispute has become an item on the United Nations agenda
known as the "Question of al-Buraimi". The Secretary-General of the United Nations
Dag Hamarskjold appointed a special representative, Ambassador de Rissing from
Sweden, to settle the problem of al-Buraimi, after British troops, with the assistance
of Oman and Abu-Dhabi, had driven the Saudi force out from al-Buraimi on 26
October 1955. The British government informed Sa'udi Arabia that the rulers of
Muscat and Abu-Dhabi had been advised to resume their former control of the al-
Buraimi oasis. However de Rissing's mission failed.32 Following the British move,
Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain. Many of the Sheikhs from
the al-Buraimi area were exiled to Saudi Arabia. Most of these Sheikhs did not return
30. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. op.cit. pp. 106-107.
31. Phillips, Wendell, op.cit p. 172.
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to al-Buraimi until the beginning of the seventies after Sultan Qaboos took power in
Muscat and Sheikh Zayed in Abu Dhabi.33
32. Kelly, J.B. op.cit. p. 205.
33. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. op.cit. p. 136.
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The British position over al-Buraimi
Sir Anthony Eden, the then British Prime Minister, explained the British move in al-
Buraimi in the House ofCommons in 1955:
The ruler of Abu-Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat have scrupulously
observed the conditions ofarbitration which Her Majesty's Government, in good
faith, recommended to them. They have had to stand by and watch their subjects
being suborned, and the outcome of the arbitration itself being gravely
prejudiced in advance. A fair and impartial arbitration is not possible in such
circumstances the British government felt obliged, in the exercise of their
duty to protect the legitimate interests of the ruler ofAbu-Dhabi and the Sultan
ofMuscat, to advise them that the attempt to reach a just compromise by means
ofarbitration has failed..
The British Prime Minister confirmed that the frontier between Saudi Arabia and
Abu Dhabi would be regarded as the Green Line, as amended in 1937. No
unauthorised crossings of the line by the Saudis, either by land or air, would be
tolerated.34
The Saudi position over al-Buraimi
The Saudi Prime Minister, Prince Faisal (who became King in 1964) stated in
November 1955:
As a result of the British armed aggression andforcible occupation of the
Buraimi region, and in view of the fact that the British government justifies this
armed aggression on the basis of its agreements with the Sultan ofMuscat and
the Sheykh ofAbu Dhabi, His Majesty's Government in Saudi Arabia reasserts
its full rights in that region and refuses to recognise any concessions that have
been, might be, or shall be granted in the Buraimi region for any purpose to
anybody, be it an individual, a company, or a government, without the consent of
the Saudi Arabian government.35
The al-Buraimi case became a frozen issue from the beginning of the sixties after the
visit of United Nations delegates to the area. At this time security problems arose in
the Gulf area, such as, the revival of the Arab nationalist trend which aggravated the
tension in relations between Riyadh and Cairo during the era of Abd al-Naser, the
outbreak of the North Yemen revolution in 1962, and the expansion of Naserism in
34. Kelly, J.B. op.cit. p. 205.
35. Joyce, Mariam. op.cit. p. 56.
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the Arabian peninsula. This began to pose a large security challenge to Saudi Arabia,
in particular, and the other Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms in general. All these events were
the main causes of the change in the Saudi government's stand on the issue of al-
Buraimi. Since that time the Saudi government has revived its diplomatic
relationship with Britain (in 1963), and Saudi Arabia agreed with Britain to discuss
the issue of al-Buraimi with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.36
In 1964, after the renewal of relations between London and Riyadh, Britain
called for another attempt to promote a settlement of the al-Buraimi dispute. The
British government proposed the establishment of a joint oil exploration area along
the southern boundary of Abu Dhabi and the granting of right of access from the
neighbouring area of Saudi Arabia to the Abu Dhabi coast for pipelines and roads.
They also called for the return of the people of al-Buraimi under the guarantee of
supervision by the United Nations. The British proposal was rejected by the Saudi
government.37 The al-Buraimi case was considered closely from a legal point of
view, particularly for Muscat and Abu Dhabi. However, Saudi Arabia stood firm in
its claim over the al-Buraimi area until the issue entered its final stage in the early
seventies.38
Since the British departure from the Gulf region in 1971, Saudi Arabia has
continued to claim sovereignty over al-Buraimi and many parts of Abu Dhabi and
Oman.39 It attempted to reach a unilateral border with Sultan Qaboos of Oman
during his first official visit to Saudi Arabia in December 1970.
However, the two sides failed to reach an agreement. But Sultan Qaboos's visit
to Riyadh, which was followed by a joint proclamation between Muscat and Riyadh,
included the Saudi recognition of three oases in al-Buraimi, namely Buraimi, Sa'ra
and Hamasa, as being annexed to the Sultanate of Oman.40
36. Shahdad, Ibrahim M. Al-Sira' ' al-Dakhilifi 'Uman KhilH al-Qarn al-'Ishrln. op.cit. p. 176.
37. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. op.cit. p. 118.
38. A1-Anwar Magazine. Issue no. 1660. 9 August 1974. Beirut. 1974. p. 10.
39. Al-Na'Iml, 'Abd al-Rahman Muhammad. Al-Sira' 'a/a al-khalij al- 'Arabl. op.cit. p. 164
40. Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. op.cit. pp. 126-127.
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The Abu Dhabi position over al-Buraimi
Sheikh Zayed b. Sultan the ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the United Arab
Emirates, was under pressure during the early seventies due to teething problems
faced by the new federation of the UAE, including boundary disputes between certain
rulers and the question of common defence and external security. King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia made it clear that, as his territorial demands upon Abu-Dhabi remained
unsolved over the disputed area he would not recognise the legitimacy of the UAE
(which was founded by the seven Sheykhdoms of the Trucial States in December
1971).41 Saudi Arabia played a significant role in dividing the Arabian GulfEmirates
Federation (which consisted of the seven Trucial States, Bahrain and Qatar) during
the end of the sixties and early seventies. This proposed federation gave the Saudi
government another opportunity to put forward their claims over their eastern
boundary.42
Under these circumstances an agreement was reached on 21 August 1974,
between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi (on behalf of the United Arab Emirates) on the
al-Buraimi dispute after nearly four years of negotiations between the two countries.
The agreement gave Saudi Arabia access to the Khawr al-'Udaid plus a coastal strip
south of Qatar, the lines of wells through Sufuq, some of the Liwa Oasis, and much
of the Zarrara field on Abu Dhabi's side of the border.
In exchange Saudi Arabia recognised the suzerainty of Abu Dhabi over the
remaining six oases in the al-Buraimi area and recognised the United Arab Emirates.
In 1976 the construction of a new highway to link Abu Dhabi with Qatar was halted
as it reached Sila, when the Saudis claimed that the company was working in their
41. Martin, Lenore G. The Unstable Gulf Threats from Within.. Lexington Books, Toronto, 1984, p.
52.
42. The long-secret 1974 boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and (Abu Dhabi) UAE has now
entered the public domain as a result of its recent deposition to the UN as a public document. The
text confirms the agreement of the two sides to the effect that all the oil and gas located in the
Shaybah-Zarrarah field, even that part of the structure on the UAE side of the border, belongs to
Saudi Arabia. The main part of the field, known as Shaybah, lies on the Saudi side of the agreed
boundary line, but a small part of the structure extends onto the (Abu Dhabi) UAE side where it is
known as Zarrarah. See. Boundary and Security Bulletin. Summer 1995, IBRU, University of
Durham, p, 18 and see Pike, David "Cross-border hydrocarbon reserves" in: Territorial
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territory. This resulted in renewed negotiations on the boundary in 1976 and 1977
and a new agreement was eventually reached in 1977 between the two countries. (For
more details on the Saudi-Abu Dhabi agreement of 1974 see the appendix p. 489).
The Omani Position over the 1974 Agreement
In reaction to the agreement of 21 August 1974 between Saudi Arabia and Abu-
Dhabi, Sultan Qaboos ofOman publicly issued a rejection of it at a press interview:
Abu Dhabi has abdicated lands which do not belong to it or to Saudi
Arabia; they are under the suzerainty of Oman and we are neither a partner to
this agreement, nor are we aware of any discussions. We hope our brothers in
Abu Dhabi andSaudi Arabia will rectify the mistake which has occurred. 43
The Omani stance was officially declared when the Omani representative in the
United Nations handed the Secretary-General of the UN an official Omani letter
dated 28 September 1993 rejecting the Saudi-Abu Dhabi border agreement. The
Omani letter declared its reservation about the articles of agreement in these words:
The Omani government is unaware of any such agreement signed on 21
August 1974, between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. The purported agreement
includes articles pertaining to lands which historically and legallyfall under the
suzerainty of Oman and are inhabited by Omani citizens and protected by the
Sultanate of Oman. The Omani letter confirms that Oman has full sovereignty
over all Omani lands and, as such, any interference with the Omani border will
be treated as involving the internal affairs ofOman, which is not acceptable to
the Omani government... that the Sultanate ofOman will not recognise anything
except what is declared in the Omani-Saudi border agreement which was signed
in 1990, and the Omani agreement with Abu Dhabi. Anything else aimed at
breaking the authority and legality of what had been reached concerning the
international border between Oman-Sa'udi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, Oman will
neither recognise it nor accept it and will treat such things as non-existent. 44
The border disputes between Oman and the UAE remained in status quo. As far as
the dispute between the Omanis and the Saudis is concerned, it was resolved after the
border agreement was signed in Riyadh on March 21 1990, between Sultan Qaboos
ofOman and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The instruments of the Omani-Saudi border
foundations ofthe GulfStates" (ed.) Schofield, Richard. UCL Press, 1994, p. 190. See Al-Shamsi,
Saeed M. op.cit. pp. 126-127 and Encyclopedia ofInternational Boundaries, op.cit. p. 462.
43. Al-Na'imi, 'Abd-al-Rahman M. op.cit. p. 165.
44. Al-Havah Newspaper. Issue No: 11511. 24 August 1994, London, p. 4.
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agreement of ratification were exchanged during the state visit of Sultan Qaboos to
Riyadh in May 1991. Some sources indicate that the new Omani-Saudi border
agreement coincided with a delimitation which the British government declared in
1955 on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.45 The demarcation of the two-
country border was completed. The erection of 341 concrete boundary markers took
three years and required overcoming formidable geographical obstacles, including
sand dunes reaching 200metres high in some places. The ceremony for the signing of
the border maps took place in Riyadh on 10 July 1995.46 (for full text of the
agreement see appendices p. 492)
Abu Dhabi, as a responsible party to the 1974 agreement with the government
of Saudi Arabia, attempted several times to open discussions with the latter in order
to reach an amicable settlement in respect of that agreement. The Saudis promised to
discuss and decided to deposit the 1974 agreement with the United Nations, but
refused to have any further discussions with Abu Dhabi on this issue. Privately, Abu
Dhabi officials continued in 1992 to express unhappiness with the 1974 border
agreement with Saudi Arabia, which they regarded as having been imposed upon
them.47
The Political Developments of the al-Buraimi Dispute (the Omani
position)
The al-Buraimi question, which represented the greatest political dispute in the
Arabian Peninsula during the fifties and sixties, is considered to be the most
complicated political boundary question between the Sultanate of Oman, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE (Abu Dhabi). The 1974 Treaty or Jeddah convention between
45. Geographic Notes. Winter 1992.1993. Vol. 2. No. 4. US Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Washington ,DC, pp. 1-2
46. Oman Daily Observer. Vol.14. No.205. Tuesday 11 July 1995. Sultanate of Oman, Muscat, p.l
and Boundary and Security Bulletin. Summer 1995. p. 19. Copies of maps of the International
borders between the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia were deposited at the Arab League on
15 November 1995 in accordance with the border agreement signed in March 1990. Oman Daily
Observer. Issue No. 15. No.2, Thursday 16 November 1995. p. 1.
47. Schofield, Richard "Border and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
Twentieth Century " op.cit. p. 66.
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Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Abu Dhabi) represented political differences between all
three countries, especially after the publication of the treaty in 1992. Up till then it
remained confidential between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The attitude of the
Sultanate of Oman was clear from the memorandum of protest and non-recognition
of this treaty which Oman submitted with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the Arab League
and the United Nations.
The Omani attitude came as a result of the Saudi submission of the treaty to the
United Nations. This was a step which Saudi Arabia had not taken in the past, but
their documentation of this treaty arose as a result of the second Gulf war, and was in
addition intended to counteract the repeated demands by the UAE to reformulate the
1974 treaty. The UAE thought that the treaty of 1974 was unfair and was a result of
the political circumstances of the time, which had led to the creation of the UAE
federation. Saudi Arabia continued not to recognise the new federation until the
settlement of the boundary problem between the two parties.
On 28 September 1993 the Sultanate of Oman submitted to the UN a
memorandum of protest against the 1974 treaty, after the treaty had been registered
by the United Nations on 9 September 1993. (We have to note that the
documentation of this treaty has not yet been achieved because the legal procedures,
terms and conditions of registration have not yet been satisfied.)
On 27 November 1993 the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the Omani
Consul in Abu Dhabi and submitted to him the response of the UAE regarding the
Oman protest memorandum; the UAE attitudes included the following:
— the UAE recognised the right and the situation of Oman regarding the 1974 treaty.
Saudi Arabia had been informed about this situation by the UAE on many occasions
since 1975;
— the UAE confirmed its observance and recognition of the treaties made in 1959 and
1960 between Sultan Sa'Id b. Taimur and Sheykh Shakhbiit b. Sultan.
On 20 April 1994 the representative of the UAE at the United Nations
submitted a memorandum stating that the UAE had since 1975 persisted in informing
Saudi Arabia that the 1974 treaty conflicted with two treaties signed between the
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Sheykh of Abu Dhabi in 1959 and 1960. It
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stated that the boundary treaty signed between Oman and Saudi Arabia in 1990 had
deleted the dispute over the treaty of 1974, and therefore it was possible for Saudi
Arabia to amend the treaty of 1974.
The UAE's representative claimed that Saudi Arabia should carry out the
amendment of the 1974 treaty before the application of the registration of the treaty
as per article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
On 14 June 1994, the Sultanate of Oman received a memorandum from the
foreign ministry of Saudi Arabia in response to the Omani protest memorandum
confirming that she was ready to discuss the matter with the other two countries; it
was however noted that the Saudi memorandum was not as clear as the UAE
memorandum dated 24 November 1993 and did not demonstrate any real wish to
solve the problem. The Saudi memorandum suggested that any conflict between the
boundary treaties of 1959 and 1960 between the Sultanate ofOman and the UAE and
that of 1974 between Saudi Arabia and the UAE should be negotiated by the three
countries. However no practical steps were taken by Saudi Arabia. The situation
regarding the 1974 treaty became more complicated and more doubtful when Saudi
Arabia submitted a memorandum on 17 October 1994 in response to the Omani
memorandum to the United Nations. The Saudi memorandum angered Oman, which
described the Saudi memorandum as compositional, and as political marketing more
than legal. The Saudi memorandum gave many unreasonable interpretations
according to the Omanis who accused the Saudis of intending to mix papers
mysteriously from the very beginning. The Omani government thought that Saudi
Arabia might wish to re-negotiate the content of the boundary treaty signed by the
three countries, including the boundary treaty signed on 21 March 1990 between
Oman and Saudi Arabia, but this would never be accepted, as the Oman government
believed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE ought to correct the 1974 treaty in a way that
does not conflict with the boundary treaty signed between the Sultanate of Oman and
Saudi Arabia on that day.
Oman became more doubtful about Saudi Arabia and the UAE, particularly
after the withdrawal by the Emirates of the application regarding the circulation of
the protest memorandum dated 20 April 1994. The Emirates only demanded the
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registration of the memorandum's content and its documentation. This meant that the
Emirates had become more relaxed and flexible, and this seemed to suggest that
boundary negotiations between the Sultanate of Oman and the UAE were not going
well.
As shown by the protest memoranda and the content of the 1974 treaty, Oman
became more and more dissatisfied with it. Oman confirmed that the 1974 agreement
incorporated some lands that were and still are under Omani sovereignty (for
example Mahadah, al-Buraimi, Dhank and al-Sunaynah). The Omani government
considered this agreement to be a serious violation of Omani sovereignty, a matter
which was unacceptable even if the boundary question had been solved between
Oman and Saudi Arabia as per the agreement signed on 21 March 1990. Oman could
not complete the legal procedures to document the two treaties of 1959 and 1960
between the Sultanate and the UAE; this made the Omani situation weaker regarding
its frontiers with the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, since Abu Dhabi (UAE) had signed an
international boundary treaty with Saudi Arabia including some Omani territories
assigned by Abu Dhabi to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The Omani position regarding the 1974 treaty was the following: (a) the UAE
should correct the 1974 treaty in a practical way, because it violates Omani
territories; (b) the Sultanate ofOman confirms its protest at the UN in response to the
Saudi memorandum including the Saudi reaction to the Omani memorandum
submitted in 1993; (c) regarding the signature of a boundary treaty between the
Sultanate and each of the seven Emirates, in this case Oman confirms that she might
face some difficulties in dealing separately with each Emirate, without any
intervention on the part of the federal government. Oman did not want the UAE to
have doubts as to the permanent Union.
Regarding the development of the 1974 treaty the Qatari government protested
on 8 November 1994 against it after she was informed about the Sultanate of Oman's
protest. Qatar also claimed she had some rights and obligations which Abu Dhabi
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had abdicated by the treaty of 1969 (between Qatar and Abu Dhabi). She also
declared that she had reservations regarding all her legal rights. 48
Some writers suggest that the reactivation of the boundary disputes since the
second Gulf war was the means on which Saudi Arabia depended to assure her
regional domination. The evidence for this view is that Saudi Arabia has continued to
escalate disputes at different levels with both Qatar and Yemen and has documented
most of her previous boundary treaties. This is an unusual Saudi policy. For this
reason the relations between Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Co¬
operation Council were always regarded with suspicion by these countries, especially
concerning boundary issues.49
48. Private Source. This document is still not published.
49 Khadir, Bishara. uruba wa-Buldan al-KhalTj al-'Arabiyyah al-Shuraka'al-Aba'id. Unity Studies




"OfferedtoIbnSaud1935 SawdiaArabianCl im1949 AbuDhabicl im1952 *****Qiatarclaim1952 FrontierlaiddewnbyBritishGov nme t1955 BoundaryfOmanandTruci lSt te*agree1955
/'
Dubayyfc=g|F jayrah SharjahH[..Ajr >an UmmalCL ywayn|[AbuDhabi RAsalKhaymah 100Miles I I 160Km
Source:InternationalBound riesRes archU it.Denar menfGeofxranhvTTniv r itvfDurhamFnalariH1QQ6
The Saudi-Qatari Border Disputes
Chapter Five
Historical Background
The historical background to the border disputes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar
includes most of the historical events which we have mentioned earlier when
discussing the border dispute in the south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula, and
in particular, the case of al-Buraimi. As such, the border dispute between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar may be considered as one of the aspects of those issues between
Britain, on behalfofOman, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and the Aden Protectorates, on the one
hand and Saudi Arabia on the other hand.
The border issue between Saudi Arabia and Qatar began during the occupation
of al-Hasa by Ibn Sa'ud in 1913. He considered the Peninsula of Qatar as part of a
Saudi Administrative division. To Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms were no
more than a dynasty of petty squabbling Sheikhs, continually assassinating each other
and incapable of shouldering any effective rule.50
The British-Turkish agreement of 1913 and 1914, which divided the influence
of the two countries in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the agreement of 1916
between the Sheikh of Qatar and Britain, protected the Sheikh of Qatar from the
attacks and threats of the Ikhwan of Ibn Saud and the Al-Khallfah of Bahrain.51
In 1934, Hajjl 'Abdullah Williamson, an English Muslim Employee of the
Anglo-Persian oil company, said that Ibn Than! was a part from the sixty-odd
members of his own family. There were a few scattered semi-nomads of the Na'im
tribe on the peninsula dating back to the time of the Ban! Musallam, who were the
rulers in Qatar before the Than! family. Ibn Than! depended on men drawn from the
BanI Hajir and the Ban! Murra, two of the three tribes pasturing along the border of
Qatar, for his fighting force. The third tribe was al-ManasIr. Ibn ThanI was definitely
50. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
Twentieth Century" op.cit. p. 32.
51. Kelly, J.B. Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op.cit. p. 124.
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the goodwill of Ibn-Saud and his Governor, Ibn Jalwl, for the safety of his lands from
the raids of the Najdi tribes, especially from the Manaslr.52
The British position over Qatar
After Ibn Sa'ud occupied al-Hasa in 1913, he claimed the Peninsula of Qatar as part
of Saudi Arabia. Britain, as the protector of the interests of the Sheikh of Qatar,
rejected the Saudi view and in 1916 concluded a protectorate agreement with the
Sheikh of Qatar, for him to subject all Qatari lands to British protection against Ibn
Saud and Al-Khallfah of Bahrain, who laid claim to many areas disputed by Al-
Thanl ofQatar.
Britain, in her turn, considered that the border between Saudi Arabia and Qatar
was that which was contained in the aforesaid Blue line and Violet line from the
agreements between Britain and Turkey in 1913 and 1914. However the Saudi
government refused to accept the British view on this dispute, which was entirely
separate from the Buraimi issue already discussed between the two sides.53
Since the Saudi occupation of al-Hasa in 1913, the border issue between the
two sides has remained an issue of contention and dispute. The Sheikh of Qatar
claims that his border started at Ghar al-Baried on Dawhat Salwa then extended
eastward across the three axes of Hazam, Sudat-Nathll, and 'Uqlat al-ManasIr to the
point situated on the western coast of Khawr-al-'Udaid. Qatar also retains an area 25
miles wide, which lies at the base of Qatar Peninsula and which was a claim already
included on the Saudi agenda.
The Agreement of 1965
However, Saudi Arabia rejected the border demands of the Sheikh of Qatar. Thus the
border issue remained in status quo till the two sides reached a bilateral agreement,
without British consultation, in 1965, which extended the border between the two
52. Schofield, Richard, op.cit.. p. 32.
53. Kelly. J.B. op.cit. p. 113.
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countries from the head of Khawr-al-'Udaid, Sudat-Nathll and from there in a
western direction towards the head of Salwa. Bay.
The 1965 agreement conceded the Khawr-al-'Udaid to Saudi Arabia in
exchange for additional territory for Qatar at the base of its Peninsula. The agreement
also delimited the Continental shelf boundary on the western side of Qatar in the Bay
of Salwa. In accordance with the 1965 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Qatar
and the 1974 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Abu-Dhabi (UAE), Saudi Arabia
was able to gain the Khawr-al-'Udaid and the surrounding areas.
Thus Saudi Arabia became the only country lying to the south of Qatar. As a
result of this, there were no common borders between Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates.54 Some sources indicate that Qatar abdicated its border strip near Khawr-
al- Udaid to Saudi Arabia. Her aim was to bring Saudi Arabia to her side in her
border dispute with Bahrain over the two islands of Hawar and Fisht al-Dibal. 55 (for
full text of the agreement see appendices pp 487 and 488).
54. El-Rayyis, Riyad Najlb. Riyah al-Sumum, al-Sa'udiyyah wa-Duwal al-Jazlrah Ba'd Harb al-
KhalT] 1991-1994. op.cit. pp. 305-306. Some sources indicate that the border dispute between
Qatar and Saudi Arabia over the al-Khufiis area appears as a result of the 1974 border agreement
between Saudi Arabia and UAE (Abu Dhabi), in line with which the UAE (Abu Dhabi) ceded
some land to Saudi Arabia, including that the road between the UAE and Qatar ran through Saudi
Arabia territory. Qatar accused the Saudi government of unilaterally demarcating the border and
preventing the passage of trucks unless they pass through Saudi territory. See Jane's Sentinel
Newsletter. "The Gulf states" Vol.2. No. 12. p. 8.
55. Al-Na'lml, 'Abd -al-Rahman M. op.cit. p. 16.
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The Incident of al-Khufus
The situation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia worsened, when a border crisis
exploded between the two countries in September 1992 and the Saudi border guards
attacked one of the Qatari border stations, called al-Khufus. Al-Khufus is situated on
the south of the Qatar peninsula some 130 km south east of the Qatari capital and
only one kilometre from the Khawr-al- Udaid.
The clash between the two sides resulted in the killing of two Qatari soldiers
and the injuring ofmany others. However, the Saudi government claimed that the al-
Khufus incident of 1 st October 1992 took place between the Bedouin and the Qatari
border guards. According to the Saudi position, it was the Qatari border units who
fired at the Bedouin. The Saudi added that a local tribal leader named Muhammad b.
Shuryan of the Murra clan was killed in an act of revenge when he went with his
men to investigate whether his followers had destroyed the border post the following
day. Saudi Arabia accused the government of Qatar of exploiting the outbreak of the
second Gulf crisis and thereby extending her borders about 14 km into Saudi
territory. The Sa'udi declaration rejected the Qatari ministerial decision to suspend
the 1965 border agreement.56
The Qatari reaction to the incident resulted in the unravelling of the political
position with Saudi Arabia, such that Qatar announced her unilateral revocation of
the 1965 border agreement and launched a fresh political campaign against Saudi
Arabia. This was championed by the Qatari foreign minister Hamad b. Jassim b.
Jaber Al-Thani, who threatened to withdraw from the GCC and pull back Qatari
troops who were stationed in Saudi Arabia as part of the Peninsula shield force, and
boycott all the GCC meetings.57
56. Jaber, Nadim "Qatar and Saudi Arabia So Much For "Brotherhood" Middle East International,
Vol. 9.0ctober.l992.London..p. 5. See also Shahatah, Muhammad M "al-Hudud al-Sa'udiyyah
Ma'a Duwal al-Khallj" in: Harb, Usamah Ghazall (ed). al-Sivasah al-Duwaliwah. Issue No:l 11,
January 1993, Cairo, p. 224.
57. El-Reyyes, RiadN. op.cit. p. 301
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The Iranian Position over the al-Khufus Incindent
At the regional level Qatar established congenial relations with Iran and announced
many large economic contracts with her, in particular involving gas and the
supplying of Qatar with fresh drinking water from Iran through a pipeline crossing
the Gulf. Iran actually exploited the Qatari-Iranian rapprochement and the Tehran
Times offered to come to the defence of any Gulf States threatened by "Saudi
aggression".
Iran found the Saudi-Qatar border dispute a golden opportunity and went as far
as signing a security agreement with Qatar (a kind of agreement which Qatar had not
signed with Arab States).58
Independent Policy ofQatar
After the explosion of the border dispute between Doha and Riyadh, Qatar set its
own political agenda, which differed from the other members of the GCC, especially
Saudi Arabia. During the Yemeni crisis, which broke out in May 1994, Qatar
announced her rejection of and reservations about all the decisions and declarations
of the GCC states concerning Yemen, whereas the stand of the other GCC States was
to assist and approach the ex-South Yemeni leadership rather than the San'a
leadership.
Qatar announced that it supported the cause of the unification government in
San'a.59 Qatar also, during the border crisis with Saudi Arabia, resumed diplomatic
relations with Iraq, which had been broken off during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
58. Jaber, Nadim, op.cit. p.6. Reportedly, Iran offered to conclude a joint defence treaty with Qatar
and to supply 30,000 soldiers. Iran sees Saudi Arabia as being behind her problems with the GCC.
Iranian Scholars tirelessly point to the fact that the GCC is a vehicle for Saudi dominance, that the
Saudis use the 'Iranian threat' to strengthen their position on the GCC states. In light of the
growing Saudi-Qatari dispute towards the end of 1994, and Qatar's refusal even to attend the
GCC's Interior Ministers' meeting to discuss the internal security agreement, the Saudi media
reacted sharply to Iran's exploitation of the border dispute with Qatar, attacking the Iranian
regime for 'searching for any superficial, emergent dispute within the GCC in an attempt to
disturb the fraternal relations existing between the GCC states'. See Chubin, Shahram and Tripp,
Charless " Iran, Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" op.cit. pp. 35-36.
59. Al-Na'imi, 'Abd-al-Rahman M. "Border Conflicts and American Machinations" Arab- Review.
London, Vol. LIV, 1993, p. 24.
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1990. The Iraqi government announced her support and encouragement of countries
in the territory.
There have been no more details released on the demarcation of borders by the
government of Qatar against the Saudi aggression.60 On the Arab front, the foreign
minister of Qatar announced that Qatar's policy on Israel was not against any Arab
countries and that it had an independent policy, which differed from the GCC states
in many aspects. Thus the foreign minister held a meeting in January 1994 with the
Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres in London, and announced the revocation of the
second boycott against Israel.61 Moreover, the Qatari minister confirmed that he had
concluded a contract with the Israeli minister to supply natural gas to Israel.
The Qatari change of view came as a result of the encouragement given by the
American foreign secretary Warren Christopher to his Qatari counterpart when he
said:
I will encourage him to take decisions to weaken the effects of the Israeli
boycott by establishing economic and cultural relations between Qatar and
Israel as a foundation to a real peace in the Middle East.
Some sources indicated that the new
establishing a strong relationship with the
Washington led through Israel.62
Qatari policy towards Israel aimed at
United States, in the belief that the way to
60. The state of Qatar was the first anti-Iraqi coalition country to re-establish relations with Iraq as a
reaction to the Saudi Arabian position in the incident of the al-Khafus border area. See MEES.
Vol.XXXVI No.5. 2 November 1992. p.CI. MEES's claim that the possibility that the Qatari
normalization of relations with Iraq might encourage others to break ranks in a similar fashion can
therefore only increase the already high level of concern felt in Riyadh and elsewhere in the Gulf
at Qatar's maverick behaviour. MEES. op.cit. p.CI. and see Shhatah, Mohammad M. op.cit. p.
225.
61. Al-RumayhT, Mohammad (ed.) Maiallat Dixasat al-Khalii al-'Arabl Vol. 8. Second year,
University of Kuwait, 1976, p. 28.




The Egyptian President Husnl Mubarak's negotiations with the two leaders of Saudi
Arabia and Qatar succeeded in bringing them together in al-Madinah al-
Munawwarah in December 1992. The precise terms of the accord were not made
public, but the two sides agreed to produce a final border map, which was expected
to be completed within a year. The accord also reportedly upheld Qatari sovereignty
over the al-Khufus area.63
According to the report from Reuters, the Saudi-Qatari accord of December
1992 states:
a) In implementation of the border agreement concluded between the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar on 11th Sha'ban 1385 AH corresponding to 4th
December 1965 AD, it was agreed to append a map signed between the two sides
showing the final border line to which both sides shall be committed, b) The
formation is agreed of a joint Saudi-Qatari committee in accordance with Article 5 of
the agreement, to be entrusted with the task of implementing the 1386 AG/ 1965 AD
agreement with all its provisions and articles and the contents of this joint statement.
This committee shall embark upon placing the border demarcations in accordance
with the appended map.64
The GCC Role over the al-Khufus Incident
In fact the GCC was not able to solve the border disputes between the council
members, because all these States have similar disputes with each other. The GCC,
during the Saudi-Qatari border dispute, did not take any significant action, except
that it called the two sides to solve this problem through negotiation.65
63. Jarrah, Najm "The GCC, A Dispute Resolved" Middle East International. Vol. 8, January 1993,
London, p. 12.
64. Schofield, Richard, op.cit. p. 66.
65. Shahatah, Muhammad M. op.cit. p. 266.
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Oman tried to mediate between Doha and Riyadh, but failed. Diplomatic
sources in Abu Dhabi said that the Egyptian proposals were similar to those proposed
by Oman when it tried to mediate between the two sides.66
The Qatari movement towards Iran and Iraq angered Saudi Arabia, who then
increased her pressure on Qatar in two ways: a sea blockade in the form of Saudi
naval patrols during the months after the al-Khufus border incident, in Qatari
territorial waters, when ships heading towards Qatar were frequently intercepted, and
by cutting the road leading from Qatar to Abu Dhabi and diverting it to the new
international road, adding more the 200 km to the land route between Qatar and the
UAE.
The Saudi control posts intensified their duties on imports and exports on this
road, and this caused strong popular resentment in Qatar towards Iran and Iraq. Saudi
Arabia encouraged the Bedouin tribes to create problems against the Qatari
government. The most important Saudi reaction came when the Saudi government
moved towards establishing a military base at Khawr-al-'Udaid near the Saudi-Qatari
border.67
On 7 April 1996, Saudi Arabia and Qatar reached an agreement on the
demarcation of the borders between them and on the resumption of the works of the
joint technical committees within the following two weeks, which they would select
an international surveying company to carry out the survey and to fix the border
points between the two countries.68
66. Jarrah, Najm op.cit. p. 12.
67. MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.l. 5 October 1992. p. C3. See also Al-Na'Iml, Abd-al-Rahman M. op.cit.
p. 24.
68. Al-Ta'awun Magazine. Issue No.42. Eleventh Year, June 1996, p. 229.
260
Chapter Five
The Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Border Dispute
The Offshore Dispute
Bahrain is an island state which has no onshore boundaries with Saudi Arabia or any
other country in the Gulf area. Bahrain is a term used to indicate a group of more
than 30 small islands. The offshore limits of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain do not exceed
15 nautical miles in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf waters, though Bahrain is very close
to the Eastern Province beaches of Saudi Arabia.69 The offshore dispute between
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain was concentrated on the shallow area known as the "Fisht
abu-Sa'afah", on which lie two islands. The main one is known as the Greater
Lobainah, the other as the Lesser Lobainah.
The British and Saudi Claims
The real dispute between the two countries began when the government of Bahrain,
in 1941, awarded an oil concession to a British oil company in the Abu-Sa'afah area.
However Saudi Arabia objected to this concession as she considered that the area
belonged to her.70 Discussion between the two countries began and the first meeting
was held in London in 1951. The British delegation, representing the ruler of
Bahrain, proposed that Bahrain take possession of both Greater and Lesser Lobainah,
in exchange for the island of Abu-Sa'afah which would be given to Saudi Arabia.
However, the Saudi delegation refused to accede to this and demanded the
annexation of Abu-Sa'afah and Greater Lobainah to Saudi Arabia, leaving only
Lesser Lobainah to Bahrain. Saudi Arabia, at that time, did not want to engage in any
further discussions with Britain on behalf of Bahrain until the Buraimi dispute had
been dealt with.
69. Shahatah, Muhammad M "Al-Hudud al-Sa'udiyyah ma'a Duwal al-Khaljj " op.cit. p. 233.
70. Charney, Johnathan I and Alexander, Lewis M. "International Maritime Boundaries" Vol. II. The
American Society ofInternational Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London, p. 1490.
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The Agreement of 1958
The situation of the offshore border between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain remained
unchanged between the two parties and there was no progress till 1954, when Saudi
Arabia agreed to divide Abu-Sa'afah and distribute the oil extracted from there
equally between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Both countries signed an agreement in
this respect on 22 February 1958. Bahrain acquired half the turnover of the oil
revenue extracted from the island of Abu-Sa'afah, which was located in Saudi
waters, and abdicated her claim to sovereignty over Fisht Abu-Sa'afah. Saudi Arabia
acquired Greater Lobainah, while Bahrain acquired Lesser Lobainah without there
being any continental shelf between them.
The Saudi Arabia-Bahrain agreement was the first delimitation of submarine
areas between two states in the Gulf region. The first article of the agreement
provided for a "boundary line between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to be established on
the basis of the median line". The agreement did not provide for territorial seas for
the islands of the two Lobainahs, which represented points on the boundary line. The
delimitation appears to be based generally on equidistance, with some deviations
possibly due to the existence of a number of shoals, low-tide elevations and islets in
the area.71 The ratification of the 1958 agreement was exchanged on February 26
1958 and the agreement then came into force.
It should be noted that the Bahraini-Saudi agreement of 1958 was the first
delimitation agreement signed in the Gulf.72 As recently as December 1992, the
Bahraini minister of Finance and National Economy announced that Saudi Arabia
had agreed to allow Bahrain to increase her share of the output from the Abu-Sa'afah
field from 70,000 to 100,000 barrels per day (that is, from a 50% share to a 71.4%
71. The offshore boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain was not only the first
offshore boundary in the Gulf, but also the first in the world to incorporate the sharing of revenues
from seabed resources. See Blake, Gerald "Shared zones as a solution to problems of territorial
sovereignty in the Gulf states" op.cit. p. 205 and Bundy, Rodman R "Maritime delimitation in the
Gulf' in. Schofield, Richard, (ed.) Territorial Foundations of the GulfStates UCL Press, London
1994. p. 177. See also Amin, S.H."Law of the Continental Shelf Delimitation: The Gulf
Example", op.cit. p. 344.
72. International Boundary Study. Series A Limits in the Seas. Continental Shelf Boundary Bahrain-
Saudi Arabia. No.12. March 10, 1970. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Washington, DC, p. 1.
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share of the average total daily production figure of 140,000 b/d).73 The Saudi-
Bahraini accord of 1958 stated that the oil revenues would be awarded to the ruler of
Bahrain and not the State Treasury. 74 (for full text of the agreement see appendices
p. 523).
73. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula During the
Twentieth Century " op.cit. p. 55. See also MEES. Vol. XXXIX No.30, 22 April 1996, p. A8.
74 AI-Majid, Majld. op.cit. p. 46.
263
Map No. 12.
The 1958 Bahrain - Saudi Arabia maritime boundary and the Fasht Bu Saafa Hexagon.





When the Ottomans ruled the Arabian Peninsula, the border between Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait was virtually an uninhabited desert area, which was the historic route for
the Arabian tribes to move to the northern part of the fertile lands of Basra and the
Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq. However, with the decline of Ottoman authority in these
areas during the early 1920s, the Ikhwan of Ibn Sa'ud took the opportunity to invade
almost all the territory of the Sheikh of Kuwait. According to the secret agreement of
1899 with Sheikh Mubarak, Britain entered into a discussion on behalf of Al-Sabah
with Ibn Sa'ud concerning the settling of the frontier dispute between the two sides.
However, Ibn Sa'ud at that time refused to recognise or discuss the sovereignty of the
Sheikh of Kuwait as ruler of the area.
The al-'Uqair Convention
The British Political Resident in the Gulf, however, rejected Ibn Sa'ud's claim. This
led to the treaty of Muhammarah, which was signed in May 1922. This was the first
attempt to define approximate territorial limits in northern Arabia between Iraq, Najd
(Saudi Arabia) and Kuwait.75 On December 2 1922 as a consequence of the
Muhammarah treaty, Britain (on behalf of Sheikh of Kuwait) and Ibn Sa'ud
convened the al-Uqair conference, where a border agreement was reached known as
the al-'Uqair protocol. This settled the frontier dispute. Many sources indicate that
the Sheikh of Kuwait lost about two-thirds of the territory included within the British
(Green) line as the result of a compromise when Ibn Sa'ud claimed territory which
75. Kelly J.B. Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op.cit. p. 114.
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extended to the Sa'udi (Red line.) Some sources mention that Kuwait lost around
40% of her claimed territory to the expanding Sa'udi state during the 1920s.76
The Al-'Uqair protocol created for the first time in the Middle East what was
known as a Neutral Zone between Najd (Saudi Arabia) and Kuwait. This zone
consisted of some 2,500 square miles (6,500 sq. km) of desert with a coastline about
40 miles (64 km) long on the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. The al-'Uqair convention
defined the territory of the Neutral Zone as follows:
"The portion of territory bounded on the north by this line (i.e. "the
indisputable southern frontier ofKuwait") and which is bounded on the west by
a low mountainous ridge calledAsh Sharq, and on the east by the sea and on the
south by a line passing from west to east from Ash Sharq to Ayn al-Abd and
thence to the coast north ofRas al Mish'ab. In this territory the government of
Najd (Saudi Arabia) and Kuwait will share equal rights until through the good
offices of the government ofGreat Britain a further agreement is made between
Najd (Saudi Arabia) andKuwait concerning it."77
During the 1930s the Neutral Zone became very important following the discovery of
oil in southern Kuwait. Since 1953 oil production in the Zone has created strains and
stresses for workers and oil companies there. The area is jointly administered by
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and there are over 4,000 workers. There were accusations
by Kuwait that the Saudis treated the entire workforce as though they were under
Saudi law. After a Kuwaiti protest, Saudi Arabia proposed the creation of a proper
joint administration for the neutral Zone headed by a council of four persons from the
two countries. However, Kuwait refused the Saudi proposal.78
The Agreement of 1965
As a result of the administrative problems caused by the construction of oil
installations and the increased number of workers in the Zone in the late 1950s, both
76. Blake, Gerald "Shared Zones as a solution to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf States"
in: Schofield, Richard (ed.). Territorial Foundation of the GulfStates. UCL Press, London, 1994,
p. 202.
77. Day, Alan J. Border and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. pp. 251-252 see also Encyclopedia of
International Boundaries, op.cit. p. 346.
78. The Saudi-Kuwaiti (Neutral Zone) contains reserves currently estimated at 5 billion barrels. See.
Pike, David "Cross-border hydrocarbon " op.cit. p. 189 and see. Blake, Gerald, op.cit. p. 204.
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countries agreed, in 1960, to divide up the Neutral Zone area equally. On July 7 1965
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait signed an agreement in Jeddah to divide it into two
geographical areas, annexing them equally between the countries. The two parties
agreed for the Neutral Zone and its resources to be divided equally between them,
and established a Survey Committee for that purpose.
The two states agreed that a six Nautical Mile belt of sea should be annexed to
the respective parts of the Zone, and that the offshore boundary should also be fixed
by agreement. The 1965 agreement did not specify the territorial sea boundary
between the two states and in the meantime, the provision for joint exploitation of the
offshore areas applies.(for full text of the agreement see appendices pp.482 and 483).
The boundary question is still more complicated by the proximity of two
offshore oil fields, the first called Safaniya (on the Saudi Shelf) (possibly the largest
offshore oil field in the world) and Khafjl (lying offshore of the Neutral Zone).The
agreement was ratified by the two countries in Jeddah on July 25, 1965.79
The Islands ofQaru and Umm al-Maradim
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are still disputing the two islands known as Qaru and Umm
al-Maradim, situated some 16 miles (26 Km) off the coast of the northern part of the
Neutral Zone adjacent to the outer zone of Kuwaiti authority.
Lorimer in his book The Gazzatte of the Gulf, mentioned the two islands of
Qaru and Umm al-Maradim as maritime possessions of Kuwait. These two islands
were included in the fifth article of the Anglo-Turkish convention of 1913, in which
it is stated that these two islands, along with the other islands of Warbah, Bubiyan,
Mashjan, Failakah, Awhah and Kubr, belong to the Sheikh of Kuwait. The British
government (which was responsible for the conduct of Kuwait's international
relations until 1961) have always taken the view that the two islands do not pertain to
the Neutral Zone, because they were not subject to the dispute for the settlement of
79. Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf' in:
Johnston, Douglas M and Saunders, Phillip M. (eds.) Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues
and Developments. Croom Helm, London, 1988, p. 217. See Day, Alan op.cit. p. 251. and El-
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which the Neutral Zone was created under the above mentioned 'Uqair Convention
of 1922.80 Further, during the exchange of the border letters of 1923 and 1932
between Iraq and Kuwait it was stated that these islands belonged to Kuwait. Saudi
Arabia however claimed that the islands should be subject to co-sovereignty to reflect
the Saudi position in the Neutral Zone.
It should be noted that the median line between the Neutral Zone and Iran still
needs to be determined as well. The issue between the three parties appears to
revolve around the effect of various islands, including the island of Kharj (Iran ) and
the two islands ofQaru and Umm al-Maradim.81
No development took place during the 1960s and early of 1970s over the two
islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim. However in June 1977, Saudi Arabia, as a
result of the improving relations between Kuwait and the former Soviet Union,
appears to have forced the issue by occupying the two islands of Qaru and Umm al-
Maradim. The object of the Saudi action was to put pressure on the Kuwaiti
government to keep those Soviet advisors out of Kuwait who were brought in as a
result of the Kuwait-Soviet military agreement of 1976.82
The two countries of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are still in dispute with Iran
over the offshore boundary of the Neutral Zone. In 1966 the three countries, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran on the other, held negotiations to resolve this
Hakim, Ali A. The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea. Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1979, p. 108.
80. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
twentieth century" op.cit. p. 43 and the Encyclopedia of International Boundaries op.cit. p. 346,
and on a Kuwaiti offer to share income from oil production on the islands, see. El-Hakim, Ali A.
The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea. op.cit. pp. 109-110. On the Saudi refusal see
Day, Alan. Op.cit. p. 251.
81. Day, Alan, op.cit. p. 251. See also Gault, Ian Townsend. op.cit. p. 218 and Al-Baharna, Husain M.
The Arabian Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems.
op.cit. pp. 296-297.
82. Martin, Lenore G. The Unstable Gulf Threats From Within, op.cit. p. 53. In 1976 the Kuwaiti
government concluded a military agreement with the Soviet Union. The agreement included
Soviet advisors for training the local Kuwaiti forces in the use of the sophisticated equipment in
the £400 million arms package. See. Martin, Lenore G. op.cit. p. 54.
268
Chapter Five
dispute. But the three parties did not reach agreement, due to the existence of some
islands on both sides. 83
After the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait entered into
serious negotiations over the two disputed islands. But, until the present time the two
countries have not issued any official declaration about them. In March 1996 the
Kuwaiti foreign minister, Sheykh Sabah Al-Ahmad, announced that the issue of the
sea border demarcation with Saudi Arabia was physically accomplished but there
were still a few marginal processes to complete.84
83. El-Hakim, Ali A. op.cit. p. 111.
84 Al-Shuruq Magazine. Vol.21, No. 15-21 April 1996, Sharjah, UAE, p. 5 and see the Boundary and
Security Bulletin. Spring 1996. op.cit. p. 32
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The Bahrain and Qatar Border Disputes
Historical Background
Until the middle of the nineteenth century Bahrain included most of the Qatar
Peninsula. During the agreements concluded between Britain and the other
Sheikhdoms in the Gulf Area, Qatar was treated as a part of the Bahraini-British
agreement of 1820. The agreements concluded with Britain in 1866 by the Sheikh of
Qatar, Muhammed b. ThanI, the alliance with the Saudi Amir Faisal b. Turk! (of the
second Saudi state), and the request for protection from the Turks in 1871
contributed towards the protection of the Sheikh of Qatar from the threat posed by
Al-Khallfah of Bahrain. This was the first stage in the separation and independence
of Qatar from Bahrain. However, the Al-ThanI controlled the eastern coast of Qatar,
though they were not able to control the entire Qatar Peninsula, in particular the
northern coastal region of Zubarah, which was inhabited by tribes who were clients
of Al-Khalifah.85
The British stand on the Al-Khallfah claim to the Qatar Peninsula has moved,
since 1873, in favour of the Sheikh of Qatar, as Britain considered the Sheikh of
Bahrain to have no claim whatsoever to suzerainty of the Qatar Peninsula. The final
British decision came in the agreement signed in 1913 between Britain and Turkey,
which decided, in one article, that the Sheikh of Bahrain would not be allowed to get
involved in the internal affairs of Qatar. As a result of the Al-Khallfah claim over
Qatar, Britain subjected Qatar to her control through the 1916 agreement signed with
the Sheikh of Qatar. Since that time the British political resident in the Gulf has
attempted to draw the offshore boundary between the two sheikhs, but with no
success.86
85. Al-'AzamI, Walid HamdI. Tarslm al-Hudud Bayn al-Bahrayn wa-Qatar fi al-Watha'iq al-
Baritaniyyah. (Demarcation of Boundaries Betwen Bahrain and Qatar in British Archives ). Al-
hanl International Book, London, 1992, pp. 11-16.
86. Kelly, J.B. Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op.cit. pp. 111-113.
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The Dispute over Zubarah
Bahrain and Qatar have two long-standing territorial disputes. The first dispute
concerns the former Bahraini settlement of Zubarah, which lies on the north-western
coast of the Qatar peninsula. The second dispute involves the Hawar islands and
many small fashoot (small islands) like al-Dibel, al-'Azam and Jaradah.87
The dispute over the area of Zubarah constituted the first dispute between the
two families of Al-Khalifah of Bahrain and Al-ThanI of Qatar. The area of Zubarah
had been controlled by Al-Khalifah since 1766. The rulers of Bahrain have continued
to make demands and claims over Zubarah till the present time, and this dispute may
be considered the prime cause of differences between the two royal families.
Most of the tribes settled in the Zubarah area, especially the Na'im tribes,
entrusted their loyalty to al-Khallfah of Bahrain; the evidence of this is that the
Na'im tribes submitted their complaints to the ruler of Bahrain when the Sheikh of
Qatar built a customs post in the Zubarah region in 1937. During the same period
(the end of the thirties), the British political resident invited both sides to settle their
dispute. However, no amicable settlement was reached between the two Sheikhs. The
dispute over Zubarah resumed between the two sides when Bahrain rejected any
internal control by the Qatar sheikh of the tribes of Na'im, but the British political
resident proposed a suggestion which was agreed to by the sheikh of Bahrain. He
agreed to not make any demands over any oil discovered in the Zubarah area if the
sheikh of Qatar would agree not to get involved in the affairs of the Na'im tribes,
who were his subjects. But there was no official agreement signed between the two
parties. In 1953, the Zubarah issue entered a new phase when the British Political
Resident abandoned hope of reaching a compromise to resolve the issue and left it in
87. Martin, Lenore G. The Unstable Gulf Threat from Within, op.cit. p. 62. This group of islands
consist of a large island, length 11 miles and width 2 miles, with a surface area of approximately
17 square miles, and a number of smaller rocky islands surrounding it. There are two villages on
Hawar island, one in the north and the other in the south, consisting of some twenty houses made
of stone, whose inhabitants depend on rain water or during drought, water brought by boat from
Bahrain. Most of the inhabitants are from the tribes which settled in Bahrain.The former rulers of
Bahrain were accustomed to visit the Hawar islands every year. All disputes between the islanders
are subject to the jurisdiction of Bahrain. Al-'AzamI, Walld H op.cit. pp. 43-44.
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the hands of the disputing countries. The situation continues to be unsettled between
the two countries until the present time.
The rulers of Qatar (Al-ThanI) did not assert any sovereignty over the Zubarah
area until 1937, when they did so despite the protest of the al-Khalifah of Bahrain
who maintained their rights to the area of Zubarah, because it was their ancestral
home- land and the al-Na'im tribes had paid allegiance to them.88
The Dispute over the Hawar Islands
The second dispute between Bahrain and Qatar is over the Hawar islands (which lie
one kilometre off the Qatari coast and 12 kilometres from the Bahraini coast). The
dispute became prominent during the period of oil discovery in the Arabian Gulf. In
1938, the sheikh of Bahrain granted an oil concession on these islands to a British oil
company, but the sheikh of Qatar rejected the Bahraini concession and claimed that
the Hawar islands were subject to Qatari sovereignty. Britain, in her attempts to
please the sheikh of Bahrain and as a compensation for the Zubarah area, granted the
Hawar islands to him.
Most of the British documents, especially the letters of the British political
agent in Bahrain, indicate that the Hawar islands fell under the sovereignty of
Bahrain. The most important recognition was the letter which was dispatched in 1939
to the two sheikhs of Bahrain and Qatar confirming that, having considered the
claim, the British government had decided that the Hawar islands belonged to
Bahrain and not to Qatar. 89
88.A1-A'zami, Walid H op.cit. p. 38.
89. Day, Alan J. Border and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. p. 228.
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The Dispute after the British Withdrawal
When the British controlled the area of the Gulf and acted as protector to both these
Sheykhdoms, no action was taken by either side. Since the British withdrawal from
the Gulf region in the early 1970s, followed by the independence of Qatar and
Bahrain, the two sides accepted Saudi mediation.
During the early 1970s, Qatar attempted to settle amicably the issue of the
Hawar islands while retaining the historical rights. Bahrain, however, upheld the
British decision and asserted its right over these islands.90 Bahrain and Qatar's
disputes over the Hawar islands and the Zubarah area was the main cause for the
collapse of the Union ofNine in 1971 between the seven sheikhdoms of the Trucial
States, Qatar and Bahrain. The historical rift between the two sides, owing to
territorial, tribal and dynastic disputes, spilled over into their attitudes and behaviour
towards each other during the federation negotiations at the end of the sixties and
early seventies.91
The political development of the dispute became more intensive after the
British withdrawal from the Gulf region in the early 1970s. Both Qatar and Bahrain
tried to open a new chapter in their relations in order to find a solution for the
disputed islands. The Qatari government suggested to the government of Bahrain to
construct an island in Bahraini regional waters opposite the concession to Hawar
island, which is claimed by Doha. The Qatari government also suggested forming an
economic co-operation agreement in the field of oil discovery within the disputed
regions along with the right of sovereignty for each country to reach a complete and
final agreement governed by the provisions of international law. Qatar also suggested
to Bahrain that they construct a bridge connecting the two countries.92
90. Day, Alan J. op.cit. p. 230.
91. Khalifah, Ali Mohammed. The UnitedArab Emirates. Croom Helm, London, 1979, p. 34.
92. Abu- al-Fazal, Muhammad "Mushkilat al-Hudud al-Ma'iyyah Bayn Qatar wa al-Bahrayn" Al-




Saudi mediation tried to freeze the dispute until 1978 when the two countries agreed
to a set of principles proposed by Saudi Arabia to guide relations between them until
a final solution could found. Both sides undertook (1) to refrain from any action
which would strengthen their respective legal positions, weaken the position of the
other party or change the status quo in the disputed area; and (2) to refrain from any
action which would block negotiations between them or harm the brotherly
atmosphere necessary to achieve the aim of the negotiations.93
Saudi Arabia, also in 1980, mediated between the two countries in order to
prevent the dispute from worsening and asked officials in the two countries not to
allow the media to exacerbate the situation. Saudi mediation, since the early 1970s,
has hardly helped to resolve the dispute between Bahrain and Qatar. 94
Dispute and Escalation
In March 1980 the government of Bahrain declared that the Hawar islands were
governed by a concession agreed between Bahrain and a group of United States
companies who were planning to drill a new experimental well in search of oil. Qatar
rejected the Bahraini action and claimed, in the same month in 1980, that "all these
islands constitute an indivisible part of Qatar, since they are situated within its
territorial waters". The Qatari government added that Bahrain had nothing to support
its claim of sovereignty over these islands except the British decision made in 1939,
which Qatar considered "null and void" as it contradicted "the basic norms of
international law governing such matters" and also "the established geographical,
material and historical facts."95
93. Day, Alan J. op.cit. p. 230.
94. Schofield, Richard "Border and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
Twentieth Century" op.cit. p. 48.
95. Day, Alan J. op.cit. p. 230.
275
Chapter Five
The issue of Qatar and Bahrain's offshore dispute was further complicated
when the sheikh of Bahrain claimed rights in the Zubarah area, on March 4 1982.
The Qatar government condemned and protested against Bahrain's decision to name
a new warship the Hawar and condemned Bahraini military manoeuvres in the Fasht
al-Dibel.96 The Qatari-Bahraini offshore dispute was the first challenge to the GCC,
which had been established one year before. The GCC Ministerial council, held in
Riyadh on March 7-9 1982, requested that Saudi Arabia continue her efforts to
resolve the dispute. According to a statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting,
both sides agreed "to freeze the situation and not to cause an escalation of the
dispute" and to continue their fraternal relations on the basis of a return to the status
quo ante.91
Qatar captures Fisht al-Dibel
In October 1984, Bahrain declared its intention of surveying the area of the Fisht al-
Dibel and al-'Azam in order to build a new settlement containing up to 70,000
people. But when Qatar protested, Bahrain suspended her survey. The situation
between the two parties became complex when the government of Bahrain also
announced that it would keep the area of Fisht al-Dibel, which lies 20km from Qatar
and 25km from and the Hawar islands for military exercises, thus permanently
prohibiting any settlement in this area.
The dispute did not appear in the media headlines until 16 April 1986 when a
Qatari force captured Fisht al-Dibel (up until this point dominated by Bahrain) and
arrested 30 contractors from a Dutch company (most of them Asian workers) who
were engaged in the construction of a Bahraini "coast-guard station". Bahrain
condemned the Qatari operation and strengthened its military garrison on the Hawar
islands. The government of Qatar then declared all the area of Fisht al-Dibel, Jaradah
96. Al-Nufaysl, 'Abdullah Fahd. op.cit. p. 47.
97. Schofield, Richard, op.cit. p. 48.
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and the Hawar islands to be military zones and mobilized her considerably superior
firepower.98
The GCC Role in the Dispute
After tension between the two sides during the incident of April 1986, the GCC
attempted to contain the dispute and Saudi Arabia began her intermediary role,
whereby she managed to convene a meeting between the foreign ministers of Bahrain
and Qatar in May 1986. Saudi Arabia submitted a plan of action which consisted of
the following:
1) to return to the position prior to 26 April 1986.
2) to undertake not to resort to the use of military force so long as they endeavoured
to reach an amicable settlement.
3) to create a team to supervise and monitor the military withdrawal to the previous
situation.
4) to scrutinise all border disputes between the parties in respect of law and history
and to submit all such documents which would contribute towards the improvement
of the disputes between the parties in respect of law and history.
As a result of this accord between the two parties, Qatar withdrew her military
force on 15 June 1986. The GCC had set up a monitoring team to ensure that the two
sides implemented the accord. The accord, which was signed by the two foreign
ministers of Bahrain and Qatar, included also that only Bahraini fishermen and coast¬
guards were allowed to enter the Fisht al-Dibel and Hawar islands, so that there
would be no change in the status quo in the islands.99
Saudi Arabia acted as a mediator, but following the May 1986 accord between
Qatar and Bahrain, took no more steps to settle the dispute between the two
countries. The Sultanate of Oman, the UAE and Kuwait attempted, individually, to
mediate between the two countries, however without result. During the second Gulf
98. Al-'Azami, Walld Hamdi. op.cit. p. 18.
99. Abu-al-Fazel, Muhammad "al-Niza' bayn Qatar wa al-Bahrayn" in: Harb, Usamah Ghazall (ed.)
al-Sivasah al-Duwaliwah. (International Politics) Issue No. Ill, Cairo, January, 1993, p. 229.
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crisis, relations between Doha and Manamah continued to be tense, such that both
sides clung to their rights over the islands. Once again Saudi Arabia attempted to
bring together the foreign ministers of Bahrain and Qatar on 25 December 1990.
Both sides agreed on the following principles:
1) to continue the Saudi initiative, so that both parties would begin to bring the
matter to the International Court of Justice, according to the Bahraini formula,
which was accepted by Qatar.
2) to confirm what had been reached in the previous accord.
3) to withdraw the case from the arbitrator if the matter proved impossible to settle
on the basis ofmutual brotherhood. 100
Following the incident with Saudi Arabia in September 1992, Qatar preferred
Saudi Arabia not to be the mediator in the dispute with Bahrain over the Hawar
islands. Qatari officials saw the balance of the Saudi mediation as being against them
and closer to Bahrain. After the failure of the Saudi mediation, Qatar tried to get out
of the conflict. She announced unilaterally on 8 July 1991 that she had submitted a
request to the International Court of Justice to decide on the sovereignty of all
disputed areas with Bahrain. However, Bahrain expressed her disapproval of the
Qatari unilateral decision and emphasised the need for a mutual decision between the
two countries. 101
As a result of the Hawar islands dispute with Bahrain, Qatar issued a decree on
16 April 1992, extending her territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and claiming a
further adjacent area of 12 miles outside that, over which the state would exercise all
the rights provided for in the provisions of international law. 102
100. The Saudi mediation, in this case from 1971 to the turn of the 1990s, was successful on two
counts: ensuring that the disagreement never developed into open hostilities and paving the way
for a referral of the case to the international courts. Schofield, Richard "Mending Gulf Fences"
Middle East Insight. Vol. XII. No.3. March/April 1996. p. 40 and Abu-al-Fazal, Muhammad.
op.cit. p. 230.
101. Al-Naimi, Abd al-Rahman M "Border Conflicts and American Machinations" op.cit. p. 24.
102. Schofield, Richard, op.cit. p. 49. See also MEES. Vol.XXXV No.30. 27 April, 1992, p. A7. The
Qatari decree asserts control over much of the disputed area, particularly the Hawar Islands as
well as the two coral reefs of Fisht al-Dibel and Qit'at Jaradah.
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On 17 April 1992, Bahrain issued a decree rejecting all Qatari claims and
demanded that they stick to resolving the dispute through the effort of the Saudi
mediators and, in the meantime, demanded joint submission of the case to the
International Court of Justice. 103
During the Hawar islands crisis of 1986, Bahraini officials launched a
campaign against Qatari sovereignty in the Zubarah area and renewed the Bahraini
royal family's allegations that Zubarah was a part of Al-Khallfah sovereignty. The
Bahraini strategy was to pressurise Qatar to confirm Bahrain's sovereignty over the
Hawar islands. 104
International Arbitration
The dispute between Qatar and Bahrain became international on 8 July 1991, when
Qatar submitted an application to the International Court of Justice claiming its
sovereignty over the disputed areas. Bahrain objected to this action and thus
demonstrated the necessity of the two countries submitting a joint application.
The International Court of Justice agreed on a hearing for the case after six
Judges approved and four Judges objected to a resolution. Qatar and Bahrain have
different perspectives on the border dispute. Qatar believes the following:
a). Qatar should have sovereignty over the islands of Hawar, Fisht al-Dibel and
Jaradah.
103. Al-'AzamI, Walld Hamdi. op.cit. p. 14. A Foreign Minister spokesman in Manama said that his
government "totally rejects what is implied in the decree about extending the territorial waters of
the state of Qatar, "and that Bahrain reserves the right to take any legal measures which are
necessary to preserve its rights". The Amir of Bahrain sent a cable to President George Bush on
22 April 1992, proposing that both parties take the issue to the ICJ for adjudication and thanking
the US President for his "positive" stand. See. MEES. Vol.XXXV. No.30. op.cit. p. A8. One year
after the Qatari decree, the Crown Prince of Bahrain issued a decree on 20 April 1993, defining
the Bahraini territorial waters at 12 nautical miles and an adjacent area of another 12 nautical
miles over which Bahrain would exercise its rights to sovereignty and authority as prescribed in
contemporary international law. See. MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.32. 10 May 1993. p. A13.
104. Litwak, Robert. Security in the Persian Gulf2: Source of inter-State conflict. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower Publishing Company Limited, England, 19481, p. 49.
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b) The division line must pass at an equal distance from her territories and Bahrain's.
(c)The arbitration of the disputed islands must be carried out only by the International
Court of Justice.
e)There must be successful mediation before withdrawing the case from the
International Court of Justice.
The point of view of Bahrain includes the following:
a) Rejection of Doha's claims on the three islands based on their geographic
location close to Qatar. Some islands are near one country but are subject to the
sovereignty of another, as in the case of Turkey and Greece.
b) Britain, as the mandatory power, codified the policy regarding the borders, a
matter which emphasises her actual ownership of the three islands.
c) The discussion of the problem by the International Court of Justice should
concentrate on the water line and marine borders between the two countries,
considering the historical existence of Bahrain in the Zubarah area.
d) The case should first be withdrawn and then solved within the GCC States.
Political Developments of the Dispute
Since the second Gulf War of 1991, mass-media campaigns have aggravated the
tension between the two countries, a matter which has hindered mediation. Generally,
the border dispute between Qatar and Bahrain has started to have a negative impact
on the area, particularly within the GCC.
The government of Bahrain boycotted all the GCC meetings held in Doha in
1996. There was no precedent for such an action in the history of the Council. It
came in response to what it called the Qatari provocations against Bahrain. The
absence of Bahrain from the Doha summit in 1996 was explained by the Bahraini
Information Minister, who said:
The Gulf Summit in Doha was due to certain reasons mainly the
resentment ofBahrain towards the aggravation of the dispute between Bahrain
"Bahrain usually does not practice this type ofpressure, but we claim our right
clearly and ask for the activation of the Gulf Co-operation Council role in
resolving such problems between the member states and that our problems
should be resolved within the Gulf brotherhood only the absence ofBahrain
from the and Qatar without any decisive action on the part of the Gulf Co¬
operation Council to solve it and without any activation of the Co-operation
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Council mechanism or systems to find a radical solution for such a dispute
amicably.
Due to the aggravated relations between Qatar and Bahrain, there were series of
events and mass-media campaigns between Doha and al-Manamah in 1996. The
Bahraini media launched a campaign against Qatar before the holding of the Gulf
Summit, which was held in Qatar in December 1996. Bahrain officially declared the
arrest of two Qataris in Manamah and accused them of spying, and started
proceedings against them.
On 11 December 1996 Qatar accused Bahrain and her Crown Prince, Hamad b.
'Isa al-Khallfah, of being involved in an abortive coup d'etat attempt in Doha in
February 1996, as well as the smuggling of arms and explosives into Qatar. Relations
deteriorated when Bahrain declared the arrest of a similar group of Qataris at the
beginning of 1987; therefore Qatar made similar accusations against Bahrain for the
first time. After issuing a condemnation for spying in December 1996, Bahrain issued
a general amnesty to reduce the tension with Qatar, but this initiative collapsed after
the escape of one of the Bahraini ruling family members with a fighter plane to Qatar
asking for political asylum. 105
The Bahraini situation changed when it accepted on 30 September 1996 the
arbitration of the International Court of Justice, and submitted a motion including its
evidence and documents of dispute, for the judgement of the International Court of
Justice on 1 February 1996.
On the 2 October 1996 the International Court of Justice declared 31 December
1997 to be a date on which the written responses to motions submitted by Qatar and
Bahrain would be given. 106 It is of note that the border dispute between Qatar and
Bahrain was the first in the Gulf area to be submitted to the International Court of
Justice. These serious precedents in relations between the GCC States aggravated the
105. Salman, Muhammad "Al- Taqnm al-Mu'assasi lil-Khilafat al-'Arabiyyah" Taqdirat Istratiivah.
Issue No.43. January 1997, Cairo, p. 31.
106. Salim, 'Alia "Al-niza' al-Hududl al-Qatari-al-Bahraynl Hal Tusahlm al-Tatawwurat al-Akhirah




dispute between Qatar and Bahrain to such an extent that the dispute represented a
substantial threat to the existing political systems in the Arab Gulf States. 107
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The Omani-United Arab Emirates Border Disputes
Political Description of the Dispute
The Border dispute between the Sultanate ofOman and the confederation of the UAE
is the most difficult and complicated one in the Arabian Peninsula due to the
boundary overlaps between the frontiers of the Emirates and the Sultanate. These
boundaries extend from the Musandam area, which overlooks the Strait ofHormuz in
the north ofOman and is separated from the rest of Oman by a part of the UAE up to
the al-Buraimi area in the west. This area (al-Buraimi) witnessed the most serious
political border dispute during the fifties and sixties between Britain (on behalf of
Muscat and Abu Dhabi) and Saudi Arabia (with the support of the United States) 108
The border question between the two parties has a historical and geographical aspect.
Oman is a state with historical and geographical claims on what was called until
recently the Coast ofOman or the Trucial States.
Many Nationalist Arab Parties, either in Oman or in the other Arab countries,
believe that what was called the Oman Coast Emirates, before the seventies, and
what is now called the United Arab Emirates, is a natural extension of Omani
territory, both geographically and historically. The separation of these Emirates from
the mother country was due to British imperialism in the nineteenth century, which
aimed to divide up the Omani Empire.
Riyadh al-Reyyes, in his article Oman's rule in the GCC and the Region.
claims that all the states which now form the components of the UAE (considered by
many Omanis to be an artificial state created out of political convenience) had, before
independence, the word 'Omani' describing the nationality of their citizens, in every
passport issued. Al-Reyyes adds that Oman watches carefully over developments in
108. The boundary between the two countries is divided into two sections. One crosses the Musandam
Peninsula from the Arabian (Persian) Gulf to the Gulf of Oman while the other, forming the
western border of mainland Oman, extends from the Gulf of Oman some 10 miles (16-km) south
of Kelba to the boundary tripoint with Saudi Arabia at Umm az Zamul. There are also enclaves of
the Sultanate within the UAE, and of the UAE within Oman. See The Encyclopedia of
International Boundaries, op.cit. p.413 and also Al-Na'Iml, 'Abd al-Rahman. Al-Sira' fi al-
Khalij al- 'ArabI. op.cit. p. 164.
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the UAE in the same way that Syria watches over affairs in Lebanon, particularly in
the matter of security. 109
The ability of Oman to pursue her territorial claims against the UAE has been
conditioned by the complex interplay between the internal and external political
environment especially from Saudi Arabia and Iran. The royal family of Al-Sa'Id in
Oman, which rose to power in 1749, has the desire to join the Omani Trucial States
to the motherland ofOman under the flag of 'Greater Oman'. 110
British Mission in Oman and the Trucial States
The delimitation of the border dispute between Oman and the UAE started in the
early 1950s, when the British government appointed Julian Walker to investigate the
various boundaries between the Trucial States (Sheikhdoms) on one side and
between the Trucial States and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman on the other side.
Oman was split into three parts by the territories of the Trucial States. The routes
between Sultanate territory in Buraimi and Muscat, and from Buraimi to 'Ibri, ran
across land belonging to Abu Dhabi and the Peninsula of Musandam, which are
divided from the rest of Oman. The political borders between the two countries are
divided into many geographical regions both offshore and onshore:
1. the borders between Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate;
2. the borders of the Sultanate with Dubai and Ajman Emirates;
3. the borders ofOman (in the Musandam Peninsula) with the northern Emirates;
4. the borders ofWadi Madha region;
5. the borders of the Sultanate ofOman with the Qawasim in the south. 111
109. El-Reyyes, Riyad N. "Oman's Rule in the GCC and the Region" op.cit. p. 205.
110. Litwak, Robert, op.cit. p. 60.
111. Walker, Julian. "The United Arab Emirates and Oman Frontiers" op.cit. pp.179-182, and Hay,
Sir Rupert. "The Persian Gulf States and their Boundaries Problems" in: The Geographical
Journal. Vol. CXX. January to October. London, 1954, p. 438. For UAE details see Al-Alkim,
Hasan H. The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, op.cit. p. xix. For more details of the
285
Chapter Five
The borders between Oman and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi represent the
larger part of the eastern borders of the UAE with Oman, being about 300km in
length. At the beginning of the fifties, especially after the international arbitration
process regarding the al-Buraimi case, which was discussed at the beginning of this
chapter, oil companies were very active both in Oman and the Trucial States,
especially in Abu Dhabi. This led to more complications concerning the claims of
each party over the borders and loyalty of the tribes.
In 1959 (as the result of British mediation) Sultan Sa'Id b. Taymur of Muscat
and Oman and Sheykh Shakhbut b. Sultan of Abu Dhabi agreed on a settlement of
the borders and signed the 1959 convention. This convention was based on the fact
that the Na'im, Shawamis, and Ban! Qattab tribes belong to the Sultanate of Muscat
and Oman. Thus the border line between the two parties starts to the north of the al-
Buraimi Oasis west of Simini mountain, extends to the south, and is separated by the
Bani Ka'ab tribe from the BanI Qatab and al-Dhwaher tribes; this line passes
between the two Jeefar wells, the east well belonging to the Bani Ka'ab and the west
to al-Dhwaher. In the al-Buraimi area the line runs between the al-Dhwaher tribe in
Abu Dhabi and the al-Na'Im and al-Shawamis in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.
To the south of al-Buraimi, the line separates the al-'Awamir tribe from the al-
Shawamis tribe, and also separates the al-Duru ' and al-'Awamir tribes. 112
During the mid-1960s, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Sheykh of
Sharjah were able to reconcile their territorial grievances.
A neutral zone was defined between Oman and Sharjah west of the Hajr
mountains, and a second along the Wadi Hadf to solve a 'Ajman-Oman dispute that
had hitherto proved incapable of settlement. 113
Another enclave problem between Oman and the UAE concerns the village of
Diba. The disputed area of Diba is located at the juncture ofOman's boundaries with
Omani-UAE's tripoints and lines boundaries, see. The Encyclopedia ofInternational Boundaries.
op.cit. pp. 413-414.
112. Abdullah, Muhammed M. Dawlat al-lmarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttahidah wa-Jiranuha. Dar al-
Qalam, Kuwayt, 1981, pp. 417-418, and Hay, Sir Rupert op.cit. p. 438.
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the Emirates of Fujairah and al-Sharjah. Historically the area was inhabited by tribes
who paid allegiance to the Sultanate ofMuscat. However, during the early 1970s, the
people of this area became affected by the prosperity brought about by the
development policies of each state. At the same time there was an absence of
development in Omani-administrated territories in the area strongly contrasting with
the efforts made by the other two states, Fujairah and Sharjah, to improve the
conditions in their parts of the disputed area. 114
The Dispute of 1977
Both Oman and the UAE tried to buy the loyalties of the border tribes in order to
further their territorial claims. Between 1966 and 1974 Abu Dhabi offered Oman
several hundred million dollars in direct assistance and offered the sultan of Oman
millions more to help secure the allegiance of the Shihuh and Habus tribes in
Oman's Musandam region as well as in Diba.115 The most important disputed area
between Oman and the UAE was between Oman and the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah.
The disputed area of 1977 centred on a 10-mile coastal strip in the border area
separating the Omani enclave of Ras Musandam from the Emirate of Ras al-
Khaimah. 116
This dispute was a result of the long struggle between the Qawasim and the
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman during the nineteenth century. The area of Rus al-
Jibal (Musandam) forms the northern tip of the promontory of the Trucial States,
defined to the south-west by an approximate line between Diba on the Gulf of Oman
and the headland of al-Qir, north of Sha'am on the Gulf. It is inhabited mainly by
113. Schofield, Richard. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
Twentieth Century" op.cit. p. 28.
114. J.C. Wilkinson, "The Oman Question" The Background to the Political Geography of South-East
Arabia" Geographical Journal. Vol. 137, part 3, September 1971, p. 361.
115. Cordesman, Anthony H. op.cit. p. 109.
116 Murad, Nasrin Abdul Rahman . Territorial Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Ph.D. Thesis.
Department of Politics, University of Lancaster, 1990, p. 101.
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Shihuh and Dhwaher tribes who pay allegiance to the Sultanate of Muscat and
Oman. 117
Developments in the disputed area became more critical in December 1977
when Sultan Qaboos sent a letter to Sheykh Zayed, the President of the UAE,
complaining that Ras al-Khaimah was drilling for oil in areas which it considered as
part of its territory. The dispute over the 10-mile coastal strip led to a complex
situation, with an escalation of tension when the troops of the two countries moved to
the disputed area. Unconfirmed reports claimed that the armed confrontation between
the two parties ended like a "comic opera". According to Cordesman, this was
because a large number of Omanis in the Ras al-Khaimah forces refused to fight
Oman's forces. 118
In the early 1970s, Oman did not take part in any action in the disputed areas
with the UAE. The reason for this was that the UAE, especially Abu Dhabi, was the
main source of financial assistance to the government of Oman in its war with the
Dhofari revolutionaries. However, after the Dhofar revolution subsided in December
1975, the Government of Oman was in a better position to direct its attention to the
north. During 1978, Oman threatened to expand her claims on the Musandam borders
issue with the UAE and include the larger area within the historical "Greater Oman".
She also took some actions which indicated that she would revive her claim over the
al-Buraimi area. In January 1978 she put into circulation a memorial coin bearing a
picture of the Sultan's old palace at the al-Buraimi Oasis. Later that year it was
reported that Oman had massed 300 mechanised military vehicles in the vicinity of
al-Buraimi. 119
117 Abdullah, Muhammed M. op.cit. p. 296.
118. Cordesman, Anthony H. op.cit. p. 418.













The Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah resisted Omani pressure by obtaining support from
Kuwait (it should be noted that during that time, relations between Oman and Kuwait
were poor because of the security situation in the Gulf), who backed her plan to
establish an oil refinery in the disputed area. 120 The Soviet Union became involved
and declared her support for Ras al-Khaimah against Oman in 1978, presumably
because of Oman's western orientation and also her establishment of diplomatic
relations with Peking. 121
The Mediation of Sheykh Zayed
In an attempt to contain and settle the disputed area peacefully, Sheykh Zayed b.
Sultan, the President of the UAE, flew to Muscat on 29 December 1977. After this,
three high-ranking UAE delegations visited Oman in April 1978 and held talks with
Sultan Qaboos of Oman over the area disputed with Ras al-Khaimah.
On 7 April 1979 the Emirates News Agency, citing a responsible source in the
office of the UAE Prime Minister, said that Oman and Ras al-Khaimah had agreed to
'adopt specific bases in the demarcation of the border between the two sides. Sheykh
Zayed b. Sultan played a significant role in resolving the dispute .122
The outbreak of the Iranian revolution had accelerated the attempts of the two
parties to settle the problem. Thus the Iranian threat had pushed the two countries
into a new alignment. 123 During the talks between the Omani and UAE delegations,
Oman mentioned that the disputed area was populated by the Shihuh and Habus
tribes and had been administrated by Oman for centuries. Moreover, the Omani
government accused Sheykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah of having initiated the process
of territorial encroachment in 1951, when he occupied the village of Rims. In order to
120. Murad, Nasrin A. op.cit. p. 107.
121. Chubin, Shahram, "Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf' Adelphi Papers. No.157, IISS,
London, Spring 1980, P. 38.
122. Al-Alkim, Hasan H. The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, op.cit. p.50, and see
Schofield, Richard. Arabian Boundary Disputes. Vol. 19. op.cit. p. 53
123. Martin, Lenore. op.cit. p. 62.
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bolster their contending territorial claims, both Oman and the UAE sought to obtain
some pledge of allegiance from the local people, and it was reported that, in 1975,
some of the Shihuh and Habus accepted an offer of citizenship from Ras al-
Khaimah.124
Sheykh Saqr b. Sultan of Ras al-Khaimah, in an interview, claimed that:
1 am really surprised that Qaboos lays claim to this area and its oil when
it is 17 km away from the Omani motherland. They are undoubtedly mistaken.
We have documents signed by Qaboos's grandfather which show that the Omani
nationalfrontier ends at North Khassab.
However, Sheykh Saqr b. Sultan was not satisfied with the settlement which was
reached through the pressure of the federation government ofUAE.
The dispute has been quiet since the mediation of 1978. Nothing specific has
been reported during recent years. Some official sources in the two countries claim
that the process of demarcating the boundaries is making progress, but nothing
official has been released yet. 125
Some Gulf affairs specialists believe that the government of Oman, particularly
the ruling family of al-Sa'Id, wishes to annex the Emirates to the Sultanate of Oman
under the so-called "Greater Oman plan" but in secret, in order to avoid provoking
either Iran or Saudi Arabia, the two big powers in the region. These specialists offer,
as proof of this the fact, that the Sultanate of Oman has not established any
diplomatic relations with Abu Dhabi since the creation of the federation in December
1972, despite the persistent demands by the UAE government for the establishment
of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Since the creation of the UAE, Oman has refused to recognise the union at any
official diplomatic level. The UAE is represented by a Consul in Muscat but Oman
has no diplomatic representation in Abu Dhabi. The two countries did not establish
full diplomatic relations until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when they agreed
to establish official diplomatic relations. The diplomatic representation between the
124. Litwak, Robert, op.cit. p. 59. Also see. Murad, Nasrin A. op.cit. p. 109.
125. Murad, Nasrin A. op.cit. p. 108.
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Sultanate of Oman and the UAE was at the level of Minister and not at the level of
Ambassador; this was due to the demand of Oman for that level. 126
In May 1991 the two countries set up a joint high committee to discuss bilateral
issues including the border dispute. The Omani government's policy towards the
border disputes with the UAE has been to discuss the issues of the borders
individually with every Emirate. On 9 April 1993, the Omani foreign minister issued
a statement declaring that "the frontier disputes between Oman and the UAE are
completely settled, following the signature of a lasting agreement between the two
states". 127 ( Until the end of 1996, the two countries had not mentioned a formal
frontier demarcation agreement over the 410-km boundary).
The most important political evolution came in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990. This was the fear that the border problems felt by the GCC
States would escalate. For example the UAE feared that the Sultanate of Oman, a
member of the GCC, might take steps to invade parts of the UAE territories
particularly in the northern areas which border with Musandam, where tribal
problems occur frequently between the inhabitants of the Omani area and those of the
northern Emirates. The fears of the UAE became clear when they demanded that the
Egyptian and Syrian governments station some of their armed forces on the Emirates
borders with the Sultanate of Oman. Some sources mention that the British
government mediated between Oman and the UAE to calm the situation, especially
after Oman denounced the steps taken by the government of the UAE. We should
note that after Egyptian forces were stationed on the Omani-UAE border, Omani-
Egyptian relations cooled distinctly. Some of the mass media mentioned that the
Egyptian President was paid to visit Muscat in 1990 after it was rumoured that the
126. El-Reyyes, Riyad N "Oman Rule in the GCC and the Region" op.cit. p. 205. Al-Na'imi, 'Abd al-
Rahman M. op.cit. p. 168.
127. Schofield, Richard. "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
Twentieth Century" op.cit. pp. 56-57. Although there is an official agreement delineating the
complex borders, armed clashes between tribesmen of both countries have frequently occurred.
These arose because various UAE nationals have sought to gain oil concessions in territory
claimed by Oman. Military forces have been deployed on many occasions to support the Omani
claims. Between 1992 and 1994 the disputed areas in Musandam witnessed many armed clashes
between Omani and UAE tribesmen. On 11 November 1992, the armed clashes resulted in the
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Omani government, which has good relations with Egypt, had criticised the Egyptian
government for this step. 128
It should be recorded that the government of the Sultanate of Oman still
reminds the rulers of the UAE that the UAE was once a part of Greater Oman,
especially after the discovery of oil in the UAE in several locations. The two
countries have not arrived any formal agreement concerning their disputes over the
offshore and Continental Shelf boundaries. 129
Regarding the reasons that hindered the signature of a global border agreement
between Oman and the UAE, the Omani Minister of Information said that Oman and
the UAE have taken advanced steps to reach this, while the special historical
background and the overlapping of the regions played a large part in delaying it. Most
of the border regions between Oman and the UAE, with the exception of Sharjah,
were on the point of reaching a global border agreement; the Minister stated that Abu
Dhabi was about to sign a border agreement with Oman, and that there were no
political obstacles between the two countries. He explained, however, that there were
some social obstacles between the tribes that live along the borders. Finally he
confirmed that his aim was to reach a border agreement and have tighter relations and
not create ruptures. 130.
Hassan Al-'Alkim summarised the main reasons for that as follows: 1) The
border problems between the two countries are complicated because of the
geographical overlapping and tribal alliances on who the loyalties both countries
depend. 2) The border problem between the two countries sometimes involves other
neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia. 3) The federal nature of the UAE
prohibits the signature of any border agreement regarding any Emirate with another
deaths of at least six persons from both sides. See Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan. The GCC States in
an Unstable World Foreign-Policy Dilemmas ofSmall States, op.cit. p. 84.
128. Al-Na'imI, 'Abd al-Rahman M. op.cit. p. 168.
129. Al-Anzi, Abdullah M. op.cit. p. 34, and El-Hakim, Ali A. The Middle Eastern States and the Law
of the Sea. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1979, p. 105.
130 Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Rawas. op.cit.
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country without the consent of the concerned Emirate, a matter which hinders Federal
Union initiatives in any negotiations. 131
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■Chapter Six
The GCC External Boundaries Disputes
The Saudi-Iraqi Border Disputes
Introduction
After the British recognition of Ibn Sa'ud as ruler of Najd and Hasa under the 1915
treaty of al-Qatif, he sought to take control of Ha'il from Ibn al-Rashid. Thus in
1921-1922 Ha'il came under the control of Ibn Sa'ud following the defeat of the pro-
Ottoman Al-Rashid in Jabal Shammar by the Ikhwan (brotherhood) of Ibn Sa'ud.
That spread the Saudi area of control right up to the borders of Transjordan and Iraq
in the north of Najd. Ibn Sa'ud's expansion north of Najd, following the collapse of
Ottoman authority in those areas after their defeat in the First World War, was a
result of the competition between Ibn Sa'ud and the Hashemites of Iraq. Furthermore,
there were no defined borders in the desert territories between Najd and Iraq.l
The British Role in the Demarcation
The Iraqi-Saudi border was drawn during the British control over Iraq. The British
influence over Iraqi affairs came about through a League ofNations mandate after the
First World War. The raids and attacks of the Ikhwan of Ibn Sa'ud on the border
areas of Najd and Iraq forced the British authorities to start negotiations with Ibn
Sa'ud in order to resolve the problems between the tribes of the region. On May 5
1922 the then British High Commissioner for Iraq, Maj-Gen. Sir Percy Cox, was able
to conclude an agreement at al-Muhammarah (Khorramshahr of today) with Ibn
Sa'ud.2 However, this agreement did not define the boundary between Iraq and Najd.
1. Kelly, J.B. Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op.cit. pp. 112-113 and the Encyclopedia of International
Boundaries, op.cit. p. 307.
2. Finnie, David H. Shifting Lines in the Sand Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq. Tauris and Co
Ltd. London, 1992 pp. 57-61. The Treaty of Muhammara did not resolve the entire problem of the
boundary dispute because of Ibn Saud's suspicions of British intentions. The negotiations were
difficult because international boundaries had never existed in Arabia; the British officials dealt
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The only thing achieved was the division of the loyalties of the border tribes between
the two sides. Ibn Sa'ud, later in the same year, refused to ratify the agreement unless
the other side agreed to the condition that the wells and watering places near the
frontiers would not be used for military purposes and that the Najdi tribes would not
be refused access to watering places on the Iraqi side of the border.3
The Al-Uqair Protocol
After accepting Ibn Sa'ud's conditions, the British High Commissioner for Iraq
entered into new negotiations with Ibn Sa'ud and Iraq. Finally, the two countries
reached an agreement at al-'Uqair on December 2 1922. This convention consisted of
two protocols. The first protocol concentrated, in its articles, on the Neutral Zone
with equal rights between the two sides for all purposes. The Neutral Zone between
Najd and Iraq was a diamond-shaped zone which began at the extremity of Kuwait's
western frontier at the junction of the Wad! (Valley) al-'Audja and the Wadi al-
Batin, its northern border with Iraq running for some 119 miles (190 km) and the
southern border with Saudi Arabia for some 125 miles (200km); at its widest north-
south point the zone measured about 40 miles (65 km) in length and had a total area
of 2,500 square miles (6,500 sq. km). The second protocol was concerned with the
tribes of the region, and the two countries agreed that if "any tribe, or section of a
tribe which is outside the boundaries not subject to either government, desires to give
allegiance to one of them, they will not prevent it from doing so."The two sides
mutually agreed not to use the watering places and wells situated in the vicinity of the
border for any military purpose, such as building forts on them, and not to
concentrate troops in their vicinity.
Many sources indicate that the convention of al-'Uqair between Iraq and Najd
cost the sheikh of al-Kuwait the loss of about two-thirds of the territory within the
with the tribes not as a community but as territorial unit, and the tribes refused any kind of
boundaries that might block their freedom ofmovement. See. Al-Asha'al, 'Abdullah, op.cit. p. 57.
3. Martine, Lenore G. The Unstable Gulf Threats from Within, op.cit. p. 42.
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outer zone bounded by the 1913 borders convention.4 The December 1922
convention of the al-'Uqair borders between Najd and Iraq did not settle the deep
rivalry between the two sides and the situation became more complicated when Ibn
Sa'ud defeated the Sherif ofMecca and proclaimed himself the King of Najd and al-
Hijaz on January 8 1926 (for full text of the agreement see appendices p. 483.)
Iraqi and Saudi Harmony
The situation became critical during the conflicts between the Ikhwan and the other
tribes of Iraq, Syria and Transjordan, when the Ikhwan refused to suspend their raids
and attacks in these areas. Relations between Ibn Sa'ud and Iraq did not improve
until Ibn Sa'ud dissolved the power of the Ikhwan in 1928-1929. The Iraqi authority,
supported by the British Agent, handed the leaders of the Ikhwan to Ibn Sa'ud after
they had fled to Iraq during their war with him. As a result of the meeting, on board
ship, between Ibn Sa'ud and King Ghazi of Iraq the two countries concluded in April
1931 a Friendship and Good Neighbour treaty.5
After 1932, relations between Iraq and the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
improved and there were no serious incidents between them. This was due to the
growth of the oil industry in both countries. In 1936 Ibn Sa'ud and King Ghazi of
Iraq concluded a treaty of Arab Brotherhood and alliance.
4. Day, Alan. J. Border and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. p. 249, and Encyclopedia of International
Boundaries, op.cit. p. 307.





The situation in the Neutral Zone was settled when the two countries signed an
agreement in 1938, providing for a joint administration between the two countries of
the Neutral Zone.6 The relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia became critical after
the events of 1968, when the Ba'ath Party took control of the country, launched a
propaganda war against Saudi Arabia and signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet
Union in 1972. But after many events such as the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq
in the early 1970s, which was supported by the Shah's regime in Iran, Iraq concluded
a border agreement with the Shah of Iran in 1975. Iraq sought a similar dynamic
balance of power with Saudi Arabia.
On July 2 1975 Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi government reached an agreement
on an equal division of the Neutral Zone by drawing a line as straight as possible
across the zone. But the agreement apparently remained un-ratified, because of the
differences between the two countries over security priorities in the Gulf region.7 The
Neutral Zone border between the two countries remained unsettled during the 1970s,
but the Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel in 1978, and the outbreak of the
Iranian revolution in 1979, led Saudi Arabia and Iraq to approach a tactical alliance
and develop a good relationship. In September 1979 it was reported that the two
countries had concluded a security agreement which included plans for intelligence
co-ordination.
The Outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War
Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, Saudi Arabia and
Iraq decided to work more closely together against the Iranian revolution. Saudi
Arabia exploited this to settle the border dispute over the Neutral Zone. Talks on
these matters had a positive outcome on December 26 1981, when the Interior
Ministers of Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in Baghdad settling all
6. Rubay'I,'Abdullah Fu'ad. Qadaya al-Hudud al-Siyasiyyah li-al-Sa'udiyyah wa-al-Kuwayt Mabayn
al-Harbayn al-'Alamiyyatayn. Madbull Publications, Cairo, 1990, pp. 55-56.
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border disputes between the two countries. This agreement was followed by the
announcement of two protocols over tribal movement and border administration in
February 1982.
The Saudi minister of the interior, Prince Nayif, said that the new border
agreement "defined and fixed" the borders between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and also
provided for the division of the Neutral Zone with the result that the frontier between
the two states had been 'stabilised'. The relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia
improved during the Iraq war with Iran, and Saudi Arabia became the main supporter
of Iraq beside Kuwait until the war was suspended in 1988. There are no active
disputes between the two countries regarding the alignment of the boundary. The
boundary between the two parties was marked on maps but never physically
demarcated. 8.
7. Day, Alan G. op.cit. p. 249.
8. Allocke, John. B. Border and Territorial Disputes. 3rd Ed. 1992. op.cit. p. 394, Martin, Lenore
op.cit. p. and the Encyclopedia of International Boundaries, op.cit. p. 307. Since the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the validity of the 1981 agreement between Saudi Arabia and
Iraq has not been questioned by either of the parties. See Allocke, John. A. Border and Territorial
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The Saudi-Yemeni Border Dispute
There is a story, probably apocryphal, that King Abd al-Aziz,
the founder of the modern Saudi State, gathered his eldest sons around
his death bed and told them "the good or evil for us will come from
Yemen."
Early Period of Saudi-Yemeni Relations
The modern history of Saudi-Yemeni relations begins in 1803, with the expansion
and attacks of the Wahhabi forces against the territory of the Zaydi Imamate. The
Saudi forces defeated the Imam's forces and retained an influence in the area of
Tihamah until the destruction of the first Saudi state by the forces of Mohammed
'Ali Pasha in 1818. After that time the area, which many Arab families disputed, was
under nominal Ottoman sovereignty along with Yemen and Saudi Arabia ('Aslr,
Tihamah and Najran).
The dispute over the three areas above entered a new stage following the
departure of the Ottomans after the First World War. Both Ibn Sa'ud and Imam
Yahya of Yemen laid claim to the area of 'Aslr. The Imam of Yemen quickly moved
to assert control over those adjacent border areas (of 'Aslr, Tihamah and western
Aden) which he considered to be part of "Greater Yemen". Britain rejected the
Imam's action and claimed that the latter area was part of her western Aden
protectorate. British troops then moved and occupied the area of al-Hudeidah in 1919
as a reaction to the Imam's action.
Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, Asir remained the focal point of
Saudi-Yemeni hostility, with each side lending assistance and political backing to her
favoured faction of the Idrisi family (which was in control of 'Aslr).9 The evolution
of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary dispute goes back to the early 1920s when the Saudis
were able to occupy the area of 'Asir. After Ibn Saud secured his position in the
Hijaz, the Saudi Army advanced into Tihama and 'Aslr. With the Saudi victory in
these areas and the collapse of the families which controlled them, the Saudi
boundary reached right up to the Yemeni borders. In 1933, war erupted between the
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two countries and Saudi forces succeeded in capturing many disputed areas,
including Najran, which up until then had been outside the Saudi domain. Saudi
forces also advanced into North Yemeni territories and occupied many areas such as
al-Hudeidah. The Saudi Arabia-Yemen boundary extends 906 miles (1,458km) from
the Red Sea to a tripoint with Oman. Of this length some 75% is clearly disputed
between the two countries, representing one of the world's longest undefined
boundaries and one of the most serious boundary disputes in the Middle East. From
the terminus of the Ta'if line south and east-ward there is no agreed boundary
between the two states up to the tripoint with Oman in the Empty Quarter. The two
countries have different views over their claims in practice or on their political
maps. 10
The Western Powers' Involvement
The European powers-Britain, France and Italy-intervened and became involved in
the Saudi-Yemeni conflict after the Imam of Yemen appealed for outside aid. None
of the three European powers wanted to see the Saudis so close to their colonies in
Aden (British), Djibouti (French) and Eritrea (Italian). No progress was made
towards demarcating the border of Saudi Arabia and South Yemen during the
negotiations between Britain (on behalf of Aden and her dependencies) and Saudi
Arabia. No Anglo-Ottoman treaties on the Arabian Peninsula borders had taken place
to settle these boundaries and nothing was ratified between the two parties because of
the outbreak of the First World War.
The Treaty of 1934
As a result of the war between the two countries, on 20 May 1934 Ibn Sa'ud and the
Imam of Yemen formulated the Treaty of Muslim Friendship and Arab Fraternity.
This was concluded at Ta'if and confirmed the Saudi control over the disputed 'Aslr
9. Litwak, Robert, op.cit. p. 86.
10. Abu-Dawood, Abdul-Razak and Karan, P.P. op.cit. pp. 35-36 and see Peterson, J.E. "The GCC
and Regional Security op.cit. p. 181.
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and Najran territories as well as the return of the port city of al-Hudeidah to Imam
Yahya of Yemen and the withdrawal of Saudi forces from Yemeni territories. 11 The
treaty of Ta'if settled the border dispute over the areas of 'Asir, Najran and Jizan in
1934, while leaving the most important potentially oil-rich areas in dispute. The
Treaty of Ta'If was renewed between San'a and Riyadh in 1954 and 1974, and was
up for renewal again in 1994. But the deterioration of relations between the two
countries following the unification of Yemen and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
1990, as well as the conflicts over the disputed areas in the eastern part of North
Yemen and the northern area of South Yemen where oil companies were operating
under concessions granted by the Yemenis, were the main reasons for suspending the
renewal of the Ta'If Treaty between the two countries. 12
The External Powers' Intervention
The Saudi-Yemeni border dispute entered into a new conflict in the early 1960s,
when the royalist Yemeni regime came to an end after a military coup in North
Yemen in November 1962. This led to a civil war between the pro-Republican and
anti-Republican factions. The internal conflict became more intense when Saudi
Arabia and Egypt intervened militarily. 'Abd al-Naser adopted a pro-Republican
policy while Saudi Arabia supported the Royalists. The conflict became international
and the two sides sought external support from the United States and the Soviet
Union. Thus the Yemeni civil war became the dominant feature of Arab politics from
1962 to 1967.13
11. Litwak, Martin, op.cit. p. 86 and see Gause Grogory III, F. op.cit. pp. 57-58. The western section
of the boundary, governed by the Treaty of Taif, starts from the Red Sea coast at Oreste, a point
just north of the Yemeni town of Maydi, and extends over approximately 215 miles (345 km.).
Since 1936 there have been recurrent calls by Yemeni nationalists for the return of the "lost
province" ofAsir and Najran. See The Encyclopedia ofInternational Boundaries, op.cit. pp. 463-
464. The Yemeni-Saudi border is one of the longest undemarcated frontiers in the world. Only a
small part of it-at the extreme western end-has ever been defined. The absence of an agreed
border has become increasingly problematic because of attempts to explore for oil in the area and
there have been a number of military incidents. See Whitaker, Brian "Progress on the Saudi
border" Middle East International. 26 September 1997. p. 13.
12. Katz, Mark N "External Powers and the Yemeni Civil War" op.cit. p. 82.
13. Peterson, J.E. "The GCC and Regional Security op.cit. p. 181.
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The main reason for President 'Abd al-Naser's 1962 military intervention in
Yemen was to improve his position in the Arab world and his international standing,
after suffering the humiliating secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic. 14
The Egyptian President accused the two royal families of Saudi Arabia and Jordan of
conspiring to finance the sabotage of his union with Syria. According to him, peace
between conservative and revolutionary Arab States was impossible:
We made the mistake of making peace with reaction. We must rid
ourselves ofthis dangerous illusion in order to protect the people's struggle. We
must fight imperialism in the palaces of reaction. We must fight reaction in the
arms ofimperialism.
During the early 1960s King Faisal sought, at all costs, to avoid a direct confrontation
with the Egyptians. He supported the royalists as the only practical impediment to
Egyptian advances, while seeking time to secure the Kingdom's own domestic front.
He broke diplomatic relations with Cairo on November 6 1962 after the first
Egyptian attacks on Saudi territory. From early November 1962 Egyptian planes and
warships conducted bombing raids on royalist bases in Saudi Arabian territory. The
events in Yemen shook the political foundation of the Saudi regime. The military
appeared to be more loyal to 'Abd al-Naser than to the Saudi regime, as between
October 2 and October 8 1962, four Saudi aircraft crews defected to Egypt with
plane-loads of arms intended for the loyalists. 15 The presence of thousands of
Egyptian troops in North Yemen posed a number of internal and external threats to
the Saudi regime and other Sheykhdoms in the Arab Gulf. The Egyptian troops could
use their new base in North Yemen to extend material support to opposition forces
throughout the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in South Yemen, Oman and Saudi
Arabia.
The Saudi rulers had always considered Yemen to be of immense importance
to their national security. The Saudi royal family were convinced that the Egyptian
14. Gerges, Fawaz A "The Kennedy Administration and the Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in Yemen: Co-
opting Arab Nationalism" The Middle East Journal. Vol.49. No.2. Spring, Middle East Institute,
1995, London, p. 293.
15. Gregory Gause III, F. op.cit. p. 60.
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President's objective was to "overthrow the Saudi monarchy and gain control of the
vast oil resources which she possessed" 16
In August 1962, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with assistance from Iran and the
west, formed a joint command and developed mechanisms for closer economic and
military co-operation to counter the Egyptian presence in Yemen and support the pro-
Royalists in their civil war with the pro-Republicans.
Internal and External Initiatives
The Egyptian-Saudi conflict over Yemen led to serious peace proposals. The United
Nations Secretary-General U-Thant supported the first step initiated by the
Americans on April 30 1963. The plan called for the simultaneous withdrawal of all
foreign forces and an end to outside aid. The United Nations agreement was
unsuccessful as a result of the two countries' unwillingness to implement it. The
second step was the Alexandria Arab Summit in September 1964 where Abd al-
Naser and Faisal announced an agreement to a seek a peaceful solution to the
Yemeni conflict.
The two countries, with the delegations of the Republicans and Royalists, held
a reconciliation meeting in Sudan on October 30-31 1964. However, the negotiations
over the Alexandria agreement in Sudan failed to bring an end to the conflict. The
third step took place in Jeddah on August 24, 1965 during Abd al-Naser's visit to
Saudi Arabia. The two countries announced what became known as the Jeddah
agreement to end the fighting in Yemen. But the negotiations, which took place at the
conference of Haradh between November 23 and December 25 1965, failed to reach
any settlement of the Yemen conflict between the Republicans and Royalists. 17
16. Gerges, Fawaz A. op.cit. p. 299.
17. Groegory Gause III, F. op.cit. pp. 64-68 and Gerges, Fawaz A. op.cit. pp. 305-306.
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Soviet and American Involvement
In October 1962, the Soviet Union was the first non-Arab State to recognise the
Republican government in North Yemen. The Kremlin went beyond the stage of
implicit support by supplying aid to the revolutionaries in North Yemen and to the
Egyptian troops. The Soviet and the American recognition of the North Yemen
Republic regime was seen by 'Abd al-Naser as a political gain for Cairo's
interventionist role and a political setback for the Saudi regime.
In response to increased Saudi aid to the royalists, Egyptian troops escalated the
confrontation by sending their air force to bomb Saudi border towns, which were
being used as training grounds and staging posts for the royalist forces and the Saudi,
Jordanian and Iranian Command areas near the Saudi-Yemeni borders. After the
British announcement in February 1966 of their intention to withdraw from the south
of Arabia by 1968, the Egyptian President adopted a new strategy to consolidate his
position in North Yemen. The new strategy was accompanied by a more active
hostile stance against Saudi Arabia. Propaganda attacks were stepped up and a
welcome was offered to ex-King Sa'ud and the Free Princes Movement in Cairo.
They then broadcast on the Voice of the Arabs against the monarchical regimes in the
Arab world, especially those of Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
After the death ofKennedy and his replacement by Lyndon Johnson, the United
States, with the support of Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, played a significant role in
supporting the royalists in Yemen, and a squadron of United States fighter aircraft
was stationed in Saudi Arabia to protect the Saudi regime against any internal or
external threats. 18
The War of 1967
The series of conflicts over North Yemen came to an end during 1967. The solution
in favour of Saudi Arabia, which she could not bring about on the battlefield or at the
negotiating table, was finally imposed upon Egypt from outside. 'Abd al-Naser's
ambitions in Yemen became more critical after the five-day war of June 1967 with
18. Gerges, Fawaz A. op.cit. 307.
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Israel, which made the Egyptian position in Yemen untenable. The Saudi
government's willingness to provide financial assistance to Egypt in the wake of her
defeat was made contingent upon a complete withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from
Yemen.
The last Egyptian soldier left North Yemen in early December 1967. Saudi
Arabia formally recognised the Yemen Arab Republic on July 27 1970, two months
after the compromise agreement between the two countries.
The Saudi Role in Yemen
The Saudi objective in this action was to consolidate her relations with the North
Yemen regime in order to counter the left-wing South Yemen regime. The Saudi
policy towards the regime of North Yemen was to maintain military and financial
assistance to her and yet maintain pressure on the regime by military assistance to
tribal federations in North Yemen and the frontier regions. These could threaten to
bring down the regime or revive civil strife. Since the early 1960s Saudi Arabia's
foreign policy towards North Yemen has been based on the principle of "Riyal
Politik" using her wealth to buy the loyalties and alliances of the Yemeni tribal
Sheykhs
It should be noted that the northern tribal federations constitute approximately
one-third of North Yemen's population. Saudi Arabia had subsidised the North
Yemen tribes annually at an estimated cost of $300 million, whereas Saudi subsidies
to the North Yemen regime approached $400 million. The Saudis also directly
subsidised economic development projects within North Yemen at an estimated rate
of approximately $300 million annually. The purpose of the Saudi aid was make the
regime in North Yemen economically dependent on her in order to counter North
Yemen's interest in obtaining military assistance from the Soviet Union and pursuing
unification negotiations with South Yemen. 19
Saudi Arabia and South Yemen did not establish diplomatic relations until
March 1976, but no mention was made of any negotiation or agreement over their
19. Lenore, Martin, op.cit. p. 56 and Gause Groegory III, F. op.cit. pp. 70-82.
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boundary. During the early 1970s, South Yemen increased her attacks on the Saudi
border. These attacks came as a response to an abortive attempt by Saudi Arabia to
extend control over Hadramaut and establish that region as a buffer zone. Another
clash at the frontier was reported in 1973. Since the early 1970s the Saudi
government retained a number of effective internal policy instruments in her dealings
with the North Yemen regime or with the heads of the big tribes.
Some sources indicate that Saudi Arabia played a major role in the
assassination of President Ibrahim Al-Hamdl on the eve of his scheduled journey to
Aden to discuss possible steps towards unification. Saudi policy in Yemen permitted
tribal dissidents, Nationalists and ex-Sultans from Hadramaut to use her territory as a
base for operations against the Aden government or any progress towards
unification.20
Clashes Between the Two Countries
No political development took place on the question of the border dispute during the
1980s. Many press reports state that the border dispute deteriorated into armed
confrontations in early 1980, 1983, 1984, 1988 and the early 1990s on many
occasions. In November 1984 a Saudi airliner was hijacked by North Yemeni
nationals and flown to Tehran. They were protesting against what they alleged was
Saudi "interference" in the internal affairs ofNorth Yemen.21
The Dispute of the Southern Boundary
The two countries have not had any legally-defined border since the Treaty of Ta'If
of 1934, which defined only a small part of the frontier in the populated area of the
north-western corner. The remaining 1,000 miles or so have never been agreed. Since
this undefined section runs mostly through desert on the fringes of the Rub' al-Khali
(Empty Quarter), its precise location had little importance until the mid-1980s when
20. Litwak, Robert, op.cit. pp. 88-89 and see. Jane's Sentinel Newsletter :The Arab Gulf State, op.cit.
p. 9.
21. Alan, Day J. op.cit. p. 253.
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Yemen discovered oil close to the notional line.22 The Treaty of Ta'if did not grant
'Aslr, Jizan and Najran as permanent areas under Saudi authority, but only for a
twenty-year renewable term. As a result of these confrontations and skirmishes on the
borders between the two countries as well as the unification of Yemen, Saudi Arabia
regarded this as a threat to Saudi internal and external security. Since that time she
built strong military bases near the Saudi-Yemeni borders, namely the KhamTs al-
Mushait base in the 'Aslr area and the Sharura base near her border with the former
South Yemen in the Rub'al-Khali. She maintains large numbers of troops there. The
Saudi royal family also saw the free elections and press in Yemen as an unwelcome
development, which could destabilise the Saudi Kingdom.
Many observers noted that the Saudi leadership regarded democratisation in
Yemen as highly threatening since it might serve to fuel demands for political change
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has apparently rejected recent moves
by Egypt and Syria to establish an independent control regime on the Saudi-Yemeni
border. Sultan b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Saudi Minister of Defence, said that there were
already plans for a joint Saudi-Yemeni Military Committee to monitor the border.23
22. Whitaker, Brian "Yemen and Saudi Arabia Crisis over the border" Middle East International 20
January 1995, London, p. 11.
23. Peterson, J.E. "The GCC and Regional Security" op.cit. p. 181 and Jane's Sensentinel Newsletter :









The Unification ofYemen and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
During the early 1990s, the political relations between San'a and Riyadh worsened
after North and South Yemen merged into one country called the Republic of Yemen;
the second issue was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The Yemeni
position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait opposed Saudi policy on the Gulf crisis.
Relations were seriously disrupted at the Arab League Conference on the invasion,
when the Yemeni President, 'All 'Abdullah Saleh, voted against condemning Iraq.
Relations further soured when the Yemeni government representative in the United
Nations abstained from voting on various UN Security Council resolutions against
Iraq. In addition, demonstrations were held in most Yemeni cities supporting the
Iraqi invasion ofKuwait.24
The Saudi Reaction
The Saudi reaction to the Yemeni government position over the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait was to exert real political pressure on the unification government. During the
second Gulf war, the Saudi government expelled and sacked some 700,000 persons
of Yemeni origin. 'All 'Abdullah Saleh announced, on 23 November 1990, that
817,000 Yemenis had returned to Yemen from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.25
Since early 1990, Saudi Arabia has cut off all aid to Yemen and forced the
other members of the GCC to impose sanctions on her. During the early 1990s there
were many skirmishes over the Saudi-Yemeni borders resulting in the death ofmany
soldiers from both sides. In 1992, Saudi Arabia warned western oil companies not to
accept Yemeni oil exploration contracts in a disputed area of the seabed in the Red
Sea.26
24. Kechichian, Joseph. Political Dynamics... op.cit. p. 64.
25. Whitley, Andrew "Minorities and the Stateless in Persian Gulf Politics" op.cit. p. 24, and
Kechichian, Joseph A. Political Dynamics op.cit. p. 64.
26. Pike, David "Cross-border hydrocarbon reserves" op.cit. p. 193 and MEES. Vol. XXXV. No.35 1
June 1992. p. A3, see. MEES. Vol. XXXV. No.32. 11 May 1992. p. A5. See also Burrowes,
Robert D "The Yemeni Civil War of 1994: Impact on the Arab Gulf States" in: Al-Suwaidi Jamal
S (ed.) The Yemeni War of 1994 Causes and Consequences. The Emirates Centre for Strategic
Studies and Research, 1995, Abu Dhabi, pp. 73-74.
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In June 1994, during the civil war in Yemen, the Saudi government, together
with all the GCC except Qatar, sided with and supported the southern forces led by
the ex-Marxist Vice-President 'All Salim al-Baid. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait played a significant role in supporting these forces financially and militarily
against the unification government of San'a. The Saudi and Kuwaiti purpose was to
destroy Yemeni unification. Unification meant, to Saudi Arabia, real internal and
external threats to Saudi stability. For Kuwait this was a revenge on Yemen for her
position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which was directed against the royal family
of Kuwait. In July 1994, King Fahd condemned the victorious Northern Leadership
for its "insistence" on continuing the civil war despite pleas from the UN special
representative to agree a permanent cease-fire.
Saudi efforts to achieve a cease-fire were perceived in San'a as an effort to aid
the Southern leaders: if a cease-fire had taken hold, the Southern government would
have had a greater opportunity to consolidate its independence. Towards the end of
the civil war in Yemen, Riyadh reportedly attempted to persuade other Arab
governments, especially the GCC States, to recognise the independence of the former
South Yemen.
Towards the end of the conflict, the Kuwaiti foreign minister openly talked
about granting diplomatic recognition to the South.27 There are numerous,
unsubstantiated reports of Saudi military aid being given to the Southern leaders and
it is clear that the Saudis took diplomatic action to help prevent them from being
overrun. When the senior leaders of South Yemen fled into exile, they were allowed
to form an opposition movement in Jeddah and given support in an international
campaign to oppose the North Yemen regime. During December 1994 and January
1995 border clashes broke out between the two countries.28
27. Katz, Mark N "External Powers and the Yemeni Civil War" in: Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S (ed.) The
Yemeni War of 1994 Causes and Consequences. The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and
Research, Abu Dhabi, 1995, pp. 82-87
28. Jane's Sentinel Newsletter: The Arab Gulf States, op.cit. p.8. For more details over the Saudi
position on the border dispute with Yemen see. Report published by Al-Ouds al-'Arabl. Issue
No.2702. Date 17-January, 1998, London, pp. 3-4.
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Saudi Ambitions in Hadramaut
It should be recorded that the Saudi royal family had long-term strategic aims to
extend their sovereignty to the Arab Sea (Indian Ocean) in the south of Arabia, in the
Dhofar region in Oman or in Hadramaut and al-Mahrah in Yemen. Saudi Arabian oil
exports are vulnerable to blockade since tankers have to pass through one of two
narrow waterways, neither of which the Saudis directly control: the Strait of Hormuz
in the Gulf Region and Bab al-Mandab in the Red Sea. During the late 1960s, Saudi
Arabia supported the Sultans of the South Arabian states with the formation of
dissident armies especially for the HadramI opposition, and encouraged the HadramI
merchants (most of the big merchant families in Saudi Arabia originate in
Hadramaut) to play a significant role with dissidents in establishing a puppet
government in Hadramaut and al-Mahrah. This would then give Saudi Arabia a safe
corridor to the Arab Sea. During the civil war in Yemen of 1994, she tried to revive
the old Saudi idea of establishing the state of Hadramaut and al-Mahrah, but the idea
failed after the North Yemeni victory in the war. After the termination of the civil
war in 1994, the Saudi government naturalised most of the former South Yemen
people, particularly the people of Hadramaut and al-Mahrah, in order to use these
people to exert a pressure on the unification government.29
The Memorandum of 1995
In February 1995, as a result of American pressure on the Saudi government, the two
countries entered into talks, which resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding in Mecca. The memorandum contains the establishment of several
committees on disputed issues, like the border disputes, military clashes, economic
co-operation and preventing troop movements near disputed areas. However, the
Saudi government was not keen to stabilise relations with Yemen. During the talks
the Yemenis seem to have conceded the possibility of settling the border issue in
more than one stage.
29. Whitaker, Brian, op.cit. pp. 11-13, and MEES. Vol. XXXV No.32. 11 May 1992. p. A5.
314
Chapter Six
The Saudis have given ground on the question ofmilitary supervision and have
accepted the principle of arbitration if no mutual agreement on the border is reached.
It should be noted that the Yemeni position on the Ta'if treaty concentrated on its
renewal. The treaty of Ta'if was signed in 1934 and expired in December 1992.30
Until the end of 1996, the two countries held more than thirteen rounds of talks
without result on the issue of border disputes. Some Yemeni leaders, nonetheless,
were saying unofficially in the autumn of 1992 that they would be willing to
relinquish claims to the areas of 'Asir, Najran and Jizan if the Saudis were
forthcoming and generous regarding Yemeni territorial claims in the east and north of
Hadramaut (for full text of the memorandum of 1995 see appendices p. 514.)
The Military Incidents
On January 10 1996, a further incident was reported on the Yemeni-Saudi border.
Saudi troops reportedly hoisted the Saudi flag inside Yemen territory. Yemeni troops
retaliated by launching a counter-offensive to recapture the territory. Yemen's
President 'All 'Abdullah Saleh, discussed the incident with King Fahd of Saudi
Arabia. On January 15 1996 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republic
issued a statement indicating that recent tension on the border between the two
countries had been contained and that an agreement had been reached not to resort to
violence. Both countries looked forward to resuming talks to resolve difficulties
30. The February Memorandum was ratified by both countries in May 1995, and MEES. Vol.
XXXVIII. No.34. 22 May 1995. p. A15. On 25 May 1996, the Saudi government announced that
it was ready to sign a security pact with Yemen, as envisaged in the memorandum of
understanding signed by the two countries in February 1995. The Saudis claimed to be waiting on
Yemen's approval of the final draft, but no details of the pact were revealed. See Boundary and
Security Bulletin Summer 1996, IBRU, University of Durham, p. 31. For more details see Al-
Dulayml, Muhammad 'All . Al-'Alam Newspaper. Issue No.588. 27 September pp.17-19. On
Yemeni desire to negotiate, see MEES. Vol. XXXV. No.29. 20 April 1992. p. A5. On 30 April
the Yemeni government called on the foreign powers (US, UK, France and Canada) whose
companies were operating in the disputed border areas with Saudi Arabia to help mediate the
dispute between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. MEES. Vol. XXXV. No.32. 11 May 1992. p. A5. See
also Whitaker, Brian "Yemen and Saudi Arabia Limited agreement" Middle East International
3 March 1995, London, p. 15.
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concerning the border.31 On January 27 1996, conflicting reports again pointed to a
build-up of Saudi troops on the border with Yemen.
The President of Yemen confirmed the existence of Saudi military
concentrations and said that they had intensified since 25 January in order, he
thought, to guarantee the status quo regarding border demarcation. He indicated that
so far, there had been no substantial progress in the talks taking place in Riyadh
(during the visit of 'Abdullah Al-Ahmar, the Speaker of the Yemeni House of
Representatives, on 22 January 1996).32 On 26 February 1996, a Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between the two countries in which they affirmed their
commitment to the Ta'if accord of May 1934. They agreed to establish a joint
committee within a period of 30 days, charged with re-establishing the border signs
in accordance with the reports appended to the Ta'if accord. The Committee would
continue its work to decide on measures to demarcate the remaining parts of the
border. A joint committee would be established to determine the maritime boundary
in accordance with international law, and a military committee would be formed by
the two sides to ensure the prevention of military incidents between the two
countries. On 5 November 1996, the Saudi-Yemeni joint committee on the
demarcation of the border began four days of discussions in its first session in San'a.
At the conclusion of talks, the committee issued a statement saying that the two sides
had agreed to start implementing the timetable of technical field work to demarcate
the border.3 3
31. The two countries, on 28 September, held border talks in Riyadh (on the level of experts). These
talks were the first to be held between the two countries since 1974. Since then the two countries
have held many rounds of talks but without progress. See. MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.l. 5 October
1992. p.A4. The most important talks over the border disputes between the two parties were held
in Geneva on 20 July 1992 on the ministerial level. MEES. Vol. XXXV. No.43. 27 July 1992.
p.A3. The Yemeni Foreign Minister Muhammed Salim Basandawah in July 1992 was the highest
ranking Yemeni official to visit Saudi Arabia since relations were strained by Yemen's stand
during the second GulfWar. See. MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.43. 26 July 1993. pp. A9-A10.
32. Many sources indicate that Sheykh 'Abdullah Al-Ahmar (Sheykh of Hashid federation, the big
federation in Yemen) has strong relations with the Saudi government and is considered to be a
Saudi strong man in Yemen. See. Renter News Agency. News dated on 25/5/96 and 5/6/96. See
also Rusi International Security Review !996 "The Gulf: International Security and External
Threat" op.cit. p. 256.
33 Rusi International Security Review 1996 "The Gulf: International Security and External Threat"
op.cit. pp. 257-271, and IBRU Boundary andSecurity Bulletin. University of Durham, p. 24.
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The Yemeni Position over the Border
'Abd al-Karim al-Iryanl, the Yemeni Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
described the Yemeni-Saudi border dispute as a most complicated one, which could
not be solved by the few mutual visits paid by the officials of the two countries. Al-
Iryani explained in an interview published by the Weekly Yemen Times that the
Memorandum of Understanding was signed two years ago regarding borders and the
determination of border relations without reaching until now any agreement on the
fixation of a first border point on the border line. This had been planned in
accordance with the Ta'if agreement, which starts from a point between the two
regions, on the western beach looking over the Red Sea, up to Al-Thar mountain in
the north-west of Yemen. Al-IryanI justified the disagreement on the fixation of this
point by the fact that nobody had put up any border signs in 60 years, which indicated
the complicated nature of the problem. Regarding the concept proposed for the
planned border line between the two countries, it starts at the 23rd latitude in the
North and is directed towards the east curving slowly to the south. Al-Iryani said,
"we have changed the curve line many times, given the complaints about violations
of regions by both parties." He also emphasised that Yemen has raised more
complaints than the other party regarding border violation.
The Yemeni Foreign Minister issued a statement saying that the Yemeni-Saudi
sides had now solved 40% of the border disputes in their quest to find a final solution
for their 60-year old disputes.34
Some sources indicate that the Saudi-Yemeni negotiations have reached an
impasse despite the agreement concluded between the two parties in Mecca in 1995.
The two parties have exchanged accusations of hindering the negotiations, and some
of the Yemeni opposition sources have stated that one of the reasons for the
aggravation of differences between San'a and Riyadh is that Saudi 'Arabia insists on
bringing about a reconciliation between the Yemeni government and the leaders of
the separation in the South Yemen before the signature of the border agreement.
34. Al-Watan Newspaper. Issue No.4982. The 27th year. Saturday 22 February 1997, Sultanate of
Oman, Muscat, p. 1.
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Sa'udi 'Arabia considered national reconciliation as a necessary condition to
normalise relations between the two countries and settle the border problems. She
also wanted the leaders concerned to share the power. Some of the political leaders in
San'a explained clearly that they would have recourse to arbitration in case of the
insistence of Sa'udi 'Arabia upon her rights.35 Some political analysts summarise the
reasons that hindered the progress of negotiations between the parties as follows:
(a) The insistence of Sa'udi 'Arabia on the national reconciliation between the
Yemeni government and the separation Southern leaders. This is imposed as a
condition on San'a in order to reach a global border settlement and to normalise the
relations between the two countries, as well as the sharing of power with such
leaders.
(b) Yemen claims the negotiations should recover the Yemeni territories occupied by
Sa'udi 'Arabia in 1969 in the Eastern border region (Wadi'ah and Sharurah) and
include Sau'di demands for a sea passage on the Arabian sea through Yemeni
territory crossing the Hadramaut or Al-Mahra region, close to the Omani border with
Yemen.
(c) Sa'udi 'Arabia tried to impose the policy of fait accompli de facto regarding the
demarcation of the borders, particularly the borders with the former South Yemen
which have been undefined since the British presence in that area. (For a good
example of this see the Saudi map on page no. 2)
35 Al-Ouds At- 'Arabi. Issue No. 2674. December 1997, London, p. 4.
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The Iraqi - Kuwaiti Border Disputes
Early Background
Kuwait, as a sheikhdom, was founded in the early eighteenth century by three clans
of the 'Anlza tribe, namely Al-Sabah, Al-Khallfah, and Al-Jalahimah, who migrated
from central Arabia. In 1716 the heads of the three clans agreed to give the Al-Sabah
pre-eminence in government affairs, subject to consulting the Al-Khallfah in
commercial affairs, and the Al-Jalahimah in maritime affairs (see Chapter 1, p. 17).
The Ban! Khalid tribe dominated the area of Kuwait before the federation of these
three tribes. Since the early eighteenth century Al-Sabah has become the dominant
family in the territory after the emigration of al-Khallfah to Zubarah in the Qatar
Peninsula.36
However, in the early 1870 the Sheikhdom of Kuwait came to be a part of the
Ottoman Empire, during her expansion in the Arabian Peninsula. Sheykh Abdullah
Al-Sabah of Kuwait was appointed as qaimmaqam (sub-governor) as a reward for
his assistance during the Ottoman forces' intervention in the Arabian lands. In 1875
Kuwait and the newly-conquered territories of eastern Arabia, Hasa and Qatif, along
with Basra, Nasiriyah, Qurna and al-'Amara, were grouped together into a newly
constituted autonomous Ottoman Wilayah under the Wall of the Muntafiq. But in
1884 the territories of Faw, Qurna and Kuwait were brought under the control of the
Basra province. Kuwait, from that time, was administered as part of the Ottoman
province of Basrah. British influence in Kuwait came as a result of her competition
with the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Peninsula during the 1870s. The scheme for
the Berlin-Baghdad railway was the most important incentive for the British
government to support the Sheykh of Kuwait's authority over the territory of Kuwait
in order to deny any opportunity to the Germans and Russians for the development of
a railway terminus in the Umm Qasr / Khawr al-Zubair area.
36. Mendelson, Maurice and Hulton, Susan "Iraq's claim to sovereignty over Kuwait", in. Schofield,
Richard (ed.) Territorialfoundations of the GulfStates. UCL Press, 1994, London, p. 119.
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The Treaty of 1899
The British position in Kuwait became stronger after they supported Shaykh
Mubarak in seizing power in the sheikhdom after he had murdered his pro-Turkish
brothers Muhammad and Jarrah. Shaykh Mubarak sought British protection when
the Turks refused to recognise his authority over the Sheikhdom of Kuwait.37 In
1899 Mubarak, who is known as "the Great", concluded a secret agreement with
Britain, without the approval of the Ottoman Sultan, in which Mubarak himself, his
heirs and his successors agreed not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for
occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory, to the government of
any power without the previous consent ofHer Majesty's Government.38
The 1899 secret agreement provided that Britain would not establish a formal
protectorate over Kuwait unless the Ottomans intervened militarily in the
Sheykhdom. The most important reason that had prompted Britain to conclude this
secret agreement was the successive plans of the Germans and Russians to run a
railway to the Gulf on Kuwait Bay. However, this agreement did not change the
status quo of the Ottoman control over the Sheikhdom of Kuwait.
The Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913
After 1899 Britain became the controller of the Sheykhdom's foreign affairs.
Between 1911 and 1913, Britain and Turkey, the two authorities which dominated
Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, engaged in talks over their influence over Arabian
boundaries and the Baghdad railway question. After long discussions they reached an
agreement on 29 July 1913, which formally defined the respective spheres of
influence of the two sides in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. But the 1913 agreement
was not ratified because of the outbreak of the First World War. The 1913 agreement
was the first attempt to settle border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula. It caused the
territory of Kuwait to be defined and divided into two zones, in which the Sheykh of
37. Finnie, David H. Shifting Lines in the Sand Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq, op.cit. pp. 5-13.
38. Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes. Middle East
Programme, London, 1993, 2nd, p. 17.
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Kuwait was recognised as having varying degrees of authority. Within a semi-circle
radius of approximately 40 miles from Kuwait town, the complete administrative
autonomy of the ruling family of Al-Sabah was recognised. The islands of Warbah
and Bubiyan 39 (as well as of Mashjan, Failakah, Awhah, Kubr, Qaru, Maqtah, and
Umm al-Maradim) were included within this zone. Within an outer zone, bounded by
a "Green Line", which was occupied by tribes recognised as being dependent on the
Shaykh of Kuwait, the latter was to continue to collect their tithes, as in the past, and
to exercise the administrative rights belonging to him in his capacity of qaimmaqam
under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. The Sheykh of Kuwait was to continue to
hoist the Ottoman flag, as in the past.
The agreement also provided Ottoman recognition of the 1899 secret
agreement between Britain and the Sheykh of Kuwait.40 The Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier
was defined by a large notice board during the British presence in Iraq and Kuwait,
but its actual location moved from time to time, which means that the border itself
was unclear and ambiguous in definition.
39. Schofield, Richard "The Kuwaiti Islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, and Iraqi Access to the Gulf "in:
Schofield, Richard (ed.) Territorial foundations of the GulfStates. UCL Press, 1994, London, p.
157. The two islands lie in the north-west corner of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf very close to each
other and to the mainland of Kuwait and are less than a mile from Iraq's 10-nautical mile border
zone and are virtually uninhabited. The importance of the two islands lies in the fact that they
dominate the channel between Iraq's main port on the Gulf (Umm Qasr) and the Gulf itself, and
thus command the narrow maritime lane through which BaSrah-bound shipping has to pass. El-
Hakim, Ali A. The Middle Eastern States and the Law ofthe Sea. op.cit. p. 118.




































Map showing the Red (inner) and Green (outer) lines of diminishing Kuwaiti
territorial authority as defined by the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention.
Source: Map produced by the Foreign Office Research Department in May 1954
Source: International Boundaries Research Unit. Boundary and Security Bulletin. Vol. 2. No. 3.
October 1994. Department ofGeography. University of Durham. England, 1994.
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Iraq Under the British Mandate
The Iraqi claims on Kuwait are on two levels: the first level focuses on the historical
claim, that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraqi territory belonging to the Basrah
province. This was argued by King Ghazi of Iraq and the Iraqi foreign minister
Tawfiq al-Suwaidi (1938), Nurl al-Sa'Id (1958), 'Abd al- Karlm Qasim (1961) and
Saddam Hussein (1990). The second claim concerns the boundary between the two
countries, especially the two strategic islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Since Iraq
became independent in 1932, it has been sensitive about its narrow frontage on the
Arabian (Persian) Gulf, a mere 20 kilometres. An example of this level of the Iraqi
claim is the correspondence of 1923, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti agreement of 1932 and the
agreement of 1963 between 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif and the Sheykh of Kuwait.4l
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War,
Mesopotamia (the Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah) became
independent and as a result of the San Remo Conference decisions of 25 April 1920,
Britain became the High Mandatory of Iraq. As Mandatory of Iraq on the one hand,
and protector of the sheikhdom of Kuwait on the other, Britain decided to settle the
border dispute between the two sides according to the 1913 agreement (un-ratified).
Sir Percy Cox, the Iraqi High Commissioner, following on from the al- Uqair
protocol of 1922 between Najd and Iraq on the one hand and between Najd and
Kuwait on the other, suggested that the "Green Line" of the 1913 agreement be
confirmed as the Iraqi - Kuwaiti boundary. The border between Iraq and Kuwait was
first defined when Sir Percy Cox exchanged, on April 4 and April 19 1923, letters
with the British Political Resident in Kuwait and the Sheykh of Kuwait. The border
between Iraq and Kuwait still remained in the position of the 1923 letters until the
early 1930s. However, when Britain decided to end her mandate over Iraq and to
accept it as a member of the League ofNations in 1932, and subsequent to the letters
exchanged in 1923 through the mediation of the British government, the Sheykh of
Kuwait, Ahmad Al-Sabah, and the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nurl al-Sa'id, exchanged
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letters dated July 21 and August 10 1932 accepting the demarcation of the frontier
between them on the basis of the 1923 letters. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan,
Mushkan or Mashjan, Failakah, Auhan, Kubbar, Qaru and Umm al-Maradim were
declared Kuwait territory 42 (for full text of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti letters reaffirming
the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary in 1932 see appendices p. 486)
The Iraqi Claim During the Monarchical Era
Since Iraq became independent in the early 1930s, it has been sensitive over the
narrow coastal strip at Umm Qasr on the Gulf, a mere 20 kilometres, and with the
discovery of oil in Kuwait it has felt that, as a large country with a fairly large
population, it has been squeezed out of the Gulf because of the boundaries drawn by
British colonial officials after the First World War.43 The Iraqi officials launched a
campaign during the 1950s calling for the annexation of Kuwait as a part of the
former Ottoman territory. King Ghazi of Iraq began broadcasting from a private radio
station called Qasr al-Zuhur demanding the annexation of Kuwait and depicting the
Sheikhdom's ruler as "an out-of-date feudal despot", dependent upon Britain's
support.
During the reign of King Ghazi relations between Iraq and Kuwait were
unsettled, particularly after the fleeing to Iraq of a number of Kuwaiti nationalists
who called for closer relations with Iraq after the failure of the two Kuwaiti
experiments with a legislative assembly. According to British Military Intelligence,
Iraq sent some troops to the Zubair area in the south of Iraq and there was a plan to
invade Kuwait, but the operation did not take place. Iraqi media on the other hand
launched a big campaign for the incorporation of the Sheikhdom of Kuwait within
41. Al-Sarjani, Khalid "Tarsim al-Hudud al-'Iraqiyyah-al-Kuwaytiyyah Ba'd Azmat al-Khalij al-
Thaniyah" Al- Sivasah al-Duwaliwah (.International Politics) Issue No.l 11, January 1993, Cairo,
p. 234.
42 .Day, Alan J. Border and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. p. 245 and Bishku, Michael B "Iraq Claims to
Kuwait: A Historical Overview" American-Arab Affairs Vol. 37, 1991, p. 79.
43. Jansen, G.H "The Iraq-Kuwait, boundary The Umm Qasr time bomb" .Middle East International -
6 March, 1992 , London, p. 9.
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the Hashemite Kingdom, concentrating on the historical link between Mesopotamia
and Kuwait.44
Tawfiq Al-Suwaidi, the Iraqi foreign minister, in a speech before the Iraqi
parliament in 1938, referred to Kuwait as an inseparable part of Iraq and Iraq's
natural outlet to the sea. He declared that the Shaykh of Kuwait was an Ottoman
Qaimmaqam and he acknowledged that in 1932, the prime minister of Iraq, Nurl Al-
Sa'id, had written a letter recognising a certain line as being the frontier, but stated
however, that the reaffirmation of this frontier could not be held to have brought any
change to the status of Kuwait.
In Geneva on September 28 1938, Al-Suwaidi handed the British Parliamentary
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs an aide-memoire stating firmly: "The Iraqi
Government, as the successor to the Ottoman Government in the Wilayets of Mosul,
Baghdad and Basra, considers that Kuwait should properly be incorporated in Iraq. If
incorporation should take place, Iraq would agree to maintain the local autonomy of
Kuwait.45 The foreign minister of Iraq explained the Iraqi purpose to control Kuwait
as being not only to control smuggling into Iraq (a major issue at the time), but also
because the government of Iraq was thinking about "the extension of the Iraq railway
to Kuwait Bay, in order to provide Iraq with a port on GulfWaters.46
The British Government did not take the Iraqi foreign minister's claims very
seriously, but the two sides held talks in London in October 1938, without any
development relating to the Iraqi claim over Kuwait. But after the meeting in London
in 1938, the Iraqis continued to demand that the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan
be ceded to them. As Britain was a protector of the Sheykhdom, the Foreign Office
presented a note dated 6 October 1938, which claimed that:
The Sheykhdom of Kuwait was, for a considerable period, in an
anomalous state of semi-dependence on the Ottoman Empire; His Majesty's
Government have nevertheless been in treaty relations with the Shayks ofKuwait
since 1841; and Kuwait finally became completely independent of Turkey and
44. Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. pp. 74-
76. See also Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p. 79.
45. Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. p. 77.
46. Finnie, David H. op.cit. p. 114.
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Kuwaiti nationality finally came into existence on the same date as Iraq and
Iraqi nationalityA1
During the early 1930s Iraqi officials made many demands to Britain and the Kuwait
Sheykhs for the cession of the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Some sources
indicated that the Iraqi Defence Minister, Ja'far al-'Askari, expressed strong
reservations on the Nuri al-Sa'id accord of 1932 which admitted Kuwaiti sovereignty
over the two islands.48 The Iraqi monarchy refused to make any demarcation of its
border with Kuwait unless it received the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. On the
other side the Kuwaiti Sheykhs also refused to cede or lease the two islands until the
boundary between the two countries had first been securely demarcated.49
After Iraq became a member of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the Iraqi
government sought closer relations with Kuwait. During the last six months of
Hashemite rule in Iraq in 1958, Nuri al-Sa'id, the Iraqi Prime Minister, as a result of
the establishment of the Hashimite Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan, proposed that
Kuwait should be a member of this Union. The Kuwaiti Sheykh was invited to
Baghdad to discuss the proposal. The Iraqi Prime Minister's aim in this was to exploit
the massive Kuwaiti oil wealth to support the Jordanian economy under the
protection of Baghdad. The British reaction was frosty after the Iraqi Prime Minister's
discussions in London on July 20, 1958.50
The Coup of 1958
The Hashemite Arab Union and the Hashemite royal regime ended on 14 July 1958
after the bloody military coup when a group of nationalist Iraqi officers overthrew
the monarchy. This group was headed by Major-General 'Abd al-Karim Qasim. The
Sheykh of Kuwait congratulated the new Iraqi regime and visited Baghdad in
47. Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. pp. 77-
78.
48. Schofield, Richard "The Kuwaiti Islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, and Iraqi Access to the Gulf'
op.cit. p. 162.
49. Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p. 87.
50. Finnie, David H. op.cit. p. 124.
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November 1958.51 During the three years 1958 to mid-1961, the Iraqi regime
positively improved her relations with Kuwait and encouraged any steps which
Kuwait took to assert her independence from Britain. The Iraqi government also,
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, supported the Sheykhdom of Kuwait's
membership in many international organisations.52
The Independence of Kuwait
No development in the frontier demarcation had taken place between Kuwait and
Iraq during the three years 1958-1961, despite Kuwaiti requests to set up a committee
to settle the boundaries. On June 19 1961, Kuwait achieved full independence by an
exchange of notes between Sheykh 'Abdullah of Kuwait and the last British Political
Resident, Sir William Luce, and the government of Kuwait issued a statement that
day giving the text of the agreement. The correspondence contained the following
provisions:
1 .The agreement of January 23 1899 shall be terminated as being inconsistent with
the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait.
2. The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a spirit of
close friendship.
3. When appropriate the two governments shall consult together on matters which
concern them both.
4. Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's
Government to assist the Government ofKuwait if the latter request such assistance.
The two countries also concluded a defence agreement for ten years.53
51. Al-'Aqqad, Salah. al-Tayarat al-Siyasiyyah fi al-KhalJj al-'Arabl Min Bidayat al-'Usur al-
Hadithah Hatta Azmat 1990-1991. op.cit. p. 379.
52. Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. pp. 102-
103.
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Qasim's Claim Over Kuwait
Six days after Kuwait had gained independence, in June 1961, the Iraqi Prime
Minister Major-General, 'Abd al-Karlm Qasim, held a conference in which he stated:
The Republic of Iraq has decided to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait
and to demand the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs to Iraq
as part of the province of Basrah... We shall, accordingly, issue a decree
appointing the Sheykh of Kuwait as a qaimmaqam of Kuwait, who will come
under the authority of the Basrah Wilayat. The Iraq Republic will never cede a
single inch ofthis land. When we say this, it means we can execute it. 54
The Iraqi claim to Kuwait was based on two issues, the first issue being the historical
connection of Kuwait with the Ottoman Empire and the second the succession of the
new State of Iraq to the territorial sovereignty of that empire over Kuwait.55
The Kuwaiti Reaction to Qasim's Claim
The Kuwaiti government as a reaction to General Qasim's claim, declared that the
Sheykhdom of Kuwait was an independent Arab State with full sovereignty,
recognised internationally. The Kuwaiti declaration added that Kuwait had signed the
1899 agreement with Britain as an independent entity, while it was emphasised that
Iraq had aided Kuwait's successful applications for membership of international
organisations during the end of the 1950s and early 1960. The Kuwaiti declaration
asserted that it had never been subjected to direct Turkish interference, that it had
been controlled by the al-Sabah dynasty since 1756 and that the title of qalmmaqam
was never used in Kuwait.56
Many sources indicate that the purpose of Abd al-Karim Qasim's claim over
Kuwait was to rally domestic support for a foreign adventure that would alleviate
Qasim's problems in maintaining internal stability. Others pointed to the massive oil
wealth of the Al-Sabah Sheykdom, which, by 1960, was the world's third largest oil
54. Al-Samarrai, Bashir. Military Build up and Political Instability in the Gulf: 1965-1974. Ph.D.
Thesis. University of Denver, 1978, p. 45.
55. Al-Baharnah, Husain M. The Arabian Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and Their
International Problems, op.cit. p. 252.
56. Day, Alan J. op.cit. p.246 and al-Baharnah, Husain. op.cit. p. 252.
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producer. Kuwait's annual production, at over 620 million barrels, was nearly twice
that of Iraq, while proven Kuwaiti oil reserves were estimated at around a quarter of
the reserves in the world.57
Kuwait Requests British Troops
Five days after Qasim had laid claim to Kuwait and moved his troops to the Basrah
province in the south of Iraq, Sheykh 'Abdullah of Kuwait delivered to the British
Political Agent in Kuwait, Sir John Richmond, the following note:
In view of the military movements which have been undertaken by the
Iraqi government on the borders ofKuwait and which threaten the security of
Kuwait, I have decided to submit a request for military assistance to Her
Majesty's Government in accordance with the notes which I exchanged with Sir
William Luce on June 19, 1961. 58
The Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute became the most explosive issue in the region during the
early 1960s, and involved the regional powers in conflict. Britain, at Kuwait's
request, responded by sending 7,000 British troops backed by 3,000 more on standby
and auxiliary duties in the British bases in Kenya, Aden, Bahrain, Sharjah and
Muscat. The British operation, which was Known as "Operation Vantage", was until
the second GulfWar the largest British military operation in the Arab world since the
Second World War. Saudi Arabia also hurried to send some 2,000 troops to Kuwait
to support the Kuwaiti troops, which were estimated at between 2000 and 3000 men
compared to the Iraqi total of 60,000 armed men.59
The UN and the Iraqi Claim
The issue of the Kuwaiti dispute with Iraq was discussed at a special meeting of the
United Nations held on July 2 1961. The two countries' representatives in the United
Nations, Britain (on behalf of Kuwait) and Iraq argued their claims over Kuwait.
However, the discussions remained unresolved.
57. Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. p. 108.
58. Shwadran, Benjamin. The Kuwaiti Incident in Middle East Affairs, January 1962, New York, p.
10.
59. Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p. 83.
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'Abd-al-Nasser and the Arab League
The United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) which supported Kuwait's
independence but also opposed the British intervention, called for the problem to be
resolved within the Arab League.60 Discussions over the Kuwaiti crisis ended in
deadlock when the Soviet Union voted against the Kuwaiti application for full
membership in the United Nations. The Soviet representative accused Kuwait of not
being fully independent and still being subject to continuing political and military
domination of the British government.6l The Arab League Council engaged in
discussions over the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute on 5 July 1961 and, as a result of a draft
produced by Morocco and Saudi Arabia, the members of the Arab League voted
unanimously to admit Kuwait as a member of the Arab League, despite strong
protests from Iraq who withdrew from the League and declared, in many
communiques, that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq.
The Arab league adopted on the issue of the Kuwait crisis the following points:
1. (a) The government of Kuwait undertakes to request the withdrawal of British
forces from Kuwait territory as soon as possible, (b) The government of the
Republic of Iraq undertakes not to use force in the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq.
2. The Council undertakes to support every wish Kuwait may express for union or a
federation with other countries of the Arab League.
3. The Council decides to welcome the State of Kuwait as a member of the Arab
League.
4. The Council decides to assist the State of Kuwait in joining the United Nations.
5. The Arab states undertake to provide effective assistance for the preservation of
Kuwait's independence, upon its request, and the Council confers upon the Secretary-
60. Reaction from the Arab world was overwhelmingly pro-Kuwait. Egypt's Nasser, politically at odds
with Qasim of Iraq, publicly expressed support of the Al-Sabah, and Saudi Arabia sent troops to
Kuwait. The Arab and International support (especially from Britain) for Kuwait persuaded the
Iraqi regime not to invade Kuwait. See Kechichian, Joseph A. Security Efforts in the Arab World:
A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations, op.cit. p. 9. See also Al-Aqqad, Salah.
op.cit. p. 380.
61. Litwak, Robert. Security in the Persian Gulf2: Sources ofInter-State Conflict. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower, London, 1981, p. 27.
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General the power to take the necessary measures for the urgent implementation of
this resolution.62
With the acceptance by the Kuwait government of the Arab League decisions,
3,000 men headed by a Saudi commander and consisting of troops from Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic arrived in Kuwait by
mid-September to replace the British troops there. Britain completed her withdrawal
in October 1961.63
The Coup of 1963 and the Iraqi Recognition
The dispute between Iraq and Kuwait did not witness any development until the
overthrow of the Qasim regime on 8 February 1963. This was replaced by a new
military group headed by 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif. Relations between Iraq and Kuwait
improved and the new Iraqi regime agreed to conclude an agreement with the Sheykh
of Kuwait. On 4 October 1963 a document confirming Iraqi recognition was signed
in Baghdad by Sheykh Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and heir
apparent, and Major-General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, the Prime Minister of Iraq. The
two countries agreed on the following accord:
1. The Republic of Iraq recognises the independence and complete sovereignty of
the state of Kuwait and its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime
Minister of Iraq dated 21.7.1932 and which the ruler of Kuwait, in his letter dated
10 August 1932, accepted.
2. The two Governments shall work towards reinforcing the fraternal relations
subsisting between the two sister countries, inspired by their national duty,
common interest and aspiration to complete Arab Unity.
3. The two Governments shall work towards establishing cultural, commercial and
economic co-operation between the two countries and the exchange of technical
information.
62. Lauterpacht, E and others (eds). The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents. Grotius Publications
Limited, Cambridge, 1991, p. 55.
63. Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p. 85.
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4. In order to realise all the foregoing objectives, they shall immediately establish
diplomatic relations between them at the level of ambassador.64
Some sources indicate that Iraq's charge to Kuwait for its recognition and
territorial definition was an interest-free loan to be repaid over 25 years. Even the
size of the loan is in dispute, with figures ranging between $15 million, $85 million
and 30 million Kuwaiti dinars.65
Iraq Requests Warbah and Bubiyan
Despite the recognition and territorial definition agreement of 1963 between Iraq and
Kuwait, the Iraqi recognition did not extend to acceptance of a precise delimitation of
the boundary. The two countries did not reach any solution to the Iraqi request to
cede or lease the two islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. The Kuwaiti government
rejected any discussion over the two islands until the government of Iraq had
demarcated the boundary with Kuwait.
Until the crisis of 2 August 1990, Iraqi governments refused to draw the
boundary with Kuwait until it ceded or leased the two islands (it should be noted that
no Iraqi official council had ratified the agreement of 1963 between Kuwait and
Iraq).66 Kuwait became the 111th member of the United Nations on May 14 1963
after her first two attempts were vetoed by the Soviet Union. Relations between Iraq
and Kuwait improved in many aspects, especially when Kuwait asked the Arab
League to withdraw its force in 1963. The two countries established many
committees to deal with different affairs, particularly the boundary between them.
However, the two countries did not reach any compromise on the frontier position.67
64. Schofield, Richard. Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. pp. 111-
112.
65. Kelly, J.B. Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy.
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, p. 277, and al-Baharnah, Husain. op.cit. p. 252 and al- Aqqad,
Salah. op.cit. p. 382.
66. Schofield, Richard "The Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, and Iraqi access to the Gulf."
op.cit. pp. 166-169 and Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p. 87.
67. Finnie, David H. op.cit. pp. 149-150.
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The Coup of 1968
On 30 July 1968, the 'Abd al-Rahman 'Arif regime was overthrown by a faction of
the Ba'thist party. The new regime did not change the status quo towards the dispute
with Kuwait, because of the confrontation with Iran over the Shatt el-'Arab. But the
Iraqi claim to the two islands continued during the early 1970s. As a result of Iranian
pressure on the Shatt el-'Arab at the end of the 1960s the Iraqi Defence and Interior
Ministers visited Kuwait and requested to be allowed to control the two islands of
Warbah and Bubiyan to protect the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. The Iraqi Foreign
Minister Murtada 'Abd Al-Baqi made a visit to Kuwait, and presented a scheme for
the settlement of the border question. The Iraqis proposed to recognise a boundary
delimitation based on the 1932 and 1963 agreements, on condition that Kuwait
recognise cession of the two islands in favour of Iraq. However, the Kuwaiti
government rejected the Iraqi proposal.68 Later in 1972 and in 1973, the Iraqi
government returned to their demand that Kuwait should cede Warbah and Bubiyan.
Kuwait Rejects the Iraqi Requests over the Two Islands
The Kuwait government rejected all the Iraqi demands on the two islands and
declared that it was not prepared to demarcate any boundary with Iraq other than that
set out in the 1932 and 1963 agreements.69 In an interview given by the Iraqi foreign
Minister 'Abd Al-Baqi to Lebanese journalists and as a reaction to the Kuwaiti
rejection of ceding or leasing the two islands to Iraq, he claimed that:
the whole ofKuwait is a disputed area. There is a document saying that
Kuwait is Iraqi territory. There is no document, which says it is not Iraqi
territory.... We are giving up Kuwait for the sake ofthe two islands (Warbah and
Bubiyan) .... Iraq should be a GulfState.
68. Kelly, J.B. op.cit. p. 282.




Iraqi Troops on Kuwait Border
On 20 March 1973 Iraqi troops attacked a Kuwaiti police station at al-Samitah—
about two and halfmiles from the two countries' de facto borders, which resulted in
the death of some Kuwaiti and Iraqi border guards.70 It was reported that up to 3,000
Iraqi troops were positioned in Kuwaiti territory south of Umm Qasr at the time of
the al-Samitah attack. However, the Iraqi troops withdrew from al-Samitah on 5
April 1973, after a strong protest from Kuwait, an angry public reaction in the
Arabian peninsula and also Soviet advice that the dispute be settled peacefully. After
the incident of al-Samitah, the relationship between the two countries had
deteriorated and the border remained closed.
Saddam's Proposal over the Two Islands
On August 1973, the Iraqi vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council,
Saddam Hussein, made a proposal that Kuwait should cede Warbah and a two-mile
strip of a land from al- Abdall east to the Khawr al-Zubair, and half of Bubiyan
island, in full sovereignty to Iraq in exchange for Iraqi recognition of the demarcation
of the boundaries between the two countries. The Kuwait government's reaction to
the Iraqi proposal was negative, and it declared that there would be no discussion
over the two islands until the government of Iraq re-demarcated the boundary.71
Talks on the delimitation of the border made little progress over the following years
and the relations between the two countries did not improve until Iraq changed her
policy towards the Arab Gulf States after Saddam Hussein signed the Algiers accord
with the Shah of Iran in March 1975. This settled the conflict between the two
countries over the Shatt el-Arab.
Throughout the mid-1970s Iraq adopted a new policy of expanding her
economic and political influence to play a greater political role within the Arab Gulf
70. MEES. No.22. 23 March 1973, London, p. 16, and MEES. Issue No.23. 30 March 1973. London,
p. 14. El-Hakim, Ali A. op.cit. p.250, and Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p. 87.




States. The relations between Iraq and Kuwait particularly improved following a
number of conciliatory statements. Various joint committees were set up to deal with
many problems, especially the border question. In 1975, Iraq proposed another plan
to cede Warbah Island and lease half of Bubiyan island to Iraq for 99 years in
exchange for fresh water for Kuwait from the Shatt al-Arab. The Kuwaiti government
stressed in December 1976 that both the two islands belonged to Kuwait as defined
in the 1932 exchange of letters and in the 1963 agreement.72
During the period of 1977-1980, Kuwait tried several times to demarcate the
boundary with Iraq but without any result. By two agreements in November 1979 and
May 1980 Iraq secured access to deep-water facilities for trans-shipment purposes at
Mina Shuwaikh in Kuwait Bay. The outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in
September 1980 led to a revival of the Iraqi claim to Warbah and Bubiyan islands,
when the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein repeated the Iraqi proposal of 1975 and
demanded that Kuwait cede Warbah and lease Bubiyan.73
Iranian Threats
The state visit of the Kuwaiti crown prince Sheykh Sa'd Al-'Abdullah to Baghdad in
November, 1984 resulted in the formation of a common boundary committee. Iranian
Radio claimed that Kuwait had reached an agreement with Iraq under which Iraq
obtained the use of Bubiyan and two other islands in the Gulf. The broadcast also
quoted a speech by the Iranian Parliament Speaker (later the Iranian President)
Hashemi Rafsanjani warning Kuwait "not to play with fire". He threatened that, if
Iran were to capture Bubiyan, Kuwait would have no territorial claim to the island.
Kuwait as a reaction to the Iranian threat deployed a Kuwaiti force on the island of
Bubiyan on 2 December 1984.74
72.Bishku, Michael B. op.cit. p.87 and Day, Alan J. op.cit. p.225 and The Encyclopedia of
International Boundaries, op.cit. p. 305.
73. Litwak, Robert, op.cit. p. 32.




As a result of the Kuwaiti support for Iraq (which was estimated at over $10 billion
in cash and the provision of 125,000 barrels a day during the Iran-Iraq war, the two
governments of Iraq and Kuwait held many meetings to settle the border dispute
between the two countries. Iraq, in fact, did not take seriously any discussions to
demarcate the boundary unless Kuwait agreed to cede to her the two islands of
Warbah and Bubiyan, especially in light of the Iranian attack on the Iraqi ports on the
Gulf and the occupation of the Faw peninsula in 1986. By the end of the Iran-Iraq
war, after Iran's acceptance of United Nations resolution 598 in 1988, many official
visits were held between Iraq and Kuwait. Kuwaiti officials were reportedly hopeful
that Iraq might go a long way to solve the border issue in recognition of the massive
financial aid which had been provided from Kuwait during the war with Iran.75
Iraq's Claim over Kuwait and the UAE
Relations between Iraq and Kuwait, following the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran in
1988, remained in the same position without any progress in settling the border
dispute. The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, in preparation for the invasion of
Kuwait and to win over Arab public opinion declared on 2 April 1990 that Iraq was
capable of destroying half of Israeli territory. Saddam also, during the Arab summit
conference which was held in Baghdad in May 1990, was able to make known his
demands after his war with Iran, which had been fought on behalf of all Arabs. He
claimed that every one-dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil meant a loss of $1
billion a year for Iraq, and Saddam accused some Arab countries in OPEC of
adopting a quota-busting policy within the organisation.
On 15 July 1990, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and foreign minister Tariq
'Aziz delivered a memorandum to the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Chedli
Klibi, complaining bitterly that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were operating
75. After the termination of the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, Iraq was left with a debt of $16 billion to
Kuwait. See The Encyclopedia ofInternational Boundaries, op.cit. p.306, and Schofield, Richard
Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes, op.cit. pp. 121-124.
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quota-busting policies within OPEC and accusing Kuwait of having extended into
Iraqi territory and stolen $2,400 million worth of Iraqi oil from the Rumailah field
during the Iraqi war with Iran.
Kuwait Rejects the Iraqis' Claim
The Kuwaiti government rejected the Iraqi accusation and called, in a memorandum,
for the solution of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute by an Arab committee, and stated that
Kuwait had attempted to demarcate the boundary with Iraq for a long time without
any positive answer from the Iraqi side. Kuwait also stated that the decrease of the oil
price was as a result of the international economic situation without any intervention
from Kuwait.
The Iraqi Invasion ofKuwait
After many unsuccessful initiatives to contain the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait
by the Saudi Arabian King, the Egyptian president, the King of Jordan and the
chairman of the PLO, Iraqi troops estimated at 300,000 invaded Kuwait on 2 August
1990 with the help of what the Iraqis claimed to be a group of Kuwaiti
revolutionaries, and overthrew the Al-Sabah monarchy. The Iraqi government later
claimed that Kuwait was a part of Iraq and announced that Kuwait was the nineteenth
province, to which they gave the title of Kazimah.76
76. Al-'Aqqad, Salah. op.cit. pp. 430-436.
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The Arab Summit in Cairo
The Iraqi invasion was condemned by the UN Security Council and, on the Arab
side, the majority of Arab countries. At an emergency summit held by the Arab
League in Cairo on 10 August, Egypt, Syria and Morocco backed a resolution to send
a pan-Arab force to defend Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states against attack.
They also voted in favour of imposing economic sanctions against Iraq. Many Arab
countries such as Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Algeria and Mauritania entertained
reservations about the Arab League decisions on Iraq. Libya, the PLO and Iraq
rejected the resolution. Tunisia was the only Arab country not to attend.77
Saddam accepts the Treaty of 1975
On 8 of August the Iraqi president, to secure his borders with Iran, agreed to accept
the Iranian conditions for a permanent cease-fire and to withdraw from Iranian
territory, to exchange prisoners and to share the sovereignty of the Shatt el-'Arab-the
main reason for the Iran-Iraq war, which had continued for eight years.78
International Coalition
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait continued until February 1991, when the American
troops with the international coalition troops, liberated Kuwait in the operation called
"Desert Storm". The UN Security Council, with the support of the United States,
issued more than twenty resolutions against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait.79
The International Commission
On 2 May 1991 the UN Secretary-General set up an independent commission as a
result of resolution 687 which was adopted by the Security Council on 3 April 1991,
77. Britain and the GulfCrisis. HMSO Publication Centre. London, 1992. p. 9.
78. Bahbah, Bishara A " Why Saddam Invaded Kuwait" in: Bennis, Phyllis and Moushabad, Michel
(eds.) Beyond the Storm A GulfCrisis Reader. Canon Gate Press, London, 1992, p. 53
79. Weller, M. Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath. Grotius Publications Limited,
London, 1992, p. 435.
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to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. The commission consisted of
three independent expert members besides the two members from Iraq and Kuwait:
Mukhtar Kosoma-Itmada Indonesia President.
Ian Broke Sweden Member.
William Robinson New Zealand Member.
Riyadh al-Qaisi Iraq Member.
Tariq Razoqi Kuwait Member.
Since being set up in May 1991, the Commission has held five sessions and most of
its operations have been dependent (in its delimitation) on the previous documents of
the 1913 agreement which was not ratified the exchanged letters of 1923 and 1932,
and the Iraq-Kuwait accord of 1963. The President of the committee formed by the
Secretary-General (Butrus GhalT) resigned after seven months from the date of his
nomination, on 20/1/1992. Kuwait sources mentioned that the reasons for resignation
were personal. A Greek Jurist Nicolas Flinikos, was nominated to replace the
Indonesian diplomat. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on 27 May 1993
to approve the 20 May 1993 final report on the Demarcation of the International
Boundary between Iraq and Kuwait by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation
Commission. On 16 of April the committee members had ratified the following
decision on the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq, the representative of Iraq not
participating in the vote:
1. That the boundary monument on the Iraq-Saudi Arabian border, Pillar no. 1, shall
be the starting point for the boundary along the Thalweg of Wadi al-Batin, and
therefore, the tri-point of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;
2. That the boundary south of Safwan shall be located at a distance of 1,430 metres
from the south-west extremity of the compound wall of the old customs post
along the old road from Safwan to Kuwait;
3. That the boundary at the northern end ofWad! al-Batin shall be the intersection
of the Thalweg of the Wad! and the latitude of the point south of Safwan;
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4. That the boundary south of Umm Qasr shall coincide with the location at which
the boundary line on map sheet 5549-1 of series K 7611, Edition 2 (1990),
produced by the Military Survey of the United Kingdom, crosses the western
shore ofKhowr Zhobeir;
5. That the junction of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr 'Abdallah shall be the one best
identified as the 1932 marker and transposed onto modern orthophoto maps produced
by the Commission.
The Commission further decided that:
A) The boundary line in the WadI al-Batin shall be a series of straight line segments
of about 2 kilometres length best approximating to the lowest point line in the WadI;
B) The boundary line from the point at the northern end of the WadI al-Batin to the
point south of Safwan shall be a line running along the common latitude of the
points; C) The boundary line from the point south of Safwan to the point south of
Umm Qasr shall be the shortest line between the points; and D)The boundary line
from the point south ofUmm Qasr on the shore shall follow the low water line up to
the location directly opposite the junction of Khowr Zhobeir and Khowr 'Abdallah.80
On 26 August 1992, the Security Council welcomed the report of the boundary
demarcation commission between Iraq and Kuwait by resolution 773.81 The Iraqi
member in fact boycotted most of the Commission's sessions, refused to deliver any
documents concerned with the border with Kuwait, and declared previous rejection
of the Commission's decisions.82 The most explosive element of the Commissions'
boundary demarcation was that it moved the Umm Qasr (the most important Iraqi
port on the Gulf) boundary to the north, putting all, or most of the naval and
commercial ports under Kuwaiti control in addition to many oil wells. Kuwait had
never even suggested that Umm Qasr belonged to Kuwait and all the Kuwaiti
goverment maps show the line of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi boundary as south of Umm Qasr.
80. Weller, M. op.cit. pp. 438-439. For more details over the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border demarcation, see.
MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.39. 28 June 1993. pp. D1 to D4. MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.39. 28 June
1993. p. Dl.
81. Mendelson, Maurice & Hulton, Susan, op.cit. p. 117
82. A SarjanI, Khalid. op.cit. p. 235.
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Kuwait welcomed the United Nations resolution of the demarcation of boundary
between Iraq and Kuwait and the Kuwaiti representative to the UN said: if Iraq does
not accept the results of the Commission, that in itself is an invitation not only to
maintain economic sanctions against Iraq but to use all necessary means to make Iraq
accept, even by force.83
The Iraq Reaction to the International Commission Demarcation
Iraqi reaction to the new boundary demarcation was announced, on the official side,
by the Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'Id Al-Sahaf who claimed that the Iraqi
People would never accept the new Iraqi-Kuwaiti demarcation according to the new
map of the United Nations and that he considered that the Security Council
ratification would transform the area into a powder-keg. The Iraqi minister accused
the Commission of being on the Kuwaiti side and subject to international pressure.
Minister Al-Sahaf declared that if Iraq was obliged to accept the boundary
demarcation with Kuwait, the Iraqi people would not be satisfied because Iraqi rights
had been abused.
The Iraqi Foreign Minister made it clear, in a long memorandum to the
United Nations Secretary-General, that he considered that the international
Commission of Border Demarcation was dependent, in its work, on the 1963 accord,
which was not legitimate and had not been signed by the Iraqi President.
83. Kuwait has recaptured 11 oil wells previously occupied and operated by Iraq in the Rutqa area of
northern Kuwait following the demarcation of the UN Commission. The Kuwaiti Oil Minister
claims that eight of the 11 wells were located south of the "Arab League Line" where a contingent
of forces from Arab League member countries was stationed following the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border




On the other side of this, all opposition parties to the Iraqi regime rejected the
new boundary demarcation between Iraq and Kuwait and called, in separate
communiques, on the United Nations not to ratify the international commission
report.84
84. In June 1992 the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmed al-Samarai warned that "imposing the
border by force would leave the region in a state of boiling tension". In November 1992, Iraqi Oil
Minster Osama al-HItl said the six wells belonged to Iraq "and will remain Iraqi". He said
Baghdad was keeping a close eye on its border oilfields and if a neighbouring country (Kuwait)
tried to increase production from one, "We will insist on having our full share. See Pike, David
"Cross-border hydrocarbon reserves" op.cit. p. 192, and Al-SarjanT, Khalid. op.cit. p. 235.
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The U.N.'s Involvement
The government of Kuwait after the termination of the UN Commission's
demarcation of the boundary with Iraq, started to build a 240-km border-ditch,
fortified with 1.3 million Iraqi-planted land mines recovered since 1991.85 The
second Gulf war (1990-1991) led to very serious precedents being set regarding
border disputes, since it has always been the case in modern history that border
demarcation should be made by a committee nominated by the United Nations
without a request from the two concerned parties or authorisation of the international
organisation to undertake such a function.
This committee had to reduce a part of the Iraqi territories along the border in
favour of Kuwait. As a result of the committee's decisions the movement of Iraq has
been restricted in the port ofUmm Qasr, and Iraq has been prevented from exploiting
some oil wells in the Rumaila region, which were Iraqi oil wells before her invasion
ofKuwait.
Many reports indicate that the demarcation of the border between the two
countries represents a temporary political situation, because the existing system had a
bad relationship with the United Nations and the Great Powers, and was unacceptable
to international public opinion. Whatever the evaluation of the Iraqi regime, it will
vanish one day, and the Iraqi people will continue to feel oppressed by this way of
demarcating their borders with Kuwait. It is expected that, in the long run, the dispute
between the two parties will arise again because Iraq has been forced to accept the
border demarcation with Kuwait and the fait accompli policy. 86
85. Jane's Sentinel Newsletter. The Gulf States. Vol.2. No.12. 1995. p. 8.
86. It should be noted that Iraq, with or without Saddam Hussein, will continue to be obsessed with the
vulnerability of its narrow access to the Gulf. Iraq has only about 40 miles of coastline and it will
always want access to or control of the two Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. Those two
islands would double Iraq's coastline and give it control of both banks of the Khaur Abdullah,
bringing major influence in the Gulf. See Katzman, Kenneth "Beyond Dual Containment"op.cit.
p. 22, and Al-'Aqqad, Salah "Al-Itar al-Tarikhl Li-Mushkilat al-Hudud al-'Arabiwah" Maiallat
al-Sivasah a-Duwaliwah (International Politicts) Issue No. 111. January 1993. The Political and
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Chapter Six
The Iranian Claim to Bahrain
Historical Background
Introduction
In the early history of Bahrain before Islam, Arabs and Persians dominated the
islands on account of their pearl-fisheries. Between the seventh and eleventh century
it became part of the Islamic Caliphate under Arab authority. After the downfall of
the Abbasid Caliphate, the islands of Bahrain were subject to various independent
Arab dynasties until the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese
occupied them.
Portuguese rule in the islands lasted from 1522 to 1602. With the defeat of the
Portuguese in 1602, the islands came under the domination of the Persians until
1783. However, control was wrested away from the Persians by various Sheykhs,
who occupied Bahrain for short periods. The Sultan of Muscat held Bahrain in 1718
and 1720.87
The modem history of Bahrain as an independent Emirate dates from 1783,
when the 'Utubi Arab Sheykhs from Zubarah on the Qatar coast conquered the
islands and expelled the Persian garrison. Sovereignty over the islands is still in the
hands of the descendants of the 'Utubi tribe, who are known, at the present time, as
Al-Khallfah.88 The controversy over the sovereignty of the islands between Britain
(the protector of Al-Khallfah) and the Persians is based on many arguments over
legitimacy. The Persian argument concentrates on her long-established ancient title
over the islands, on the British acknowledgement of the Persian right of sovereignty
and on the doctrine of international law that a territory belonging to a sovereign state
cannot be lawfully detached so long as its annexation by another state has not been
87. Al-Baharna, Husain M. The Arab Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and Their
International Problems, op.cit. p. 167.
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officially recognised by the lawful owner of the territory. The arguments of Britain
against the Persian claim are based on the assertion that Bahrain is an independent
state and therefore at liberty to place herself under British protection, that Britain has
never recognised the Persian sovereignty over the island and that international law
does not recognise the principle that the consent of the dispossessed state is necessary
to validate a change of sovereignty. 89
Iranian Claim
The Persian claim of sovereignty over the islands of Bahrain goes back to the
agreement of 1820, when the British government concluded a treaty with Bahrain,
which was also concluded with the other Sheykhs of the Arab Gulf. As a result of the
Persian claim on Bahrain and with the intention of finding some solution to the
Persian-British dispute, the British Political Resident (Bruce) in the Gulf concluded,
on 30 August 1822, an agreement with the governor of Shiraz, Zaki Khan. The
agreement comprised five articles. The second article starts with the positive
statement that the island of Bahrain "has always been subordinate to the province of
Fars". The same article also confirms that the tribe of Bani 'Utubl, the possessors of
the island, "who have lately become unruly and disobedient", had applied to the
commanding officer of the British forces for a distinguishing flag. This flag, if it had
been granted, was to be withdrawn and no assistance was to be rendered (by the
British) to the Bani 'Utubl thereafter. In articles 4 and 5, the British government was
committed to supplying Persia with war vessels for the purpose of conquering
Bahrain.90
It should be noted that the Government of Bombay entirely disapproved of
Bruce's journey to Shiraz. Later, the British government in Bombay disapproved the
agreement of 30 August 1822, in a statement issued by the Governor, Mount Stuart
88. Kelly J.B "The Persian Claim to Bahrain" International Affairs. Vol. 33. Royal Institute of
International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1957, p. 53.
89. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. Bahrain Islands A Legal and Diplomatic Study of the British-Iranian
Controversy. Fredrick A. Praeger, Inc, New York, 1955, pp. 204-205.
90. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. op.cit. pp. 106-108.
349
Chapter Six
Elphinstone. He wrote to Bruce and told him that his action was not only un¬
authorised, but entirely inconsistent with the views of the government and with the
"obligation of the public faith". The Shah of Persia also rejected the agreement and
declared that it had been made without his knowledge or injunction.9l
Persia, until 1845, did not make an effective claim to the islands. The most
important Persian claim was renewed in 1845, when the Prime Minister of Persia,
Haji Mirza AghassI, had issued a statement on March 15 1844, which listed the
following arguments in favour of Persia, based on many evidences proving the right
of Persia to the ownership of the islands. Mirza's argument concentrates on the
following claims:
(I) The Persian Gulf from the commencement of the Shatt al-Arab to Muscat
belongs to Persia, and that all the islands of that sea, without exception, and
without the participation of any other government, belong entirely to Persia as
indeed, in Your Excellency's language, you call that sea the Persian Gulf.
(II) Bahrain has been under the authority of the governor of Fars from 1300 A.D.
In the commencement of the reign of his Majesty the late Shah, the Arab Bani
' Atub came and conquered it. 'From the tribe itself. . . presents have generally
been sent to the governor of Fars.'
(III) All European and Turkish books of geography, as well as the books of
travellers, considered Bahrain as Persian.
(IV) Bruce's agreement of 30 August 1822 recognised Persia's ownership of
Bahrain.
A further argument presented by Persia in support of her claim is the alleged
declaration of loyalty and the payment of tribute by the rulers of Bahrain to the
government of Persia.92
91. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. op.cit. p. 106, and Day, Alan J. Border and Territorial Disputes. Longman,
London, 2nd edn, 1987, p. 227.
92. Al-Baharna, Husain M. op.cit. pp. 167-170.
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Britain Rejects the Iranian Claim
The British government's attitude to the Persian Prime Minister's statement over
Bahrain was to reject it with another statement issued by the East India Company
Committee on July 31 1845. The British statement contains, inter alia, the following:
(I) that the British government had treated the Sheykhs of Bahrain as independent
authorities since their occupation of the island in 1783; (II) that Bahrain might have
been a dependency of Fars while the Persians were in actual possession of the island
but that to allege that the Persians possessed it since 1300 AD is contrary to the best
evidence that could be produced on the subject and; (III) the 1822 treaty had no legal
significance as it had been expressly disavowed.93
The Committee therefore concluded that Persia had no legitimate claim to
sovereignty over the islands of Bahrain. The Persian claim of 1845 was a response to
the critical period witnessed in the history of the ruling family of Al-Khalifah. During
that period the islands of Bahrain faced an internal conflict amongst the Al-Khalifah
family themselves. This resulted in some Sheykhs offering loyalty to Persia in return
for her assistance and assistance, from the sultan of Muscat. There was also an
external threat from the Wahhabis, Omanis and the government of Persia.94
The Iranian Claims During the 1920s
After 1845 no development was effected concerning the relationship between Britain
and Persia over the sovereignty of the islands. However, during the 1920s, the
government of Persia dispatched two notes of protest against Britain. The first
Persian protest note over Bahrain was dated 22 November 1927, when Britain
concluded the agreement of Jeddah with Ibn Sa'ud on 20 May 1927. The Persian
claim concentrated on article 6 of the agreement in which reference was made to the
maintenance of friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of Kuwait and
Bahrain. 95 The second Persian protest was dated 2 August 1928.
93. Day, Alan, op.cit. p. 228.
94. Kelley. J.B. op.cit. p. 60.
95. Day, Alan, op.cit. p. 227.
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The British government replied to the two Persian protest notes, and rejected
and denied both of them. The two British notes, dated 18 January 1928 and 18
February 1929, denied emphatically that there were any valid grounds upon which
the claim of the Persian government to the sovereignty over Bahrain was or could be
based. The British government, since 1783, said they had played a significant role in
protecting the Al-Khallfah sovereignty over the islands against the Persians,
Wahhabis and the Sultan ofMuscat 96
The Iranian Claims During the 1930s
The government of Iran renewed its claim in 1934, the first protest being against the
American government, when it stated that the concession granted to the standard Oil
Company in Bahrain could not be recognised as it had not been obtained in Tehran.
The second protest was against the British government and referred to the
establishment of a British base in Bahrain.
Iran's affiliation with Bahrain
The British-Iranian controversy was again revived in the Iranian press during the oil
crisis of 1950. In December 1952, an officially-published list of Persian electoral
districts included the Bahrain islands and in November 1957, Bahrain was specified
as one of the areas covered by the new Persian administration of the Ports and Islands
in the Persian Gulf. Bahrain became the fourteenth province in Iran's new
administrative plan, and the giving of two seats in the Iranian Parliament to Bahrain
followed this. These were filled by two Bahrainis of Iranian origin, 'Abdullah al-
Zubrah and 'Abd-al-Hamid Al-'Aliwat. During the 1950s, Bahrain was subjected to
more pressure from Iran and also from some citizens of Persian origin. Passports
issued by Bahrain were not recognised in Iran, and when Bahraini citizens entered
96. Al-Baharna, Husain M. op.cit. pp. 176-177.
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Iran, their passports were withdrawn and a domestic pass was issued instead, and
they could not leave if required for military service.97
The Iranian claim to Bahrain has been based from time to time on the following
grounds:
(a) The history of Bahrain prior to 1783. Iran has contended that Bahrain formed part
of Iran continuously except for the period of Portuguese occupation.
(b) The absence of Iranian consent to the detachment of Bahrain from Iran.
(c) The un-ratified agreement of 1822 between the Prince-Govemor of Shiraz and
Captain Bruce, the British Resident.
(d) The gold coin alleged to have been struck in Bahrain in 1817.
(e) Payment of Peshkesh (offerings or tribute) by the Sheykh of Bahrain to Iran from
time to time.
(f) The flying of the Iranian flag by Bahrain from time to time.
(g) Letters from past Rulers of Bahrain admitting Iranian sovereignty.
(h) The "Clarendon" letter of 1869.
(i) The closeness of relations between Iran and Bahrain.98
Britain Rejects the affiliation
The British government has never admitted the Iranian claim and their argument is
based on the following:
(a) That it manifestly absurd. The modem historical view is that from the eleventh to
the sixteenth century Bahrain was an independent State. Although Iran controlled
Bahrain at times from the end of the sixteenth century until 1783, this control was
neither continuous nor unchallenged.
97. Burell, R.M. "Britain, Iran and the Persian Gulf: Some aspect of the Situation in the 1920s and
1930s" in. Hopwood, Derek The Arabian Peninsula Society and Politics. George Allen and
Unwin Ltd, London, 1972, p.p. 183-184. See also Al-Gharreb, 'Abdullah M. Waja Dawur al-
Majus al-Ab'ad al-Tarikhiyyah wa-al-'Aqalydiyyah wa-al-Siyasiyyah Li-al-Thawrah al-
Iraniyyah (n.p.) part one, 1988, Kuwait, p. 301.
98. (LR 6/14) (31 October 1967) Territorial Disputes Between Iran and the Persian GulfStates. Joint
Research Department Memorandum, p. 1.
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(b) International law does not recognise that the consent of the dispossessed State is
an indispensable condition for the valid transfer of sovereignty or for the
acquisition of territory.
(c) This agreement cannot be regarded as ever having been in force, since it was
repudiated not only by the Government of Bombay but also by the Shah, who
expressed his displeasure that the Prince-Governor of Shiraz should have entered
into any arrangements without his knowledge.
(d) There is no evidence that this coin was in fact minted in Bahrain.
(e) It was remarked in 1845 that payment of tribute, presents and complimentary
messages did not imply an acknowledgement of sovereignty, and in Bahrain's
case, have not been confined to Iran. Arguments based on such payments would
support claims, which could be made by Saudi Arabia, Muscat and Oman, Turkey
or Egypt in addition to Iran.
(f) Although the Iranian flag was hoisted in 1860, the Turkish flag shortly replaced
it. For a period, both flags appear to have been flown simultaneously. The flying
of the Iranian flag cannot therefore be regarded as conclusive.
(g) It is possible that letters admitting Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain were
addressed to the Iranian Government in 1799, 1816-17 and 1839, and almost
certain that this occurred in 1860. The only letters made available to Her
Majesty's Government appear to date from 1860, and little weight can be
attached to them since Bahrain ostensibly submitted to Turkey immediately after
hoisting the Iranian flag.
(h) Although the Clarendon letter was loosely expressed, it does not admit the
validity of the Iranian claim as the Iranian Government has contended. Indeed it
confirmed Her Majesty's Government's intention of continuing to hold the Rulers
of Bahrain to their treaty obligations as independent rulers.
(i) The closeness of relations between Bahrain and Iran is hardly borne out by Iranian
restrictions on Bahraini documents, stamps, visas. Much closer relations are
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maintained between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and, in a different sense, between
Bahrain and Her Majesty's Government.99
The Shah of Iran's Claim
The Shah of Iran restated his claim to Bahrain in November, 22, 1957, when he said
at a press conference in Tehran:
We consider Bahrain an integral part ofPersia... we would gladly accept
the allegiance of its ruler in the capacity ofthe first Iranian governor-general of
Bahrain.
The Iranian claim was rejected by the Arab League, which reaffirmed on
November 15 1957, that Bahrain was "Arab Territory". 100 The Iranian claim over
Bahrain became more intensive during the 1960s. With the British announcement of
their intention to withdraw from the Gulf region in 1968, the Shah's government
revised and renewed its old claim over Bahrain. The Iranian claim consisted of some
historical documents showing that the rulers of Bahrain had many times offered their
loyalty to Fars province and paid tributes (Zakah and Taxes).101 The Iranian attitude
towards the Bahrain question became more conciliatory during the late 1960s. The
Shah of Iran declared, on 5 January 1969, that Bahrain's inhabitants were welcome to
decide their own fate, although Iran would not want the island to be made over to
anyone else without Iranian consent.
The UN Referendum
At the request of both Iran and Britain, the United Nations Secretary- General, U
Thant, agreed on March 28 1970 to appoint a special representative to visit Bahrain
in order to ascertain the wishes of its population with regard to its future status. The
UN representative, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi (Italy) visited the islands of
99. (LR 6/14) (31 October 1967) Territorial Disputes Between Iran and the Persian Gulf States.
op.cit. pp. 1-2.
100. Day, Alan, op.cit. p. 228.




Bahrain between March 30 and April 18 1970 and, in his report issued on May 2, he
declared:
My conclusions have convinced me that the overwhelming majority of the
people of Bahrain wish to gain recognition of their identity as a fully
independent and sovereign state free to decide for itselfher relations with other
states. 102
The United Nations Security Council unanimously endorsed the report of the
secretary-general's special representative, and this endorsement was ratified by the
Iranian Majlis, by 186 votes to 4 on May 14, and endorsed unanimously by the
Iranian Senate Majlis four days later. The Shah of Iran's recognition of the islands of
Bahrain came as a result of the British intention to withdraw from the Gulf region by
the end of 1971, and he decided to moderate his position on Bahrain to consolidate
his relationships with Saudi Arabia (the second pillar of Gulf security) and with the
small Arab Gulf States.
From the early 1970s, by arrangement with Britain and the United States, Iran
became the "policeman" of the region with the support of the two countries. Some
reports indicate that Iranian recognition of Bahrain was given as compensation for
Iranian occupation of the three strategic Arab islands situated at the entrance of the
Strait ofHormuz (the Greater and Smaller Tunbs and Abu Musa).l03
Iran's Recognition of Bahrain
In June 1971, just prior to the Bahrain's independence and as a show of good will
from the Shah of Iran, the two countries reached an agreement over their continental
shelf boundary. The agreement drew a median line of approximately 29 nautical
miles, essentially equidistant from both shores but wedged between the other
continental shelf boundaries of Iran with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 104
102. Day, Alan, op.cit. p. 228.
103. Litwak, Robert. Security in the Persian Gulf2: Sources of Inter-State conflict. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Gower, England, 1981, pp. 43-44.
104. Martin, Lenore G. The Unstable Gulf Threat From Within, op.cit. p. 62.
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Iranian pressure on Bahrain became clearer when the Foreign Minister of Iran
visited the islands two months before their independence. The Iranian minister put
some conditions on the relationships between the two countries:
1. Iran desired to lease the Muharraq Air Base following the withdrawal of British
forces.
2. Bahrain should refrain from entering into any form of federation or similar
arrangement with Kuwait.
3. Bahrain should not interfere in Iran's claim to the three islands (the two Tunbs and
Abu Musa).
4. Bahrain should open its doors to Iranian immigrants and its markets to Iranian
goods.
The Al-Khalifah of Bahrain had to accept some of the Iranian demands,
especially the second demand, when it refused to join the UAE federation unless it
could assume a leadership position. In addition it accepted the fourth demand. 105
Relations between Iran and Bahrain improved during the 1970s as a result of
the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf region, and the situation remained without any
negative effects on Bahrain sovereignty until the fall of the Shah and the emergence
of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979.
The Iranian Claim of 1979
The Iranian claim over Bahrain became more insistent after the revolutionaries took
power, when a leading figure of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Sadeq Ruhani,
threatened that Iran would annex Bahrain unless it adopted an Islamic government
after the Iranian model. 106
The Egyptian President Sadat and the Iraqi government responded by offering
aid to Bahrain and the Arab Gulf States to counter the Iranian threat. The government
of Bazargan in Iran denounced the unauthorised statement of Ayatollah Ruhani. The
105. Rathmell, Andrew "Bahrain: The Pearl Loses It's Lustre" Middle East International. 28 April
1995, London, pp. 18-19.
106. Ramazani, R.K. The GulfCo-operation Council Record andAnalysis, op.cit. p. 7.
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foreign minister of Iran, Ibrahim Yazdl, declared that the RuhanI declaration did not
represent the official view of Iran and that he represented only himself. This was
followed two weeks later by a state visit made by the Iranian Assistant Prime
Minister for Public Relations and Transition Affairs, Sadeq Tabatabal.107
It should be noted that the Iranian claims and threats to the Island of Bahrain
still exist without any direct action except for the support and assistance of Islamic
Shi'a groups and clerics. As a reaction to the attempted coup in Bahrain in December
1981 by a group belonging to the Islamic Front supported by Iran, the Prime Minister
of Bahrain declared, in an interview, that there was "no internal danger in Bahrain,
but the external danger is Iran and the present regime in Tehran". He added that the
Iranian regime was inciting the Shi'ites in Bahrain and in the Gulf under slogans of
the Islamic revolution and with sectarian motives against the Arab Gulf states and
their regimes. 108
Since December 1994, Bahrain has not enjoyed social peace, though its
stability has come under threat. The Bahraini protest movement, especially in the
Shi'a areas, has come into bloody collision with the government security forces. The
government of Bahrain, during 1995, faced protest movements, fire-bombings, waves
of arrests, curfews and clashes between the security forces and the protesters. The
total number of people detained since the trouble started is said by opposition groups,
to be as high as 5,000. In January 1996 the government of Bahrain exiled three Shi'a
clerics ('Ulama').109
Several senior ministers in Bahrain have given interviews and have insisted
that the trouble has been instigated by a handful of foreign agents. The government of
Bahrain has pointed the finger squarely at Tehran with the support of Lebanon's
Hizbollah Party, and recalled her ambassador from Tehran. 110 The ruling family of
Al-Khallfah still faces a real threat from Shi'a groups who are supported by the
107. Litwak, Robert, op.cit. pp. 44-45.
108. Ramazani, R.K. op.cit. p. 34.
109. Jarrah, Najm "Getting Tougher" Middle East International. 14 April 1995, London, p. 11, and
Rathmell, Andrew. "Bahrain: The Pearl Loses It's Lustre" op.cit. pp. 18-19.
110. Rathmell, Andrew, op.cit. p. 19.
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government in Iran. Since the outbreak of demonstrations and fire-bombings, the
government of Bahrain has received assistance from many security forces and
intelligence officers from the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 111
The Iranian-United Arab Emirates Disputes over the Islands of the
Tunbs and Abu Musa
Introduction
The dispute between the UAE (Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah) and the Islamic
Republic of Iran over the island of Abu Musa (Sharjah) and the two islands of
Greater and Lesser Tunbs (Ras al-Khaimah) has brought new tension to the Gulf,
which has not enjoyed any type of stability for more than two decades. The tension is
caused by the difficult dispute in which each party claims its own rights and
sovereignty to the islands. Up to 1996 Iran refused to negotiate with the UAE over
any of the disputed islands except for Abu Musa, and, in the latter case, it has made
the condition that these negotiations must be between Iran and the Sharjah Emirate
and not the federal government of the UAE, in view of the fact that the treaty was
signed between Iran and the Sheykh of Sharjah in 1971 and not with the federal
government. 112
111. Jarrah, Najam "Blaming Foreign Agents" Middle East International. 3 February 1995, London,
p. 10.
112. Iran adamantly refuses to accept the 'Arbitration' of the dispute and insists that the issue is a
bilateral one that can be settled by direct negotiations, without preconditions or linkage of the two
Tunbs (the Greater and the Lesser). It therefore rejects any 'internationalisation' of the dispute
and involvement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The failure of the 1993 bilateral
negotiations between Iran and the UAE led the GCC states, the Arab League and the Damascus
Declaration States to decide that the matter should go to the ICJ. See. Chubin, Shahram and Tripp,
Charless "Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order" op.cit. p. 32. We should note that
there is some difference in the references in fixing the distance between such islands and the
Iranian and Arab Coasts. The Arab party believes that they are closer to their coasts and the
Iranian party that they are closer to Iran. See Al-'Isa, Shamlan. "Al-Khilafat Bayn al-Imarat al-
'Arabiyyah wa-Iran Hawl al-Juzur al-Thalath" op.cit. pp. 52, 61.
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The Claims of Two Countries
Iran and the United Arab Emirates (on behalf of the two Emirates of Sharjah and Ras
al-Khaimah) claim to have documents proving their historical suzerainty over the
Islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa. The Persian / Iranian claim to
the islands goes back to the pre-British period in the Gulf region. She claims that all
these islands were controlled by the Persian government at that time.
The Iranian Claim
This claim is historically dependent on the evidence that the Persian Foreign Minister
Haji Mirza Aghassi claimed, during the 1840s, that all waters and islands of the Gulf
were Persian. In the late nineteenth century Iran reiterated its claim when the three
islands were administrated by a section of the Qawasim tribe who had migrated to
the Persian Coast near Lingeh and when the Qasimi Sheikh and his followers
acquired the status of Persian subjects before the Persians captured the area of Lingeh
in 1887. The third Iranian claim lays stress on the British Intelligence Section map,
produced in 1886, in which Abu Musa and the two Tunbs are shown clearly in
Iranian colours, and which was presented to the Nasir al-Din Shah in 1888. The
Iranian government claimed that Britain took the islands from Iran in 1820, because
Russia and Germany were posing a threat to the Gulf region. Moreover, in order to
maintain security in the face of widespread piracy in the southern Gulf, Britain
pursued its imperial interests over the Islands by declaring that these islands belonged
to the Arab Sheikhs of the Trucial States and thus transferred them to the de facto
administration of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah when Iran was politically weak. 113
113. Schofield, Richard "Border and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the




The Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah claimed that the three islands of Abu
Musa and the two Tunbs had been controlled by the QasimI Sheikhs since the early
eighteenth century. These claims by Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah were based on the
fact that these Sheykhs used to collect annual fees from the pearlers and fishermen
who shared, with their Arab brethren in the Emirates, tribal linkage, family ties,
character, language and traditions.
Between 1750 and 1866 the Qawasim claimed that the islands were directly
under their control. They also claimed that since British control was established over
the Omani coast, the Qawasim Sheikhs had signed an agreement with Britain on 8
January 1820, stating therein that the three islands belonged to the Qawasim. Britain
recognised their sovereignty over them. 114 Documents disclosed by a British Agent
in the Gulf proved that the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs belonged to the
Greater branch of the Qawasim of the Trucial Coast, and not to the Smaller branch of
al-Qawasim who controlled Lingeh. 115
The British records, on the other hand, as Richard Schofield mentions in his
research on the historical background of the three disputed islands "Round Table
Discussion on the Dispute over the GulfIslands" in London in 1993, show that it was
not until 1877 that a Persian claim to the Tunbs was first formally entered and not
until 1888 that Tehran did the same for Abu Musa. Up until 1873 the British
Residency at Bushire had generally believed that the Tunbs belonged to Persia,
because of their close connection with southern Persia though the Qasiml-controlled
port of Lingeh. But, by 1882, Britain was apparently of the opinion that the Qaasimi
Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah held the title over the Tunbs, after the receipt of original
114.Taryam, Abdullah Omran. The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950-85. Croom
Helm, London, 1987, p. 65.




documents from the rulers of the southern Gulf littoral. 116 Britain formally
recognised the QasimT ownership of Abu Musa. in 1870 and the two Tunbs in 1880.
This recognition came as a result of the British treaties with the southern Coastal
Sheykhdoms in 1820.
The Background to the Dispute
The struggle between Iran and Britain (on behalf of the Qawasim) began when the
Persian government defeated the Qawasim of Lingeh in 1887 and claimed that all the
islands situated opposite Lingeh were under the authority of Lingeh. But at that time
the Persian government was unable to occupy the three islands, because of the British
protection of the Sheykhs of the Qawasim, who controlled the Islands before they
broke with their fellows on the Persian Coast in Lingeh in the mid-eighteenth
century.
During the first part of the twentieth century Britain encouraged and protected
the Qawasim sovereignty over the Islands. Following the end of the First World War
and after the division of the Qasimi state in 1920 into the two branches of Ras-al-
Khaimah (the two Tunbs) and Sharjah (Abu Musa), Britain tried to accommodate the
Persians by enabling the Iranian governments to discuss their claims over the three
islands ofAbu Musa and the Tunbs and Bahrain, in the 1920 and 1930s. 117
These Anglo-Iranian negotiations over the Islands, which lasted ten years,
failed and no compromise was reached. The two countries produced a draft, however,
which decided that the island of SIrri would be recognised as Iranian and Abu Musa
as Arab. In 1930, negotiations between Iran and Britain were broken off, because of
the British refusal to accept an Iranian claim to the Tunb islands. The Iranian
government, during the negotiations with the British delegation, offered to drop its
claim over Bahrain if Britain was prepared to recognise its sovereignty over the
116.Schofield, Richard. Abu Musa and the Tunbs: The Historical Background Round Table
Discussion On The Dispute Over the Gulf Islands. The Arab Research Centre, London, 1993, pp.
7-8.
117. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula during the
twentieth century" op.cit. p. 36.
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disputed islands in the lower Gulf. But the British government rejected the Iranian
proposals over the islands. The two countries resumed fresh negotiations during the
mid-1950s. Britain tried to conclude an agreement between Iran and the two emirates
of the Qawasim, Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah. However that too did not produce any
positive result. In the mid-1960s the dispute over the islands was renewed and more
complex negotiations began between Iran and Britain (on behalf of the Trucial
Sheikhdoms) over the demarcation of their continental shelf boundary were held.
The Negotiation of 1971
The situation over Abu Musa island and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs remained the
same until the British decision in 1968 to withdraw from the Gulf after three years.
Iran, with the support of the last British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir William
Luce, held negotiations with the Sheykhs of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah in
November 1971. The Sheykhs offered to settle the dispute on the following bases: (a)
a lease agreement, founded on recognition by Iran of Ras al-Khaima's title; or (b) an
ascertainment of the wishes of the Tunbs population (comparable with the Bahrain
ascertainment); or (c) a meeting of the two sides to exchange documents of title.
None of these was acceptable to Iran.l 18
Julian Walker, a prominent British boundary-maker in the southern Gulf
region, mentioned that in the discussion over the disputed islands held in London in
1994, all the documents of the 1971 negotiations had still not been published and
were not allowed to be shown, since the William Luce negotiations had used threats
to enforce Iran's claim over the islands. 119 The Iranian International Newspaper
Kayhan reported, on 9 November 1970, that Iran would not hesitate to enforce her
sovereignty over the islands if her claims were not recognised. Iran's intention to
occupy the islands had been stated by the Shah of Iran on many occasions. On
118. Documents ofArabian Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 28 July 1970, London,
pp. 5-6 and Schofield, Richard "Abu Musa and the Tunbs: The Historical Background".op,cit.
p. 10
119. Walker, Julian "Al-usus al-Tarlkhiyyah Li al-Niza ' Hawl Juzur al-Khalij Hatta Sanat 1971.
Nadwat Juzur al-Khallj al-'Arabi: Asbab al-Niza' Wa-Muttallabat al-Hal" Arabian-European
Studies Centre, Paris, 1994, pp. 68 and 147.
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February 16 1971 the Shah stressed that he would act "by force if necessary" if no
peaceful agreement for the islands was reached. In an interview with the Guardian
newspaper, published on 28 September 1971, the Shah said that "we need them (he
meant the islands); we shall have them; no power on earth will stop us". During the
Iranian occupation of the Islands the Shah claimed that he needed them in order to
protect the entrance of the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. The three islands are
valued by these two countries for economic and security reasons. The island of Abu
Musa contains a large number of oil deposits (in April 1993, and the Iranian
Parliament passed a law extending the limits of the country's territorial waters to 12
miles. A limit of 12 miles is significant considering the size of the Arabian (Persian)
Gulf and the close proximity of the Arab Gulf States. Control of Abu Musa could
also directly affect shipping. All of Iran's tanker traffic must pass through this area.
The island of Abu Musa lies at the mouth of the narrow Strait of Hormuz, through
which passes a fifth of the world's oil supplies, about 15 million barrels per day.
In the course of the British mediation the Shah of Iran was able to conclude a
Memorandum of Understanding with the Sheykh of Sharjah on 29 November 1971,
in which they agreed that Iran and Sharjah would share sovereignty over Abu Musa
island. But during the negotiations between Iran and the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah
over the Two Tunbs the latter failed to accede to Iranian sovereignty. Ras al-Khaimah
rejected the Iranian occupation, though it was in no position to resist Iranian power,
and was also reluctant to affiliate with the UAE in December 1972.120
120. For the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to Iran, see Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz. Political
Geography The Strait ofHormuz. The Evolution of Iran's Role (1970s and 1980s).Geography
Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1990, p.6. Harold
Hough ofJane's Intelligence Review states that "the Iranian military build-up in Abu Musa is part
of a greater move by Iran to spread its influence in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf rather than an
attempt to solidify its hold on the Strait ofHormuz". For more details over the importance of these
islands see Dabbs, Corbett "Abu Musa Island Dispute Between Iran and the UAE" Inter-net
Publication, pp. 3-4. As a reaction to the Iranian decision to extend their nautical water to 12
miles, protests were filed with the United Nations by Saudi Arabia on 25 July 1996 (A/50/1029),
the UAE in August 1996 (A/50/1033), Kuwait on 26 August 1996 (A/50/1029) and Qatar on 4
September (A/50/1034). A protest was filed by Germany, on behalf of the European Union. See
Al-Alkim, Hassan "The United Arab Emirates Perspective on the Islands Questions. Round Table
Discussion on The Dispute Over The GulfIslands. The Arab Research Center, London, 1993. pp.
28-29 and also Dabiri, Mohammad Reza "Abu Musa Islands: A Binding Understanding or A




Some sources indicate that the Iranian accord with Sharjah was due to a British
bargain with Iran to recognise the new federation between the Trucial Sheikhdoms,
which came to be known the United Arab Emirates. 121
The Iran and Sharjah Memorandum ofUnderstanding 1971
Neither Iran nor Sharjah will give up its claim over Abu Musa nor recognise the
other's claim. Against this background the following arrangements were made:
1. The inhabitants of Abu Musa were to remain as subjects to the laws and
legislation of Sharjah, but Iranian forces would occupy an agreed part of the
Island.
2. Revenues from oil produced from the Island and its territorial waters, within 12
nautical miles, were to be divided equally between Iran and Sharjah.
3. The Iranian government was to grant aid amounting to 1.5 million pounds
annually to Sharjah for a period of nine years, or until Sharjah's oil revenues
reached 3 million Pounds annually.
4. The agreement did not affect Sharjah's right of sovereignty over the island. The
Sharjah flag was to continue to fly over the Police station, and Sharjah was to
continue to administer all parts of the Island not occupied by Iranian forces.
5. Iranian forces were to arrive shortly in the agreed area of Abu Musa.
6. The Buttes Gas and oil company was to undertake exploration for oil on the island
and in its territorial waters. 122
Iran's Occupation of the Three Islands
The result of the previous understanding and the encouragement given by the United
States and Britain was that the Shah of Iran would fill the power vacuum in the Gulf
area in line with the Nixon Doctrine after the British Military withdrawal from the
Gulf region in 1971. Iranian troops occupied the islands of Abu Musa and the two
Tunbs on 30 November 1971, a day before Britain terminated her treaty relations
121. Martin, Lenore G. op.cit. p. 49.
122. Taryam, Abdullah Omram. op.cit. 184.
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with the Sheykhdoms of the Trucial states and two days before the formal declaration
setting up the United Arab Emirates on 2 December 1971.123
The Iranian policy of occupying the three islands on 30 November 1971, was
aimed at settling the issue in its own favour before the British withdrawal, and not
allowing the federation of the UAE to be launched before the issue was resolved. The
Iranian occupation was also a compensation for the Iranian recognition of Bahrain in
1971.124 In fact the Iranian occupation of 1971 came as a consequence of the three
years of discussions between Iran, Britain and the two QasimI Sheikhs of Sharjah and
Ras-al-Khaimah.
There was resistance to the Iranian troops in Greater Tunb and the clashes
resulted in the death of four Ras al-Khaimah guards and three Iranian soldiers. On the
other hand, in Abu Musa island, Sheikh Saqr, the brother of the ruler of Sharjah,
together with a number of Sharjah officials, welcomed the Iranian officials. Iran tried
to absorb all the Arab inhabitants on the Islands and let them continue to live there,
but 120 QasimI inhabitants ofGreater Tunb were expelled from the island to the Ras-
al-Khaimah mainland. 125
The Importance of the Islands
Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb have a strategic location near the
60 mile-long Strait of Hormuz, through which tankers carrying, at that time, half the
world's crude oil supplies had to pass. The islands continental shelf contains large
deposits of oil. The Tunb islands are respectively known to Arabs as Tunb as-Sughra
and Tunb al-Kubra, and to the Iranians as Tunb-e Bozorg and Bani Tunb. 126 Abu
Musa island is about 30 square miles in area, has three small oil wells and some
deposits of red-oxide; it lies near the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz, 35 miles off
the coast of Sharjah, and 43 miles off the Iranian coast on the other side of the Gulf.
123. Schofield, Richard "Abu Musa and the Tunbs: The Historical Background", op.cit. p. 11.
124. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. op.cit. p. 177.
125. AI-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan, The Foreign Policy ofthe UnitedArab Emirates, op.cit. p. 143
126. Day, Alan. Border and Territorial Disputes.op.cit.. p. 242.
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The population of the island fluctuates at about 800, and the majority of them are
Arab.
Greater Tunb is about 2 miles and a quarter in width and 9 miles in length,
and lacks fresh-water wells. Most of its inhabitants were exiled to Ras al-Khaimah in
1971 after the Iranian occupation. The Lesser Tunb, an uninhabited island with no
access to drinking water, lies 8 miles from Greater Tunb, and has a length of one mile
and a width of three quarters of a mile. 127
The new council ofministers for the UAE stated at their first meeting held, on
2 December 1971, that the United Arab Emirates repudiated the principle of the use
of force, rejected Iran's recent occupation of a part of the cherished Arab homeland
and advocated the need to respect legitimate rights and discuss any differences that
may occur among states through internationally agreed methods. 128
It should be noted that not all the Emirates were equally affected by the
consequences of the Iranian occupation. In fact some had close links with the Shah,
especially Dubai. The new federation of the UAE during the early 1970s, faced on
the one hand many internal problems between its members and on the other external
pressures from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Oman. 129
127. See Amirahmadi, Hooshang, "The Colonial Political Dimension of the Iran-UAE Dispute" in:
Amirahmadi, Hooshang. Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Gulf.
Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 13, and Taryam, Abdullah Omran. op.cit. p. 178.
128. Day, Alan op.cit. p. 242.











Al Jazirah Al Hamr<
tfjr Al KarrihamH
Adpaqdaqar
/A OAS ALW<HiSjjtiI?,fXl'O *NrFPNAn^|!«jW
Mp'.* ■ ■ ■SAmHah ^
Umm Al Quwain Rol Dadna
wl 'lyervOh
jabgDJd BSha'biyyat Sharm
















f y . id?i K i "1
^ ' —m> \JabalAimffph 1 [m
V ' sja.'biyyav-•


























■'vrst - ». ' 4.-.T . . ,/j. ?










Reaction to the Iranian Occupation
Reactions to the Iranian occupation were registered in many Arab capitals, as well as
in Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, in the form of anti-British and anti-Iranian
demonstrations. In Sharjah, an abortive palace coup in February 1972 resulted in the
assassination of her ruler. 130 The Iranian occupation of the three islands was
criticised by the Arab League, which claimed that the Iranian and Sharjah accord was
also signed under Iranian pressure and there was a threat to take over the island by
force if no satisfactory response to Iran's demand was reached. The Arab League in
its reports published on December 2 1971, the Arab League declared that the British
failure to act was contrary to her treaty obligations with the Trucial Rulers.
The government of Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran and with
Britain on November 30 1971 and described the Shah's action as a "flagrant
aggression in collusion with Britain".
The UN and the Iranian Occupation
At the request of Libya, Algeria, Iraq and the former South Yemen, a discussion of
the Iranian occupation of the three islands was held in the United Nations on 9
December 1971. The Iraqi representative claimed that the three islands had been
under Arab jurisdiction for centuries and rejected the Iranian argument of historical
rights, power vacuum and the strategic value to Iran of the Islands. He also criticised
the British attitude over the Iranian action.
On the other hand the Iranian representative declared that the Iranian title to
the islands was long-standing and substantial, since both maps (the old and the
modern one) and a highly authoritative encyclopaedia treated the territories as
belonging to Iran. The British representative at the UN, during the discussions over
the islands, explained that his government was satisfied with the agreement reached
130. Al-Omair, Ali. The Arabian Gulf: A Study ofStability and Integration in the Realm ofRegional
and International Politics after British Withdrawal in 1971. op.cit. p. 59.
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between Iran and Sharjah. The Security Council did not adopt any resolution, thereby
adjourning the issue to some future time. 131
The Saudi position over the Islands
The Saudi stand on the Iranian occupation of the three islands was lukewarm with no
strong protests. Saudi Arabia said that it did not expect Iran to behave in such a way.
Instead it hoped that Iran would reconsider her stand and work towards the future
stability of the region. However, according to some sources, Saudi Arabia, after the
British announced their intention to withdraw from the Gulf area in 1968, had
adopted a policy of rapprochement with Iran, especially after the state visit of the
Shah of Iran to Riyadh in 1968, which marked the starting-point of a new relationship
between the two countries. Saudi Arabia also during the early 1970s was able to
resolve its own dispute with Iran over the islands of 'Arab! and FarsI (more details
see Chapter 7, p. 392). 132
The British Position over the Islands
The British Foreign office, in a strong reaction to the Arab countries over the Iranian
occupation of the three Islands, argued, just one day before the treaty relations were
terminated on the first of December 1971, that it was impossible to stop the Iranian
action. But the Times Newspaper, on the 2nd of December 1971, criticised the British
government as "hypocritical" and said that the agreement was "as valid on the last
day as on the first". 133
131. Day, Alan, op.cit. p. 241.
132. For an account of the Saudi reaction see Foreign and Commonwealth Office memorandum, 28
July 1970 pp. 5-6, London. For the reaction of other Arab Gulf States, see op.cit. p. 7, and
Taryam, Abdullah Omran. op.cit. p. 186. For possible reasons behind Saudi attitudes, see
'AALAMAl-KHALEEJ. No. 46. April 1997, London, p. 1.
133. Day, Alan, op.cit. p. 241
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Iranian Occupation During the 1970s
After the British withdrawal in the early 1970s the Shah of Iran became the "police
man" of the Gulf region. The dispute over the three islands was frozen, on the pretext
of the internal and external threats envisaged by the new American policy of the
Twin Pillars (Iran and Saudi Arabia) in the Gulf region. 134
During the early 1970s the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah started to improve his
relationship with Iraq with the aim of exerting pressure on Iran. Iraq was the only
State in the Gulf which requested, on many occasions, that Iran withdraw from these
islands. Despite the differences between Iran and the UAE over the three islands,
relations between the two countries improved in many ways, especially with Dubai
and Abu Dhabi. The UAE saw Iran's occupation as a de facto action and was unable
to do anything about it except to reject the Iranian sovereignty over the islands. On
August 12 1974, following an official visit to Iran by the UAE Vice-President,
(Sheykh Rashid b. Sa'Id) the two countries concluded an agreement demarcating the
continental shelf. This agreement defined the boundaries of the two countries along
the median line in the Gulfwater. But the delineation of the territorial waters did not
include the islands over which the two countries claimed sovereignty. 135
The Dispute is Revived after the Iranian Revolution
The question of the disputes between Iran and the UAE (on behalf of Sharjah and
Ras al-Khaimah) resumed after the fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of the
Islamic Iranian revolution in 1979, when the Iraqi ambassador in Beirut issued a
declaration demanding that the Iranian government withdraw from the islands. The
Iraqi demands were rejected by Iran. 136
The first president of the Islamic Iranian Republic, Abu al-Hasan Ban! Sadr,
stated in March 1980:
134. Al-Alkim, Hassan "The United Arab Emirates Perspective on the Islands Question" op.cit. p. 28.
135. Al-Alkim, Hassan. Hamdan. The Foreign Policy of the UnitedArab Emirates, op.cit. p. 145.
136. Day, Alan, op.cit. p. 244
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Evacuate the islands? Who is going to take them? To whom do the islands
belong? Not to any one... in the south there is Abu-Dhabi, Qatar, Oman, Dubai,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia... to us these states are connected with the United States
and are not independent. At the end there is the Strait ofHormuz through which
oil passes. They (the Arab governments) are afraid ofour revolution. Ifwe allow
them to have the islands they will control the Strait. In other words the United
States would control the waterway. Is it possible to give such a gift to the United
States?... If all of them, the littoral states of the Gulf were independent, we
would have returned the islands to them. 137
In April 1980, in a message to the United Nations Secretary-General, the Iraqi
Foreign Minister called for the immediate withdrawal of Iran from the islands and
accused Iran of pursuing an aggressive and expansionist policy in the Gulf region.
Iran stated on the same day that its differences with Iraq went beyond the disputed
islands and that the Iraqi government was "under the control of Zionists and
Imperialists" while "pretending that it wants to preserve Arab interests in the region".
Also in response to the Iraqi demands, Ayatollah RuhanI stated, on April 1980, that
Iran would lay claim to Bahrain if the Iraqi government continued to demand the
return of the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs.
Some reports indicate that the Iraqi demands for Iran to withdraw from the
three islands came as a result of the Iraqi foreign Minister Sa'dun Hamadi's meeting
with the American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the United Nations in 1979.138
The government of the UAE did not take any formal action over the disputed islands
until 11 December 1980, when they dispatched a message to the United Nations
stating that while they desired to maintain good, neighbourly relations and co-operate
to maintain security and stability in the Gulf area, they insisted on the restoration of
their full sovereignty over the three islands and declared that they were ready to
negotiate with the Iranian government to reach a solution which would fully
recognise the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the islands in accordance
with the United Nations Charter and Principles. The UAE representative at the UN
137. Al-Alkim, Hassan "The United Arab Emirates Perspective on the island's question" op.cit. pp.
28-29. The Economist Magazine suggested in 1979 that the USA should occupy the three islands
as a means to force Iran to release the American hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran and
to enhance at the same time the protection and security of the tankers passing through the Strait of
Hormuz. See Hushang, Amir Ahmad! "Al-niza' al-Iranl al-Imarati al-Isti'mariyyah wa-al—
Siyasiyyah" Shu'un al-Awsat Strategic and Research Center, Beirut, p. 40.
138. Day, Alan. J. op.cit. p. 244
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asked for the distribution of this message as an official document of the United
Nations General Assembly.139 In a formal statement declared on March 28 1982, the
ruler of Ras-al-Khaimah and the members of the UAE Council said that their country
would not compromise or change its position regarding the three islands, adding that
"the three islands belong to the Arabs, about which there can be no discussion. Iran's
leaders know this better than others; no contact on this issue has been made between
them and us".
After the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran, the Iraqi regime reiterated its
call for the re-establishment of Arab sovereignty over the three Gulf islands. Saddam
Hussein, the Iraqi President, claimed that the restoration of Abu Musa and the two
Tunbs to the Arab homeland was a prime territorial goal in his decision to make war
on Iran in 1980.140 During the war, Iran used these islands for military purposes,
especially when the two countries started the Tankers war in 1984, and Abu Musa
used as a base for speedboat attacks on shipping and oil installations. From the early
1980s, Iran's developmental program on Abu Musa island included the construction
of an airport, roads, and civilian and military facilities. The prominence of these
islands increased after the Iranian President Rafsanjani visited them in 1993.141
The Iranian Action of 1992
From the establishment of the GCC in 1981 all the Council members recognised and
supported the sovereignty of the UAE over the three islands. The dispute over the
three islands did not progress at all until 1987 after a failed Coup in Sharjah when
Iranian troops had occupied the Sharjah part ofAbu Musa island, but in 1989 the two
countries agreed to solve the problem in accordance with the previous status quo of
the 1970 accord.
139. Day, Alan. J. op.cit. p. 344
140. Schofield, Richard " Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
Twentieth Century" op.cit. p. 40
141. Al-'Alkim, Hassan. "At-Usus al-Tarlkhiyyah Lil-Niza ' Howl Juzur al-Khalij hatta sanat 1971
Nadwat Juzur al-KhalTj at- 'Arabi: Asbab al-Niza' Wa-Muttallabat at-Hal. op.cit pp. 68, 147.
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The reason for the current Iran-UAE islands dispute came about when, in April
1992, Iranian authorities expelled from Abu Musa about 100 foreigners working for
the UAE government because they did not have Iranian visas. Later that year, in
August 1992, the Iranian authorities refused to allow foreigners without Iranian visas
to disembark at Abu Musa and forced UAE vessels to turn back. Iran's foreign
minister 'All Akbar Velayati played down the incidents as isolated actions of junior
Iranian officials. 142
In fact the United Arab Emirates did not announce her dispute with Iran for six
months. Their aim was to contain the dispute and reach a peaceful settlement with
Iran. However, some sources indicate that the United Arab Emirates delayed the
announcement of the dispute with Iran to coincide with the new American policy in
the Gulf region after the liberation of Kuwait, which came to be known as the "dual
containment" of Iraq and Iran. 143
Iranian official statements in April and August 1992 stressed the Iranian
intention to abide by what was agreed in the 1971 accord between Iran and Sharjah
and denied any intention of expelling the Arab inhabitants of the islands whose
Sharjah citizenship was duly acknowledged. 144
Sheykh Zayed's Reaction
Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan, the President of the United Arab Emirates, visited a number
of Arab countries following the Iranian action of 1992, to explain his country's view
on the Iranian occupation of the islands. Many of them have already aligned
themselves with the UAE in condemning the action, including Iran's regional ally,
142. Schofield, Richard " Borders and territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
twentieth century" op.cit. p.70, and Moberly, John "Renewed Tension in the GulfOver Abu Musa
and the Tunbs: Some Considerations Affecting Reaction in the Gulf and more Widely". Round
Table Discussion on The Dispute Over the GulfIslands. Arab Research Centre, London, 1993. pp
16-17.
143. The UAE issued a strongly-worded statement on 2 September warning that Iran's recent action on
Abu Musa could disturb relations between the two countries. MEES. Vol. XXXV. No.49. 7
September 1992. p.A8. For GCC and Iranian opinions See MEES. Vol. XXXV. No.49. 7
September 1992. p. A5, and El-Reyyes, Riyad Najlb. Riyah al-Sumum al-Sa'udiyyah wa-Duwal
al-Jazirah Ba'd Harb al-Khalij 1991-1994.op.cit. pp. 416-417.
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Syria. The Arab League, in September 1992, also affirmed the sovereignty of the
UAE over the islands. The Arab League affirmed it would give full support to any
measures taken by the UAE.
Some Arab states have tried to use the floor of the United Nations to intervene
in the dispute. Thus, the Security Council has received memoranda signed by the
GCC member states, Egypt and Syria, asking Iran to "end her occupation of Arab
islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates." in the Arabian Gulf. Many Arab and
Western media have described the Iranian actions on the three islands as comparable
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 145
The Iranian government's reaction to the decision of the Arab League was
announced by the Iranian foreign minister 'All Akbar VelayatI in the same month of
September 1992. He said that Arab protests over Abu Musa and Greater Tunb and
Lesser Tunb could open up a Pandora's box of territorial claims in the region. He
added that the islands in question were Iranian islands and the world should disregard
the United Arab Emirates' "invalid historical claims. 146
The Negotiations Between the Two Countries
After many attempts to resolve the situation of Abu Musa island, the two sides
commenced negotiations in Abu Dhabi on 27 September 1992. But the conversation
between the two countries broke down when the Iranian delegation refused to discuss
the UAE demands over the two Tunbs. The UAE delegation presented their Iranian
counterpart with the following demands:
1. To terminate her military occupation of the islands ofGreater and Lesser Tunb;
2. To commit herself to respect the provisions of the 1971 Memorandum of
Understanding with respect to the island of Abu Musa;
144. Moberly, John, op.cit. p. 17.
145. Amira Hamdi, Hushang "The Colonial-Political Dimension of the Iran-UAE Dispute" in: Amira
Hamdi, Hushang (ed.) Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonhs and Abu Musa in the Gulf.
Macmillan, London, 1994, pp. 12-13.
146. Taylor, Alan "UAE and Iran Irreparable Damage?" Middle East International. 25 September
1992, London, p. 12.
376
Chapter Six
3. To refrain from intervening in any way or under any circumstances or under any
pretext with the United Arab Emirates exercising her complete jurisdiction over
her sector of Abu Musa island;
4. To revoke all steps or measures which she had imposed on the government
organs on the island of Abu Musa and on the citizens of the state and on
expatriates who worked there;
5. To indicate a suitable framework to resolve the question of sovereignty over the
island of Abu Musa within a specified period of time. 147
After the talks between the countries broke down in Abu Dhabi on 27
September the government of the UAE decided to take their case to the United
Nations. They also issued a statement demanding that Iran end its military occupation
of the islands and confirm her commitment to the 1971 Memorandum of
Understanding with Sharjah regarding Abu Musa. After the Iranian refusal to discuss
the issue of the Tunbs and to resume any further negotiations with the UAE, the GCC
summit's communique of 1993 used strong language against Iran, pledging thereby a
"total support... for any peaceful means".
The United Arab Emirates employed such means to regain Abu Musa and the
two Tunb islands, and made it clear that Tehran would have to mend its ways
radically if it wanted to win the confidence of its Arab neighbours. 148 In its reaction
to the GCC communique the Iranian government accused the council's position over
the islands of being part of a Western-orchestrated campaign against Iran. Hashemi
Rafsanjani retorted that the Arab Gulf states had no reason to fear Iran or her arms
build-up, and warned that anyone who attempted to dislodge her from the islands
would have to cross a "sea of blood". 149
147. Al-Alkim, Hassan "The United Arab Emirates Perspective on the Islands Question" op.cit. pp.
32-33.
148. Taylor, Alan "The UAE and Iran Deadlock Over the Islands". Middle East Internationa 9
October 1992, London, p. 4.




Iran has declared on many occasions that the dispute over Abu Musa island
was an issue between Iran and Sharjah and not with the United Arab Emirates. 150 In
response to the statement issued by the GCC, the Iranian speaker of the Shura
Council stated that the Arab leaders of the Gulf could forget about history; before
they became independent of British colonisation these islands were, still are, and will
remain Iranian. The response of Iran to the Emirates' claims includes the following:
The Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb are Iranian and are an integral part of the
Iranian territories. The sovereignty of Iran over these islands is not negotiable; the
negotiations on Abu Musa island would have to be arranged within the framework of
the Memorandum of Understanding, in a way that achieves the economic, defensive
and strategic objectives of Iran in the Gulf; the question should be discussed without
superpower intervention under any pretext, and to prevent provocation of any
regional claims to international organisations. 151
The situation over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs has remained the
same without any talks being convened between the two countries since the last talks
in November 1995. The two sides failed to agree to negotiations in Doha even on an
agenda for competing claims to sovereignty. After the talks, Sheykh Zayed b. Sultan
of the UAE said his country was ready to settle the issue peacefully but blamed Iran
for the failure after talks. He threatened to submit the issue to the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague if the question could not be resolved by direct talks. 152
The UAE went into the talks with a four-point agenda: to end Iran's military
occupation of the islands; to abide by a 1971 agreement over the islands; to settle the
issue of sovereignty over Abu Musa; and to refer the whole issue to the (ICJ) if a deal
could not be reached. As regards Iranian reaction to the talks, the Iranian official
described them as a good prelude to better understanding with the UAE; Iran was
150. Walker, Julian. Al-Usus al-Tarlkhiyyah Lil-Niza' Howl Juzur al-Khalij Hattasanat 1971 op.cit.
p. 72.
151. Al-'lsa, Shamlan. op.cit. pp. 61- 62.
152 On 10 October 1992 the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ali Bisharati, made his position clear
when he said that Tehran would reject international arbitration and that "if the UAE wants to
submit this question to the ICJ it must obtain Iran's agreement; in that case we will make no
concession on this matter". See MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.3. 19 October 1992. p. A6.
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ready to sign a non-aggression pact to ease tension. As a result of the failure of the
negotiations of Doha, the Iranian admiral said his country was prepared to fight for
"80 years" over the islands.
Oman is the only member of the GCC which has offered to mediate between
the two countries. 153 The Saudi government's position over the disputed three
islands became more flexible when she supported, in a statement issued in 1996, the
sovereignty of Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudi statement called for
more direct talks between the two countries. It should be noted that the Saudi
position over the disputed islands had not been clear since the Shah of Iran's
occupation of these islands. The UAE Foreign Minister has rejected calls for a new
meeting with Iran over the disputed islands. The Minister said there was no point
holding another round unless Iran was going to offer something new. 154
The three islands have indeed become a national issue, making it impossible
for the Iranian government to negotiate any concession with the UAE. 155 It should be
noted that, since the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait in 1990, the West, especially the United
States and Britain, have exploited the dispute over the islands as a pretext to isolate
and sanction Iran's domestic and international policy. The former US Defence
Secretary William Perry warned in March 1995 that Iran had positioned chemical
weapons on Abu Musa. It was also claimed that there were 6,000 Iranian military
personnel on the Tunb island group and Abu Musa, and that they had constructed a
series ofmilitary facilities, including surface-to-air missile batteries, anti-ship coastal
defence batteries and the positioning of 155 mm artillery shells with chemical
warheads. 156
In late January 1997, the UAE protested to Iran's Ambassador in Abu Dhabi
after an Iranian vessel crossed into UAE territorial waters to tow a small vessel
153. The Economist Intelligence Unit. "United Arab Emirates Country Report" 1st quarter 1996,
London, p. 4-9.
154. The Economist Intelligence Unit. "United Arab Emirates Country Report" 2nd quarter 1996.
London, p. 10.
155. Amirahmadi, Hushang. op.cit. p. 18.
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carrying building materials. Throughout the early part of 1997 the UAE has
continued to seek support from the GCC and the Arab League for a swift solution to
the dispute either through bilateral negotiations or the International Court of Justice
in the Hague. 157
The Omani-Yemeni Border Disputes
Introduction
The Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia are the only two members of the Gulf Co¬
operation Council which have common borders with the Republic of Yemen. The
common border between Oman and Yemen lies on the common border between the
Dhofar Province in the south of Oman and al-Mahrah Province (former South
Yemen).
The border dispute between Oman and Yemen is quite straightforward when
compared with the other border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula. This dispute gives
a good example to others by the recent developments between the two parties, as a
result of which they resolved their border disputes and agreed to demarcate the
borders and to sign the border agreement in October 1992. The Omani-Yemeni
agreement coincided with an intensive conflict on other border disputes such as
between Qatar and Bahrain (over the islands of Hawar), Qatar and Saudi Arabia (the
al-Khufus incident) and Saudi Arabia and Yemen (clashes over the Saudi-Yemeni
border). 158
156. The US and Britain declare that they are supporting the resolution of the GCC that these matters
should be determined by peaceful negotiations rather than by the use of force. MEES. Vol.XXXV.
No.49. op.cit. p. A9 and Jane's Sentinel Newsletters'. The Arab Gulf States. 1995. op.cit. p. 7.
157. The Economist Intelligence Unit. " UAE Country Report" 2nd quarter 1997. op.cit. p. 13.
158. Kechichian, Joseph A. Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula Through the




Concerning the historical development of the borders between the two countries, they
refer to the old border line which separates the southern Omani borders (Dhofar)
from al-Mahrah Sultanate, which represented one of the southern provinces of the
Unified Yemen in 1990. In 1965 an agreement was signed between the British
authorities in Aden and Sultan Sa'id b. Taimur ofMuscat and Oman. The border line
was just an amendment of the previous border line which was called the
Higginbotham Line after the governor of Aden at the end of the 1950s and the
beginning of the 1960s. It was this line that was included in the agreements signed
between the Sultanate ofMuscat and Oman and the al-Mahrah Sultanate in 1954 and
1960.
The British objective was to draw the border between the two parties so as to
protect its local and regional interests in the eastern Aden protectorate and in the
Sultanate ofMuscat and Oman (during that period both Muscat and Aden were under
the control of the British government.) 159
The Political Development of the Dispute
British troops withdrew from South Yemen at the end of the 1960s, and the National
Front took power on 30 November 1967. In a first statement concerning the borders
inherited from the era of colonisation, South Yemen recognised that she adhered, in
all respects, to all the agreements signed between the South Yemen Protectorates and
the neighbouring countries. However, political developments in the Arabian
Peninsula, particularly in South Yemen, led to an attempt to violate the 1965
agreement. Many sources attribute such violation to three main reasons:
1. Developments in the structure and the nature of political power in South Yemen,
its application of global Marxist Ideology, its association with the former Soviet
Union and its attempt to struggle against what it considered traditional Arab
systems blindly following American and British colonisation.
159 On the history of sovereignty of Perim, Kamaran and the Kuria Muria islands, see El-Hakim, Ali
A. The Middle Eastern States and the Law ofthe Sea. op.cit. p. 18.
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2. The outbreak of the armed resistance movement in the Omani Dhofar Province
bordering Southern Yemen: this movement gained political and military support from
the government of the former South Yemen.
3. The government of Oman obtained external aid from Iran and Jordan in the
beginning of the 1970s and was able to eradicate all sorts of armed resistance in
Dhofar Province. The Omani military operations for elimination of the armed
resistance in Dhofar Province created new borders which did not correspond to the
border line shown in the 1965 agreement.
Aden Supports the Omani Opposition
The political and military developments resulted in a border between the two
countries, which contributed to the deep divisions between the governments of
Muscat and Aden. 160 The two countries' relations were seriously strained by the
support given by the South Yemen regime to the military activities of the Popular
Front for the Liberation ofOman (PFLO) in the Dhofar Province.
Some sources indicate that South Yemeni support for the PFLO was part of a
strategic aim to lay a claim to the Dhofar area, which had been historically controlled
by many Hadraml families.161 During the early 1970s there were major clashes on
the frontier and in May 1972 the Omani Air Force bombed South Yemeni artillery
positions across the border. During the mid 1970s, the border of the two countries
witnessed intensive clashes and the Omani Air Force again bombed the centres and
stations of the PFLO in al-Mahrah Province inside Yemen.
160. Abu-Talib, Hassan "Halat al-Hudud al-Yamaniyyah ma'a 'Uman wa-al-Sa'udiwah" Maiallat
al-Sivzsah a-Duwalivah (International Politics) (ed). Harb, Usama Ghazali. Issue No.Ill,
January 1993. The Stragic Political Centre, Cairo, pp. 214 - 215.




During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ideological tension between Oman (pro-
Western Camp) and South Yemen (pro-Soviet Camp) increased the hostilities
between the two countries. This was accomplished through mass-media campaigns
and through external interference, which led the disputants to provide military bases
and facilities in their territories. During this time South Yemen became a centre for a
number of Soviet bloc personnel. Reportedly some 16,000 Cubans and East
Germans, as well as 5,000 Soviets, were there as advisors. They assisted in the
construction of a military air base in South Yemen at al-Ghaydah, less than sixty
miles from the Omani border. 162
The Mediation of Kuwait and the U.A.E.
Since the establishment of the GCC in May 1981, two members of the council,
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, have played a significant role in mediation
between Oman and South Yemen. The Foreign Ministers of the two countries
arranged a series of meetings between them in Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, which
culminated in direct talks between the two sides in July 1982. After further
discussions, a four-point agreement was concluded in November 1982 on
normalising relations. These points concentrated on:
(a) a commitment to establish normal relations" and to form a "technical committee"
including Kuwait and UAE representatives, to discuss outstanding border
problems;
(b) an undertaking not to allow "any foreign forces to use their territories for
aggression or provocation against the other country";
(c) a promise to stop hostile media campaigns;
(d) an agreement to "exchange diplomatic representation" after bilateral contacts. 163
162. Martin, Lenore G. The Unstable Gulf Threats from Within, op.cit. pp. 60-61.




These committees did not make any progress as a dispute broke out between the two
sides over their relations with America and the Soviet Union. The two countries
continued participating in joint exercises, military manoeuvres and military training,
especially the Omani government, which carried out many joint exercises with
American troops on Omani soil. In October 1983, the countries declared that they had
agreed to establish diplomatic relations without making any progress on the issue of
the border. Negotiation was suspended as a result of the internal conflict of 1986 in
South Yemen. 164
Some unofficial sources mention that the Omani Air Force supported forces
loyal to President 'All Naser Muhammad in the Yemeni civil war in January 1986
and bombed Aden airport. It should be noted that 'All Naser Muhammad, when he
came to power in 1986, adopted a policy of reconciliation with the members of the
GCC.165
In 1987, the negotiations were resumed in a more congenial atmosphere after
'All Nasser took power. The negotiation process was affected by the lack of trust
between Oman due to the South Yemeni support of the PFLO. The negotiations over
the border disputes between Oman and South Yemen did not make any progress until
the two Yemeni countries (South Yemen and North Yemen) became unified as the
Republic of Yemen in May 1990.
164. Al-Taarlr al-Istratiilal-'Arabl 1992. "Azmat Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khalljl wa-Fath Malaff al-
Hudud fi al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah" Yassin, Sayyid. (ed.) The Political and Strategical Studies
Centre. Cairo, 1993, p. 198.




The government of the Sultanate of Oman started serious negotiations with the
Unified Yemeni state, in spite of the contradictory situation regarding the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Border negotiations began progressing well at
the beginning of September 1991, when the political leaderships in both Muscat and
San'a decided to take responsibility for the border problem in place of the joint
technical committee, a matter which encouraged the two leaderships to resolve the
main border dispute in less than two months, when the final borders were planned.
There was a minor amendment to the 1965 agreement, which was considered as the
basis for the border negotiations. This amendment changed the bending zigzag into a
straight line, a matter which persuaded Yemen to give up the policy of fait accompli,
as it meant that there had to be concessions from both sides in a way that satisfied the
two parties, and made neither a winner nor a loser. This was the basis for these
negotiations.
On 1 October 1992, the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman signed
the final border agreement in San'a.166 The demarcation agreement consisted of 10
articles which defined the onshore boundary as a straight line running from a point at
Ras Dharbat 'Ali on the Arabian Sea through the Habrut region to latitude 19oN and
longitude 52oE. The agreement also provides for the delineation of the offshore
boundary between the two countries in accordance with the provisions of
international law, the relative UN conventions, and the international law of the sea.
The Yemeni government ratified the agreement a week later on 7 October 1992.167
It should be recorded that the final agreement of the border between Oman and
Yemen was signed by Thuwaini b. Shihab, the personal representative of Sultan
Qaboos and Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas (from Hadramaut in South Yemen) the
former Prime Minister of Yemen. The Omani objective was to sign the border
agreement with one of the former South Yemen leaders in order to avoid the leaders
166. Al-Taqrir al-IstratHi al-'Arabi 1992. "Azmat Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khaliji wa-Fath Malaff al-
Hudud fi al-JazIrah al-'Arabiwah" op.cit. p. 198.
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of North Yemen making any formal agreement especially over the border issue (for
full text of the agreement see appendices p. 504)
The two countries have recently opened the border crossing between them after
25 years and have agreed to construct a new 250-km road link from Qishn and al-
Ghaidah in Yemen to Mazyunah and Thamrait in Oman's Dhofar province. On 28
September, the Omani government granted Yemen $21million to finance the
construction of the road. Oman also signed a contract with a German firm to carry
out a detailed survey of its border with Yemen under the terms of the border
agreement.
On 2 October 1990 Sultan Qaboos of Oman made his first official visit to
Yemen. Unfortunately the visit coincided with a deterioration of relations between
the Yemeni President 'All 'Abdullah Saleh and his Vice-President 'All Salim al-
Baid. This led to the Yemeni civil war of 1994.168 On 3 June 1995 the two countries
held a ceremony near the border. Both parties expressed their pleasure at the
successful completion of the project and stressed the importance of fraternal relations
and peaceful coexistence. A copy of the border agreement was subsequently
deposited with the Arab League in Cairo. However, in July 1998 the border
agreement of October 1992 between Oman and Yemen rejected by Saudi Arabia and
the situation over the boundaries between the three countries become more critical
over the Saudi claim of some lands demarcated by Oman and Yemen (For more
details of the agreement see the Appendix p. 499). 169
167. Schofield, Richard "Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
Twentieth Century" op.cit. p. 68, and MEES. Vol. XXXVI. No.2. 12 October 1992, p. A8.
168. MEES. Vol. XXXVI No.2. 12 October 1992, p. A8.
169. Boundary and Security Bulletin. Summer 1995, IBRU, University of Durham, p. 19. For more
details over the Saudi Arabia claim of August 1998 see the Reuter News Agency. Thursday 16
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Coordinates for Omani-Ycmeni Border
Point No. Latitude Longitude
1. 16° 39' 3.83" 53° 6' 30.88"
2. 17° 17' 7.91" 52° 48' 44.22'
3. 17° 17' 40" 52° 44' 45"
4. 17° 18' 6.93" 52° 44' 33.50'
4a. 17° 18' 8.87" 52° 44' 34.24'
4b. 17° 18' 8.42" 52° 44' 35.57'
5. 17° 18' 15" 52° 45' 5"
6. 17° 18' 21" 52° 45' 2"






Coordinates for Oraani-Saudi Border
Point No. Latitude












The Maritime Boundary Disputes in the
Gulf Region
Introduction
The Arabian (Persian) Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman
which connects the Gulf to the Arabian Sea, is some 500 miles long and between 50
and 200 miles wide. The depth rarely exceeds 50 fathoms. There are no significant
seabed features such as troughs or declivities, and all the countries of the Gulf region
share a common continental shelf. The issue of offshore boundaries in the Gulf
region affects all of these states.
The Arab Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates and Oman share the western shore of the Gulf, while Iraq lies at its tip and
Iran occupies its eastern shore. 1 The coastline of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf is nearly
2,000 miles (3,219 km) long. The main factor causing these countries to settle their
offshore boundaries was the discovery of oil. The presence of a large number of
proven and probable petroleum deposits in the Gulf ensured that the position of
maritime boundaries became important.
Following President Truman's proclamation of 1945, all the Arab Gulf States
except Saudi Arabia (all the Arab Gulf States during that time were under the
protection of the United Kingdom) issued proclamations in which they individually
defined their future policies in connection with the natural resources of the sea-bed
and subsoil of the offshore areas lying off their coasts. Saudi Arabia was the first
Arab Gulf country (28 May 1949) to claim that the sea-bed and sub-soil areas of the
l.Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf' in: Ocean
Boundary Making: Regional Issues and Developments, (eds.) Johnston, Douglas M and Saunders,
Phillip M. (eds.) Croom Helm, London, 1988, p. 204. The Arab Gulf states have no common
border with Iran.They share a large area of the Arabian (Persian ) Gulf. The division of territorial
waters between the countries seems easy from a geographical angle, but the matter of strategic
and mineral or natural resources is very complicated. Moreover, due to a long history of rivalry
between the Arabs, on the one hand, and the Iranians, on the other, the solution to any dispute
between them must include many psychological, historical, and social factors. See. Al-Asha'al,
'Abdullah op.cit. p. 76.
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Gulf contiguous to her coasts were 'subject to her jurisdiction and control'. After the
Saudi pronouncement all the Arab Gulf States (Sheikhdoms) issued similar
proclamations in June 1949.2 None of the Gulf region states are signatories to the
Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf of 1958.3 (Iran alone signed this
Convention but decided not to ratify it.) But they have all now signed the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
It should be recorded that all these countries had considered the "median
line" system as constituting the customary international rule for Continental Shelf
delimitation. Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Iraq have separately declared their adherence
to the principle of the median line via their national legislation. In 1993 Iran and the
UAE joined the system. The other two states which have not done so (Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain) have, in practice, acknowledged the "median line" norm as part of the
customary international law in the course of their offshore boundary agreements.4
During the early 1960s the countries of the Gulf region, as a result of the pressures
exerted on them by foreign oil companies in the region, agreed on Continental Shelf
demarcation on the seabed in Gulf waters (some oil companies were reluctant to
spend considerable amounts on the survey, exploration, and development of areas
whose title was still in dispute). Offshore delimitation in the Gulf region faced
obstacles caused by three major factors, the first being the presence of about 130
islands,5 most of which are small and uninhabited. The second obstacle is the
2. For more details on the development of the concept of the Continental Shelf in International Law
with special reference to the proclamations of 1949 see the Canadian Yearbook of International
Law 1984. "The Legal Regime of the Continental Shelf' and The Canadian Yearbook of
International Law 1985. "The Legal Regime of the Continental Shelf'. El-Hakim, Ali A. The
Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1979,
pp. 83-84. See Al-Baharna, Husain. Arab GulfStates, op.cit. p. 278.
3 The Geneva Convention of 1958 was the first multilateral Convention which embodies the
Continental Shelf as a legal concept. It resulted from the Conference of International law of the
Sea, held in Geneva from 24 February to 27 April. The Convention on the Continental Shelf,
which comprises 15 Articles, was adopted by the states represented in the Conference on 26 April
1958. See.Al-Baharna, Husain M. Arab GulfStates, op.cit. p. 286
4. Amin, S.H. "Law of the Continental Shelf Delimitation: The Gulf Example" Netherland
International Law Review. Vol. XXVII, p. 345.
5 The foreign oil companies played a significant role between the Arabian / Persian Gulf States on the
delimitation of their maritime boundary and most were settled by the end of the 1960s and early
1970s. See Young, Richard "The Persian Gulf' New Direction in the law ofSea. Vol.3. Churchill,
Simmonds and Welch (eds.) p. 234.
390
Chapter Seven
determination of the base-points for the measurement of the Continental Shelf and
the third is the preservation of the unity of hydrocarbon or mineral deposits. In
addition to these major factors there are some historical, political and strategic
considerations which influence the apportionment of the Continental Shelf between
respective Gulf States.6
It should be recorded that the output of the offshore oil fields in the Gulf region
is 3.6 million barrels per day, or less than 20% of the current output of onshore oil
fields in the Gulf.7 Since the settlement of the offshore dispute between Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain in 1958 a number of the required offshore boundary lines have been
definitively settled (for more details of the two countries' offshore development see
the Saudi-Bahraini dispute in Chapter 5. P. 261).
Another attempt to settle the offshore boundary disputes in the area of the Gulf
was made in October 1963, when the delegations of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and
Kuwait held a meeting in Geneva. The four delegations agreed on working together
to reach an equitable settlement of their disputes. In November 1963 Iran and Iraq
held discussions on the question of the delimitation of the offshore boundaries. The
meeting of the two states resulted in an agreement on 'a basis for joint exploitation of
oil in the disputed areas'. In April 1964, the Iranian government held a series of
negotiations with the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait relating to the
determination of the offshore boundaries between these countries. 8
6. Young, Richard "The Persian Gulf' op.cit p. 232. See also Amin, S.H. op.cit. p. 339.
7. Young, Richard "The Persian Gulf' op.cit. p. 236.
8. Al-Baharna, Husain M. The Arab Gulf States, op.cit. p. 294. See also Gault, Ian Townsend
"Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf' op.cit. p. 212.
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The Saudi Arabia - Iran offshore Boundary
During the early 1960s, as a consequence of Britain's desire to terminate her
influence in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and as a result of the discovery of oil in
tradable quantities in the Gulf offshore areas, the eight countries of the Gulf held a
series of negotiations covering their disputes about offshore boundaries.9
The offshore boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran concentrated
on the two islands of Al-Arabiyah and Farsi, small, waterless islets, 13 miles apart,
slightly close to the Arabian side, near the middle of the Gulf. 10 Since the early
1960s the two states had held many discussion meetings over their claim to offshore
and submarine boundaries, and were able to reach an agreement on 24 October 1968.
The agreement has three main provisions. The first gives sovereignty of Al-Arabiyah
island to Saudi Arabia and Farsi to Iran. A 12-nautical mile limit was given to the
islands and a local median line was constructed where the two territorial seas of the
islands overlapped.il The agreement also prohibited oil and gas exploration and
production within 500 metres of the boundary line. This agreement was the most
significant in terms of boundaries in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, and concerned the
longest such boundary in the Gulf region. The offshore agreement between Saudi
Arabia and Iran marked the termination of a period of dispute between the two
parties concerning not only the course of their Continental Shelf boundaries in the
middle of the Gulf, but also over the security of the Gulf after the British
9. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah of Iran adopted a flexible policy towards the Arab
Gulf States to settle most of the Iranian offshore (Continental Shelf) boundaries (in spite of the
Iranian occupation of the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs). The Shah's purpose was
to gain the Arab Gulf States approval and become involved in Gulf security after the British
withdrawal. During the early 1970s the Shah of Iran was the main pillar of Gulf security.
10. For more details of the dispute between Kuwait (supported by Britain), Saudi Arabia and Iran, see.
Documents (LR 6/14) (31 October, 1967) Joint Research Department Memorandum. Territorial
Disputes Between Iran and the Persian GulfStates. Appendix D, p. 10.
11. The settlement of offshore boundary disputes in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf cannot be considered
without reference to the principles adopted in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. The
Saudi-Iranian accord of 1968 came into force one month after the Judgment of the International
Court of Justice resolution over the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. See. Young, Richard
"Equitable Solutions for Offshore Boundaries: The 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement". The
American Journal ofInternational Law. Vol.64, op.cit. p. 152.
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withdrawal. 12. (for the full text of the agreement between the two countries see
appendices p. 527).
12. Since the end of the 1960s, the United States and Britain had prepared the two countries to become
involved in Gulf security. By the beginning of the 1970s, the two states were its twin pillars. See
MacDonald, Charles G. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea Political Interaction and
Legal Development in the Persian Gulf. Greenwood Press, London, 1980. pp.128-130. See also
Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf' op.cit. p.
212. In 1993 Iran issued a maritime law where she accepted the median system principle at the





The Kuwait-Iran offshore Boundary
Since April 1964, the two states of Kuwait and Iran have held many discussions on
their offshore boundary disputes. According to Hussein M. Al-Baharna in his book
The Arab Gulf States Their Legal and Political Status and their International
Problems the main matter of dispute appeared to be Iran's insistence on using the
Kharj (Khark) island as the base point for determining the Gulf median line (on the
ground that it was linked to the mainland by pipeline). In earlier talks the Kuwaitis
offered to accept this, provided that the Iranians agreed to acknowledge an equivalent
status for the island of Failaka off the Kuwaiti coast. The problem became more
difficult for Kuwait when Iran and Kuwait adopted a uniform belt of territorial Sea. 13
Until 1997, the State of Kuwait did not sign any formal offshore agreement
(except for the UN Commission agreement with Iraq) with any of the Gulf States.
The Kuwaiti-Saudi offshore boundary is still not officially settled, but some sources
indicate that serious negotiations between the two countries took place to settle their
offshore boundary disputes and conclude a final agreement over the sovereignty of
the two islands of Qaru and Umm al-Maradim. The Kuwaiti offshore boundary with
Iran has not made any progress towards settlement and this is due, in large part, to
the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1979. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian
government was reluctant to settle any dispute with Kuwait because of the Kuwaiti
government support for Iraq. 14
Qatar and Iran Offshore Boundary
Iran and Qatar lie on opposite shores of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. As a
consequence of her flexible policy towards the Arab Gulf States and following her
maritime agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1968, Iran agreed with the State of Qatar
(under the auspices of Britain) to delimit its offshore (Continental Shelf) boundaries.
The two parties signed an agreement on 20 September 1969. The agreement provided
13. Al-Baharna, Husain M. op.cit. pp. 295-296.
14 Kuwait and Iran held a discussion in early 1994 over their fishing rights at the neck of the Gulf, but
to date no formal settlemrnt has been reached. Further discussions were held in 1995. See Jane's
Sentinel News Letter. The Gulf States, op.cit. p. 10.
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that the boundary was delimited using the equidistant method, disregarding all
islands. The boundary consists of geodetic lines connecting the terminal and turning
points and prohibits any drilling operations on either side of the boundary line within
a zone 125 metres wide. The only location which is excluded is the Iran and Qatar
Continental Shelf on the side of Qatar, and the Bahrain Continental Shelf. This is
because of the dispute over this area between the two states. 15
During early 1990, the two sides' relations were affected by a dispute over the
ownership of the gas structures comprising the North Dome gasfield (known as the
North field in Qatar and the South Pars field in Iran) on the Continental Shelf of the
Gulf lying between the two countries. During 1990 and 1991 many meetings were
held to resolve their dispute, which were crowned by the signing of many bilateral
agreements. The gasfield dispute was settled by their agreement to a joint
exploration. 16
Some sources indicate that the government of Qatar improved her relations
with Iran during the early 1990s in order to gain Iranian support over her difficulties
with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and because she did not want to face an international
boundary conflict with Iran as had already happened between Iran and the UAE over
the three islands. 17
15. International Maritime Boundaries. Vol. II. (eds.) Charney, Jonathan I and Alexander, Lewis M
"Iran and Qatar" The American Society of International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
London, 1993. p. 1511. See. Amin, S.H. "Law of the Continental Shelf Delimitation: The Gulf
Example" op.cit. p. 345. Prior to the signing of the 1974 agreement between the two countries,
the Shah of Iran and the Omani Sultan issued a joint communique expressing a joint desire for
agreements aimed at maintaining stability in the region and ensuring freedom of passage through
the Strait ofHormuz.
16 On 10 November 1991 an agreement was signed between Qatar and Iran for a feasibility study
into a water pipeline from the Karun (Qarun) river in southwest Iran to Qatar. See McLachlan,
Keith, op.cit.p. 235. The agreement of 1969 between Qatar and Iran defines the maritime border
between the two sides, but does not mention how any cross-border reserves should be shared. The
North field gas is shared by Qatar and Iran. The Qatari government developed her share, which
contains recoverable reserves of 250 trillion cubic feet. Iran, in late 1992, started to develop her
part, which has estimated reserves of 100 trillion cubic feet. See Pike, David "Cross-border
hydrocarbon reserves" op.cit. p. 236. For more details of the Iranian and Qatari Gas Fields. See
MEES. Vol. XXXIX. No, 10. 4 December 1995. pp. A4-A7.
17. McLachlan, Keith "Hydrocarbons and Iranian Policies towards the Gulf States Confrontation and
Co-operation in Island and Continental Shelf affairs" in: Territorial Foundations of the Gulf
states, (ed.) Schofield, Richard. UCL Press, 1994, London, pp. 235-236.
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The Oman-Iran Offshore Boundary
During the reign of the Shah of Iran, Oman was the only Arab Gulf State to have a
strong connection with Iran, especially on security matters. This relationship became
important when the Shah's troops were sent to Oman to support the Omani Army
against the rebellion in Dhofar. During the early 1970s the two countries entered into
serious negotiations to resolve their offshore boundaries. On 25 July 1974, they
concluded an agreement which delimited the territorial Sea boundary from the
eastern part of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf through the Strait ofHormuz to the Gulf of
Oman.
The Omani agreement with Iran was the fifth of five maritime boundary
agreements negotiated by Iran with the Arab Gulf States on the opposite side of the
Gulf. In early 1997 the two parties reached an agreement on the division of the
shared Hormuz field. The agreement follows a decision taken in 1995 to proceed
with the joint development of the shared gas/condensate field. According to official
Iranian sources, the two sides have agreed to share the field on the basis of an 80-20
split in favour of Iran 18 (for full text of the two countries agreement see appendices
p. 519).
Until 1997 the two countries did not conclude any Continental Shelf
agreement. Some internal sources mention that the Omani government was holding
discussions with Iran, Pakistan and Yemen to reach a formal maritime boundary in
the disputed areas in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, the Strait ofHormuz and the Gulf of
Oman (with Iran), in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea (with Pakistan), and in
the Arabian Sea (with Yemen). 19
The UAE's Offshore Boundary with Iran
The maritime (offshore) boundaries between the United Arab Emirates and Iran can
be divided into many areas. The most important dispute is concentrated on the
18. MEES. Vol.XI. No.3. 20 January 1997. p. A5.
19. See Charney, Jonathan I. and Alexander, Lewis M. International Maritime Boundaries "Iran-
Oman" The American Society of International Law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London, 1993.
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sovereignty of the three islands of Abu Musa (claimed by the Emirate of Sharjah)
and the two islands of Tunb (claimed by the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah). This
dispute has prevented the two side from reaching an agreement on the offshore
boundaries between them. The other offshore disputes are between Abu Dhabi and
Iran and Dubai and Iran. Iran has no offshore delimitation agreement with any of the
other Emirates of the UAE, although there is an Understanding Memorandum signed
in 1971 with Sharjah over Abu Musa. ( For more details see The Iranian-UAE
Disputes over Tunbs and Abu Musa in Chapter 6. P. 359).
The offshore dispute with Dubai was settled by the agreement of 31 August
1974, and the agreement was ratified by Iran on 15 March 1975. However, the
UAE's federal government has never ratified it. The agreement of August 1974
separates the boundary (offshore) of the opposite coasts with a common Continental
Shelf. The boundary between Dubai and Iran is the only offshore boundary agreed by
Iran and the UAE.20
Abu Dhabi's Offshore Disputes with Iran
During the early 1970s Abu Dhabi and Iran entered into a boundary (Continental
Shelf) negotiation. But since that time, the two parties have yet to release any of the
details of their negotiations. Some sources especially S.H. Amin in his book Political
and Strategic Issues in the Persian /Arabian Gulf.\ mention that Abu Dhabi and Iran
signed a Continental Shelf boundary agreement, which was initialled in September
1971.21 The other important dispute, which affected the negotiations between the
two parties, was over the island of Bani Yas which is about 145 miles to the west of
the island of Abu Dhabi.22 In January 1972, the Iranian government announced that
pp. 1503-1504, and MacDonald, Charles G. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Law of the Sea. op.cit. p.
134.
20. See Charney, Jonathan I and Alexander, Lewis M. (eds.) International Maritime Boundaries. Vol.
II. (eds.) "Iran-United Arab Emirates (Dubai)" The American Society of International Law.
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, London. 1993, p.1534, and MacDonald, Charles G. Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and the Law ofthe Sea. op.cit. p. 134. See also Bundy, Rodman R "Maritime delimitation
in the Gulf' op.cit. p. 183.
21. Amin, S.H. Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian /Arabian Gulf op.cit. pp. 167-168.
22. El-Hakim, Ali A. The Middle Eastern States and the Law ofthe Sea, op.cit. p. 103.
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it had no more territorial claims in the Gulf and would not use its position to interfere
with free transit.23 Since the outbreak of the Iranian revolution all the Arab Gulf
States have been reluctant to enter into any serious negotiations over offshore
boundary disputes with the Republic of Iran.
The Qatar-Abu Dhabi Offshore Boundary
The offshore boundary between the two parties was complicated by disputes
concerning the sovereignty of the offshore islands of Halul,24 Daiyinah, Shuraiwah
and al-Ashat. During the late 1960s, the two sheikhdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi
(under the auspices of Britain) resolved their longstanding dispute over the above-
mentioned islands and delimited the boundary between the two parties' Continental
Shelf. The agreement of 20 March 1969 also provides for 'equal rights of ownership'
and revenue-sharing with respect to the Al-Bunduq oilfield. The agreement
confirmed that the island of Daiyinah formed part of the territory of Abu Dhabi,
while the islands of al-Ashat and Shuraiwah belonged to Qatar; it also provides that
neither state shall have any territorial claim upon any islands or offshore areas falling
outside the agreed offshore boundary.
The two Emirates agreed that the proceeds from the Al-Bunduq oilfield should
be shared equally and controlled by joint development. The agreed Continental Shelf
boundary extends for a distance of 115 nautical miles.25
23 .Young, Richard "The Persian Gulf' op.cit. p. 234.
24 For the historical backgound of Halul island, see. El-Hakim, Ali A. The Middle Eastern States and
the Law of the Sea. op.cit. p. 97. The dispute over Halul was resolved in 1962,by British
mediation, which appointed two experts to study the two parties' claims and to make
recommendations as to how they should be resolved. Halul island came under the sovereignty of
Qatar. See Charney, J, I. And Alexander, L.M. (eds.) International Maritime Boundaries. Vol. II.
"Qatar-United Arab Emirates(Abu Dhabi)" op.cit. p. 1542. As a result of offshore oil exploration
in the vicinity of Halul Qatar and Abu Dhabi intensified their rivalry over the ownership of the
island. See AI-Baharna, Husain M. The Arabian GulfStates, op.cit. pp. 303-304.
25. Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf' op.cit.
p.214, and Bundy, Rodman R "Maritime delimitation in the Gulf' op.cit. p. 181. See also
Charney, J. I. And Alexander, L.M (eds.) International Martime Boundaries. Vol.11. Qatar-United
Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi)" op.cit. pp. 1541-1542.
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The Land and Offshore Boundary within the UAE's
The boundaries of the Trucial States (UAE) were not demarcated in any way until
the first attempt was made in 1937 at the request of the British government (the
British Political Agent in Bahrain). This request came as a result of the pressure
exerted by oil companies in the Gulf region.26
The Trucial States (since December 1971 the United Arab Emirates) were
sovereign states which had a separate treaty with the United Kingdom up to 1971.
Prior to that time the UK had been responsible for the foreign relations and defence
of the separate emirates (Sheikhdoms). Since the withdrawal of Britain in the early
1970s and the establishment of the UAE in December 1971, the Sheikhdoms of the
Trucial States have had a long history of land and maritime boundary disputes.
Britain, as a protector of these Sheikhdoms for more than one hundred years, entered
into negotiations with the Sheykhs of the Trucial States to settle their boundary
(onshore and offshore) disputes. During the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the
British government made an intensive mediation and sent many investigation teams
to study the boundary disputes (from the Foreign Office and the Hydrographic
Department of the Admiralty) among these states. The British government succeeded
in solving some of them and failed in others. Her purpose was to facilitate the areas
for petroleum exploration due to pressure from the oil companies that the disputes be
settled. The most important one was the settling of the Abu Dhabi-Dubai offshore
dispute. The two Sheikhdoms concluded an offshore agreement on 18 February
1968, which followed a series of disputes between 1951 and 1965.27
The 1968 agreement provides the delimitation of the boundary concerned with
the Continental Shelf jurisdiction of the two parties.28 It should be noted that the
British government, which played a significant role in settling and drawing up the
26. Bowett, D.W "The Dubai / Sharjah Boundary Arbitration of 1981" British Year Book
International Law. Vol.65. 1994, Cambridge, p. 104.
27. For the disagreement of 1965/66, see El-Hakim, Ali A. The Middle Eastern States and the Law of
the Sea. op.cit. p. 99. For the shared neutral zone, see Blake, Gerald "Shared zones as a solution
to problems of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf states" op.cit. p. 205.
28. Gault, Ian Townsend "Offshore Boundary Delimitation in the Arabian / Persian Gulf' op.cit.
p.215. See also Charney, J.I. and Alexander, L.M. (eds.) International Maritime Boundaries.
Vol.11 "Abu Dhabi-Dubai" op.cit. pp. 1475-1476.
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UAE borders, depended on two factors. The first is the documents of the Sheikhdoms
and the second the area demarcation subject to the tribes' allegiance. It became more
difficult to identify precise boundaries because they overlapped with one another and
this led to real difficulties for the British government on the one side and the
Sheikhdoms (Emirates) on the other.29
It should be recorded that these uncertainties did not prevent the formation of
the federation of the United Arab Emirates. The two Emirates of Sharjah and Umm
al-Qaiwain settled their Continental Shelf boundary which was delimited by an
agreement embodied in two separate unilateral declarations issued in 1964 (under the
auspices of the British government). But the seaward extent of the boundary between
the two parties remains undefined because of the complicated question of Abu Musa
island, which lies approximately 1 nautical mile from the Sharjah-Umm al-Qaiwain
land frontier. The disputes between the two parties erupted in 1970 over an oil
drilling location situated nine miles off the island of Abu Musa and about 32 miles
off the coast of Umm al-Qaiwain. Sharjah claimed that the correct translation of the
Arabic text of the agreement was 'Sea boundary' rather than 'Seabed boundary'. The
offshore dispute between Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain still remains unsettled, in
spite ofBritish mediation during the 1970s.30
Like the other Trucial States, Dubai and Sharjah were sovereign states which
had separate treaties with the UK up to 1971. The boundary disputes between the two
Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah have had a long history of British government
mediation. In 1948 the two rulers of Dubai and Sharjah agreed that they would
accept British government arbitration over their disputed boundary. The British
29. Bowett, D.W "The Dubai / Sharjah Boundary Arbitration of 1981" op.cit. p. 104. See also
Schofield, Richard "Borders and territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the
twentieth century" op.cit. pp. 27-28.
30. Sea boundary: the maritime or the offshore boundary of a coastal state. This term will contain the
territorial sea boundary-contiguous zone boundary-continental shelf boundary and the exclusive
economic zone boundary. Sea-bed boundary: a term used in the past to refer to the continental
shelf boundary. For More details see El-Hakim, Ali A. The Middle Eastern States and the Law of
the Sea, op.cit. The question of the Abu Musa Continental Shelf rights relative to those of Umm
al-Qaiwain arose in a series of law suits in the United States and Britain involving oil companies
which held overlapping offshore concessions granted by Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain. See
Charney, J.I. and Alexander L.M. (eds.l International Maritime Boundaries. Vol. II. op.cit.
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Political Agent appointed Julian Walker for this purpose. The first report by Walker
over the coastal dispute was submitted in 1955. The ruler of Dubai protested against
the British Political Agent's proposal for the boundary settlement with Sharjah in
1956, 1961, 1963 and 1964.31
The British mediation left the dispute unsettled between the two parties after
her withdrawal from the Gulf region in December 1971. The dispute also extended to
the offshore boundary, which had been outside the Walker mandate and was not
included in the British Political Agent's decisions. During the early 1970s, the two
parties did not reach an effective solution regarding their dispute because the two
Emirates became members of the new federation of the UAE. Two incidents which
illustrate the friction between the two parties took place when Sharjah protested
against the construction of a corniche, an extension of the harbour made by Dubai,
and Dubai then made a protest concerning the extension of Sharjah's industrial
estate.32
During 1976, the two parties, as a result of the mediation of the Supreme
Council of the UAE, agreed to refer the boundary dispute to ad hoc arbitration. In
1981, the Court of Arbitration gave their decision on the disputed areas of the land
boundaries and offshore boundaries.33 As a result of the Court arbitration decision,
the parties agreed, in 1985, to sign a boundary agreement which settled their
boundary disputes.34
On 29 May 1994, the two Emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Umm al-Qaiwain
agreed to settle a longstanding dispute and signed a land boundary agreement. This
agreement resulted from mediation by the High Council of the UAE.35
p.1550. "Sharjah-Umm al-Qaywayn". op.cit pp. 1550-1551. See also El-Hakim, Ali A. The
Middle Eastern States and the Law ofthe Sea, op.cit. pp. 124-125.
31. For the disputed areas, especially the al-Mamzar Peninsula, see. Bowett, D.W "The Dubai /
Sharjah Boundary Arbitration of 1981" op.cit. pp. 118-120
32 See Charney, J.I. Alexander, L.M. (eds.) International Maritime Boundaries. Vol. II. "Dubai-
Sharjah" op.cit. pp. 1499-1500. See also Bowett, D.W. op.cit. pp. 106-107.
33. Bowett, D.W. op.cit. pp. 106-107.
34. Al-IttihddNewspaper. 24 April 1985. UAE, Abu Dhabi, p. 1.
35. Al-Shurua. Issue No. 113. 2-8/6/1994. UAE. Sharjah. p. 5.
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It should be noted that boundaries are still in dispute between many countries
in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf such as offshore boundaries of Saudi Arabia-
Yemen, Oman-Yemen, Oman-UAE, Oman-Iran, Abu Dhabi-Saudi Arabia, Qatar-
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia and Kuwait-Iran. The most controversial of these
offshore disputes is that between the seven Emirates of the UAE over the regional
waters of Abu Musa, which is not yet settled (because of the sovereignty conflict
between Iran and UAE). Most of these countries are in the process of negotiating
their offshore disputes. The Gulf also contains areas of co-sovereignty, both on land
and the seabed. Those include: Iraq-Saudi Arabia (Neutral Zone), Saudi Arabia -
Kuwait (Neutral Zone) Abu Dhabi-Dubai (Neutral Zone), Saudi Arabia-Bahrain
(shared revenues), Abu Dhabi-Qatar (shared revenues), Oman-Sharjah (shared zone),
Oman-Ajman (shared Zone), Fujairah-Sharjah (shared Zone) and Iran-Sharjah (joint
administration and revenues) 36
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Conclusion of Chapters Five, Six and Seven
These chapters concentrate on the political developments in the Arabian Peninsula
and the Gulf region over historical and political boundary disputes, especially
between the six states of the Arab Gulfwho formed the GCC in 1981.
Border disputes, onshore or offshore, are one of the main obstacles to peace in
the third world. The Arab states which constitute part of this world, show that it is
impossible to demarcate borders without disputes. There are many examples of such
a situation. There is the border problem between Algeria and Morocco that led to an
armed conflict between the two countries in the 1960s, and the political
repercussions are apparent to this day. Other examples are the disputes between
Mauritania and Morocco, Tunisia and Libya (on the continental shelf and the
regional waters), Egypt and Sudan (on Halayb), Syria and Lebanon, Iraq and Iran
(the greatest border dispute in the region) and the border disputes between the GCC
states themselves on one the hand and between the GCC states and their neighbours
on the other. Most analysts attach the blame for this to the countries which colonised
the area-Britain, the Ottoman Empire, France-and the Western oil companies.
The first attempt to demarcate the frontiers in the Arabian Peninsula started in
the early 1910s, and came as a result of British and Ottoman rivalries. Britain and the
Ottomans concluded agreements in 1913 and 1914 to demarcate the Arabian
Peninsula frontiers and their spheres of influence. But these agreements received no
formal approval by the two sides because of the outbreak of World War I. Britain,
since the termination of this War and as a result of its responsibility over its
protectorates in the Arabian Peninsula, played a significant role in demarcating the
frontiers of these Sheykhdoms with Ibn Saud. The questions of Al-Buraimi, the
agreement of Al-'Uqair in 1922, the Iraqi claim over Kuwait and the Iranian claim
over Bahrain were the main examples of the British responsibility to defend the
legitimate sovereignty of these Sheykhdoms against the more powerful states of
Saudi Arabi, Iran and Iraq.
The border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf region are still the
main obstacles which stand in the way of real co-operation between the Arab Gulf
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States (GCC). All the GCC states have at least one real border dispute, onshore and
offshore, with each other. Saudi Arabia the largest of the six Arab Gulf states, has a
real border dispute with every one of these countries. Qatar has one with Bahrain, the
UAE with Oman, Qatar with Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia with Iraq, Saudi Arabia with
Yemen, Saudi Arabia with Iran, the United Arab Emirates with Iran (over the three
islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs and offshore boundary), Kuwait with Iraq,
Kuwait with Iran, Oman with Yemen, Oman with Iran, Qatar with Iran. There are
also the internal border disputes between the seven Emirates (Sheykhdoms) of the
UAE. Disputes over boundaries, whether they are onshore or offshore, are unlikely to
be the sole cause of armed conflict between states. They can, however, become the
symbol of deteriorating relationships, and may be used as a justification for military
action.
The boundary disputes in the Gulf region are the product of political
relationships operating on a number of levels. There are many factors that lead to the
complexity of border settlements between the GCC states on one side and between
the GCC states and their neighbours (Iraq, Iran and the Yemen) on the other :
1) The nature of these states: the nature of the modern state leads to a complication in
the border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula. Political loyalties are associated with
the tribe more than the land. The continuous bedouinism and nomadism, the division
and devotion of the tribes, all these factors played a significant role in complicating
the border problem. Most of the previous border demarcations proved this fact,
including the al-Uqair agreement in 1922 (between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and
Iraq and Saudi Arabia), the Al-Buraimi problem and the Saudi disputes with the
other Arab and Gulf states.
2) The economic factor: The international oil companies played a great role in
complicating the border problem between the Arab Gulf states (Sheykhdoms). A
good example of such complexity is the problem of the Al-Buraimi border dispute
(between Saudi Arabia, Oman and Abu Dhabi) where the American and British oil
companies were heavily involved. The American oil companies supported Saudi
Arabia and the British oil companies supported Oman and Abu Dhabi in order to get
better concessions. These companies brought great stress on their governments, and
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supported some GCC states to aggravate the problems of the borders in which big
reserves of oil are found.
3) The physical geography of the Arabian Peninsula: it was difficult for these
countries to demarcate the borders on a desert land, due to sand dunes which hinder
the delimitation.
4) The foreign role: the demarcation of borders by foreign powers, and the formation
of new political entities, urged the political elites (ruling families) of these states to
vigorously defend the borders because it represented a self defence. These modern
states fear that differences over borders might lead to a review of the existence of the
state itself. 'Abd al-'AzTz Al-Rawas, the Omani Minister of Information, in an
interview concerning the reasons for the border disputes in the Arabian Peninsula,
explained that the state sovereignty and the historical allegiances of each of these
countries, as well as the search for oil, constituted the most important reasons for the
outbreak of border disputes between them.l
The desire for extended territorial boundaries, onshore and offshore, has
become more pressing, especially since the discovery of oil in the Gulf region. The
sovereignty concept and the border disputes between the Arab Gulf states form the
greatest challenges to the progress of the GCC. Since the foundation of the Council
in May 1981, these countries have witnessed many border clashes. However, the
Council has not taken any global initiative to resolve these border problems.
'Abd al-AzIz Al-Rawas, the Omani Minister of Information, agreed with
Muhammad A1-'Alawl, the Omani Minister of State for Legal Affairs, that there are
a number of things that hinder the activation of the dispute settlement commission at
the level of sovereignty for each GCC state. Among these are the fact that these
countries always refuse imposed political solutions. The high sensitivity of such
countries to border disputes makes them reject the idea of Council intervention.
Muhammad A1-'Alawl added that the GCC states do not intend to activate the
commission for the settlement of disputes in order to avoid the intervention of other
countries in their conflicts. Al-'AlawI said that sovereignty obliges these countries to
1. Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Rawas. op.cit.
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refuse intervention in their internal affairs by the member states of the Council. In
addition common co-ordination between these states is considered as a new concept.
The Minister of State for Legal Affairs explained that the members of the GCC can
accept any decision regarding conflicts between them that is made by a non-Gulf or
Arab state. For example the GCC states easily accepted decisions made by the
International Court of Justice but they could not accept any decision made by the
commission for the settlement of borders in the GCC even if that decision were the
same. The Minister added that high sensitivity and the concept of sovereignty have
become the most difficult challenges to the future progress of the Council.2
2. Interview with 'Abd-al-'Aziz Al-Rawas op.cit. and Muhammad Al-'Alawi the Omani Minister of




Students of the political and the security history of Arab Gulf States since their
establishment as autonomous political entities would conclude that external powers
played a major role in creating and protecting them against intervention by other
powers as well as in suppressing internal rebellions. For example, Britain, after the
Protection Treaties of 1800, continued to play a major role in protecting those states
and administering their foreign policy up to its military withdrawal from the region at
the beginning of the seventies.
Following Britain's withdrawal, the United States moved in to play the same
role in protecting the local regimes from intervention by other powers. It made Iran,
during the rule of the Shah, as well as Saudi Arabia its two major allies. Both
countries have provided a great deal of assistance to the US in implementing its
policy in the region, especially the Nixon policy which aimed at containing the Arab
nationalist tide as well as the leftist movements in the region and protecting its allies.
A good example of that policy was when Iran dispatched its troops into Oman to
thwart the Dhofar leftist revolution and managed to suppress it during the mid
seventies.
Following the end of the Nixon policy and the collapse of the regime of the
Shah came the Carter policy of creating a rapid deployment force in the region,
which was followed by the formation of a unified central force during the Reagan
and Bush eras which played a major role in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.
Later the US under the Clinton administration started a policy in the region of
"dual containment" with the aim of containing both Iran and Iraq and ending their
threat to its allies. This continues to be the US policy in the region up to the present.
This attention given to the Gulf region by the United States and other countries
demonstrates the importance they attach to it as they consider it to be vital for their
strategic interests because it contains most of the oil reserves in the world. Western
countries and their allies consider that protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf to
their countries is strategically important for their interests.
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The succession of political events and the internal and external repercussions of
those events which took place in the Gulf region at the end of the seventies such as
the British military withdrawal from the region, the collapse of the Shah's regime,
the outbreak of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - all
these factors in addition to other internal factors speeded up the establishment in May
1981 of a political alliance in the Gulf region of restricted membership which was
called the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The establishment of the GCC met
with various Arab and international reactions which ranged from reservation and
welcome on the part of moderate Arab regimes to outright hostility on the part of
nationalist and radical Arab regimes as well as the Soviet Union. Opponents
described the Council as nothing but a scheme hatched by the US with the aim of
extending its influence and the influence of its Western allies in the region. Although
the preamble of the constitution of the GCC provided for co-operation in many fields
amongst member states whether economic social or cultural, the security concerns
and challenges were in fact the most important reasons for the establishment of the
Council. However it must be stressed that the Council since its inception in 1981 has
been unsuccessful in formulating a collective security regime. All the initiatives that
were put forward by some member states in the Council with the aim of finding a
joint security formula for member states, especially the initiatives put forward by
Oman, were not worth the paper they were written on. Amongst the reasons for this
failure to arrive at a common security policy amongst member states has been the
fear on the part of some of them of Saudi and Omani hegemony in view of the fact
that both countries represent the largest concentration of population in the region.
There have also been considerable differences between member states on foreign
policy matters. An example of this is the continued disagreement between Oman and
Kuwait since the establishment of the Council over some issues related to their
foreign policies. Amongst the reasons for the lack of political consensus amongst the
Gulf states about the concept of security in the Gulf are the following:
1) Differences among member states about the sources of the threats to their security.
Kuwait for example believes that Iraq is the biggest threat to its national security.
Oman on the other hand believed that the former South Yemen and the Soviet
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presence there close to the Hormuz straits represented a threat to its national
security. Other Gulf States believe that Iran constitutes the biggest threat to their
security. Saudi Arabia which has the largest area, believes that its neighbouring
regional powers, especially Iraq, Iran and Yemen, constitute a threat to its national
security.
2) The small size of the population in these countries and the variation in their
sources of armaments.
3) Numerous border differences amongst member states.
4) The concept of the modern state and state sovereignty and the unwillingness of
GCC states to give up some of their national sovereignty.
5) Variation in the sources of national income amongst member states, with Oman
and Bahrain having much smaller national income than the other member states.
Although more than 18 years have passed since the establishment of the GCC,
the issue of security and border disputes between member states continues to be
amongst the major obstacles and challenges holding back the development of the
Council and undermining the objectives for which it was set up. The questions now
are, can Gulf states give up some of their national sovereignty in order to strengthen
co-operation amongst themselves? If the member countries were to give up some of
their national sovereignty in order to face up to the problem of security and border
differences, would they in such a scenario be able to safeguard their internal and
external security against foreign aggression?
This thesis suggests that the answer to both questions is no. Those countries as
they are currently constituted are very unlikely to give up any of their national
sovereignty, nor will they be able to protect themselves against foreign aggression.
The regimes in those countries, or more accurately the ruling families rather than the
people, will continue to want to link themselves to a number of military and political
alliances with some western countries, in particular the United States and Britain, in
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order to protect their dynasties as well as to safeguard the flow of oil to Western
countries against external threats. A good example of this are the agreements that
were concluded between the GCC countries and the United States, Britain and
France in the wake of the liberation ofKuwait.
Western countries, especially Britain and the United States, will continue to be
in charge of safeguarding the security of the Gulf rulers and states as long as the
region continues to be of vital importance to their interests, especially with respect to
protecting the oil supplies against regional or international threats.
Regarding the question of border disputes, the concept of the modern state and
the concept of national sovereignty in addition to the lack of trust amongst GCC
countries, will continue to constitute a major obstacle in the way of the development
of the Council. Although there exists at present a body which was set up for the
purpose of settling border disputes amongst GCC member states, it has no real teeth
and has never been convened since its formation; nor have its members been named.
During a discussion I had with a senior official from one of the member states
of the GCC, he stated that the ineffectiveness of that body in settling border disputes
amongst member states is due to the fact that member states themselves mistrust
each other and that they have no desire to settle their disputes through a Gulf body,
preferring instead to solve their problems through an international organisation or
tribunal. A good example of this is the border dispute between Qatar and Bahrain
which is now in front of the International Court of Justice, after neither of them
showed any willingness to bring their dispute before the body set up by the Council
for that very purpose.
Researchers who have studied the GCC are still in disagreement about a clear
legal definition of the Council. Some of them consider it as nothing but a political
alliance. Others consider it to be a small regional organisation. Yet others see its role
to be limited to bringing about a degree of political co-operation and co-ordination
among its members, and that it has no clear legal character within the framework of
regional or international organisations.
All these factors combined have made the Council ineffective in achieving the
declared goals and objectives for which it was set up.
412
Conclusion
Although this thesis deals with some historical and political developments
which stood in the way of making the Council effective with respect to the question
of the region's security and border disputes, the Council does however constitute a
unique model in the Arab region in terms of its structure. It may represent the seed
for potential future unity in the Gulf elsewhere which the coming generations may be
able to bring about. The similarity in the political systems, the unity of language and
religion in addition to economic and social factors make it possible for the coming
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Foreign Minister's Statement on the Founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Riyadh
Communique)
4 February 1981
The United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman,
the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait, out of consideration of their special relations and joint
characteristics stemming from their joint creed, similarity of regimes, unity of heritage, similarity of
their political, social and demographic structure, and their cultural and historical affiliatiomand out of
these states desire to deepen and develop cooperation and coordination among them in all fields in a
manner that brings good, development and stability to their peoples, these states foreign ministers met
in Riyadh in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 4 Feb 1981 and resumed their consultations with a view
to setting up the operational system (at-tanzlm al-amall) and the organizational structure to crystallize
and develop the desired cooperation and coordination among their states. They agreed to set up a
cooperation council among the said Arab Gulf states, to form a secretariat general for this purpose and
to hold periodic meetings on the summit level and the level of foreign ministers with a view to
attaining the desired objectives of these states and their peoples in all fields.
This step comes in conformity with the Arab nation's national objectives and within the framework of
the Arab League Charter, which urges regional cooperation that is aimed at strengthening the Arab
nation and emphasizing these state affiliation to the Arab League and their enhancement of its role in
attaining the aims and principles of its charter in a manner that serves the Arab and Islamic issues.
The foreign ministers decided to hold another meeting in Muscat on 8 March 1981. It is to be
preceded by the two meetings of experts, on 24 February 1981 and 4 March 1981, in Riyadh and
Muscat with a view to completely systematizing what has been agreed upon with regard to
establishing a cooperation council for the Arab Gulf states.
Document 2
The Decision to Establish the Gulf Cooperation Council
14 Feb 1981
In the name of God, the compassionate and the merciful: Out of their realizations, common
characteristics and similar regimes that govern them, out of their feeling of the importance of
establishing close coordination in all spheres, especially the economic and social domains, out of their
desire to realize coordination, integration and closer relations in all spheres, the UAE, the State of
Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of
Kuwait have decided to establish an organization that aims at deepening and bringing closer relations,
ties and cooperation among its members in various spheres. The organization shall be named the
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf [liduwal al-khallj al-'Arabiyyah]. Its headquarters
shall be in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The council will be the vehicle by means of which the maximum
coordination, integration and closer relations will be realized. It will also draw up regulations in the
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spheres of economy, finance, education, culture, social affairs, health, communications, information,
passports and nationality, travel., transport, trade customs, freight and legal and legislative affairs.
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the GulfOrganizational structure:
The council shall consist of:
A. The Supreme Council, to which will be attached a body for resolving disputes.
B. The Ministerial Council.
C. The Secretariat General.
The Supreme Council:
1. Shall consist of the heads of state of the member states.
2. The presidency of the council shall be rotated in alphabetical order.
3. The council shall meet in normal sessions twice a year.Emergency sessions may be held.
4. Each member has the right to call for an emergency meeting. The meeting shall take place if
seconded by another member.
Competency of the Supreme Council:
It will draw up the high policy of the Cooperation Council and the basic lines it will follow. It will
discuss the recommendations, laws and bylaws presented to it by the Ministerial Council and the
Secretariat General in preparation for their endorsement. It shall form the body for resolving disputes.
Body for resolving disputes:
It shall be attached to the Supreme Council. It shall resolve existing disputes or any that may occur
between member states. It also shall be the reference for interpretation of the basic bylaws of the
Cooperation Council.
The Ministerial Council:
1. It shall be composed of the foreign ministers of the member states, or any ministers
deputizing for them.
2. It shall draw up the basic regulations for the Secretariat General.
3. The Ministerial Council shall prepare for meetings of the Supreme Council and studies,
topics, recommendations, bylaws and laws presented to the Supreme Council.
It will also make preparations for meetings of the council.
4. The council shall meet six times every year, that is, once every 2 months. Emergency
sessions may be held at the proposal of two member states.
5. It shall draw up policies, recommendations, studies and projects which aim at developing
cooperation and coordination among member states in various spheres.
6. It shall encourage aspects of cooperation and coordination between the various activities of
the private sector.
7. It shall endorse routine reports as well as regulations and bylaws concerning administrative
affairs, and those proposed by the Secretariat General of the Cooperation Council.
8. It shall work to encourage, develop and coordinate existing activities between states in
various spheres. Such activities shall be binding should the Ministerial Council endorse them. The
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council shall recommend competent ministers to draw up policies as well as studies apt to bring to
fruition the objectives of the Cooperation Council.
Secretariat General:
The Cooperation Council shall have a secretary general appointed by the Supreme Council. The
Supreme Council shall define the conditions and period of office of the secretary general. He shall be
chosen from subjects of the Cooperation Council states.
The secretary general shall be responsible directly for all actions of the assistant secretary generals,
the Secretariat General and the good course ofwork in its various sectors.
The Secretariat General shall have a data information apparatus.
Competency of the Secretariat General:
1. Preparation of studies concerning cooperation and coordination.
2. Following up the implementation of resolutions and recommendation of the Supreme
Council and the Ministerial Council by the member states.
3. Preparation of reports and studies required by the Ministerial Council.
4. Preparation of routine reports on the work of the Cooperation Council.
5. Preparation of the budgets and final accounts.
6. Preparation of the draft of financial and administrative bylaws which shall make the body
elaborate and commensurate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its increasing
responsibilities.
Secretariat General budget
The Secretariat General shall have a budget toward which all member states shall contribute in equal
proportions.
[Signed] Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Bahrain, the State ofU.A.E. the State of Kuwait, the
State ofQatar and the Sultanate of Oman.
Minutes ofMeeting
LD142210 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1750 GMT 14 Feb 1981 [Minutes of meeting of the foreign
ministers of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, the Sultanate ofOman and Saudi Arabia on 4 Feb 1981
in Riyadh]
[Text][No dateline given] The foreign ministers of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, the Sultanate of
Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have met. They endorse the plan for a cooperation council
for the Arab states of the Gulf, the bylaws of which were attached. The foreign ministers have also
decided to hold another meeting in Muscat on 8 March 1981, provided that it is preceded by another
two meetings of experts on 24 February 1981 and 4 March 1981 in Riyadh and Muscat in order to
formulate integral bylaws on what has been approved concerning the establishment of the Cooperation
Council of the Arab states of the Gulf. It has been agreed to recommend to the states concerned
appointing a minister for cooperation affairs among the Gulf states in the future.
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Document 3
The Structure of the GCC
10 March 1981
His Excellency Abd al-Aziz ar-Rawas, Minister of Information and Youth Affairs, opened the sixth
Arab Gulf Information Ministers Conference in the Muscat Intercontinental Hotel conference hall at
1030 today.
The conference began with a recitation of verses from the holy Koran. His Excellency Abd al-Aziz ar-
Rawas, who is the conference chairman, then delivered the sultan's speech. He welcomed their
excellencies, the ministers and the participating delegations, and said that it is auspicious that the
meeting is taking place in the light of continuous contacts among our states to construct the greater
edifice to Gulf fraternity and effective cooperation among the region's states and peoples in harmony
with the inevitability of history and common destiny.
He said that none of them had spared their afforts to unite our voice and ranks. We could not make our
voice heard and respected in the world unless we reverted to a united voice in a manner that would
yield prosperity for our region and people.
His Excellency Abd al-Aziz ar-Rawwas said it was because of this that there is an urgent and pressing
need for a new information policy that would lift us to a cultural level from which our nation would
derive vitality and transform the role of our Gulf information policy into an active one in the various
international fields.
The new information policy we propose is above all political, but it cannot be a substitute for other
institutions that have defined duties and tasks. If we make objectivity our guide in information work
and exert the required efforts to raise the level of proficiency of our cadres and improve their
performance we will be able to attain our goals with the same level of scientific proficiency and
technical capacity as that which at present we seek from abroad. For this reason, if we infuse the
existing information institutions with experienced information expertise and train the workers in the
field of information then we should be able to develop the capacity to attain our goals.
His Excellency went on to say that there is a positive phenomenon that had emerged during the last
few years, namely, the Arabic newspaper published by Arabs living abroad. Permit me in your name
to hail our colleagues who had made of their [word indistinct] a reality accompanied by the
development of Arab corporations in the field of journalism and information. In this manner they
carried the Arab voice to our sons and brothers living abroad. He said that it is time the Gulf
information institutions which we established by joint efforts during previous conferences were
developed.
The right approach which we believe will crystallize these institutions in a manner that will make
them more effective and beneficial will not be possible without organization, coordination and
consultation among us through a permanent secretariat of a level commensurate with the tasks of the
Gulf information policy. One of its principal concerns should be the evaluation of the work of the
existing institutions and a follow-up of the implementation of the required information policy.
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His Excellency said that the depth of the relations that link us in his region, headed by relations of
faith, blood, and neighborliness, were bound-with God's support-to lead us to full coordination in all
files in a manner that will save the interests, hopes and aspirations of the peoples in our region and the
stability of our states.
Decisions Reported
The Foreign Ministers of the Cooperation Council of the six Gulf Arab states concluded their meeting
this afternoon at the guest palaces at Al-Ghubrah. After the final session His Excellency Qais Abd al-
Munim Zawawi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, made the following statement to newsmen:
This morning the foreign ministers of the state of the United Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, the
Sate of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman met in
Muscat for their second preparatory meeting to finalize the statutes relating to the Cooperation
Council of the Gulf Arab states.
The Ministers discussed the following draft bills and statutes presented to them by the committee of
experts following its meetings in the cities ofRiyadh and Muscat:
The basic statute [an-nizam al-TasasI] for the Cooperation Council:
The internal statute[an-nizam ad-Dakhill] for the Supreme Council:
The internal statute for the Ministerial Council:
The internal statute for the General Secretariat.
the ministers reviewed it but resolved not to make any final decision until the appointment of a
secretary general who will express his view about the statute.
The Ministers recommended that the Supreme Council should hold its session at he beginning ofMay
and November every year. The council recommended a meeting of leaders to be held 26-27 May
1981, in the city of Abu Dhabi. This meeting is to be preceded by the foreign ministers meeting on 24
May.
His Excellency Qais Zawawi said the initialling of the statutes will take place later today.
Their excellencies the Foreign Ministers of the six Gulf states have now gone to Salalah where they
will be received by His Majesty Sultan Qabus.
Document 4
Charter of the GCC
25 May 1981
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: The States of the United Arab Emirates, the State
of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, and the State of
Kuwait.
Being fully aware of their mutual bonds of special relations, common characteristics and similar
systems founded on the Creed of Islam: and based on their faith in the common destiny and
destination that link their peoples: and in view of their desire to effect coordination, integration
interconnection between them in all fields: and based on their conviction that coordination,
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cooperation and integration between them serve the higher goals of the Arab Nation: and in order to
strengthen their cooperation and reinforce their common links: and in an endeavor to complement
efforts already begun in all vital scopes that concern their peoples and realize their hopes for a better
future on the path to unity of their State: and in conformity with the Charter of League of Arab States
which calls for the realization of closer relations and stronger bonds: and in order to channel their
efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes, have agreed as follows:
Article One, Establishment of Council
A council shall be established hereby to be named The Cooperation Council for the Arab
States of the Gulf, hereinafter referred to as the Cooperation Council.
Article Two. Headquarters
The Cooperation Council shall have its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Article Three. Cooperation Council Meetings
The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its headquarters, and may
convene in any member state.
Article Four. Objectives
The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:
1. To effect coordination, integration and interconnection between member states in all
fields in order to achieve unity between them.
2. Deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation now prevailing
between their peoples in various fields.
3. Formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:
a. Economic and finanical affairs
b. Commerce, customs and communications
c. Social and health affairs
e. Information and tourism
f. Legislation and administrative affairs.
4. Stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mineralogy,
agriculture, water and animal resources: the establishment of scientific research centers,
implementation of common projects, and encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of
their peoples.
Article Five. Council Membership
The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated in the Foreign
Ministers meeting held at Riyadh on 4 Feb 1981.
Article Six. Organizations of the Cooperation Council
The Cooperation Council shall have the following main organizations:





Each of these organizations may establish branch organizations as necessary.
Article Seven. Supreme Council
1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation Council and shall be formed
of heads of member states. Its presidency shall be rotatory based on the alphabetical order of the
names of the member states.
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year. Extraordinary sessions may
be covered at the request of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territories ofmember states.
4. A Supreme Council shall be considered valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.
Article Eight. Supreme Council's Functions
The Supreme Council shall enedeavour to achieve the objectives of the Cooperation Council,
particularly as concerns the following :
1. Review matters of interest to the member states.
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic line it should follow.
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects submitted by the
Ministerial Council for approval.
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary General is charged to prepare.
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international organisations.
6. Approve the rules of procedures of the Commission for Settlement of Disputes and nominate
its members.
7. Appoint the Secretary-General.
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.
9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules.
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General.
Article Nine. Voting in Supreme Council
1. Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous
approval of the member states participating in the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters
shall be carried by majority vote.
Article Ten. Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
1. The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called "Commission for Settlement of
Disputes"" and shall be attached to the Supreme Council.
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every case separately based on the
nature of the dispute.
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the Charter and such dispute is not
resolved within the Ministerial Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may refer such
dispute to the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, as applicable, to the Supreme
Council for appropriate action.
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Article Eleven. Ministerial Council
1. The Ministerial Council shall be formed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states or
other delegated Ministers. The Council's presidency shall rotate among members every three months
by alphabetical order of the states.
2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may hold extraordinary
sessions at the invitation of any member seconded by another member.
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session.
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds of the member states.
Article Twelve. Functions of the Ministerial Council.
The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following :
1. Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing
cooperation and coordination between member states in the various fields and adopt required
resolutions or recommendations concerning thereof.
2. Endeavour to encourage, develop and coordinate activities existing between member states in
all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall be referred to the Ministerial Council for further
submission, with recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate policies whereby the
Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put into action.
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the various private sector
activities, develop existing cooperation between the member states chambers of commerce and
industry, and encourage the flow ofworking citizens of the member states among them.
5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or more technical or specialized
committee for study and presentation of relevant proposals.
6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit appropriate
recommendations to the Supreme Council.
7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedures as well as the Rules of Procedures of
the Secretariat-General.
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the Secretary-General, for a
renewable period of three years.
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations related to administrative
and financial affairs proposed by the Secretary-General, and submit recommendations to the Supreme
Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat-General.
10. Make arrangements for the Supreme Council's meetings and prepare its agenda.
11. Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.
Article Thirteen. Voting at Ministerial Council.
1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous




1. The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General who shall be assisted by
assistants and a number of staff as required.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall be a citizen of one of
the Cooperation Council states, for a period of three years which may be renewed for one time only.
3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the Assistant Secretaries-General.
4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat General's staff from among the citizens
ofmember states, and may not make exceptions without the approval of the Ministerial Council.
5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for the work of the Secretariat-General
and the smooth flow ofwork in its various organisations. He shall represent the Cooperation Council
with other parties within the powers vested in him.
Article Fifteen. Functions of the Secretariat-General.
The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following functions :
1. Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, and to integrated plans and programs
for member states' common action.
2.' Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work.
3. Follow up the execution by the member states of the resolutions and recommendations of the
Supreme Council and Ministerial Council.
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council for Ministerial Council.
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commensurate with the growth
of the Cooperation Council and its expanding responsibilities.
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budget and closing accounts.
7. Make preparations for meetings and prepare agenda and draft resolutions for the Ministerial
Council.
8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the convocation of an extraordinary
session of the Council whenever necessary.
9. Any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council.
Article Sixteen. The Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretaries-General and all the Secretariat
General's staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence and for the common interest of
the member states. They shall refrain from any action or behaviour that is incompatible with their
duties and from divulging the secrets of their jobs either during or after their tenure of office.
Article Seventeen. Privileges and Immunities.
1. The Cooperation Council and its organisations shall enjoy on the territories of all member
states such legal competence, privileges and immunities as required to realize their objectives and
carry out their functions.
2. Representatives of the member states of the Council, and the Council's employees, shall
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are specified in agreements to be concluded for their purpose
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between the member states. A special agreement shall organise the relation between the Council and
the state in which it has its headquarters.
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are prepared and put into
effect, the representatives of the member states in the Cooperation Council and its staff shall enjoy the
diplomatic privileges and immunities established for similar organisations.
Article Eighteen. Budget of the Secretariat-General.
The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the member states shall contribute equal
amounts.
Article Nineteen. Charter Implementation.
1. This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the heads of states of the six
member states named in his Charter's preamble.
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs which shall act as custodian and shall deliver a true copy thereof to every member state,
pending the establishment of the Secretariat-General at which time the latter shall become depository.
Article Twenty. Amendments to Charter.
1. Any member state may request an amendment of this Charter.
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who shall refer
them to the member states at least four months prior to submission to the Ministerial Council.
Article Twenty-One. Closing Provisions.
No reservations may be voiced in respect of the provisions of this Charter.
Article Twenty-two.
The Secretariat-General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this Charter with the League of
Arab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the Ministerial Council.
This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic language at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates, on
21 Rajab 1401 corresponding to 25 May 1981.
United Arab Emirates
State of Bahrain





THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
Document 5
Rules of Procedures of the Supreme Council
25 May 1981
Article One, Definitions
These regulations shall be called Rules of Procedures of the Supreme Council of the Gulf
Arab States Cooperation Council and shall encompass the rules that govern procedures for convening
the Council and the exercise of its functions.
Article Two, Membership
1. Supreme Council shall be composed of the Heads of State of the Cooperation
Council member states. The president shall be rotary based on the alphabetical order of the state's
name.
2. Each member state shall notify the Secretary General of the names of the members
of its delegations to the council meeting, at least seven days prior to the date set for opening the
meeting.
Article Three
With due regard to the objectives of the Cooperation Council and the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Council as specified in Article 4 and 8 of the Charter, the Supreme Council may perform the
following:
1. From technical committees and select their members from member states nominees
who specialize in the committee's respective field.
2. Call one or more of its members to a specific subject and submit a report thereon to
to be distributed to the members sufficiently in advance of the meeting set for discussing that subject.
Article Four, Convening the Supreme Council
1. a. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year, and may hold
extraordinary sessions at the request of any one member seconded by another member.
b. The Supreme Council shall hold its session at the heads of state level.
c. The Supreme Council shall its session in the member state's territories.
d. Prior to convening the Supreme Council, the Secretary General shall hold a
meeting to be attended by delegates of the member states for consultation on matters related to the
session's agenda.
2. a. The Secretary General shall set the opening date of the Council sessions and
suggest a closing date.
b. The Secretary General shall issue the invitations for convening a regular sessions
less than thirty days in advance, and for convening an extraordinary session, within no more than five
days.
Article Five
1. The Supreme Council shall at the start of every session decide whether the meeting
shall be secret or public.
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2. A meeting shall be considered valid if attended by heads of state of two thirds of
the member states. Its resolutions in substantive matters shall be carried by unanimous agreement of
the member states present and participating in the vote, while resolutions in procedural matters shall
be carried by majority vote. Any member abstaining shall document his being not bound by the
resolution
Article Six
1. The Council shall hold an extraordinary session based on:
a. Resolution issued in a previous session,
b. Request of a member state seconded by another state. In this case, the council
shall convene within no more than five days from that date of issue of the invitation for holding the
extraordinary session.
2. No matters may be placed on the extraordinary session's agenda other than those for which the
session was convened to discuss.
Article Seven
1. Presidency of the Supreme Council shall, at the opening of each regular session, go to a
head of state by rotation based on the alphabetical order of the member states' names. The
President shall continue to exercise the function of the Presidency until such functions are
entrusted to his successor at the beginning of the next regular session.
2. The head of a state that is party to an outstanding dispute may not preside over a session or
meeting called to discuss the subject of the dispute. In such case, the Council shall designate a
temporary president.
3. The President shall declare the opening and closing of sessions and meeting, the
suspension of meeting, and closures, and shall see that the Cooperation Council Charter and
these rules ofProcedures are duly complied with. He shall give the floor to speakers based on
the order of their requests, submit suggestions for acceptance by the membership, direct
voting procedures, give final decisions on points of order, announce resolutions, follow up on
works of committees, and inform the Council of all incoming correspondence.
4. The President may take part in deliberation and submit suggestions in the name of the state
which he represents and may, for this purpose, assign a member of his state's delegation to act on his
behalf in such instances.
Article Eight, Supreme Council Agenda
1. The Ministerial Council shall prepare a draft agenda for the Supreme Council, and such draft
agenda shall be convened by the Secretary General, together with explanatory notes and
documentation, to the member states under cover of a letter of convocation at least thirty days before
the date set for meeting.
2. The draft agenda shall include the following:
a. A report by the Secretary General on the Supreme Council's activities between the two
sessions, and actions taken to carry out its resolutions.
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b. Reports and matters received from the Ministerial Council and the Secretary General.
c. Matters which the Supreme Council had previously decided to include on the agenda.
d. Matters suggested by a member state for necessary review by the Supreme Council.
3. Every member state may request inclusion of additional items in the draft agenda provided such
request is tabled at least fifteen days prior to the date set for opening the session. Such matters shall be
listed in an additional agenda which shall be sent, along with relevant documentation, to the member
state, at least five days before the date set for the session.
4. Any member state may request inclusion of extra items on the draft agenda as late as the date set for
opening a session, if such matters are considered both important and urgent.
5. The Council shall approve its agenda at the start of every session.
6. The Council may, during the session, add new items that are considered urgent.
7. The ordinary session shall be adjourned after completion of discussions of the items placed on the
agenda. The Supreme Council may decide to suspend the session's meeting before completion of
discussions on agenda items, and resume such meetings at later date.
Article Nine, Office and Committees of Supreme Council
1. The Supreme Council Office shall be formed, in every session, of the Council President,
the Chairman of the Ministerial Council and the Secretary General. The Office shall be headed by the
Supreme Council President.
2. The Office shall carry out the following functions:
a. Review the text of resolutions passed by the Supreme Council without affecting their
contents.
b. Assist the President of the Supreme Council in directing the activities of the session in a
general way.
c. Other tasks indicated in these Rules of Procedures or other matters entrusted to it by the
Supreme Council.
Article Ten
1. The Council may, at the start of every session, create any committees that it deems
necessary to allow adequate study of matters listed on the agenda. Delegates of member
states shall take part in the activities of such committees.
2. Meetings of committees shall continue until they complete their task, with due regard for
the date set for closing the session and the resolutions shall be carried by majority vote.
3. Every committee shall start its work by selecting a chairman from among its members.
The rapporteur of the committee shall act for the chairman in directing the meeting in the
absence of the chairman. The chairman, or other rapporteur in the chairman's absence, shall
submit to the Council all the explanations that requests in the committee's reports. The
chairman may, with the approval of the session's president, take part in the discussions,
without voting if he is not a member of the Supreme Council.
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4. the Council may refer any of the matters included in the agenda to the committees, based
on their specialization for study and reporting. Any one item may be referred to more than
one committee.
5. Committees may neither discuss any matter nor refer to them by the Council, nor adopt any
recommendation which, if approved by the Council, may produce a financial obligation, before the
committee receives a report from the Secretary General regarding financial and administrative results
that may ensue from adopting the resolution.
Article Eleven, Progress of Deliberations and suggestions
1. Every member state may participate in the deliberations and committees of the Supreme
Council as stipulated in these Rules of Procedures.
2. The President shall direct discussion of the items as presented in order on the meetings
agenda and may, when necessary, call the Secretary General or his representative to the meeting to
explain any point as necessary.
3. The President shall give the floor to speakers in the order of their requests. He may give
priority to the Chairman or rapporteur of a committee to submit a report or explain specific points.
4. Every member may, during deliberations, raise points of order which the President shall resolve
immediately and his decision shall be valid unless contradicted by a majority of the Supreme Council
member states.
Article Twelve
1. Every member may, during the discussion of any subject, request suspension or adjournment of the
meeting or discussion of the subject, or closure. Such requests may not be discussed, but the President
shall put them to the vote, if duly seconded, and decision shall be by majority of the member states.
2. With due regards to provision of item 4 of the proceeding Article, suggestions indicated in item 1 of
the Article, shall be given priority over others based on the following order:
a. Suspend the meeting
b. Adjourn the meeting
c. Postpone discussion of the matter on hand
d. Closure of discussion of the matter on hand
3. Apart from suggestions concerning language or procedural matter, draft resolutions and substantive
amendments shall be submitted in writing to the Secretary General or his representative who shall
distribute them as soon as possible to the delegations. No draft resolutions may be submitted for
discussion or voting before the text thereof is distributed to all the delegations.
4. A proposal that has already been decided upon in the same session may not be reconsidered unless
the Council decides otherwise.
Article Thirteen
The President shall follow the activities of the committees, inform the Supreme Council of




Every member state shall have one vote and no state may represent another state
or vote for it.
ARTICLE FIFTEEN
1. Voting shall be by calling the names in the alphabetical order of the states
names, or by raising hands. Voting shall be secret if so requested by a member
by decision of the President. The Supreme Council may decide otherwise. The
vote of every member shall be documented in the minutes of the meeting if
voting is effected by calling the names. The minutes shall indicate the result of
voting, if the vote is secret or by show of hands.
2. A member may abstain from a vote or express reservations over a procedural
matter or part thereof, in which case the reservations shall be read at the time the
resolution is announced and shall be duly documented in writing. Members may
present explanations about their stand in the voting after voting is completed.
3. Once the President announces that voting has started, no interruption may be
made unless the matter relates to a point of order relevant to the vote.
ARTICLE SIXTEEN
1. If a member requests amendment of a proposal, voting on the amendment
shall be carried out first. If there are more than one amendment, voting shall be
first made on the amendment which in the President's opinion is farthest from
the original proposal, then on the next farthest, and then so on until voting is
completed on all proposed amendments. If one or more such amendments is
passed, then voting shall be made on the original proposal as amended.
2. Any new proposal shall be deemed as an amendment to the original proposal
if it merely entails an addition to, omission from or change to a part of the
original proposal.
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN
1. The Supreme Council may create technical committees charged with
giving advice on the design and execution of Supreme Council programs in
specific fields.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the members of the technical
committees from specialists who are citizens of the member states.
3. The technical committees shall meet at the invitation of the Secretary-
General and shall lay down their work plans in consultation with him.
4. The Secretary-General shall prepare the committees agendas after
consultation with the chairman of the committee concerned.
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN : AMENDMENT OF RULES OF PROCEDURES
1. Any member state may propose amendments to the Rules of
Procedures.
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2. No proposed amendments may be considered unless the relevant
proposal is circulated to the member states by the Secretariat-General prior to
tabling with the Ministerial Council by at least thirty days.
3. No basic changes may be introduced to the proposed amendment
mentioned in the preceding item unless the text of such proposed changes have
been circulated to the member states by the Secretariat-General before tabling
with the Ministerial Council by at least fifteen days.
4. Except for items based on the provisions of the Charter, and with due
regard to preceding items, these Rules of Procedures shall be amended by a
resolution of the Supreme Council approved by the majority of the members.
ARTICLE NINETEEN : EFFECTIVE DATE
These Rules of Procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the
Supreme Council and may not be amended except in accordance with procedures
set forth in the preceding Article.
These Rules of Procedures are signed at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab
Emirates on 21 Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 May 1981 AD.
United Arab Emirates
State of Bahrain





RULES OF PROCEDURES OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL - 25
MAY 1981
ARTICLE ONE
1. These regulations shall be called Rules of Procedures of the Ministerial
Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council and shall encompass rules
governing Council meetings and exercise of its functions.
2. The following terms as used in these shall have the meanings indicated :
Cooperation Council - The Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council
Charter - Statute establishing the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council
Supreme Council - The highest body of the body of the Gulf Arab
States Cooperation Council
Council - Ministerial Council of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation
Council
Secretary General - The Secretary-General of the Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council
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Chairman - The Chairman of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Arab
States Cooperation Council
ARTICLE TWO : STATE REPRESENTATION
1. The Ministerial Council shall be composed of the member states
Foreign Ministers or other delegated Ministers.
2. Every member state shall, at least one week prior to the convening of
every Ministerial Council's ordinary session, convey to the Secretary-General a
list of the names of the members of its delegation. For extraordinary sessions, the
list shall be submitted three days before the date set for the session.
ARTICLE THREE : CONVENING THE SESSIONS
1. The Ministerial Council shall decide in every meeting the venue of its
next regular session.
2. The Secretary-General shall decide, in consultation with the member
states, the venues of extraordinary sessions.
3. If circumstances should arise that preclude the convening of an ordinary
or extraordinary session at the place set for it, the Secretary-General shall so
inform the member states and shall set another place for the meeting after
consultation with them.
ARTICLE FOUR : ORDINARY SESSIONS
1. The Council shall convene in ordinary session once every three months.
2. The Secretary-General shall set the date for opening the session and
suggest the date of its closing.
3. The Secretary-General shall address the invitation to attend a Council
ordinary session at least fifteen days in advance, and shall indicate therein the
date and place set for the meeting, as well as attach thereto the session's agenda,
explanatory notes and other documentation.
ARTICLE FIVE : EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS
1. The Council shall hold an extraordinary session at the request of any
member state seconded by another member.
2. The Secretary-General shall address the invitation to the council's
extraordinary session and attach a memorandum containing the request of the
member which asked for the meeting.
3. The Secretary-General shall specify in the invitation the place, date and
agenda of the session.
ARTICLE SIX
1. The Council may itself decide to hold extraordinary sessions, in which
case it shall specify the agenda, time and place of the session.
2. The Secretary-General shall send out to the member states the invitation
to attend the Council's extraordinary meeting, along with a memorandum
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containing the Council's decision to this effect, and specifying the date and
agenda of the session.
3. The extraordinary session shall be convened within a maximum of five
days from the date of issue of the invitation.
ARTICLE SEVEN
No matters, other than those for which the extraordinary session was
called, may be included on its agenda.
ARTICLE EIGHT : AGENDA
The Secretary-General shall prepare a draft agenda for a Council's
ordinary session and such draft shall include the following :
1. The Secretary-General's Report on the Cooperation Council's work.
2. Matters referred to him by the Supreme Council.
3. Matters which the Council had previously decided to include on the
agenda.
4. Matters which the Secretary-General believes should be reviewed by
the Council.
5. Matters suggested by a member state.
ARTICLE NINE
Member states shall convey to the Secretary-General their suggestions
on matters they wish to include on the Council's agenda at least thirty days prior
to the date of the Council's ordinary session.
ARTICLE TEN
Member states or the Secretary-General may request the inclusion of
additional items on the Council's draft agenda at least ten days prior to the date
set for opening an ordinary session. Such items shall be listed on an additional
schedule which shall be conveyed alongwith relevant documentation to the
member states at least five days prior to the date of the session.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
Member states or the Secretary-General may request the inclusion of
additional items on the Council ordinary session's agenda up to the date set for
opening the session if such matters are both important and urgent.
ARTICLE TWELVE
The Council shall approve its agenda at the beginning of every session
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
A Council's ordinary session shall end upon completion of discussion
of matters listed on the agenda. The Council may, when necessary, decide to
suspend its meetings temporarily before discussion of agenda items is completed
and resume its meeting at a later date.
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ARTICLE FOURTEEN
The Council may defer discussion of certain items on its agenda and
decide to include them with others, when necessary, on the agenda of a
subsequent session
ARTICLE FIFTEEN : COUNCIL'S CHAIRMANSHIP
1. Chairmanship of the council shall be entrusted every six months to a
head of delegation on rotation based on the alphabetical order of the member
states names, and if necessary, to the next in order.
2. The chairman shall exercise his functions until he passes his post to this
successor.
3. The Chairman shall, as well, preside over the extraordinary sessions.
4. The representative of a state that is party to an outstanding dispute may
not chair the session or meeting assigned for discussing such dispute, in which
case the Council shall name a temporary Chairman.
ARTICLE SIXTEEN
1. The Chairman shall announce the opening and closing of sessions and
meetings, the suspension of meetings and closure of discussions, and shall see
that the provisions of the Charter and these Rules of Procedures are duly
respected.
2. The Chairman may participate in the Council's deliberations and vote in the name of the state
he represents. He may, for such purpose, delegate another member of his delegation to act on his
behalf.
ARTICLE SEVENTEEN, COUNCIL'S OFFICE
1. The Council Office shall include chairman, secretary-general, and heads ofworking subcommittees
which the Council decided to form.
2. The Council chairman shall preside over the office.
ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
The Office shall carry out the following tasks:
1. Help the chairman direct the sessions proceeding;
2. coordinate the work of Council and the subcommittees;
3. Supervise the drafting of the resolutions by the Council;
4. Other tasks indicated in these Rules of Procedures or entrusted to it by the Council.
ARTICLE NINETEEN, SUBCOMMITTEES
1. The Council shall utilize preparatory and working committees to accomplish its tasks.
2. The Secretariat-General shall participate the works of the committees.
ARTICLE TWENTY
1. The Secretary-General may, in consultation with the chairman of the session, form preparatory
committees charged with the study of matters listed on the agenda.
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2. Preparatory committees shall be composed of delegates ofmember sates and may, when necessary,
seek the help of such experts as the may deem fit.
3. Each preparatory committee shall meet at least three days prior to the opining of the session by
invitation of the Secretary-General. The work of the committee shall end at the close of the session.
ARTICLE TWENTY ONE
1. The Council may, at the start of each season, form working committees and charge them with
specific tasks.
2. The work of the working committees shall continue until the date set for closing the session.
ARTICLE TWENTY TWO
1. Each subcommittee shall start its work by electing a chairman and a rapporteur from among its
members. When the chairman is absent, the rapporteur shall act for him in directing the meeting.
2. The chairman or rapporteur of each subcommittee shall submit a report on its work of the council.
3. The chairman of repertoire of a subcommittee shall present to the council all explanations required
about the contents of the subcommittee's report.
ARTICLE TWENTY THREE
1. The Secretariat-General shall organize the technical secretariat and subcommittees of the Council.
2. The Secretariat-General shall prepare minutes of meeting documenting discussions, resolutions and
recommendations. Such minutes shall be prepared for all meetings of the Council and its
subcommittees.
3. The Secretariat-General shall supervise the organization of the Council's relations with the
information media.
4. The Secretariat-General shall convey the Council's resolutions and recommendation and relevant
documentation to the member states within fifteen days after the end of the session.
ARTICLE TWENTY FOUR
The council's Secretariat and subcommittees shall receive and distribute documents, reports
resolutions and recommendations of the Council and its subcommittees and shall draw up and
distribute minutes and daily bulletins, as well as safeguard the documents and carry out any other
tasks required by the Council's work.
ARTICLE TWENTY FIVE
Texts of resolutions or recommendations made by the Council may not be announced or published
except by decision of the
Council.
ARTICLE TWENTY SIX, DELIBERATIONS
Every member state may take part in the deliberations of the Council and its subcommittees in the
manner prescribed in these Rules of Procedures.
ARTICLE TWENTY SEVEN
1. The chairman shall direct deliberations on matters in hand in the order they are listed on the
council's agenda.
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2. The chairman shall give the floor to speakers in the order of their requests. Priority may be given to
the chairman or rapporteur of a certain committee to present its report or explain certain points
therein. The floor shall be given to the Secretary-General or his representative whenever it is
necessary.
3. The Council chairman may, during deliberations, read the list of the names of members who
requested the floor, and with the approval of the council, close the list. The only exception exercise of
the right of reply.
ARTICLE TWENTY EIGHT
The Council shall decide whether the meeting shall be open or secret.
ARTICLE TWENTY NINE
1. Every member may raise a point of order which the chairman shall resolve immediately and his
decision shall be find unless opposed by majority of the member states.
2. A member who raises a point may not go beyond the point he raised.
ARTICLE THIRTY
1. Every member may during discussion of any matter, suggest the suspension or adjournment of the
meeting, or discussion of matter in hand of clsture. The chairman shall in such cases submit the
suggestion to the vote directly, of the suggestion is seconded by another member, and it requites the
approval of the majority of the member states to pass.
2. With due regard to the provisions of the preceding item, suggestions indicated therein shall be
mitten to the vote in the following order:
a. Suspension ofmeeting
b. Adjournment ofmeeting
c. Postponement of discussion ofmatter in hand
d. Closture of discussion of the matter in hand.
ARTICLE THIRTY ONE
1. Member states may suggest draft resolutions or recommendations of amendments thereto, and may
withdraw such suggestions unless they are voted upon.
2. Drafts indicated in the preceding item shall be submitted in writing to Secretariat-General for
distribution to delegations as soon as possible.
3. Except for suggestions concerning language or procedures drafts indicated in this Article may not
be discussed or voted upon before their texts are distributed to all delegations.
4. A suggestion already decided upon in the same session may not be reconsidered unless the Council
decides otherwise.
ARTICLE THIRTY TWO
The Chairman shall follow the work of the committees, inform the Council of oncoming
correspondence, and formula announce before members the resolutions and recommendations that
have been arrived at.
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ARTICLE THIRTY THREE, VOTING
1. The Council shall pass its resolutions with the unanimous approval of the member states present
and participating in the vote, while decisions in procedural matters shall be passed by a majority vote.
The member abstaining from the vote shall document his non subscription to the decision.
2. If members of Council should disagree on the definition of the matter being put to the vote, the
matter shall be settled by the majority vote of the member states present.
ARTICLE THIRTY FOUR
1. Every member state shall have one vote.
2. No member state may represent another state or vote for it.
ARTICLE THIRTY FIVE
1. Voting shall be by calling the names on the alphabetical order of the state's names, or by raising
hands.
2. Voting shall be by secret ballot if so requested by a member or by decision of the Chairman. The
Council, however, may decide otherwise.
3. The vote of every member shall be documented in the minutes of the meeting of voting is effected
by calling the names. The minutes shall indicate the result of voting if the vote as secret or by show of
hands.
4. Member states may explain positions after the vote and such explanations shall be written down in
the minutes of the meeting.
5. Once the Chairman announces the voting has started, no interruption may be made except for a
point of order relating to the vote or postponement in accordance with the provisions of this next
Article.
ARTICLE THIRTY SIX
1. The Council Chairman with the help of the Secretary-General shall endeavor to reconcile the stands
of member states on disputed matters and obtain agreement to draft resolution before submitting it to
the vote.
2. The Council Chairman, the Secretary-General or any member state may request postponement of a
vote for a specific period during further negotiations may be made concerning the item submitted to
the vote.
ARTICLE THIRTY SEVEN
1. If a member requests amendment of a proposal, voting on the amendment shall be carried out first
be made on the amendment which the Chairman considers to be farthest form the original proposal,
then the next farthest, and so until all proposed amendments have been voted upon if one or more
amendments are passed, then voting shall be made on the original proposal as amended.
2. A new proposal shall be deemed as an amendment to the original proposal if it merely entails an
addition to, omission from, or change to a part of the original proposal.
ARTICLE THIRTY EIGHT
1. Any member state of the Secretary-General may propose amending these Rules ofProcedures.
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2. No proposed amendment to these Rules of Procedures may be considered unless the relevant
proposal is circulated to the member states by the Secretary-General at least thirty days before
submission to the council.
3. No basic changes nay be introduced to the proposed amendment mentioned in the preceding item
unless the texts of such proposed change have been circulated to the member states at least fifteen
days prior to submission to the Council.
4. Except for items in provisions of the Charter and with due regard to preceding items, these Rules of
Procedures shall be amended by a resolution of the Council approved by majority of its members.
ARTICLE THIRTY NINE, EFFECTIVE DATE
These Rules of procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the Council and may not
be amended except in accordance with procedures set forth in the preceding article.
Thus, these Rules of procedures are signed at Abu Dhabi. United Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401
AH corresponding to 25 May 1981 AD.
United Arab Emirates
State of Bahrain





Rules of Procedures of the Commission for the Settlement ofDisputes
25 May 1981
Preamble
In accordance with the provisions of Article Six of the Charter of the Gulf Arab States
Cooperation Council; and in execution of the provision of Article Ten of the Cooperation Council
Charter, a Commission for Settlement ofDisputes, hereinafter referred to as The Commission, shall be
set up and its jurisdiction and rules for its proceedings shall be as follows:
Article One, Terminology
Terms used in these Rules of Procedures shall have the same meaning established in the
Charter of the Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council.
Article Two, Commission's Seat and meetings
The Commission shall have its headquarters at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and shall hold its
meetings on the territory of the state where its headquarters is located, but may hold its meetings
elsewhere, when necessary.
Article Three, Jurisdiction
The Commission shall, once installed, have jurisdiction to consider the following matters
referred to it by the Supreme Council:
1. Disputes between member states.
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2. Differences of opinions as to the interpretation or execution of the Cooperation
Council Charter.
Article Four, Commission's Membership
1. The Commission shall be formed of an appropriate number of citizens ofmember states not
involved in the dispute as the Council selects in every case separately depending on the nature of the
dispute, provided that the number shall not be less than three members.
2. The Commission may seek the advice of any such experts as it may deem necessary.
3. Unless the Supreme Council decides otherwise, the Commission's task shall end with the
submission of its recommendations or opinion to the Supreme Council which, after the conclusion of
the Commission's task, may summon it at any time to explain or elaborate on its recommendations or
opinions.
Article Five, Meetings and Internal Procedures
1. The Commission's meeting shall be valid if attended by all members.
2. The Secretariat-General of the Cooperation Council shall prepare procedures
required to conduct the Commission's affairs, and such procedures shall go into effect as of
the date of approval by the Ministerial Council.
3. Each party to the dispute shall send representatives to the Commission who shall
be entitled to follow proceedings and present their defense.
Article Six, Chairmanship
The Commission shall select a chairman from among its members.
Article Seven, Voting
Every member of the commission shall have one vote, and shall issue its recommendations or
opinions on matters referred to it by majority of the members. In case of a tie, the party with the
Chairman's vote shall prevail.
Article Eight, Commission's Secretariat
1. The Secretary-General shall appoint a recorder for the Commission, and a sufficient number
of employees to carry out secretarial work.
2. The Supreme Council may create an independent organization to carry out the Commission's
secretarial work when the need arises.
Article Nine, Recommendations and Opinions
1. The Commission shall issue its recommendations or opinions in accordance with the
Cooperation Council's Charter, international laws and practices, and the principles of Islamic Sharjah.
The Commission shall submit its findings on the case in hand to the Supreme Council for appropriate
action.
2. The Commission may, while considering any dispute referred to it and pending the issue of
its final recommendations thereon, ask the Supreme Council to take interim action called for by
necessity or circumstances.
3. The Commission's recommendations or opinions shall spell out the reasons on which they
were based and shall be signed by the chairman and recorder.
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4. If an opinion is passed wholly or partially by unanimous vote of the members, the dissenting
members shall be entitled to document their dissenting opinion.
Article Ten, Immunities and Privileges
The Commission and its members shall enjoy such immunities and privileges in the
territories of the member states as are required to realize its objectives and in accordance with Article
Seventeen of the Cooperation council Charter.
Article Eleven, Commission's Budget
The Commission's budget shall be considered part of the Secretariat-General budget.
Remuneration's of the Commission's members shall be established by the Supreme Council.
Article Twelve, Amendments
1. Any member state may request for amendments of these rules of Procedures.
2. Requests for amendments shall be submitted to the Secretary-General who shall relay them
to the member states by at least four months before submission to the Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall be effective if approved unanimously by the Supreme Council.
Article Thirteen, Effective Date
These Rules of Procedures shall go into effect as of the date of approval by the Supreme
Council.
These Rules of Procedures were signed at Abu Dhabi City, United Arab Emirates on 21
Rajab 1401 AH corresponding to 25 May 1981 AD.
United Arab Emirates
State of Bahrain





Bylaws of the GCC
26 May 1981
During their closed meeting today, the heads of the six Gulf states participating in the Arab Gulf
Cooperation Council approved the bylaws of the Supreme Council, which is the supreme authority of
the Cooperation Council and one of its three main organs, in addition to the Ministerial Council and
the General Secretariat. The following is the text of the Supreme Council's bylaws:
Article One:
The following shall be called the Bylaws of the Supreme Council of the Arab Gulf
Cooperation Council. They contain the rules regulating the convocation of the council and the
exercise of its tasks.
Article Two: The Supreme Council's Membership and Tasks
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1. The Supreme Council shall consist of the heads of the Cooperation Councils'
member states, Its presidency shall be periodic in accordance with the alphabetical order of the names
of these states.
2. Every members state shall notify the Secretary General of the names of its delegates
to the council's meeting at least 7 days before its opening date.
Article Three:
Taking into consideration the Cooperation Council's aims and the Supreme Council's
jurisdictions as stipulated in articles four and eight of the statues, the council shall perform the
following:
1. To form technical committees and choose its members from members states
nominees, who are specialized in these committees fields ofwork.
2. To entrust one or more of its members with the task of studying a certain subject and submit
a report about it to be distributed among the members sometime before the session is held to discuss
it.
Article Four, The convocation of the Supreme Council
1. A. The Supreme Council shall hold two ordinary sessions a year. Extraordinary
sessions can be held upon the request of any member with the second of another member.
B. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions on the level of the heads of
state.
C. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the Countries of the
member states.
D. Before the convocation of the Supreme Council, the secretary general
shallcall for a meeting to be attended by the representatives of the member work.
2 A. The Secretary General shall fix the dates the sessions shall begin. He shall also
propose the dates they shall end.
B. The Secretary General shall address invitations to attend the ordinary session at least
30 days before the convocation date and 5 days at most before the convocation of an extraordinary
session.
Article Five:
1. The Supreme Council shall decide whether the sessions will be secret or public at the
beginning of every session.
2. The Supreme Council's convocation shall be sound if it is attended by the heads of two-
thirds of the member states. It shall adopt its decisions on objective issues by the unanimous vote of
the states present and on procedural affairs by the majority. The member who abstains from voting
must record that he will not abide by the decision.
Article Six:
1. The Supreme Council shall hold an extraordinary session:
A. Upon a decision adopted at a previous session.
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B. Upon the request of a member state and the approval of another. In this
case, the Council shall convene within 5 days after the invitation for the extraordinary session.
2. The agenda of the extraordinary sessions shall not include topics other than those for
which they were held.
Article Seven: Supreme Council Presidency
1. At the beginning of every ordinary session, the presidency of the Supreme Council shall be
alternately assumed by the heads of member states in accordance with the alphabetical order of the
names of the countries. The president shall continue exercising the functions of the presidency until
his successor assumes this responsibility at the beginning of the next ordinary session.
2. The head of a state which is party to an existing conflict cannot preside over the session or
the meeting devoted to the discussion of this conflict. In this case, the Council shall appoint a
temporary president.
3. The president shall open and close the sessions or meetings, suspend sessions, decide when
to end the discussions, guarantee respect for the Gulf Cooperation Councils statues, give the floor to
those who ask for it first, submit proposals on which opinions are to be given, direct the operation of
voting, decide on various points of the statutes, announce resolutions, follow up the work of the
committees and inform the council about the letter it receives.
4. The president shall have the right to participate in deliberations and discussions on behalf of
the country he represents, he shall also have the right to delegate a member of his delegation for this
purpose.
Article Eight: The Supreme Council's Agenda
1. The Ministerial Council shall prepare the Supreme Council's draft agenda and the secretary
general shall communicate it to the member states with explanatory memorandums, documents and
the letter inviting the Council to convene, at least 30 days before the date of convening the council.
2. The draft agenda shall contain:
A. The Secretary General's report on the Supreme Council's work during the
period that falls between the two sessions and the measures taken to implement its decisions.
B. Reports and topics coming from the Ministerial Council and the Secretariat
General.
C. Topics that the Supreme Council had previously decided to list on its
agenda.
D. Topics proposed by a member state which it considers as necessary to be
discussed by the Supreme Council.
3. Each member state shall have the right to list additional topics on the Supreme
Council's draft agenda at least 15 days before the set date of the Council's session. These topics will
be listed in an additional agenda that will be sent to the member States along with their documents at
least 5 days before the date of the session.
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4. Any member state shall have the right to list additional topics to the session's
agenda until the date that has been set for its opening if these topics are (at) the same time important
and urgent.
5. The Council approves its agenda at the beginning of every session.
6. The Council shall have the right to list additional topics to the agenda during the
session if they are urgent.
7. The ordinary session shall end after the completion of the discussion of the items
listed on the agenda. The Supreme Council shall have the right to suspend the meetings of the session
temporarily before having completed the discussion of the agenda and to resume the meeting at a later
date.
Article Nine : The Supreme Council's Bureau and Committee.
1. The Supreme Council's Bureau shall consist, at every ordinary session of the council's
chairman, of the chairman of the Ministerial Council and the secretary general. The chairman of the
Supreme Council shall preside over the bureau.
2. The bureau shall assume the following tasks:
A. A review of the formulation of the resolution that are adopted by the Supreme
Council without changing their content.
B. The task of assisting the Supreme Council chairman in the management of the
session in a general manner.
C. Other tasks that are contained in the status or those which are entrusted to the bureau
by the Supreme Council.
Article Ten :
1. At the outset of every ordinary session, the council shall form the committee it deems
necessary and in such a way that the opportunity is given for making a detailed study of the issue on
the agenda. Representatives from the member states shall participate in the work of these committee.
2. The committees' meetings shall continue in order to complete their work, taking into
consideration the specific date for ending the session. The committee shall issue their resolutions with
majority votes.
3. Every committee shall begin its work with the election of a chairman and rappoteur from
among its members. If the chairman is absent he shall manage its sessions. If the chairman is absent,
his representative or the rapporteur shall give the council all the required clarifications on the contents
of the committee's report. The rapporteur or chairman's representative can, with the approval of the
chairman of the session, participate in the deliberations without voting, unless he is a member of the
council.
4. The council shall refer issues listed on the agenda to committee in accordance with their
specialization in order to have them study these issues and prepare reports on them. An issue can be
referred to more than one committee.
5. The committee cannot discuss any issue unless it is referred to them by the Council. The
committees also can not adopt any recommendations on any issue that is listed on their agenda and
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whose adoption entails a financial commitment by the council before they receive a report from the
Secretary General on the financial and administrative effects pertaining to the adoption of these
recommendations.
Article Eleven: The Progress ofDeliberations and Proposals
1. Each member state shall have the right to participate in the deliberations of the Supreme
Council and its committees in accordance with the statutes.
2. The chairman directs the deliberations on the issues to be discussed according to their order
in the session's agenda. When necessary the chairman can invite the secretary general or the person
who represents him at the meeting to clarify what he considers necessary.
3. The chairman yields the floor in accordance with requests made. The floor may be given to
the chairman or rapporteur of a committee to submit the committee's report or explain points
contained in it.
4. Any member can raise a point of the statutes during the deliberations on which the chairman
shall immediately decide. The chairman's decision will be executed unless it is reversed by a majority
vote of the Supreme Council.
Article Twelve:
1. During the discussion of any issue, any member can propose the suspension or postponement
of the session, the postponement of the discussion of the issue in question or the ending of discussion.
The proposal shall not be the subject for discussion but shall be submitted to a vote by the chairman if
it is seconded by another member. The adoption of this proposal shall be made with a majority vote
ofmember states.
2. Taking into consideration the contents of paragraph four, article eleven, proposals made in
accordance with paragraph one this article shall be given preference to all other points preceding them
according to the following order:
A. the suspension of the session
B. the postponement of the session
C. ending discussion of the issue under discussion.
3. Excluding proposals on formulation and on procedural matters, draft resolutions and
fundamental amendments shall be submitted in writing to the Secretary General or to the person who
represents him for distribution to the delegations as soon as possible. The discussion of a draft
resolution or its submission to a vote cannot take place before the distribution of their test to all the
delegations.
4. Any proposal on which a decision has been taken during the same session cannot be
reconsidered unless the council decides otherwise.
Article Thirteen:
The Chairman shall follow up the committee's work, inform the Supreme Council of the
messages received by it and officially announce before the members the recommendations reached.
Article Fourteen: Voting
Each member state shall have one vote and no state shall represent another state or vote for it.
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Article Fifteen:
1. Voting shall be made by calling the name in accordance with the alphabetical order of the
states' names or by raising the hand. Voting shall be in the form of a secret ballot if asked to be so by
a member or upon a decision by the chairman. The Supreme Council shall have the right to decide
otherwise and to write down in the session's minutes the vote of every member if the ballot is made
by calling the roll. The result of the ballot shall be included in the minutes if the ballot is secret or
made by raising hand.
2. Every member shall have the right to abstain from voting or to express a reservation about a
procedural decision or part of it. The reservation shall be read out when the decision is announced
and shall be written down. The members shall have the right to explain their stands toward the voting
when said voting ends.
3. Once the chairman announces the beginning of voting, no one shall interrupt him unless this
interruption pertains to a legal point concerning the voting.
Article Sixteen:
1. If a member asks for the amendment of a proposal, a vote shall be held first on this
amendment. Should there be more than one amendment, voting will begin on the amendment whose
subject is seen by the chairman as furthest detached from that of the original amendment. Voting shall
then be on the amendment next furthest detached and so forth until all proposed amendments are
voted upon. If one or more amendment is approved, the amended original proposal shall then be
voted upon.
2. Any new proposal shall be considered and amendment of the original proposal if it includes
the mere addition, omission or change of any part of the original proposal.
Article Seventeen:
1. The Supreme Council shall form technical committees entrusted with the task of offering
consultation in the preparation and implementation of the Supreme Council's programs in certain
fields.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the technical committees' members from among the
specialist citizens of the member states.
3. The technical committees shall meet upon the invitation of the Secretary General and shall
prepare their working plan through consultations with him.
4. The Secretary General shall draw up the technical committees' agenda after consultations
with the competent committee's chairman.
Article Eighteen: Amendment of the Bylaws
1. Every state has the right to suggest the amendment of these bylaws.
2. It is impermissible to examine the request to amend the bylaws unless the proposal regarding
this amendment is sent to the member states by the Secretariat General at least 30 days before
submitting it to the Ministerial Council.
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3. It is impermissible to introduce any basic changes on the amendment proposal as cited in the
previous paragraph unless the text of these proposed changes has been sent to the member states by
the Secretariat General at least 15 days before it is submitted to the Ministerial Council.
4. With the exception of the articles based on the provisions of the statutes, taking into
consideration the above mentioned paragraphs, these bylaws are amended by a decision adopted by
the Supreme Council upon the approval of the majority of its members.
Article Nineteen: The Validity of the Bylaws
These bylaws shall be valid as of the date they are approved by the Supreme Council. They shall not
be amended except in accordance with the measures cited in the previous article.
These bylaws have been signed in the city of Abu Dhabi in the UAE on 22 Rajab 1401 Hegira,
corresponding to 26 May 1981.
The United Arab Emirates
The State of Bahrain





Abu Dhabi Supreme Council Summit: Final Communique
26 May 1981
In the name ofGod, the merciful, the compassionate.
Final statement of the first meeting of the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council of
the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf countries:
In the response to the invitation of his Highness the President of the UAE and with the help
of God, a meeting was held in Abu Dhabi 21-22 Rajab 1401 Hegira, corresponding to 25-26 May
1981, of Their Majesties and their Highnesses Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan A1 Nuhayyan President of the
UAE: Shaykh Isa ibn Salman A1 Khalifah, Amir of the State of Bahrain; King Khalid ibn Abd al-Aziz
A1 Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Sultan Qabus ibn Said of Oman; Shaykh Khalifah ibn
Hamad A1 Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar; and Shaykh Jabir al Ahmad Al-Jabir as-Sahah, the Amir
of Kuwait.
Out of the fraternal spirit that exists among these countries and their peoples; in completion
of the efforts begun by their leaders to lay down a model formula that includes their countries and
enables these countries to cooperate and coordinate among themselves; out of their belief in the
importance of cooperation among these countries; in response to their peoples' expectations for
increased cooperation and efforts to achieve a better future; and in accordance with the results of the
meetings of their Foreign Ministers in Riyadh on 4 February 1981 and in Muscat on 9 March 1981;
Their majesties and highnesses agreed to establish a council of their countries to be called the
Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf States (Majlis at-Ta'awun Ii Duwal al-Khalij al-Arabiyyah).
They signed the statutes of the council, which are aimed at developing cooperation among these states
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enhancing their relations; achieving coordination; integration and closer links; deepening and
strengthening the ties and relations that exist among their peoples in various fields; implementing joint
projects and drawing up similar systems in economic, cultural, information, social and legislative
fields in order to serve their interests and strengthen their ability to hold on to their beliefs and values.
Their Majesties and Highnesses also decided to appoint Abdullah Bisharah secretary general
of the Cooperation Council Riyadh, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, shall be the Council's permanent
headquarters.
Out of their realization of the inevitability of economic integration among their countries and
a social merger among their peoples, they believe that the current circumstances of their states and the
similar issues and problems they face, in addition to their similar economic and social systems, make
it necessary to lay down the bases for and establish the institutions and apparatus that will make this
economic integration and social merger a living reality.
In order to achieve these goals, in accordance with Article 4 of the Council's statutes, they
decided to set up specialized committees as outlined in detail in the enclosed working paper approved
by the Supreme Council.
Their Majesties and Highnesses reviewed the current situation in the area. They reaffirm that
the region's security and stability are the responsibility of its peoples and countries and that this
council expresses the will of these countries and their right to defend their security and independence.
They also affirm their absolute rejection of foreign interference in the region from any source. They
call for keeping the entire region free of international conflicts, particularly the present of military
fleets and foreign bases, in order to safeguard their interests and the interests and the interests of the
world.
They declare that guaranteeing stability in the Gulf is linked to the achievement of peace in
the Middle East, and this underlines the need to achieve a just solution for the Palestinian question- a
solution that safeguards the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, including their rights to repatriation
and the establishment of an independent state, and ensures Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied
Arab territories, the foremost of which is Jerusalem.
Their Majesties and Highnesses discussed the serious situation arising from the escalation of
Zionist aggression against the Arab nation. They discussed in a spirit of national responsibility Israel's
persistence in violating fraternal Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and the savage
bombardment of Lebanese cities and towns and Palestinian refugee camps, its war of extermination
launched against the Palestinians, its aggression against the Arab Deterrent Forces and its threats to
fraternal Syria. They affirm their full support and backing for Syria. They appeal to all parties in
Lebanon to discard their differences, put an end to the bloodshed in Lebanon and embark on
reconciliation talks within the framework of Lebanese legitimacy.
Their Majesties and Highnesses support the efforts being made to end the Iraqi-Iranian was,
since it is one of the problems that threaten the region's security and increases the possibility of
foreign intervention in the region. They stress the need to redouble efforts to find a final settlement to
the dispute.
476
Their Majesties and Highnesses also reaffirm their commitment to the Arab League Charter
and the resolutions of Arab summit conferences. They reiterate their support for Islamic Conference
Organization and their commitment to its resolutions. They express their adherence to the principles
of nonalignment and to the UN Charter.
In response to the invitation of His Majesty King Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, it was decided to hold the second meeting in Riyadh in Muharram, 1402 Hegira,
corresponding to the first half ofNovember 1981.
Issued in Abu Dhabi 22 Rajab, 1401 Hegira, 26 may 1981.1
THE UNITED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE
COUNTRIES OF THE GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL
With the help of God the Almighty;
The Governments of the Member States of the Arab GulfCooperation Council;
In accordance with the Charter thereof, which calls for closer relations and stronger links; and,
desiring to develop extend and enhance their economic ties on solid foundations, in the best interest of
their peoples and for the sake of working to coordinate and standardize their economic, financial and
monetary policies, as well as their commercial and industrial legislation, and Customs regulations




a. The Member States shall permit the importation and exportation of agricultural, animal,
industrial and natural resource products that are of national origin. Also, they shall permit
exportation thereof to other Member States.
b. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are from Member
States shall receive the same treatment as national products.
ARTICLE 2
1. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that are of national
origin shall be exempted from reciprocal charges.
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, transportation, freight or
unloading, shall not be considered as customs duties when they are levied on domestic
products.
1. (Source): Ramazani, R.K. The Gulf Cooperation Council Record and Analysis op.cit. And the




1. For products of national origin to qualify as national manufactured products, the value
added ensuing from their production in Member States shall not be less than 40% of their
final value as at the termination of the production phase. In addition Member States citizens'
share in the ownership of the producing plant shall not be less than 51%.
2. Every item enjoying exemption hereby shall be accompanied by a certificate or origin
duly authenticated by the appropriate government agency concerned.
ARTICLE 4
1. Member States shall establish a uniform minimum Customs tariff applicable to the
products of countries other than G.C.C. Member States.
2. One of the objectives of the uniform Customs tariff shall be the protection of national
products from foreign competition.
3. The uniform Customs tariff shall be implemented gradually within five years from the
date on which this agreement becomes effective. Arrangements for its gradual
implementation shall be agreed upon within one year from the said date.
ARTICLE 5
Member States shall grant all facilities for the transit of any Member State's goods to other Member
States, exempting them from all duties and taxes whatsoever, without prejudice to the provisions of
Paragraph 2 of Article 2.
ARTICLE 6
Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from entry into the territory of a Member State by
its local regulations. Lists of such goods shall be exchanged between the Customs authorities of the
Member States.
ARTICLE 7
Member States shall coordinate their commercial policies and relations with other states and regional
economic groupings and blocs with a view to creating balanced trade relations and equitable
circumstances and terms of trade therewith.
To achieve this goal, the Member States shall make the following arrangements :
1. Coordination of import/export policies and regulations.
2. Coordination of policies for building up strategic food stocks.
3. Conclusion of collective economic agreements in cases where joint benefits to Member
States would be realised.
4. Taking action for the creation of collective negotiating power to strengthen their negotiat¬




THE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND INDIVIDUALS
AND THE EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
ARTICLE 8
The Member States shall agree on executive principles to ensure that each Member State shall grant
the citizens of all other Member States the same treatment as is granted to its own citizens without any
discrimination of differentiation in the following fields :
1. Freedom ofmovement work and residence.
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity.
4. Free movement of capital.
ARTICLE 9
The Member States shall encourage their respective private sectors to establish joint ventures in order




The Member States shall endeavor to achieve the coordination and harmonization of their respective
development plans with a view to achieving integration in economic affairs.
ARTICLE 11
1. The Member States shall endeavour to coordinate their policies with regard to all aspects
of the oil industry including extraction, refining, marketing, processing, pricing, the
exploitation of natural gas, and development of energy sources.
2. The Member States shall endeavour to formulate unified oil policies and adopt common
positions vis-a-vis the outside world, and in international and specialized organisations.
ARTICLE 12
To achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement, the Member States shall :
1. Coordinate industrial activities and formulate policies and mechanisms which will lead to
industrial development and the diversification of their products on an integrated basis.
2. Standardize their industrial legislation and regulations and guide their local product¬
ion units to meet their needs.
3. Allocate industries between Member States according to relative advantages and
Economic feasibility, and encourage the establishment of basic as well as ancillary
industries.
ARTICLE 13
Within the framework of their coordinating activities, the Member States shall pay special attention to
the establishment of joint ventures in the fields of industry, agriculture and service, and shall support
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them with public, private or mixed capital in order to achieve economic integration, productive




The Member States shall collaborate in finding spheres for common technical cooperation aimed at
building a genuine local base founded on encouragement and support of research and applied sciences
and technology as well as adapting imported technology to meet the needs of the region and to
achieve the objectives of progress and development.
ARTICLE 15
Member States shall establish procedures, make arrangement and lay down terms for the transfer of
technology, selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes thereto as would serve their
various needs. Member States shall also, whenever feasible, conclude uniform agreements with
foreign governments and scientific or commercial organisations to achieve their objectives.
ARTICLE 16
Member States shall formulate policies and implement coordinated programs for technical, vocational
and professional training and qualification at all levels and stages. They shall also develop
educational curricula at all levels to link education and technology with the development needs of the
Member States.
ARTICLE 17
Member States shall coordinate their manpower policies and shall formulate uniform and standardized
criteria and classifications for the various categories of occupations and crafts in different sectors in





Member States shall accord passenger and cargo transportation belonging to citizens of the other
Member States, when transiting or entering its territory, the same treatment they accord to the means
of passenger and cargo transportation belonging to their own citizens, including exemption from all
duties and taxes, whatsoever. However, local means of transportation are excluded.
ARTICLE 19
1. Member States shall cooperate in the fields of land and sea transportation, and communi¬
cations. They shall also coordinate and establish infrastructure projects such as seaports,
airports, water and power stations and roads, with a view to realising joint economic
development and the linking of their economic activities with each other.
2. The contracting states shall coordinate aviation and air transport policies among them and
promote all areas ofjoint action at various levels.
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ARTICLE 20
Member States shall allow steamers, ships and boats and their cargoes, belonging to any Member
State freely to use the various port facilities and grant them the same treatment and privileges granted
to their own in docking or calling at the ports as concerns fees, pilotage and docking services, freight,
loading and unloading, maintenance, repair, storage of goods and other similar services.
CHAPTER SIX
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION
ARTICLE 21
Member States shall seek to unify investment rules and regulations in order to achieve a joint
investment policy aimed at directing their domestic and foreign investment towards serving their
interest, and realising their peoples' aspirations for development and progress.
ARTICLE 22
Member States shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary and banking policies and enhance
cooperation between monetary agencies and central banks, including the endeavour to establish a joint
currency in order to further their desired economic.
ARTICLE 23





In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the procedures resulting therefrom,
consideration shall be given to differences in the levels of development as between Member States
and the local development priorities of each. Any Member States may be temporarily exempted from
applying such provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local situations in
that state or specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be for a specified period and
shall be decided by the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf.
ARTICLE 25
No Member State shall grant any non-member state any preferential privilege exceeding that granted
herein.
ARTICLE 26
a. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after its approval by the Supreme
Council.
b. This Agreement may be amended by consent of the Supreme Council.
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ARTICLE 27
In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of Member States, execution of the provisions of
this Agreement shall prevail.
ARTICLE 28
Provisions herein shall supercede any similar provisions contained in bilateral agreements. Drawn up
at Riyadh on 15 Muharram 1402, corresponding to 11 November 1982.2
Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention — 1922
Kuwait-Najd Boundary Convention
In the Name ofGod, the Merciful, the Compassionate
The frontier between Najd and Kuwait begins in the West from junction of the Wadi al Aujah (W. al
Audja) with the Batin (El Batin), leaving Raq'i (Rikai) to Najd, from this point it continues in a
straight line until it joins latitude 29 and the red semi-circle referred to in Article 5 of the Anglo-
Turkish Agreement of 29th July 1913. The line then follows the side of the red semi-circle until it
reaches a point terminating (sic) on the coast south of Ras al-Wali'ah (Ras el Kaliyah) and this is the
indisputable southern frontier of Kuwait territory. The portion of territory bounded on the North by
this line and which is bounded on the West by a low mountainous ridge called Shaq (Esh Shakk) and
on the East by the sea and on the South by a line passing from West to East from Shaq (Esh Shakk) to
'Ain al 'Abd (Ain el Abd) and thence to the coast north of Ras al Mish'ab (Ras Mishaab), in this
territory the Governments ofNajd and Kuwait will share equal rights until through the good offices of
the Government ofGreat Britain a further agreement is made between Najd and Kuwait concerning it.
The map on which this boundary has been made is Asia 1-1,000,000 made by the Royal
Geographical Society under the direction of the Geographical Section General Staff and printed at the
War Office in the 1918.
Written in the port of 'Uqair and signed by the representatives of both Governments on the
Second day of December 1922 corresponding to 13th of Rabi' al Thani, 1341.
ABDULLAH SA'ID DAMLUJI
Representative of His
Highness the Sultan ofNadj
J.C. More Major
Political Agent, Kuwait.
I have agreed to the contents of this agreement.
'ABDUL 'AZIZ BIN 'ABDUL RAHMAN AS-SA'UDSultan ofNajd and its Dependencies
2. (Source): Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Secretariat General. The Unified
Economic A ereement. GCC. Printing Press, Riyadh, 1992.
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I have agreed to the contents of this agreement. AHMAD AL-JABIR AS-SABAH Hakim ofKuwait
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement to partition the Neutral Zone
Signed at Al-Hadda, Saudi Arabia, 7 July 1965
Agreement Between the State of Kuwait and
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Relating to
the Partitionof the Neutral Zone.
In the Name of God the Compassionate, the Merciful.
Whereas the two Contracting Parties have equal rights in the shared Zone whose land boundaries are
delineated in accordance with the boundary Convention made at A1 Uqair in 13 Rabi, Thani, 1341
corresponding to 2nd December, 1922, and the agreed Minutes signed at Kuwait on 12 Shaual, 1380,
corresponding to 21st March, 1961 (called hereinafter the 'Partitioned Zone), and
Whereas the aforesaid Convention did not regulate the exercise of those rights, and as that state of
affairs was of a provisional nature which entailed serious practical difficulties and
Whereas the two Contracting Parties, an exchange of notes on 15/3/1383 corresponding to 5th
August, 1963 (in regard to partitioning the Neutral Zone), have accepted to put an end to that
temporary state of affairs by means of partitioning that Zone into two sections, so that the one shall be
annexed to the State of Kuwait and the other shall be annexed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
provided that these equal rights of the two Parties shall be preserved in full in the whole partitioned
Zone as this had originally been decided by the Convention made at A1 Uqair that it is shared between
the two parties, and shall be safeguarded by the provisions of international responsibility. They
therefore have agreed upon the following:-
Article I. The boundary line between the two sections of the Zone is to be the line which divides
them into two equal parts and which begins from a point at the mid eastern shore on the low-tide line,
and ends at the western boundary line of the Zone. That boundary line shall be demarcated in a
natural manner by the Committee of Survey which is to determine that boundaryline of the Neutral
Zone and which is to be set up in the manner agreed upon in the protocol annexed to the notes
exchanged between the two parties at Jeddah on 15.3.1383 corresponding to 5th August, 1963. This
boundary line shall be approved by the two sides in an agreement they will conclude later on.
Article II. Without prejudice to the provisions of this agreement, the part lying to the north of the
line dividing the Partitioned Zone into two equal parts shall be annexed to Kuwait as an integral part
of its territory, and the part lying to the south of the line dividing the Partitioned Zone into two equal
parts shall be annexed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as an integral part of its territory.
Article III. Each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise the rights of administration, legislation
and defence over that part of the Partitioned Zone annexed to his territory in the same manner
exercised in his territory of origin while observing other provisions of the Agreement, and without
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prejudice to the rights of the contracting parties to natural resources in the whole of the Partitioned
Zone.
Article IV. Each of the Contracting Parties shall respect the rights of the other Party to the shared
natural resources either existing at present or that shall exist in future in that part of the Partitioned
Zone which is annexed to his territory.
Article V. If one of the parties cedes or otherwise alienates all or part of those equal rights which
are safeguarded by the provisions of this Agreement and which are exercised over any part of the
Partitioned Zone to any other State, the other Party shall be relieved of his obligations under this
Agreement.
Article VI. Each of the Contracting Parties shall be under obligation not to take any local or
international measure or action which may result in whatsoever form in hindering the other party from
exercising the rights which are safeguarded by this agreement, and he shall be under obligations to co¬
operate with the other Party fully to protect these rights.
Article VII. Each of the Contracting Parties shall exercise over the territorial waters which adjoin
that part of the Partitioned Zone which will be annexed to its territory the same rights as those
exercised over the part annexed to its territory; and the two Contracting Parties shall agree to
determine the boundary line which divides the territorial waters which adjoin the Partitioned Zone.
For the purpose of exploiting the natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, not more than six
marine miles of the sea-bed and sub-soil adjoining the Partitioned Zone shall be annexed to the
principal land of that Partitioned Zone.
Article VIII. On determining the northern boundary of the submerged Zone adjoining the
Partitioned Zone, it shall be delineated as if the Zone has not been partitioned and without regard to
the provisions of this Agreement.
And, the two Contracting Parties shall exercise their equal rights in the submerged Zone beyond
the aforesaid six miles limit mentioned in the previous Article, by means of shared exploitation unless
the two Parties agree otherwise.
Article IX. Each of the Contracting Parties shall in the part annexed to the other party of the
Partitioned Zone evacuate the establishments occupied by the government officials who perform
administrative and legal work, and hand it over to the other party provided that such provisions shall
not apply to establishments occupied by employees engaged in measuring oil, checking and auditing
accounts, technical supervision and purchasing committees and such similar supervision work.
Article X. If one of the Contracting Parties entrusts the companies that have been granted a joint
concession by the two parties, with the construction of establishments for judicial and administrative
purposes in accordance with terms of the concession in that part of the Partitioned Zone to be annexed
to his territory, the cost of establishing such constructions shall be deducted from the capital expenses
of the concessionary companies, provided that such costs shall be limited to necessary and reasonable
expenses.
Article XI. The present agreements of oil concessions shall remain in force and either Party
pledges to respect their provisions and the amendments entered into in that half of the Partitioned
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Zone which shall be annexed to this territory. He shall also undertake such legislative and legal
measures necessary for the continued exercise by the concessionary companies of their rights and
discharge of their obligations.
ArticleXII. Each Contracting Party shall be responsible in that part of the Partitioned Zone which
will be annexed to its territory for protection and security according to the obligations provided for in
the present concession agreements in force.
Article XIII. To avoid double taxation, each Contracting Party shall undertake to enact legislative
safeguards which ensure the non-imposition of taxation or custom duties or royalties on the companies
that have been granted a concession, in the Partitioned Zone by the other Party.
Article XIV. Entry of citizens of the two contracting parties, and their moving about in the
Partitioned Zone, who are working as officials, employees, labourers and contractors in
establishments and firms engaged in the exploitation of natural resources according to concessions
now in force and their subsidiaries shall be by valid passports issued by the other Party or by a card of
special form to be issued by one of the Contracting Parties, and to be agreed upon, without the need
for obtaining entry visas.
Article XV. Without prejudice to the concessionary oil agreements in force, each of the parties
shall safeguard in that part of the Partitioned Zone annexed to his territory, freedom of work to the
citizens of the other party and the right to practice any profession or occupation on equal levels with
his citizens, concerning oil resources granted in the present concessions or in what may supersede
them in future.
With regard to natural resources which may be discovered in future, the two parties shall agree on
the rights of each other's citizens to work and to practice any occupation.
Article XVI. Each of the contracting parties shall respect the rights of the other party's citizens in
the present establishments and constructions, existing in that part of the Partitioned Zone which shall
be annexed to its territory.
Article XVII. To safeguard the continuance of the two Contracting Parties' efforts in exploiting
natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, a joint permanent committee shall be set up and called
hereinafter the 'Committee'.
Article XVIII. The Committee shall be composed of an equal number from the two Contracting
Parties' representatives, and the two competent ministers for natural resources, in each of the
Contracting Governments, shall agree upon the number of the Committee members, its rules of
procedure and how to safeguard the necessary appropriations for it.
ArticleXIX. The Committee shall have the following powers:
(a) To facilitate passage of officials, employees of concessionary companies and of ancillary
companies and establishments in the Partitioned Zone, other than the citizens of the two Parties.
(b) Studies relative to projects of exploiting common natural resources.
(c) To study the new licences, contracts, and concessions relating to common natural resources and
submit its recommendations to the two competent ministers as to what should be done in this
respect.
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To discuss whatever the two competent ministers refer to it.
The Committee in performing its duties shall have the right to sign contracts, and shall submit its
reports and recommendations directly to the competent ministers.
Article XX. The two competent ministers shall consult together to grant or to amend any new
concession relating to common natural resources and the party who does not agree with the other,
shall send him a written notification giving the reasons, before granting or amending the new
concession.
If any other establishment or company is allowed to replace any present establishment or
company exploiting natural resources in the Partitioned Zone, this replacement shall not be considered
as a new concession provided that the rights of the other Party shall remain intact.
Article XXI. The two Contracting Parties shall undertake to supply the Committee with
information, data and documents which are needed by it to facilitate its task.
Article XXII. If a dispute arises with regard to the interpretation or application of this agreement
or the rights and obligations which it creates, the two Contracting Parties shall seek to settle such
dispute;, by friendly means for the settlement of disputes which include having recourse to the Arab
league.
If the aforesaid methods fail to settle the dispute, then it shall be submitted before the
International Court of Justice.
The two Contracting parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in this respect.
If one of the two Contracting Parties takes a measure which is objectionable to the other Party,
the objecting Party may ask the International Court of Justice to indicate any provisional measures to
be taken to suspend the measure which is objected to or allow its continuance pending the final
decision.
If one of the Contracting Parties refuses to abide by the judgement made against it, then the other
party shall be relieved from its obligations under this Agreement.
Article XXIII. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by each Contracting Party in
accordance with its constructional procedures and shall come into force on the date of exchanging of
instruments of ratification.
Done in two original texts in the Arabic Language and both of them are authentic. FOR THE
STATE OF KUWAIT FOR THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA.3
3. Source: Bahama, Husain M. The Arabian GulfStates, their Legal and Political Status and their
International Problems. Reprinted by Tein Wah Press (Ltd), Singapore, 1978.
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Letters from The Prime Minister of Iraq and the Ruler of Kuwait Reaffirming
the Kuwait-Iraq Boundary, Dated July 21, 1932 and August 10, 1932,
Respectively
Nuri Pasha to Sir F. Humphrys
Office of the Council ofMinisters,
Baghdad, July 21,1932
I think Your Excellency will agree that the time has now come when it is desirable to reaffirm the
existing frontier between Iraq and Kuwait.
I therefore request that the necessary action may be taken to obtain the agreement of the
competent authority or authorities in Kuwait to the following description of the existing frontier
between the two countries
"From the intersection of the Wadi-el-Audja with the Batin and thence northwards along the Batin to a
point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel
Sanam and Um Qasr leaving them to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor
Abdulla. The islands ofWarbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, Auhah, Hubbar, Qaru and
Umm-el-Maradim appertain to Kuwait."
(b)Translation of a Letter from the Ruler of Kuwait to the Political Agent, Kuwait, dated August 10,
1932.
With the hand of pleasure we have received your confidential letter dated the 7th instant (Rabi Thani
1351 (9th August, 1932), and have noted the contents of same, as well as the translation of the letter
dated the 25th July, 1932, of His Excellency the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Hon. The Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the translation of the letter dated 21 July 1932, of His Excellency
Nuri Pasha-as-Said, the Iraq Prime Minister, regarding the Iraq-Kuwait frontier. We also have noted
from the Hon. The Political Resident's letter dated the 30th July, 1032, that the frontier proposed by the
Iraq Prime Minister is approved of by his Majesty's Government. And, therefore, we beg to inform
you that we agree to reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and Kuwait as described in the Iraq
Prime Minister's letter.4
Saudi-Qatari Borders agreement of 1965
In the name ofGod, the Merciful, the Compassionate
No. 14
Date : 29 Jumada 11 A.H. 1385
With the help of Almighty God,
We, Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud,
King of Saudi Arabia
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Having considered Council ofMinisters decision No. 345 of 26 Jumada 11 A.H. 1385,
And having considered articles 19 and 20 of the Statute of the Council of Ministers, promulgated by
Royal decree No. 38 of 22 Shawwal A.H. 1377,
Hereby decree as follows :
I. We ratify the Agreement on the Delimitation of the Offshore and Land Boundaries between
the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Qatar and the attached map,
as annexed hereto;
II. It is for the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned to implement the present
Decree.
(Signed") Faisal
AGREEMENT ON THE DELIMITATION OF THE OFFSHORE AND LAND BOUNDARIES
BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND QATAR
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, represented by His Excellency Shaikh
Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, and the Government of Qatar,
represented by His Highness Shaikh Khalifah Bin Hamad Al-Thani, Deputy Ruler and Crown Prince,
Desiring to deliminates the land and offshore boundaries between the two countries given the great
importance of so doing, and in view of the link of friendship and bonds of brotherhood prevailing
between the two fraternal countries,
And taking into consideration the letter dated 23 Jumada I A.H. 1371 from His Majesty King
Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud addressed to His Highness Shaikh Ali Bin Abd Allah Al-Thani,
Have decided to conclude the following agreement,
Article 1
Dawhat Salwa shall be divided equally between the two countries on the basis of
equidisitance from the two coasts. As regard indentations, a straight median line shall be adopted to
the extent possible.
Article 1
The land boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar starts from a point on
the coast ofDawhat Salwa at the approximate geographical location of:
Meridian 50 49' 46"
Parallel 24 11' 50"
It extends from this point in a strict line to the highest point at Qarn Abu Wa'il and proceeds thence in
a straight line to a point on the Southern-Western edge of the Jawb al-Salamah area at the
geographical location of:
Meridian 50 55' 44"
Parallel 24 32' 43"
4. Source: Bahama, Husain M. op.cit
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It extends thence in a straight line to a point on the South-Eastern edge of the Jawb al-
Salamah area at the geoographical location of:
Meridian 51 00' 00"
Parallel 24 30' 00"
It extends thence in a straight line to a point on the Southern edge of Sabkhat Sawda Nathil at
the geographical location of:
Meridian 51 05' 55"
Parallel 1628'16"
It extends thence in a straight line to a point on the shore of Khawr al-Udayd at the
approximate geographical location of:
Meridian 51 16' 02"
Parallel 24 36' 48"
All of the points indicated area shown in a preliminary manner on map No. JF 2224 dated
December 1961 on the scale of 1:200,000 annexed to this agreement and signed by the two parties.
Article 3
An international survey company shall be commissioned to carry out a survey and establish
on the ground the boundary points and boundary lines between the two countries in accordance with
the provision of this agreement and to prepare a map of the land and offshore boundaries between the
two countries and other related dates. After signature by both parties, this map shall constitute the
official map showing the boundaries and shall be annexed to the agreement as an integral part thereof.
Article 4
The costs of the survey referred to in the previous articles shall be shared equally by the two
Governments.
Article 5
A Joint Technical Commission shall be formed of two members from each of the two parties
to be entrusted with the preparation of specifications for the survey, the establishment of the boundary
points and boundary lines between the two countries in accordance with this agreement and the
supervision of the implementation of the survey and the examination of its results.
Article 6
Done at Riyadh on 11 Shaaban A.H. 1386 corresponding to 4 December 1965 in two copies,
one to be retained by each state. This agreement shall be considered to have entered into force after
the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two Governments.
For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia For Qatar
(Signed) (Signed)
Ahmad Zaki Yamani Khalifah Bin Hamad Al-Than 5
5. Source: Bahama, Husain M. op.cit.
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Text Of Saudi-UAE Border Agreement
The following is thefull text ofthe 21 August 1974 boundary agreement and relevant exchange of
letters between the Kingdom ofSaudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates. This agreement (English
translation from Arabic) was recently deposited with the UnitedNations as apublic document.
His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz A1 Saud,
King of Saudi Arabia,
And His Highness Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan A1 Nahyan, President of the
United Arab Emirates,
In pursuance of the principles of the Holy Shariah professed by the Islamic Community, proceeding
from the spirit of Islamic solidarity that embraces the Arabian Peninsula and on the basis of the bonds
of amity between them, the links of brotherhood between their fraternal peoples and the relationship
of neighbourliness existing between their two countries.
And in view of the desire of each of the two States to delimit the offshore and land boundaries
between their territories in a definitive manner in a spirit of Islamic brotherhood and Arab fraternity,
The High Contracting parties have agreed as follows :
Article 1
The land boundary separating the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the territory of the
United Arab Emirates is the line delimited in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
Article 2
The land boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates starts from
point (a) on the coast of the Arabian Gulf at the approximate geographical location of:
Parallel 24° 11' 58" north;
Meridian 51° 35' 26" east.
It extends from this point in a straight line proceeding in a southerly direction to point (b) at the
geographical location of:
Parallel 24° 07' 24" north;
Meridian 51° 35' 26" east.
It extends from this point in a straight line proceeding in a southeasterly direction to point (c) at the
geographical location of:
Parallel 22° 56' 09" north;
Meridian 52° 34' 52" east.
It extends from this point in a straight line proceeding east by south to point (d) at the geographical
location of:
Parallel 22° 37'41" north;
Meridian 55° 087' 14" east.
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The boundary extends from this point in a straight line proceeding in a north-easterly direction,
leading Umm al-Zumul to the east of point (e) at the geographical location of:
Parallel 22° 42' 02" north;
Meridian 55° 12' 10" east.
The boundary extends from point (e) in straight lines joining the points at the following geographical
locations :
Point Parallel - North Meridian - east
f 23° 32' 11" 55° 30'00"
g 24° 00' 00" 55° 34'10"
h 24° 01'00" 55° 51'00"
i 24° 13'00" 55° 54'00"
j 24° 11'00" 55° 50'00"
From point (j), the boundary extends to point (k) at the approximate geographical location of 24° 13'
45" north and 55° 15' east, and from point (k) the boundary extends to point (1) at the geographical
location of 24° 19' north and 55° 50' east, so that the three villages located to the east of point (k) are
left inside the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. From point (1), the boundary extends to the
intersection of the boundaries of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the
Sultanate ofOman, on which agreement shall be reached by the three States.
All of the aforesaid points are shown in a preliminary manner on a map on the 1:500,000 scale
annexed to this Agreement and signed by the two High Contracting Parties.
Article 3
1. All hydrocarbons in the Shaybah-Zarrarah field shall be considered as belonging to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. The United Arab Emirates agrees and undertakes not to engage in or to permit any
exploration or drilling for or exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of the Shaybah-Zarrarah field
lying to the north of the boundary line.
3. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or any company or corporation operating with its permission
may engage in exploration and drilling for the exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of the
Shaybah-Zarrqah field lying to the north of the boundary line, and the two States shall subsequently
reach agreement on the manner in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall engage in such activities.
Article 4
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates each undertake to refrain from engaging
in and from permitting the exploitation of hydrocarbons in that part of its territory to which the
hydrocarbon fields primarily located in the territory of the other State extend.
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Article 5
1. The United Arab Emirates recognizes the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over
Huwaysat island, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises the sovereignty of the United Arab
Emirates over the all the other islands opposite its coast on the Arabian Gulf.
2. The United Arab Emirates agrees to the construction by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the
islands ofAl-Qaffay and Makasib of any general installations it may wish to establish thereon.
3. Representatives of the High Contracting Parties shall, as soon as possible, delimit the
offshore boundaries between the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the territory of the
United Arab Emirates and between the islands subject to the sovereignty of each of them. They shall
do so on such a basis of equity as will ensure free and direct access to the high seas from the territorial
waters of that part of the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adjacent to the territory of the
United Arab Emirates and from the territorial waters of Huwaysat island, mentioned in paragraph 1
above, and in such a manner as to take account of suitability for deep-water navigation between the
high seas and that part of the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia indicated above. The High
Contracting Parties shall have joint sovereignty over the entire area linking the territorial waters of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the high seas, in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.
Article 6
A duly qualified international company to be selected by the two countries shall survey and delimit on
the ground the boundary points and boundary lines set forth in article 2 above and prepare a map of
the land boundaries between the two countries and other related data. This map, after signature by the
representatives of the High Contracting Parties, shall be the official map showing the desired
boundaries and shall be annexed to this agreement as an integral part thereof
Article 7
A joint technical commission shall be formed of three members from each of the two countries to
prepare specifications for the work required of the aforesaid company, to establish the boundary
points and boundary lines between the two countries in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement and to supervise the implementation of the work and examine its results.
Article 8
This Agreement was drawn up in two copies in the Arabic language, one copy to be retained by each
State.
Article 9
This Agreement shall enter into force immediately on signature.
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Article 10
DONE at Jeddah, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on 3 Shaban A.H. 1394, corresponding to 21
August A.D. 1974.
INTERNATIONAL BORDER AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND
THE SULTANATE OF OMAN
The High Contracting Parties,
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahad bin Abdulaziz A1 Saud, King of Saudi Arabia,
and His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman,
Acting in accordance with the principles of Islamic Law professed by the Islamic community,
Proceeding from a desire to strengthen the existing bonds of fraternity among the States of the
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf,
Relying on the ties of affection, the links of brotherliness and the neighbourly relationship existing
between the two sister countries,
And having regard for the desire of each of the two States to fix the boundaries between them in a
definitive manner in a spirit of Islamic and Arabic fraternity,
Have agreed as follows :
Article 1
The boundary separating the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabic and the territory of the
Sultanate ofOman shall be that described in Article 2 of this Agreement.
Article 2
The boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman shall consist of
straight lines joining the following major frontier points :
1. Umm az Zumul, at the geographical coordinates of 22 degrees, 42 minutes, 30
seconds north latitude and 55 degrees, 12 minutes, 30 seconds east longitude.
2. The point of intersection of coordinates 22 degrees north latitude and 55
degrees, north latitude and 55 degrees, 40 minutes east longitude.
3. The point of intersection of coordinates 20 degrees north latitude and 55
degrees, north latitude and 55 degrees, 40 minutes east longitude.
4. The point of intersection of coordinates 19 degrees north latitude and 52
degrees, north latitude and 55 degrees, 40 minutes east longitude.
6. (Source): Middle East Economic Survey. (MEES). 19 June 1995.
Signed
Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz A1 Saud
King of Saudi Arabia
Signed
Zayed Bin Sultan A1 Nahyan
President of the United Arab Emirates 6
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Article 3
A duly qualified international company, to be selected by the two countries, shall survey and establish
on the ground the frontier points and the boundary line set forth in article 2 above and shall prepare
the detailed maps and other related data necessary for that purpose. Such maps, after signature by
representatives of the two Parties, shall be the official maps showing the frontier between the two
countries and shall be appended to this Treaty as an integral part thereof.
Article 4
A Joint Technical Commission consisting of four members from each of the two countries shall be
formed to prepare the terms of reference for the work required of the aforesaid company, to supervise
the execution of that work, and to scrutinize its results.
Article 5
Under the supervision of the Joint Technical Commission, markers shall be placed along the agreed
frontier separating the territories of the two countries, and the Commission shall agree on what
distance shall separate one marker from another.
Article 6
Issues arising out of the demarcation of the frontier or emerging thereafter shall be settled by friendly
means and through direct contacts between the two Parties on the basis of the principles of equality,
mutual advantage and the eschewal of prejudice to the interests of either Party.
Article 7
Frontier authorities, and the rights to grazing, movement and the use of water sources in the frontier
zone, shall be regulated in accordance with the two Annexes appended to this Agreement.
Article 8
This Agreement was drawn up in two original copies in the Arabic language, each State retaining one
copy.
Article 9
This Agreement shall enter into force immediately on signature, and the exchange of instruments of
ratification by the two Governments shall take place subsequently.
Article 10
Done at Haff al Batin on the fourth day of Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to the twenty-first day of
March A.D. 1990.
Qaboos bin Said Fahd Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
Sultan ofOman King of Saudi Arabia
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Annex I to the International Border Agreement Between the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of
Oman Concerning the Organization of
Frontier Authorities
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman,
In implementation of article 5 of the International Border Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, signed on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D.
1990,
And desiring to arrange the terms of reference of the frontier authorities,
Have agreed as follows :
Article 1
The two Parties have agreed that disputes, violations and incidents occurring in the frontier zone
covered by this Annex shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions contained herein.
Article 2
1. For the purpose of the implementation of this Annex, the frontier zone shall be
regarded as the area extending from the boundary line between the two countries to a depth of 5
kilometers inside the territory of each Party.
2. With the exception of installations of official agencies and installations of the
frontier forces, neither Party may erect any installations, encampments or the like within the limits of
the zone indicated in paragraph 1 of this article.
Article 3
1. Each of the Parties shall appoint the frontier authorities set forth hereunder in
order to effect the implementation of the provisions of this Annex.
(a) First-level frontier authorities
For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :
Director-General of the Border Guard
For the Sultanate ofOman :
Inspector-General ofPolice and Customs
(b) Higher-level frontier authorities
For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :
Minister of the Interior
For the Sultanate ofOman :
Minister of the Interior
2. The Frontier authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article may be changed or other
authorities introduced by agreement of the Parties through the diplomatic channel.
Article 4
The Parties shall, within one month of the entry into force of this Annex, provide each other with the
full names and functional titles of the members of the frontier authorities and a copy of their letters of
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appointment. The letter of appointment shall contain a photograph of the incumbent and his signature.
Any changes subsequently made in this regard shall be communicated in the same matter.
Article 5
Each authorised member of the frontier authorities shall be entitled to appoint the assistants that he
requires, and he shall provide their names, functional titles and letters of appointment to the frontier
authorities of the other Party.
Article 6
Frontier "violations" and "incidents" included within the scope of the provisions of this Annex shall
mean :
1. Interference with or destruction of boundary markers or destruction of buildings of other
installations directly relating to the frontier.
2. Shooting at control posts and frontier guards, or at persons, or at boundary markers, or at
frontier installations located in the territory of the other Party.
3. Flight by those charged with committing a crime in accordance with the laws and regulations
of the country to which they belong into the frontier zone in order to take refuge in the frontier zone of
the other Party.
4. Incidents of robbery and theft involving nationals of one of the Parties in the frontier zone of
the other Party.
5. Smuggling by a persons or persons from the territory of one of the Parties to the territory of
the other Party.
6. Hunting ofwild animals within the frontier zone.
7. Misuse or pollution ofwell water or anything which may impair its use.
Article 7.
The frontier authorities of each of the Parties shall, in the frontier zone, have the terms of reference set
forth hereunder:
1. To take necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents.
2. To take the necessary measures, and to inform the frontier authorities of the other Party, in
order to preclude the commission of crimes, smuggling and infiltration by persons in the frontier zone
of the other Party, to prevent such persons from crossing the frontier, to intercept them as required and
to pursue them in order to arrest them. Any such pursuit shall halt at the furthermost point of the
frontier zone described in article 3, paragraph 1 of this Annex, and the frontier authorities concerned
shall notify the frontier authorities of the other Party, which shall take the necessary measures to arrest
such persons and hand them over to the frontier authorities of the former Party.
3. To take the necessary measures to combat smuggling and infiltration between the two
countries, and to exchange information on such activities with the other frontier authorities with a
view to their suppression.
4. To exchange information in the event of disasters in the frontier zone and to cooperate in
containing them.
496
5. To take preventive measures against the spread of livestock diseases or epidemics or
agricultural parasites into the territory of the other Party. For this purpose, the frontier authorities of
the Party in whose territory the livestock disease or epidemic has appeared shall notify the frontier
authorities of the other Party accordingly. In the event that there is a suspicion of disease in livestock
that must cross the frontier of the two Parties, the necessary measures shall be taken to prevent the
spread of such disease in accordance with the hygiene and veterinary inspection regulations of each of
the two parties.
6. To investigate all frontier incidents.
7. To settle such conflicts that may arise in connection with the violations and incidents
mentioned in article 6 of this Annex, and to consider, within the limits of their powers, applications
for compensation consequent on a frontier incident that may be submitted by one of the Parties or by
persons present in the frontier zone that comes under their jurisdiction.
Article 8
1. Should a national of one of the Parties take refuge in the frontier zone of the other Party after
committing a crime under the law of the Party to which he belongs in the frontier zone of that Party,
the frontier authorities of the Party in whose territory the crime was committed may request that the
suspect be arrested. The frontier authorities of the other Party shall do all in their power to apprehend
the person being sought and, on apprehending him, shall inform the frontier authorities of the Parity
making the request.
2. The frontier authorities of a Party which are requested to make an arrest may return the
suspect within a period ofnot more than 10 days from the date ofhis arrest.
3. Should the frontier authorities to which the request is made be prevented for any reason from
handing over the suspect within a 10-day period, they shall keep him under arrest until such time as
the documents relating to his return are delivered through the diplomatic channel. The period for
which the criminal is detained may not, in any circumstances, exceed two months.
Article 9
The frontier authorities may, by prior agreement, undertake the joint on-site investigation of a frontier
incident with a view to establishing the facts. In such case, and if required, they may bring with them
experts and witnesses. The investigation shall be supervised by the Party in whose territory it takes
place. A report on the investigation shall be drawn up and signed by the competent authorities in the
two countries. It shall contain a summary of the evidence and deliberations and of the results reached
by the investigation and shall be transmitted to the competent judicial authorities.
Article 10
The frontier authorities of the two Parties shall, by common accord, designate points for meetings and
the exchange of letters, points for the transferal of persons and property and crossing points.
Article 11
The members of the frontier authorities shall, in the exercise of their functions, enjoy the immunity
necessary for them to perform their duties, and the materials that they require for that purpose shall
not be subject to taxes or customs duties.
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Article 12
While present in the frontier zone of one of the Parties, the persons mentioned in article 9 of this
Annex shall be provided with the necessary assistance.
Article 13
1. The frontier authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this
Annex shall meet, in rotation, in the territory of each of the Parties once every six months, or
whenever there is need for a meeting, with the approval of the two Parties, to settle outstanding issues
within their competence. If the said authorities do not succeed in resolving such issues, they shall be
submitted for settlement to the authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3
of this Annex.
2. The frontier authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) or article 3 of this
Annex shall meet, in rotation, in the territory of each of the Parties once a year, or if the frontier
authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex should otherwise
propose that a special meeting be held, for consultation and the resolution of outstanding issues.
Article 14
1. For the purpose of keeping border markers in position and for their maintenance, the frontier
authorities of the two countries for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this
Annex shall exchange information relating thereto and shall undertake an on-site inspection thereof
prior to their semi-annual meeting, referred to in article 13, paragraph 1, of this Annex, so that they
may discuss the matter and submit the necessary reports to the frontier authorities for which provision
is made in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex.
2. Should it appear to the frontier authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) of
article 3 of this Annex that the positions of markers have been changed or that their condition requires
maintenance or repair as a result of damage by natural or non-natural causes, those authorities shall
notify the competent agencies of the two Parties so that the necessary technical arrangements may be
made to restore the markers to their positions, or maintain, or repair them in accordance with the
technical specifications agreed upon by the two Parties, as set forth in the reports of the Joint Saudi-
Omani Commission established under the terms of the International Border Agreement between the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate ofOman.
Article 15
This Annex shall remain in force for a five-year period with effect from the date of its entry into force
and shall be renewed automatically for the same term unless one of the Parties notifies the other
through the diplomatic channel of its desire to amend it within six months of the date of expiry of the
aforementioned term.
Article 16
This Annex shall enter into force immediately on signature, and instruments of ratification shall be
exchanged by the two Governments subsequently.
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Done in two original copies in the Arabic language, each copy being equally authentic, and signed at
Hafr al Batin this twenty-fourth day of Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to the twenty-first day of
March A.D. 1990.
For the Government of the For the Government of the
Sultanate ofOman : Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :
Badr bin Saud Bin Hareb Al-Busaidi Nayif Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
Minister of the Interior Minister of the Interior
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Annex II to the International Border Agreement Between the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman Concerning the
Regulation of Rights to Grazing, Movement and the Use
ofWater Sources in the Frontier Zone
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the Sultanate ofOman,
In implementation of article 5 of the International Border Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman signed on 4 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D.
1990,
Desiring to lay down specific principles to ensure that their nationals may make use of the range lands
and waters located in the frontier zone of their two countries,
And desiring to regulate matters relating to grazing and sources ofwater,
Have agreed as follows :
Article 1
The frontier zone is the area extending from the boundary line to a depth of 5 kilometers inside the
territory of each of the Parties, and grazing and residence shall not be permitted in this zone.
Article 2
For the purposes of this Annex, the grazing zone shall be defined as a depth of 20 kilometers from the
furthermost part of the frontier zone indicated in article 1 of this Annex into the territory of each of the
two countries.
Article 3
Herdsmen who are nationals of the two Parties and who reside in the vicinity of the frontier zones may
make use of the range lands and water sources in the grazing zone defined in article 2 of this Annex.
Article 4
The frontier authorities of the two Parties shall establish the crossing-points that may be used for the
purposes of this Annex through consultation, on an annual basis in the light of grazing requirements.
Article 5
Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 3 of this Annex, when permitted by the
competent frontier authorities to pasture and to make use of water sources in the grazing zones,
nationals of the two Parties shall be exempt from :
1. The laws and regulations in force relating to residence and passports. They shall be issued
with a transit document by the frontier authorities of the Party of which they are nationals permitting
them to cross the frontier.
2. Taxes and duties on their livestock, tents and related equipment, customarily necessary
household articles and the foodstuffs and consumer goods that they carry with them, without prejudice
to the rights of each Party to impose customs duties on livestock or goods destined for trade in the
territory of the other Party.
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Article 6
Each Party reserves the right to limit the number of such vehicles as herdsmen may wish to bring into
its territory and the number and types of firearms that they are permitted to carry. Such weapons as
may be brought in must be officially licensed by the relevant authorities in the two countries by virtue
of official documents establishing the identity of the owner, and the frontier authorities shall issue to
owners of firearms to exceed that permitted, they shall hand them over, in exchange for a receipt, to
the responsible authorities at the crossing-point, which shall restore the firearms to them on their
return.
Article 7
Should a contagious livestock disease, an epidemic or the like break out, each Party may impose the
necessary veterinary or sanitary measures and invoke orders prohibiting importation and exportation.
The competent authorities in each of the two countries shall cooperate in this field.
Article 8
The persons indicated in this Annex shall, in the territory of the receiving country, have the right to
make use of the health services and shall be permitted to provide themselves with the necessary
foodstuffs and consumer goods within the boundaries of the area in which they are permitted to
pasture. Should there be no health center in the grazing zone, however, emergency cases shall be
transferred to the nearest health center through the crossing-point authorities.
Article 9
This Annex shall remain in force for a period of five years with effect from the date of its entry into
force, and it shall be renewed automatically for the same term unless one of the parties informs the
other through the diplomatic channel of its desire to amend it within six months of the date of expiry
of the aforesaid period.
Article 10
This Annex shall enter into force immediately on signature, and the exchange of instruments of
ratification by the two Governments shall take place subsequently.
Done in two original copies in the Arabic language, each copy being equally authentic, and signed at
Hafr al Batin on the fourth day of Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to the twenty-first day of March
A.D. 1990.
For the Government of the For the Government of the
Sultanate ofOman : Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :
Badr bin Saud Bin Flareb Al-Busaidi Nayif bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
Minister of the Interior Minister of the Interior
MINUTES
Today, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabic, in Riyadh, his Royal
Highness Prince Saud Al-Faysal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and
His Excellency Mr. Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the
Sultanate of Oman, exchanged instruments of ratification of the International Border Agreement
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between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, of Annex I to the Agreement,
concerning the regulation of frontier authorities, and of Annex II to the Agreement, concerning the
regulation of rights to pasture, movement and the use ofwater sources in the frontier zone between the
two countries, signed by the two countries on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D.
1990.
Signed accordingly.
Sultanate ofOman Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah Saud Al-Faysal
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Minister ofForeign Affairs
Riyadh :
Tuesday, 7 Dhulqadah A.H. 1411
Corresponding to 21 May A.D. 1991
SULTANATE OF OMAN




Date : 5 Dhulqadah A.H. 1411
Corresponding to 20 May A.D. 1991
Instrument of Ratification of the International Border Agreement
Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
signed by His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, and of the Two
Annexes to the Agreement
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs attests to the fact that, in accordance with article 3 of the Law
Regulating the Administrative Apparatus of the State, promulgated by Decree of the Sultan No. 26/75,
agreements signed by His Majesty the Sultan are, by virtue of their mere signature, considered to be
part of the law of the land without need for the promulgation of a Decree of the Sultan ratifying them.
The foregoing applies to the International Border Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, signed by His Majesty (may God preserve him) on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410,
corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990.
This instrument has been issued in order to attest to the foregoing in accordance with article 9 of the
said Agreement.
Decree of the Sultan No. 44/91, of 3 Dhulqadah A.H. 1411, corresponding to 18 May A.D. 1991, has
been promulgated to ratify Annex I to the aforesaid Agreement, concerning the organization of
frontier authorities, and Annex II to the Agreement, concerning the regulation of rights to pasture,
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movement and the use ofwater sources in the frontier zone, both signed at Hafr al Batin on 24 Shaban
A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990.
Yusuf Bin Alawi bin Abdallah
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Sultanate of Oman
Decree of the Sultan Number 44/91
Ratifying the Two Annexes to the International Border Agreement
Between the Sultanate ofOman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
We, Qaboos bin Said, Sultan ofOman,
Having reviewed Decree of the Sultan No. 26/75, promulgating the Law Regulating the
Administrative Apparatus of the State, and the amendments thereto,
The International Border Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabic, signed by us on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990,
Annex I to the aforesaid Agreement, concerning the organization of frontier authorities, and its Annex
II, concerning the regulation of rights to pasture, movement and the use of water sources in the
frontier zone, both signed at Hafr al Batin on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410 corresponding to 21 March A.D.
1990,
And in accordance with the requirements of the general interest,
Have decreed as follows :
Article 1:
The ratification of Annex I to the aforesaid International Border Agreement between the Sultanate of
Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, concerning the organization of frontier authorities, and
Annex II to the Agreement, concerning the regulation of rights to pasture, movement and the use of
water sources in the frontier zone, both signed at Hafr al Batin on 24 Shaban A.H. 1410,
corresponding to 21 March A.D. 1990.
Article 2:
This Decree shall be published in the Official Gazette, and it shall enter into force as of the date of its
promulgation.
Promulgated on 3 Dhulqadah A.H. 1411





Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Instrument of Ratification
With the help ofAlmighty God:
We, Fahd bin Abdulaziz A1 Saud, King of Saudi Arabia,
Having taken cognizance of the International Border Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman and of the two Annexes appended thereto, signed at Haff al Batin
on the twenty-fourth day of Shaban A.H. 1410, corresponding to the twenty-first day of March A.D.
1990, which have been approved by Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 155 of 29 Shaban A.H.
1410 and with regard to which Royal Decree Number M/23 of 5 Ramadan A.H. 1410 has been
promulgated,
Having given careful consideration to the Agreement and to the two Annexes appended thereto,
Have found them to be acceptable and have approved them as a whole and in their particulars, and we
declare, by virtue of this instrument, that we have ratified them and endorsed them and that we
undertake, God willing, to implement their provisions in all faith and sincerity.
In witness whereof, we have affixed our signature to this instrument.
Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
Promulgated from the Yamamah Palace, Riyadh, on the twenty-third day of Shawwal A.H. 1411,
corresponding to the fourth day ofMay A.D. 1991.
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE SULTANATE OF OMAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
The Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen, proceeding from the fraternal links and the
common interest that unite their two countries and peoples, in pursuance of the noble Islamic Shariah,
prompted by the desire to strengthen the existing bonds of brotherhood and the relationship of
neighborliness between the two fraternal countries,
And in view of the desire of each of the two countries to delineate the boundaries between them in
definitive manner, have agreed as follows :
Article 1
The boundary line separating the territory of the Sultanate of Oman and the territory of the Republic
ofYemen shall be described in article 2 of this Agreement and based on geodesic system 84.
Article 2
The boundary line between the Sultanate of Oman and Republic of Yemen begins from the principal
point at Ras Darbat Ali (the Rock), numbered at Point No. 1, at the intersection of the geographical
coordinates of parallel 16 degrees, 39 minutes, 3.83 seconds North and meridian 53 degrees, 6
minutes, 30.88 seconds east, and ends at the principal point numbered as point 8 at the geographical
alignment of the intersection of parallel 19 degrees north with meridian 52 degrees east, and the
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boundary line extends between the two principal points whose coordinates are set forth above passing
through points 2, 3, 4,4a, 4b, 5, 6, and 7, in accordance with the following coordinates:
Point No. 2 is at the intersection of parallel 17 minutes, 7.91 seconds north with meridian 52 degrees,
48 minutes, 44.22 seconds east.
Point No. 3 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 17 minutes, 40 seconds north with meridian 52
degrees, 44 minutes, 45 seconds east.
Point No. 4 is the at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 18 minutes, 6.93 seconds north with
meridian 52 degrees, 44 minutes, 33.50 seconds east.
Point No. 4a, ancillary to point number 4, is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 18 minutes, 8.42
seconds north with meridian 52 degrees, 44 minutes, 35.57 seconds east.
Point No. 5 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 18 minutes, 15 seconds north with meridian 52
degrees, 45 minutes, 5 seconds east.
Point No. 6 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 18 minutes, 21 seconds north with meridian 52
degrees, 45 minutes, 2 seconds east.
Point No. 7 is at the intersection of parallel 17 degrees, 20 minutes, 59.04 seconds north with meridian
52 degrees, 46 minutes, 55.83 seconds east.
Article 3
A Joint Technical Commission shall be formed of the survey authorities of the two countries and its
task shall be :
(a) To survey and establish on the ground the boundary points and the boundary line set forth in
article 2 and to prepare in a definitive manner the detailed maps and related data necessary for that
purpose so that those maps - after signature by representatives of the two parties - shall be the official
maps showing the boundaries between the two countries and shall be annexed to this Agreement as an
integral part hereof.
(b) To supervise the emplacement of markers (pillars) along the agreed boundary line separating the
territories of the two countries, and to reach agreement on what distance shall separate one marker
(pillar) from another.
Article 5
All issues arising out of the demarcation of the boundary line and any issues emerging thereafter shall
be settled by amicable means through direct contact between the two Parties on the basis of the
principles of equality, mutual advantage and the absence ofprejudice to the interests of either Party.
Article 6
In the event of the discovery of common natural resources, agreement shall be reached on the manner
of their exploitation and division in accordance with the established international norms and customs
and the principles ofjustice and fairness.
Article 7
The border authorities and rights to grazing, movement and the use ofwater resources in the boundary
zone shall be regulated in accordance with the two Annexes appended to this Agreement. Use of the
property of residents in the border zone shall also be regulated in accordance with a special annex to
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be agreed upon by the two Parties. All of the annexes mentioned in this article shall be considered an
integral part of this Agreement.
Article 8
This Agreement and its Annexes were drawn up in two original copies in the Arabic language, each
State retaining one copy.
Article 9
This Agreement shall enter into force after ratification in accordance with the procedures followed in
each of the contracting countries and the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two States.
Article 10
This Agreement was done at Sanaa on 3 Rabi II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992
For the Government of the For the Government of the
Republic of Yemen : Sultanate ofOman
Haider Abu Bakr Al-Attas Thuwayni bin Shihab A1 Said
Prime Minister Special Representative of His
Majesty the Sultan
Annex I to the International Boundary Agreement
Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen,
Concerning the Organization of Border Authorities
The Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the Government of the Republic of Yemen, in
implementation of article 7 of the International Boundary Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman
and the Republic ofYemen signed on 3 Rabi II A.H. 1413 corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992, and
in their desire to arrange the terms of reference of the border authorities, have agreed as follows :
Article 1
The two Parties have agreed that disputes, violations and incidents occurring in the border zone
covered by this Annex shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions contained herein.
Article 2
1. The border zone shall be regarded as the area extending from the common boundary line
between the two countries to a depth of 5 kilometers inside the territory of each of the two Parties.
2. With the exception of installations of official crossing points and border force installations,
neither Party may erect or maintain any fortifications, installations, military camps or the like within
the limits of the zone indicated in paragraph 1 of this article. Immediately on the entry into force of
the International Boundary Agreement between them, the two Parties shall take the necessary
measures for the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph, within a period of time to be
agreed upon, with regard to existing fortifications, installations and military camps.
Article 3
1. Each of the Contracting Parties shall appoint the border authorities set forth hereunder in
order to effect the implementation of the provisions of this Annex.
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(a) First-level border authorities :
For the Sultanate ofOman:
Inspector-General of Police and Customs
For the Republic ofYemen:
Governor of the relevant Governorate
(b) Second-level border authorities:
For the Sultanate ofOman:
Minister of the Interior
For the Republic of Yemen:
Minister of the Interior and Security
2. The border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article may be changed or other
authorities introduced by agreement of the Contracting Parties through the diplomatic channel.
Article 4
The Parties shall, within one month of the entry into force of this Annex, communicate to each other
through the diplomatic channel the full names of the members of the border authorities, their
functional titles and copies of their letters of appointment. The letter of appointment shall contain a
photograph of the bearer of his signature. Any changes subsequently made in this regard shall be
communicated in the same manner.
Article 5
Each authorised member of the border authorities shall be entitled to appoint assistants, and he shall
provide their names, functional titles and letters of appointment to the border authorities of the other
party.
Article 6
The violations and incidents relating to the boundaries that are included within the scope of the
provisions of this Annex are:
(a) Interference with or destruction of boundary pillars or destruction of buildings or other
installations directly relating to the boundaries;
(b) Shooting at border posts and border guards or at persons or at boundary pillars or boundary
installations located in the territory of the other Party;
(c) Flight by those charged with committing a crime under the law of the Contracting Party to
which they belong into the border zone in order to take refuge in the border zone of the other
Contracting Party;
(d) Incidents of robbery and theft involving nationals of one of the Contracting Parties in the
border zone of the other Party;
(e) Smuggling by a person or persons from the territory of the Contracting Parties to the territory
of the other Party;
(f) Hunting ofwild animals within the border zone;
(g) Misuse or contamination ofwater resources and anything which may impair their use.
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Article 7
The border authorities of each of the Contracting Parties shall, in the border zone, have the powers set
forth hereunder:
(a) To take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents;
(b) To take the necessary measures, and to notify the border authorities of the other Party
accordingly, in order to preclude the commission of crimes, smuggling and infiltration by persons in
the border zone of the other Party, to prevent such persons from crossing the boundaries and to
intercept them as required or pursue them in order to arrest them. In the event that such persons
should cross the boundary line from the border zone of one of the Contracting Parties into the border
zone of the other Party, pursuit must halt and the border authority concerned shall notify the border
authority of the other Party, which shall take the necessary measures to arrest them and hand them
over to the border authorities of the former Party;
(c) To take the necessary measures to combat smuggling and infiltration between the two
countries, and to exchange information on such activities with the other border authorities with a view
to their suppression;
(d) To exchange information in the event of disasters in the border zone and to cooperate in
containing them;
(e) To take preventive measures against the spread of livestock diseases or epidemics or
agricultural parasites into the territory of the other Party. For this purpose, the border authority of the
Party in whose territory a livestock disease or epidemic has appeared shall notify the authority of the
other Party. In the event that there is suspicion of disease in livestock that must cross the boundaries
of the two Parties, the necessary measures shall be taken to prevent the spread of such disease in
accordance with the hygiene and veterinary inspection regulations of each of the two Parties;
(f) To investigate all border incidents;
(g) To settle such disputes as may arise in connection with the violations and incidents
mentioned in article 6 of this Annex and to consider, within the limits of their powers, applications for
compensation submitted following a border incident by one of the Parties or by persons prevent in the
border zone that comes under their jurisdiction.
Article 8
1. Should a national of one of the Parties take refuge in the border zone of the other Party after
committing a crime under the law of the Party to which he belongs in the border zone of that Party,
the border authority of the Party in whose territory the crime was committed may request that the
suspect be arrested. The border authority of the other Party shall do all in its power to apprehend the
person being sought and, on apprehending him, shall notify the border authority of the Party making
the request.
2. The border authority of a Party which is requested to arrest the suspect may return him within
a period of not more than 10 days from the date of his arrest.
3. Should the border authority requested to arrest the suspect refrain for any reason from
handing him over within a 10-day period, it shall keep him under arrest until such time as the
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documents relating to his return are delivered through diplomatic channels. The period for which the
suspect is detained shall not, in any event, exceed 60 days.
Article 9
The border authorities may, by prior agreement, undertake the joint on-site investigation of a border
incident with a view to establishing the facts. In such a case, and if required, they may bring with them
experts and witnesses. The investigation shall be supervised by the Party in whose territory it takes
place. A report of the investigation shall be drawn up and signed by the competent authorities in the
two countries. It shall contain a summary of the facts and deliberation and of the conclusions reached
by the investigation and shall be transmitted to the competent judicial authorities.
Article 10
The border authorities of the two Parties shall, by common accord, designate points for meetings and
the exchange of correspondence and points for the hand-over of persons and property as well as
official crossing points.
Article 11
The Members of the border authorities, their assistants and experts may cross the boundaries in
exercise of the functions arising out of the provisions of this Annex. Members of the border
authorities and their assistants shall cross the boundaries on production of the letters of appointment
mentioned in articles 4 and 5 of this Annex after notifying the competent authorities of the other
Contracting Party and with their agreement.
Article 12
The closest border post of the other Contracting Party shall be notified of the day and time of crossing
of those persons required to cross the boundaries in accordance with the provisions of this Annex at
least 24 hours before the time requested. This period may be reduced in cases of extreme necessity by
agreement between the Contracting Parties.
Article 13
The members of the border authorities shall, in the exercise of their functions, enjoy the necessary
immunity for the performance of their duties, and the materials that they require for that purpose shall
not be subject to taxes or customs duties.
Article 14
While present in the border zone of one of the two Parties, the persons mentioned in article 9 of this
Annex shall be provided with the necessary assistance.
Article 15
1. The border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex shall meet
alternately in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties once every six months or whenever there
is need for a meeting, by agreement of the two Parties, in order to settle outstanding issues within their
competence. Should the aforesaid authorities fail to reach agreement on the settlement of such issues,
they shall be submitted to the border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this
Annex for the decision to decide upon them as they deem appropriate.
509
2. The border authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this
Annex shall meet alternately in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties once a year or if the
border authorities for which provision is made in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of this Annex should
otherwise propose that a special meeting be held for consultation and the resolution of outstanding
issues.
Article 16
1. For the purposes of keeping the boundary markers (pillars) in position and of their
maintenance, the border authorities of the two countries mentioned in paragraph 1 (a) of article 3 of
this Annex shall exchange information relating thereto and shall undertake an on-site inspection
thereof prior to the convening of the semi-annual meeting, referred to in paragraph 1 of article 15 of
this Annex, so that they may discuss the matter and submit the necessary report on the markers
(pillars) to the border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this Annex.
2. Should it appear to the border authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) of article 3 of this
Annex that the locations of the markers (pillars) have been changed or that their condition requires
maintenance or repair as a result of damage, those authorities shall notify the competent agencies of
the two Parties so that the necessary technical arrangements may be made to restore the markers
(pillars) to their positions or maintain or repair them in accordance with the technical specifications
agreed upon by the two Parties in the reports of the Technical Commission referred to in article 4 of
the International Boundary Agreement between the two countries and endorsed thereby.
Article 17
This Annex shall remain in force for a five-year period from the date of the entry in force of
the Agreement. This Annex shall be renewed automatically for the same term unless one of the Parties
notifies the other through the diplomatic channel of its desire to amend it six months before the date of
expiry of the appointed term.
Article 18
This Annex shall enter into force after ratification in accordance with the procedures followed in each
of the two countries and the exchange of instruments of ratification hereof by the two Governments.
Done at Sanaa this third day of Rabi II A.H. 1413, corresponding to the first day of October A.D.
1992.
For the Government of the Republic ofYemen: For the Government of the
Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas Thuwayni bin Shihab Al-Said
Prime Minister Special Representative of
His Majesty the Sultan
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Annex II to the International Boundary Agreement Between the Sultanate of Oman and the
Republic of Yemen, Concerning the Regulation of Rights to Grazing, Movement and the Use of
Water Resources in the Border Zone
The Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the Government of the Republic of Yemen, in
implementation of article 7 of the International Boundary Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman
and the Republic ofYemen signed on 3 Rabi II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992,
And desiring to regulate rights to grazing, movement and the use of water resources in the border
zone, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
For the purpose of this Annex, the grazing zone shall be defined as extending to a maximum depth of
25 kilometers from the common boundary line in the territory of each of the two countries.
Article 2
Herdsmen who are nationals of the two Parties and who are in the border zones and their vicinity may
make use of the range lands and the water resources in the grazing zone defined in article 1 of this
Annex in accordance with the tribal customs prevailing in the area.
Article 3
The border authorities of the two Parties shall establish the range of grazing and the crossing-points
that may be used for the purposes of this Annex through annual consultation and in the light of
grazing requirements.
Article 4
Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 2 of this Annex, when permitted by the border
authorities concerned to pasture and to make use of the water resources in the grazing zones, nationals
of the two Parties shall be exempt from:
(a) The laws and regulations in force relating to residence and passports. They shall be
issued with a transit document by the border authorities of the Party of which they are
nationals permitting them to cross the boundary;
(b) Taxes and duties on their livestock, tents and related equipment, customarily
necessary household articles and the foodstuffs and consumption goods that they carry with them,
without prejudice to the rights of the Parties to levy customs duties on livestock or goods destined for
trade in the territory of the other Party.
Article 5
Each party reserves the right to limit the number of such vehicles as herdsmen may wish to bring into
its territory and the number and types of firearms that they are permitted to carry. Such weapons as
may be brought in must be officially licensed by the relevant authorities in the two countries by virtue
of official documents establishing the identity of the owner, and the border authorities shall issue to
owners documents permitting them to carry their weapons. Should the number of firearms exceed that
permitted, they shall be handed over against receipt to the responsible agency at the crossing-point and
shall be returned to their owners on their return.
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Article 6
Should a contagious livestock disease, epidemic or the like break out, each Party may impose the
necessary veterinary or sanitary measures and invoke the order in force prohibiting important and
exportation. The competent authorities in both countries shall cooperate in this regard.
Article 7
The persons indicated in the Annex shall, in the territory of the receiving country, be entitled to
benefit from the health services. They shall be permitted to provide themselves with the necessary
foodstuffs and consumption goods with the boundaries of the zone in which they are permitted to
pasture. Should there be no health center in the grazing zone, however, emergency cases shall be
referred to the nearest health center through the crossing-point authorities.
Article 8
This Annex shall remain in force for a term of five years from the date of entry into force of the
Agreement. This Annex shall be renewed automatically for the same term unless one of the Parties
informs the other through the diplomatic channel of its desire to amend it six months before the date
of expiry of the appointed term.
Article 9
This Annex shall enter into force after ratification in accordance with the procedures followed in each
of the two countries and the exchange of instruments of ratification by the two Governments.
Done at Sana this third day ofRabbi' A.H. 1413, corresponding to the first day of October A.D. 1992.
For the Government of the For the Government of the
Republic of the Yemen: Sultanate ofOman:
Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas Thuwayni bin Shihab Al-Sa'id
Prime Minister Special Representative of
His Majesty the Sultan
Protocol of the Exchange of the Instruments of Ratification of the Boundary Agreement and its
Two Annexes Between the Sultanate ofOman and the Republic of Yemen
Today, Sunday, the third of Rajab 1413 A.H., corresponding to 27 December 1992 A.D., at the
Foreign Ministry of the Sultanate of Oman in Muscat, H.E.Yusuf bin Alwai bin Abdallah, Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate ofOman, and H.E Dr Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen, exchanged the instruments of ratification of the
International Boundary Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen and of
the First Annex thereto, concerning the Regulation of the Border Authorities and the Second Annex
concerning the Regulation of Rights to Grazing, Movement and the use of Water Resources in the
border Zone, Annexed to the Agreement, signed by the two countries on 3 Rabi II 1413 A.H.,
corresponding to 1 October 1992 A.D.
In witness thereof, this protocol has been signed.
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For the Sultanate of Oman:
Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
For the Republic of Yemen:
Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Protocol of the Exchange of Instruments ofRatification of the International Boundary
Agreement Between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen and of the Two Annexes
There took place today, Sunday, 3 Rajab A.H. 1413, corresponding to 27 December A.D. 1992, at the
premises of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman at Muscat and between His
Excellency Mr. Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate
of Oman, and His Excellency Dr. Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Yemen, the exchange of instruments of ratification of the International Boundary
Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Yemen and of Annex 1, concerning
the organization of the order authorities, and Annex II, concerning rights to Grazing, Movement and
the use of Water Resources in the boundary zone between the two countries, to the Agreement, as
signed by the two countries on 3 Rabi' II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 1 October A.D. 1992.
In witness whereof, this record was signed.
For the Sultanate ofOman: For the Republic ofYemen:
Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani
Minister of State for Minister for Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs
No: 1301/21070/120004/38032
25 Jumadall A.H. 1413
20 December A.D. 1992
I, Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate ofOman,
By virtue of the powers vested in me and on the basis of the Sultan's Decree No 75/92 promulgated
on 5 Jumada I A.H. 1413, corresponding to 31 October A.D. 1992.
Do declare by virtue of this instrument the ratification by the Government of the Sultanate ofOman of
the International Boundary Agreement between the Government of the Sultanate of Oman and the
Government of the Republic of Yemen and the two Annexes thereto signed at Sanaa on 1 October
In witness whereof, I have signed this instrument today, Sunday 25 Juamda II A.H. 1413,
corresponding to 20 December A.D. 1992.
Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah
Thereto
Sultanate of Oman





Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Yemen
Minister of Legal Affairs
Sanaa
Instrument of Ratification
The Chairman of the Presidential Council:
Having examined the International Boundary Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the
Sultanate of Oman-attached to this Law- signed at Sanaa on 3 Rabi II A.H. 1413, corresponding to 1
October A.D. 1992, and comprising 10 articles and two Annexes, concerning the organization of
border authorities and concerning the regulation of rights to Grazing, Movement and the use ofWater
Resources in the border zone,
And the documents and instruments relating to all the constitutional measures necessary for the
ratification of this Agreement by the executive and legislative authorities in accordance with the
Constitution of the Republic of Yemen.
We have promulgated law No. 44 of 1992 concerning the ratification of the said Agreement and its
two Annexes.
On the basis of the mutual confidence between the Parties to this Agreement, and being fully
convinced of the beneficial consequences and the close cooperation that will arise out of the entry into
force of this Agreement,
We hereby declare our definitive approval and our ratification of the Agreement and its Annexes
heretofore referred to and our commitment to all of its provisions.
Accordingly, and in witness to the foregoing, we affix to this instrument our signature and the official
seal of State.
Recorded at the Presidency of the Republic, Sanaa
Date : 6 Jumada I A.H. 1413 corresponding to 31 October A.D. 1992.
Ali Abdallah Salih
Chairman of the Presidential Council 7
7 CSource): Kechichian, Joseph A. Oman and the World: the Emergence of an Independent Foreign
Policy, op.cit.
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Text of Memorandum ofUnderstanding
In the name ofGod, the Merciful, the Compassionate.
A memorandum of Understanding between the governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
Republic ofYemen.
Out of their desire firmly to entrench and bolster the ties of brotherly relations between the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the two sides have agreed on the following:
Clause 1. The two sides affirm their commitment to the legtimacy and binding nature of the Ta'if
accord signed on 6th Safar 1353 AH, corresponding to 20th May 1934; its appendices, known as the
Ta'if accord, which will be referred to hereafter as the accord.
Clause 2. A joint committee will be set up, composed of an equal number (of people) from each side,
within a period of 30 days. Its task will be to re-establish the (border) signs in accordance with the
border reports appended to the accord-those (border signs) still existing and those which have fallen
down-starting from the border point "Rasif al-Bahr, precisely from Ra's al-Mi'wajj Shami to the
Radif Qarad outlet" (Arabic: rasif al-bahr tamama ra's al-mi'wajj shami li manfadh radif qarad)
between Maydi and Mawsim, to the last point previously demarcated in Jabal al-Thar. Modern
scientific methods are to be used to establish the signs by agreeing with a specialist company, to be
selected by the two sides, to execute the task. The company will carry out its task under the
supervision of the committee.
Clause 3. The current committee formed by the two countries will continue its work to decide on the
required measures and the steps leading to the demarcation of the remaining parts of the border,
starting from Jabal al-Thar to the end of the two countries' border, including agreement on means of
arbitration in the event of differences between the two countries.
Clause 4. A joint committee will be formed which will negotiate on determinig the sea border in
accordance with international law, starting from the border point on the Red Sea coast mentioned in
clause 2 above.
Clause 5. A senior military committee will be formed by the two sides to ensure the prevention of
military incidents, movements or other (activities) on the border between the two countries.
Clause 6. A joint ministerial committee will be formed to develop economic, trade and cultural
relations between the two countries, and to boost aspects of cooperation between them. This
committee will start its work within 30 days from the date of signing this memorandum.
Clause 7. A joint higher committee will be appointed to work on realising the aforementioned,
facilitate the tasks of the aforementioned committees and remove any obstacles or difficulties that may
obstruct their work.
Clause 8. Each of the two countries affirms its commitment not to allow itself either to be used as a
base and a centre for aggression on the other, or for carrying out political, military or information
activities against the other.
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Clause 9. In order to continue the maintenance of an amicable and appropriate climate to ensure the
sucess of the talks, each side will undertake not to carry out any propaganda against the othet.
Clause 10. There is nothing in this memorandum that includes an amendment to the Ta'if accord or its
appendices, including the border reports.
Clause 11. Everything that is discussed by the aforementioned committee will be checked and
recorded in minutes, which will be signed by officials from both sides."
This memorandum was signed in Mecca al-Mukarramah on Sunday 27th Ramadan 1415 AH,
corresponding to 26 February 1995 AD. It will come into effect on the date of exchanging the
ratification documents.
(Signed) For the government of the Republic of Yemen: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Planning and Development Abd al-Qadir Abd al-Rahman Bajammal.
For the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Personal advisor to the Servant of the two Holy
Places (King Fahd) Ibrahim Abdullah al-Anqari.8
UAE-Saudi Agreement on Security Cooperation
The text of a UAE-Saudi Arabian agreement on security cooperation and the extradition of criminals
was published in Abu Dhabi today in No.119 of the Official Gazette, issued for January 1983. The
agreement is in two parts: Part I deals with security cooperation between the two countries, and Part II
deals with the extradition of criminals.
Part I of the agreement comprises three sections. Article 1 states that the two countries have agreed to
organize regular meetings between officials of their border posts in adjacent areas on their border to
cordinate information and cooperation. The two countries will set up a follow-up committee made up
of security officials in the Interior Ministries of the two countries. The committee will meet once year
or whenever necessary.
Article 2 prohibits border patrols from crossing the border of the two countries for a distance ofmore
than 20 km to apprehend those who are being pursued, and provides that the latter should be handed
over to the state on whose territory the pursuit began. The principle of immediate extradition will be in
force if arrest is effected by officials of the state (word indistinct) and that state had taken part in the
pursuit.
Article 3 defines the method of extraditing fugitives and the handing over of their possessions and the
method of transport to the nearest post in the state on whose territory the pursuit began. The vehicles
used in the pursuit should have official plates and should not be more than three, while the number of
the members of the patrol taking part in the pursuit should not exceed 12 and must be lightly armed.
Hot pursuit should stop on arriving at the nearest town, village or Bedu encampment. The authorities
of the two countries will be notified as soon as the pursuit is over, regardless of the fact whether the
8. Source: Middle East Economic Digest (MEES). Vol. XXXVIII No.23. 6 March 1995.
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results are positive or negative. The notification will be in the form of a proces-verbal signed by the
two sides.
Section 2 of Part I of the agreement deals with fighting infiltration. It says that the two countries will
make efforts to combat infiltration across their borders by adopting different measures against those
whose participation in the infiltration is proved.
Article 3 of Part I deals with fighting crime. Article 1 of this section provides that the two sides will
exchange the names of those who have been convicted of serious crimes, as well as the names of
suspects and those who are under surveillance and who have been allowed to travel, particularly on
the occasions when this is necessary. Each side will communicate to the other any information it has
on any criminal actions that have been committed, or are planned to be committed, in the other side's
territory or abroad. There will be close contacts between officials of the respective investigation
office.
Article 3 of section 3 says that the competent authority of each country will inform its counterpart in
the other country of the new crimes that occur, the method of their perpetration, and the measures
taken to investigate and suppress them. The two sides will also exchange information on developing
the methods of fighting crime, the regulations and research of their respective Interior Ministries, and
books, magazines and other publications published in the two states. Each side will inform the other of
the conferences and seminars that are held and that lie within the competence of their respective
Interior Ministries, particularly in the field of fighting crime and of road safety, within a period of not
less than one month before such conferences and seminars are scheduled to be held, so that the other
side will be able to take part if it so desires.
Article 7 of section 3 says that each side will safeguard the secrecy of information and will not pass it
to a third party with the consent of the other side.
Part 2 of the agreement deals with the extradition of criminals and comprises 16 articles. Article 1
says that the extradition of criminals is a duty if the crime committed is of the type that requires
punishment, penalty or reprimand, or if it was committed in the country requesting extradition or
outside the two states, and the laws of the state requesting extradition demand that the criminal be
tried in its territory.
Article 2 refers to the crimes for which extradition is prohibited. These are political crimes, crimes
committed in the territory of the country that is being asked to extradite, crimes committed by
members of the Diplomatic Corps who enjoy diplomatic immunity, or any other person who enjoys
immunity in accordance with international law, as well as crimes that are still under investigation in
the country that is being asked to extradite or in the state on which the crime has taken place when the
state is other than that which is requesting extradition.
The article excludes from this prohibition some crimes that are not political, such as murder, robbery,
theft, or the hijacking of aircraft or other means of transport, as well as physical assault on the two
heads of state, their wives or members of their families, heirs apparent, ministers and those of their
rank, and military crimes.
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Article 4 says the state whose interests were harmed most by the crime has priority in acceding to its
extradition. However, if the extradition requests are based on various crimes, priority is given on the
basis of the circumstances and events of the crime with particular regard to the seriousness of the
crime and the place where it was committed, and when one of the states requesting extradition
undertakes to return the person whose extradition is being requested.
Article 5 of the agreement says that if the person whose extradition is being requested by one of the
two states had committed a crime in the state that has arrested him or is wanted by the judicial
authorities of that country, extradition is deferred until such time as the person's trial is over, or he
completes his sentence or part of it. It is permitted to send the person whose extradition is sought
temporarily to the state that is seeking to bring him to appear before its judiciary on condition that the
state undertakes to return him once his interrogation is over or once a sentence is passed on him in the
case for which the request for his extradition was made. He will incarcerated in accordance with the
sentence passed on him by the authorities that handed him over.
Articles 6 and 7 define the conditions for submitting the extradition demand. It should contain a
detailed statement of the identity of the wanted person and his description, a warrant for his arrest
issued by the competent authorities, and a certified copy of the provisions of the law that stipulate
punishment for the act committed. However, if the person whose extradition is sought admits that he
is in fact the wanted person, and confesses his crime and agrees to be extradited without and
extradition, the competent authorities can order his extradition.
Article 8 says that the competent authority in the state that is being asked to extradite a person must
notify the competent authority in the state that is seeking extradition of its decision on the extradition
request, whether it accedes to the request or rejects it, within a maximum period of two months, and
must explain the reasons for its decision.
Articles 9 and 10 allow extradition demands to be made by cable or telephone in exceptional
circumstances. The state that is being asked to extradite will take the necessary precautions to place
the wanted person under surveillance, and will hold him in preventive custody for a period that does
not exceed 30 days until the extradition demands is received. All that is found on the wanted person at
the time of his arrest, and anything that can be used as evidence of the crime, will be handed over.
Article 11 stipulates that the wanted person should not be tried by the state demanding his extradition
except for the crime for which his extradition was sought and the crimes he commits after his
extradition. He may be tried for other crimes not stated in the extradition demand if the wanted person
consents to this, or if he has the opportunity to leave the territory of the state to which he has been
extradited and has not made use of this opportunity within a period of 30 days, then it will be possible
to try him for other crimes.
Article 12 states that the state seeking extradition will foot all the expenses incurred by its extradition
demand and the expense of the extradited person's return if his innocence is proved.
Article 13 calls on the two states to cooperate in the search and apprehension of criminals, and to
extend the necessary facilities with regard to the exchange of information through direct contacts or
official visits.
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Article 14 specifies a period of 30 days for receiving the wanted person, beginning with the date on
which the notification of the extradition order was cabled to the state demanding extradition.
Otherwise, the state from which extradition is sought has the right to free the wanted person, whose
extradition cannot again be demanded for the same crime.
Articles 15 and 16 specify that the term of the agreement is five years, and that it will come into force
one month after the exchange of documents of ratification of the agreement concluded between the
two states.9
AGREEMENT CONCERNING DELIMITATION OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF BETWEEN IRAN AND OMAN
The Imperial Government of Iran
and
The Government of the Sultanate ofOman
Desirous of establishing in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line between the
respective areas of the continental shelf over which they have soverign rights in accordance with
international law, and after having exchanged credentials, found in good and due form, have agreed as
follows :
Article 1
The line dividing the continental shelf lying between the territory of Iran on the one side and the
territory ofOman on the other side shall consist of geodetic lines between the following points in the
sequence hereinafter set out:
Point (1) is the most western point which is the intersection of the geodetic line drawn between point
(0) having the coordinates of 55° 42' 15" E 26° 14' 45" N and point (2) having coordinates of 55° 47'
45" E 26° 16' 35" N with the lateral offshore boundary line between Oman and As al-Khaymah.
Longitude East Longitude North
Point (2) 55 47 45 26 16 35
Point (3) 55 52 15 26 18 50
Point (4) 56 06 45 26 28 40
Point (5) 56 08 35 26 31 05
Point (6) 56 10 25 26 32 50
Point (7) 56 14 30 26 35 25
Point (8) 56 16 30 26 35 35
Point (9) 56 19 40 26 37 00
Point (10) 56 33 00 26 42 15
Point (11) 56 41 00 26 44 15
W Intersect of Larac 12m.
E Intersect of Larac 12m.
9 Source: Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan. The GCC States in an Unstable World: Foreign-Policy
Dilemmas ofSmall States. Saqi Books, London, 1994.
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Point (12) 56 44 00 26 41 35
Point (13) 56 45 15 26 39 40
Point (14) 56 47 45 26 35 15
Point (15) 56 47 30 26 25 15
Point (16) 56 48 05 26 22 00
Point (17) 56 47 50 26 16 30
Point (18) 56 48 00 26 11 35
Point (19) 56 50 15 26 03 05
Point (20) 56 49 50 25 58 05
Point (21) 56 51 30 25 45 20
Point (22) is the most southern point located at the intersection of the geodetic demarcation line drawn
from point (21) (specified above) at an azimuth angle of 190° 00: 00' and of the lateral offshore
boundary line between Oman and Sharjah.
Article 2
If any single geological petroleum structure field, or any single geological structure or field of any
other mineral extends across the boundary line set out in Article 1 of this Agreement and the part of
such structure or field which is situated on one side of that boundary line could be exploited wholly or
in part by directional drilling from the other side of the boundary line then :
(a) No well shall be drilled on either side of the boundary line as set out in Article
1 so that any producing section thereof is less than 125 meters from the said boundary line
except by mutual agreement between the two contracting parties.
(b) If the circumstances considered in this Article shall arise both Parties hereto shall use their
best endeavours to reach agreement as to the manner in which the operations on both sides of the
boundary line could be coordinated or utilised.
Article 3
The Boundary line referred to in Article 1 herewith has been illustrated on the British Admiralty Chart
No. 2888, 1962 edition with small corrections through 1974, and with the ellipsoid used in said chart,
which is annexed to this Agreement.
The said Chart has been made in duplicate and signed by the representatives of both Parties each of
whom has retained one copy thereof.
Article 4
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of the superajacent waters or airspace above any part
of the Continental shelf.
Article 5
(a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at
Muscat.
(b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification.
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In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorised, have signed this Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Tehran the 25th day of July, 1974, corresponding to the 3rd day ofMordad 1853,
corresponding to the 5th day of Rajab 1394, in Persian, Arabic and English languages, all texts being
equally authoritative.
FOR THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
IRAN SULTANATE OF OMAN
Bahman Zand Qais Al-Zawawi
[Ambassador of Iran in Oman] [Minister of State for Foreign Affairs]
Sultanate ofOman
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Minister
Proces-Verbal
On the exchange of the instrument of ratification of the
Agreement concern Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
Oman and Iran
The undersigned Qais Al-Zawawi, Minister of State of Foreign Affairs ofOman
and Bahman Zand, Ambassador of Iran in Oman, met at this day at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Muscat, in order to exchange the instruments of ratification of the Agreement concerning Delimitation
of the Continental Shelf between Iran and Oman signed at Tehran on the 25th day of July 1974.
And having examined and compared the texts of the said instruments of ratification which were found
in good and due form, proceeded to their exchange.
In Witness Thereof, the present Proces-Verbal was signed in duplicate.
Done at Muscat on the twenty-eighth day ofMay of the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-
five.
For Oman For Iran
[Qais Al-Zawawi] [Bahman Zand]
(Source]: Kechichian, Joseph A. Oman and the World: the Emergence of an Independent Foreign
Policy, op.cit.
Offshore Boundary Agreement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
In the name ofGod, the Merciful, the Compassionate,
This Agreement on the redefinition of the offshore boundary between the Amirates of Abu
Dhabi and Dubai is concluded between His Highness Shaikh Zayid ibn Sultan A1 Nahyan, the Ruler
of the Amirate of Abu Dhabi, and His Highness Shaikh Rashid ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, the Ruler of the
Amirate of Dubai.
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Considering that the present offshore boundary between the Amirates of Dubai and Abu
Dhabi starts at Ras Hasian on the coast and extends seawards in a straight line in a northwesterly
direction passing to the west of the Fateh wells belonging to the Amirate of Dubai;
And considering that the two contracting parties wish to redefine this boundary to the benefit
of their countries and the well-being of their peoples;
Agreement and assent has been reached between the two contracting parties in respect of the
following :
(1) This boundary shall be redefined in such a way to annex to the Amirate of Dubai a
part of the sea area lying to the west of the aforesaid present boundary and forming a
parallelogram whose horizontal base in ten kilometers measured along the coast in a
westerly direction from Ras Hasian and whose vertical side is equal in length to the
present boundary referred to above, so that are thus described shall lie to the west of
the Fateh wells and extend in a southwesterly direction to the coast.
(2) The aforesaid area shall become part of the possessions and rights ofDubai.
This agreement is hereby signed by the two contracting parties at as-Samih on the 18th day of
February 1968, corresponding to the 20th day of Dhu al-Qa'dah, 1387 H.
(signed) Zayid ibn Sultan A1 (signed:) Rashid ibn Sa'id al-
Nahyan Ruler of the Amirate of Maktum Ruler of the Amirate of
Abu Dhabi Dubai
Witnessed by :
Agreement Concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between
Iran and Bahrain
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BAHRAIN
DESIROUS of establishing in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line between
the respective areas of the continental shelf over which they have sovereign rights in accordance with
international law,
HAVE AGREED as follows :
Article 1
The line dividing the continental shelf lying between the territory of Iran on the one side and the
territory of Bahrain on the other side shall consist of geodetic lines between the following points in the
sequence hereinafter set out:
Point (1) is the Eastern-most point on the Eastern-most part of the Northern boundary line of
the continental shelf appertaining to Bahrain as formed by the intersection of a line starting from the
point having the latitude of 27 degrees, 00 minutes, 35 seconds North and longitude 51 degrees, 23
minutes, 00 seconds East, and having geodetic azimuth of 278 degrees, 14 minutes, 27 seconds, with a
boundary line dividing the continental shelf appertaining to Bahrain and Qatar, thence :









If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any single geological structure or
field of any other mineral extends across the boundary line set out in Article 1 of this Agreement and
the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of that boundary line could be
exploited wholly or in part by directional drilling from the other side of the boundary line then :
a) No well shall be drilled on either side of the boundary line as set out in Article 1 so
that any producing section thereof is less than 125 meters from the said boundary
line except by mutual agreement between the Imperial Government of Iran and the
Government of Bahrain.
b) If the circumstances considered in this Article shall arise both Parties hereto shall
use their best endeavours to reach agreement as to the manner in which the
operations on both sides of the boundary line could be co-ordinated or unitized.
Article 3
The boundary line referred to in Article 1 hereof has been illustrated on the British Admiralty chart
No. 2847 which is annexed hereto and has been thereon marked in red.
Article 4
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of the superajacent waters or air-space above any part
of the continental shelf.
Article 5
a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be
exchanged at Tehran.
b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized by their respective
Governments so to do have signed this Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Bahrain the 22nd Rabi' al Thani 1391 corresponding to the 27th Khordad 1350
corresponding to the 17th June 1971 in the Persian, Arabic and English languages, all texts being
equally authoritative.
For the Imperial Government of For the Government
Iran : of Bahrain :
(Signed) (Signed)
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Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement dated 22 February 1958
Whereas the regional waters between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of Bahrain
meet together in many places overlooked by their respective coasts,
And in view of the royal proclamation issued by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the 1st Sha'ban in
the year 1368 (corresponding to 28th May 1949) and the ordinance issued by the Government of
Bahrain on the 5th June 1949 about the exploitation of the sea-bed,
And in view of the spirit of affection and mutual friendship and the desire of H.M. the King of Saudi
Arabia to extend every possible assistance to the Government of Bahrain,
the following agreement has been made :
First clause
1. The boundary line between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Government
will begin, on the basis of the middle line from point 1, which is situated at the mid-point of the line
running between the tip of the Ras al Bar(A) at the southern extremity of Bahrain and Ras Muharra
(B) on the coast of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
2. Then the above-mentioned middle line will extend from point 1 to point 2 situated at the
mid-point of the line running between point (A) and the northern tip of the island of Zakhuniya (C).
3. Then the line will extend from point 2 to point 3 situated at the mid-point of the line
running between point A and the tip ofRas Saiya (D).
4. Then the line will extend from point 3 to point 4, which is defined on the attached map
and which is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the two points E and F which are
both defined on the map.
5. Then the line will extend from point 4 to point 5, which is defined on the map and which
is situated at the point (sic) of the line running between the two points G and H which are defined on
the map.
6. Then the line will extend from point 5 to point 6, which is defined on the map and which
is situated at the mid-point of the line running between the two points 1 and J which are defined on the
map.
7. Then the line will extend from point 6 to point 7 situated at the mid-point of the line
running between the south-western tip of the island ofUmm Nasan (K) and Ras Al Kureya (L).
8. Then the line will extend from point 7 to point 8 situated at the western extremity of the
island Al Baina As Saghir, leaving the island to the Government of Bahrain.
9. Then the line will extend from point 7 to point 8 situated at the western extremity of the
island Al Baina Al Kabir, leaving the island to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
10. Then the line will extend from point 9 to point 10 situated at the mid-point of the line
running between the north-western tip of Khor Fasht (M) and the southern end of the island of
Chaschus (N).
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11. Then the line will extend from point 10 to point 11 situated at the mid-point of the line
running between point 10 to point 11 situated at the western edge of Fasht A1 Jarim and point N
referred to in subsection 10 above.
12. Then the line will extend from point 11 to point 12 situated at latitude 26° 31' 48" north
and longitude 50° 23' 15" east approximately.
13. Then the line will extend from point 12 to point 13 situated at latitude 26° 37' 15" north
and longitude 50°33' 24" east approximately.
14. Then the line will extend from point 13 to 14 situated at latitude 26° 59' 30" north
and longitude 50° 46' 24" east approximately, leaving the Rennie Shoals (known as Najwat A1 Riqai
and Fasht A1 Anawiya) to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
15. Then the line will extend from point 14 in a north-easterly direction to the extent agreed
upon in the royal proclamation issued on the 1st Sha'ban in the year 1368 (corresponding to 28th May,
1949) and in the ordinance issued by the Government of Bahrain on the 5th June, 1949.
16. Everything that is situated to the left of the above-mentioned line the above subsections
belongs to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and everything to the right of that line to the Government of
Bahrain, with the obligation of the two governments to accept what will subsequently appear in the
second.
SecondClause
The area situated within the six defined sides is as follows :
1. A line beginning from a point situated at latitude 27° north and longitude 50° 23' east
approximately.
2. From there to a point situated at latitude 26°31'48" north and longitude 50°23'15" east
approximately.
3. From there to a point situated at latitude 26°37' north and longitude 50°33' east
approximately.
4. From there to a point situated at latitude 26° 50' 30" north and longitude 50° 46' 24" east
approximately.
5. From there to a point situated at latitude 26° 59'30" north and longitude 50° 40' east.
6. From there to a point situated at latitude 27° north and longitude 50° 40' east
approximately.
7. From there to the straight point.
This area cited and defined above shall be in the part falling to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
accordance with the wish of H.H. the Ruler of Bahrain and the agreement of H.M. the King of Saudi
Arabia. The exploitation of the oil resources in this area will be carried out in the way chosen by His
Majesty on the condition that he grants to the Government of Bahrain one half of the net revenue
accruing to the Government of Saudi Arabia and arising from this exploitation, and on the
understanding that this does not infringe the right of sovereignty of the Government of Saudi Arabia
nor the right of administration over this above-mentioned area.
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Third Clause
Two copies of a map shall be attached to this agreement, making as clear as possible the positions and
points referred to in the foregoing subsections, subject to the map being made final by the expert
knowledge of the committee defined in the fourth clause below. This map shall become final and an
integral part of this agreement after approval and signature by the accredited representatives of the
two governments on behalf of the two parties.
Fourth Clause
The two parties shall choose a technical body to undertake the necessary measures to confirm the
boundaries in accordance with the provision of this agreement on the condition that this body shall
complete its work two months at the most after the date of execution of this agreement.
Fifth Clause
After the committee referred to in the fourth clause has completed its work and two parties agree on
the final map which it will have prepared, a body of technical delegates from both sides shall
undertake the placing of signs and the establishing of the boundaries in accordance with the detailed
announcements made clear in the final map.
Sixth Clause
This agreement shall come into effect from the date on which it is signed by the two parties.
Agreement Concerning Boundary Line Dividing the Continental Shelf between
Iran and Qatar
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF QATAR,
DESIROUS of establishing in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line
between the respective areas of continental shelf over which they have sovereign rights in accordance
with international low,
HAVE AGREED as follows :
Article 1
The boundary line dividing the continental shelf laying between the territory of Iran, on the one side,
and that ofQatar, on the other side, shall consist of geodetic lines between the following points in the
sequence given below :
Point (1) is the westernmost point on the westernmost part of the northern boundary line of
the continental shelf appertaining to Qatar formed by a line geodetic azimuth 478° 14' 27" west from
Point 2 below.
Point Latitude N Longitude E
2 27° 00'35" 51° 23' 00"












If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field or any single geological structure of
field of any other mineral deposit, extends across the Boundary line set out in Article (1) of this
Agreement and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of that Boundary line
could be exploited wholly or in part by directional drilling from the other side of the Boundary line,
then:
(a) no well shall be drilled on either side of the Boundary line as set out in Article
(1) so that any producing section thereof is less than 125 meter from the said
Boundary line, except by mutual agreement between the two Governments.
(b) both Government shall endeavour to reach agreements as to the manner in
which the operations on both sides of the Boundary line could be co-ordinated
or unitized.
Article 3
The Boundary line referred to in Article (1) herein has been illustrated on the British Admiralty Chart
No. 2837 which is annexed to this Agreement.
The said Chart has been made in duplicate and signed by the representatives Government
each of whom has retained one copy thereof.
Article 4
Nothing in this Agreement shall after affect the status of the superajacent waters of airspace above any
part of the continental shelf.
Article 5
(a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be
exchanged at Doha Qatar as soon as possible.
(b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instrument of
ratification.
IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments,
have signed the present Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Doha Qatar the 20 September 1969, corresponding to the 9th Rajab
1389, and corresponding to the 29 Shahrivar 1348, in the Persian, Arabic and English languages, all
texts being equally authoritative.
For the Imperial Government of Iran For the Government ofQatar :
[Signed] [ Signed ]
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Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty over the Islands of
Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi and the Delimitation of the Boundary Line
Separating the Submarine Areas between the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The Royal Government of Saudi Arabia, represented by His Excellency Shaikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani,
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, of the one part and the Imperial Government of Iran,
represented by His Excellency Dr. Manoochehr Eghbal, Chairman of the Board and Central Managing
Director of the National Iranian Oil Company, of the other part,
Desirous of resolving the difference between them regarding sovereignty over the islands of
Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi and
Desirous further of determining in a just and accurate manner the boundary line separating
the respective submarine areas over which each party is entitled by international law to exercise
sovereign rights,
Now therefore and with due respect to the principle of the law and particular circumstances,
And after exchanging the credentials, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Parties mutually recognize the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia over the island of Farsi. Each island
shall possess a belt of territorial sea twelve nautical miles in width, measured from the line of lowest
low water on each of the said islands. In the area where these belts overlap, a boundary line
separating the territorial seas of the two islands shall be drawn so as to be equidistant throughout its
length from the lowest low water lines on each island.
Article 2
The boundary line separating the submarine areas which appertain to Saudi Arabia from the
submarine areas which appertain to Iran shall be a line established as hereinafter provided. Both
Parties mutually recognize that each possesses over the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas on
its side of the line sovereign rights of the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources
therein.
Article 3
The boundary line referred to in Article 2 shall be :
(a) Except in the vicinity of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi, the said line is determined by
straight lines between the following points whose latitude and longitude are specified herein below:
Point Latitude N Longitude E
1 27° 10.0' 50° 54.0'
2 27° 18.5' 50° 45.5'
3 27° 26.5' 50° 37.0'
4 27° 56.5' 50° 17.5'
5 28° 08.5' 50° 06.5'
6 28° 17.6' 49° 56.2'
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7 28° 21.0' 49° 50.9'
8 28° 24.7' 49° 47.8'
9 28° 24.4' 49° 47.4'
10 28° 27.9' 49° 42.0'
11 28° 34.8' 49° 39.7'
12 28° 37.2' 49° 36.2'
13 28° 40.9' 49° 33.5'
14 28° 41.3' 49° 34.3'
(b) In the vicinity of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi, a line laid down as follows:
At the point where the line described in paragraph (a) intersects the limit of the belt of
territorial sea around Farsi, the boundary shall follow the limit of that belt on the side facing Saudi
Arabia until it meets the boundary line set forth in Article 1 which divides the territorial seas of Farsi
and Al-'Arabiah; thence it shall follow that line easterly until it meets the limit of the belt of territorial
sea round Al-'Arabiah; thence it shall follow the limit of that belt on the side facing Iran until it
intersects again the line described in paragraph (a).
The map prepared by the A.M. Service Corps of Engineers US Army compiled in 1966 was
used and shall be used as the basis for the measurement of the coordinated described above and the
Boundary Line is illustrated in a copy of the said map signed and attached hereto.
Article 4
Each Party Agrees that no oil drilling operation shall be conducted by our under its authority, within a
zone extending five hundred (500) meters in width in the submarine areas on its side of the Boundary
Line described in Article 3, said zone to be measured from said boundary.
Article 5
This Agreement is done in duplicate in the Arabic and Persian languages, both texts being equally
authentic. An English translation thereof is also signed by both Parties and annexed thereto.
This Agreement shall enter into force upon the date of exchange of the instruments of
ratification which shall take place at Jeddah as soon as possible.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the above-named plenipotentiaries, duly authorized by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at Tehran this Second day of Sha'ban, 1388 (Hejira calendar), corresponding to the
Second day of Aban, 1347 (Iranian calendar), and to the twenty-fourth day ofOctober, 1968.
For the Royal Government For the Imperial Government
of Saudi Arabia : of Iran :
Ahmed Zaki Yamani Manoochehr Eghbal
Minister of Petroleum Chairman of the Board and General
and Mineral Resources Managing Director of the National
Iranian Oil Company
529
Offshore Boundary Agreement between Iran and Dubai
The Government of the State of U.A.E. and the Imperial Government of Iran desirous of establishing
in a just, equitable and precise manner the boundary line between the respective areas of continental
shelf over which they have sovereign rights in accordance with international law,
HAVE AGREED as follows :
Article 1
The boundary line dividing the continental shelf laying between the territory ofU.A.E on one side and
that of Iran on the other side, except in the vicinity of Sirri Island, shall consist of geodetic lines
between the following points.
Point 1: 54° 05' 16" long. East 25° 38' 13" lat. North to
Point 2: 54° 26' 18" long. East 25° 39' 55" lat. North to
Point 3: 54° 30' 25" long. East 25° 41' 35" lat. North From this point the boundary coincides
with the southern 12-mile limit of the territorial water of the Sirri Island to :
Point 4: 54° 44' 50" long. East 25° 47' 20" lat. To
Point 5: 54° 45' 07" long. East 25° 47' 30" lat. North
Article 2
If any single geological Petroleum structure of Petroleum field, or any single geological structure or
field or any other mineral deposit extends across the boundary line set out in Article (1) of this
Agreement and the part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of that Boundary line
could be exploited wholly or in part by directional drilling from the other side of the Boundary line
then :
(a) No well shall be drilled on either side of the Boundary line as set out in Article (1) so
that any producing section thereof is less than 125 meters from the said Boundary line,
except by mutual agreement between the two Governments.
(b) Both Governments shall endeavour to reach agreement as to the manner in which the
operations on both sides of the Boundary line could be coordinated or unitized.
Article 3
The Boundary line referred to in Article (1) herein has been illustrated on the British Admiralty Chart
No: 2837 which is annexed to this Agreement.
Article 4
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of the superajacent [sic] waters or airspace above any
part of the Continental Shelf.
Article 5
(a) This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at as soon
as possible
(b) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification.
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IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned being duly authorised by their respective Governments,
have signed the present Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Tehran the 24 Rajah 1394 corresponding to the 13 August 1974 in the
Arabic, Persian, and English languages, all texts being equally authoritative.
For the State ofU.A.E. For the Imperial Government of Iran
Agreement on Settlement ofMaritime Boundary Lines and Sovereign
Rights over Islands between Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Signed on 20
March 1969
Recognizing the cordial and fraternal relations that exist between the two sister Arab States,
and desirous of settling maritime boundary lines and sovereign rights over islands on the basis of their
mutual interests, the two Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:
(1) That 'Dina' Island is part of the territory of Abu Dhabi;
(2) That the islands of'Lashat' and Sharho' are part of the territory of Qatar;
(3) That both States will have no further national claims against each other in islands
and waters beyond the maritime boundary lines herein agreed to.
(4) That the maritime boundary lines referred to in paragraph (3) above are as follows:
(a) A straight line between point A at:
Lat. 25° 31'50"
Long. 53° 02' 05"
and point B, 'Bir Elbundug', at:
Lat. 25° 05' 54.79"
Long. 52° 36' 50.98"
(b) A straight line between point B (described above), and point C, at:
Lat. 24° 48' 40"
Long. 52° 16'20"
(c) A straight line from point C (described above) to point D (at Bab Khor Eladid at the
territorial sea boundary) at:
Lat. 24° 48' 40"
Long. 52° 16'20"
(5) That the above points and lines shall as soon as possible be drawn in a small
maritime boundary chart in duplicate, each to be signed by both Contracting Parties;
(6) That the Contracting Parties will have equal rights of ownership over 'Hagl
Elbundug' and agreed to consult each other in all matters concerning its
exploitation;
(7) That 'Hagl Elbundug' shall be exploited by ADMA (Abu Dhabi Marine Areas
Co.) in accordance with the terms of the agreements between the Company and
the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. All revenues, profits and benefits derived from such
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exploitation shall be divided on equal shares by the Governments of Qatar and
Abu Dhabi.
Sea-Bed Boundaries -Agreement by the Ruler of Sharjah
I agree that the sea-bed boundary between Sharjah and Umm al Qaywayn shall be a line starting from
a point on the coast near the site of the dead well Mirdar Bu Salaf and going out to sea on a bearing of
312°.
I further agree that the sea-bed boundary between Sharjah and Ajman in the north shall be a
line starting from a point on the coast in Zora opposite in the point where the track from Zora
Fauqiniyah (Karijiyah) debauches on to the Zora Tahtiyah track and going out to sea on a bearing of
304°.
I further agree that the sea-bed boundary between Sharjah and Ajman in the south shall be a
line starting from a point on the coast in Bu Athum near the circle ofWhite sand-hills about half way
between Shaikh Reshid's Tower and the BuTajjarah well, and going out to sea on a bearing of 310°.
I further agree that beacons may be erected on the shore at the points referred to above where
the boundaries start.
(Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi)
Ruler of Sharjah.
Sea-Bed Boundary - Agreement by the Ruler of Umm al Qayawayn
I agree that the sea-bed boundary between Umm al Qayawayn and Sharjah shall be a line starting
from a point on the Coast near the site of the dead well Mirdar bu Salaf and going out to sea on a
bearing on 312 degree.
I further agree that beacons may be erected on the shore at the point referred to above where
the boundary starts.
(Shaikh Ahmed bin Rashid al Moala)
Ruler ofUmm al Qaywayn. 10
10 Charney, Johnathan I. (ed.). International Maritime Boundaries. Volume II op.cit. pp. 1475-1555.
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